“AGENT FOR PLAINTIFF”: A FATAL MISNOMER; WHY GHANAIAN LAWYERS ARE UNWITTINGLY FORFEITING THEIR PROTECTIONS THROUGH THE MISDESCRIPTION OF COUNSEL IN GHANAIAN CIVIL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DOCTRINE OF SOLICITOR-SOLICITOR AGENCY VS. LAWYER-CLIENT REALITY.

“AGENT FOR PLAINTIFF”: A FATAL MISNOMER; WHY GHANAIAN LAWYERS ARE UNWITTINGLY FORFEITING THEIR PROTECTIONS THROUGH THE MISDESCRIPTION OF COUNSEL IN GHANAIAN CIVIL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DOCTRINE OF SOLICITOR-SOLICITOR AGENCY VS. LAWYER-CLIENT REALITY.

 

HER LADYSHIP JUSTICE SEDINAM AWO KWADAM (MRS.)^*

KWADWO A.D. OWUSU-ANSAH^*

 

7TH AUGUST, 2026

 

 ABSTRACT

This paper examines the recurring practice of endorsing “Agent for Plaintiff” on writs of summons in circumstances where a lawyer acts directly for a litigant rather than as agent for another lawyer. Tracing the historical and doctrinal origins of lawyer-lawyer agency from English procedure to Ghanaian rules, it demonstrates that Order 2 rule 5(1)(b) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (C.I. 47) contemplates exclusively the situation where a lawyer acts as agent for another lawyer, and not, as commonly misapprehended, the relationship between a lawyer and their client. The paper exposes this practice as a fundamental misunderstanding, miscomprehension, and misapplication of Order 2 rule 5(1)(b). It then considers the consequences of the misstatement, analyzing the practical repercussions of such endorsement on the lawyer, including exposure to personal liability, erosion of statutory protections, and potential disciplinary consequences. The paper concludes with practical recommendations on how to address the misstatement and restore procedural fidelity.

Keywords: Writ of Summons, Form 1, Agent for Plaintiff, Lawyer-Lawyer Agency, Misstatement of Capacity, Procedural Drafting, Professional Liability

 

 

 

 

 

INTRODUCTION

Let us be clear from the outset: the law is not a playground for the careless, nor are its forms mere suggestions to be bent to convenience. When a practitioner, armed with the privilege of enrolment and the trust of a client, mechanically inscribes words upon a writ without pausing to consider their meaning, that practitioner does not merely err, they betray the very discipline upon which our profession was founded. This paper is not an exercise in pedantry; it is a summons to wakefulness, a call to arms against the creeping sloth of unexamined practice. For if we cannot be trusted with the words we write, how can we be trusted with the liberties and fortunes of those who place their faith in us?

Lodged in the lower left quadrant of the indorsement to the writ of summons are two seemingly innocuous words: ‘Agent for’. An eager practitioner, replicating an indorsement from a familiar precedent, may be tempted to insert the word ‘Plaintiff’ next to that phrase. Yet that mechanical act, undertaken without reflection on its procedural and historical foundations, has increasingly become the basis of challenges capable of derailing an action at its inception, and, more troublingly, of exposing the lawyer to personal liability and professional sanction.

The phenomenon is both pervasive and systemic. Across court registries in Accra, Kumasi, Sekondi-Takoradi, and Ho, writs bearing the endorsement ‘Agent for Plaintiff’ appear with remarkable consistency. The recurrence of this phrase has endowed it with an aura of legitimacy, gradually transforming an error into an informal procedural convention. Yet this seemingly harmless formalism conceals significant doctrinal confusion and professional risk. It reflects a fundamental misunderstanding, miscomprehension, and misapplication of Order 2 rule 5(1)(b) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (C.I. 47), a provision that contemplates not the relationship between lawyer and client, but the entirely distinct situation in which one lawyer acts as agent for another lawyer.

The central thesis of this paper is simple but consequential: Order 2 rule 5(1)(b) does not, and never has, referred to a lawyer acting as their client’s agent. The phrase ‘if the lawyer is the agent of another’ means precisely what it says: agency as between lawyers. The routine endorsement of ‘Agent for Plaintiff’ therefore rests on a misconception, one that conflates the lawyer-client relationship (which, as we shall demonstrate, is not one of agency in the procedural sense) with the historically rooted practice of solicitor-solicitor agency.

This misconception is not merely academic. It carries profound practical repercussions for the lawyer who unwittingly adopts it. By mischaracterizing their role, the lawyer may inadvertently forfeit key statutory protections, assume unintended liabilities, and expose themselves to personal financial jeopardy and disciplinary sanction. The endorsement that appears as a harmless formalism is, in truth, a self-created procedural vulnerability.

A proper understanding of the phrase ‘Agent for’, and the permissible range of endorsements thereto, invites an examination of the law of agency, the nature of the lawyer–client relationship, the procedural rule which anchors the phrase, and the legal consequences of its wrongful deployment. This paper undertakes that examination.

Section 1 draws on the first principles of the law of agency to provide a working definition that sets the stage for the principal agency relationship to be juxtaposed with the lawyer-client relationship. Section 2 examines the lawyer-client relationship within the context of that definition, demonstrating that while superficial similarities exist, the two relationships are conceptually distinct a conclusion that itself exposes the misunderstanding underlying the wrongful endorsement. Section 3 traces the historical emergence of the phrase ‘Agent for’ from English practice to its incorporation into Ghanaian civil procedure, demonstrating that its purpose was exclusively to regulate lawyer-lawyer agency. Section 4 exposes the phenomenon of wrongful endorsement as a fundamental misunderstanding, miscomprehension, and misapplication of Order 2 rule 5(1)(b), analyzing the practical repercussions of such endorsement on the lawyer, including exposure to personal liability, erosion of statutory protections, and potential disciplinary consequences. Section 5 explores the legal effect of the wrongful endorsement, positing it as a curable misstatement of capacity. Section 6 concludes with recommendations for curtailing the practice and restoring procedural fidelity.

 

1. AGENCY IN ITS PROPER SENSE

An important inquiry this paper attempts is whether the lawyer-client relationship is of the nature of an agency relationship. It is thus necessary to establish a working definition of agency to aid subsequent comparison.

When asked to define an agent, the commercial law student may reflexively offer that an agent is ‘any person who happens to act on behalf of another’, echoing the definition proffered by Lord Alverstone CJ in The Queen v Kane.[1] Yet this definition is overbroad. As Sealy and Hooley observe, ‘Any concise definition of the concept of agency must be treated with care. Striving for brevity, the definition is likely to be flawed by errors and omissions which may make it misleading.’[2]

The High Court adopted three authoritative definitions in Yaw Kyei v Henrietta Dei Nikoi:[3]

According to the American Restatement of the Law of Agency, agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests or otherwise consents so to act.[4]

The Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency (18th edn, 2006), art 1(1) states that agency is the fiduciary relationship which exists between two persons, one of whom expressly or impliedly manifests assent that the other should act on his behalf, so as to affect his relations with third parties, and the other of whom similarly manifests assent so to act or so acts pursuant to the manifestation.

The GHL Fridman The Law of Agency (7th edn, 1996), p 11 defines Agency as the relationship that exists between two persons when one, called the agent, is considered in law to represent the other, called the principal, in such a way as to be able to affect the principal’s legal position in respect of strangers to the relationship by making of contracts or disposition of property.

A combined reading suggests that an agency relationship must typically evince the following elements:

1. Mutual consent for the agent to act on behalf of the principal and for the latter to be bound by such conduct;[5]
2. The agent stands in a fiduciary position to the principal;[6]
3. The agent has the power to alter the legal position of the principal;[7] and
4. The agent acts subject to the principal’s manifest or tacit control.[8]

Other iterations of the agency concept exist which do not fit squarely into these criteria. However, a sustained excursus into the law of agency is beyond the scope of this paper. We shall proceed to examine the nature of the lawyer-client relationship in the context of these elements.

 

2. THE LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP DISTINGUISHED FROM AGENCY

• Consent in Common

It has been established that mutual consent is a prerequisite for the creation of an agency relationship. The authorities support an affirmative answer to the question of whether this criterion applies to the lawyer-client relationship.

It is trite that the lawyer-client relationship commences upon an agreement by the lawyer to act for the client upon certain terms; in the absence of such an arrangement, no such relationship arises, and any action purported to be taken by the former on behalf of the latter strays into misconduct. Order 1 rule 4 of C.I. 47 exemplifies this position:

‘A person who without authority knowingly acts or takes any proceedings in the Court in the name of or on behalf of another person shall be liable to committal for contempt of court.’

More pointedly, the Supreme Court in Sam Jonah v Richmond Aggrey, Yoni Kulendi & Kulendi @ Law[9] was unequivocal that third-party funding of suits could not mature into a lawyer-client relationship. The court, resisting an expansion of the Chorley principle,[10] held that only parties to an agreement for legal services enjoyed the rights and liabilities that flowed therefrom. The apex court thus stressed the need for express agreements containing the full complement of terms as a precursor to the lawyer-client relationship.

Further, in Tamakloe & Partners Unltd v Gihoc Distilleries Co. Limited,[11] Amegatcher JSC admonished that lawyers are required to discuss, negotiate and agree fees with the client, then execute a written retainer agreement detailing the scope of legal services, fees and expenses, and terms of payment.

The unmissable conclusion is that the lawyer-client relationship must be rooted in consent. In this regard, it mimics an agency relationship.

• The Client’s Fiduciary?

The question whether the lawyer stands in a fiduciary position to their client is easily disposed of. In Vambaris v Altuna and Another,[12] Hayfron-Benjamin J (as he then was) was unambiguous:

‘The relationship existing between a solicitor and his client is recognised in equity as a fiduciary one imposing on the solicitor special obligations. In his dealings with his client the solicitor must exercise the utmost good faith, and in any financial transaction with his client (save as to costs for work done) there will be a presumption that such transaction should not be upheld unless the solicitor can establish that it was affected by free exercise of the client’s will and without any influence on the part of the solicitor.’[13]

A more recent restatement appears in Addy York Co. Ltd v Noble Dream Financial Services and Kwadwo Owusu Sekyere, where Osei Hwere J (as he then was) espoused:

‘The relationship between a lawyer and his client has been recognized as a fiduciary relationship. The term fiduciary duty is derived from the Latin phrase fide et fiducia, which means “by faith and confidence”. Fiduciary relationship is a relationship of trust. Thus the client places his or her confidence, good faith, reliance and trust in the lawyer. A lawyer as a fiduciary must act in good faith when dealing with the affairs of his client; he is forbidden to make secret profit out of his trust; and he is not required to place his personal or any other interest above that of his client. Compliance with conflict of interest rules is at the heart of lawyer-client relationships.’[14]

The fiduciary relationship between lawyer and client is beyond doubt, and here, too, the similarity with agency is manifest.

• The Authority to Affect Rights

The agent’s ability to alter the principal’s legal position finds ready parallel in the lawyer-client relationship. Intrinsic to the formation of that relationship is the anticipation that the lawyer shall exercise their best endeavours to achieve a legal feat for the benefit of the client or ward off undesirable legal consequences. Consequently, the actions of the lawyer, acting within authority, bind the client.

The authorities bear this out. In Asahin Industries v Kofifoh Boat Building Co. Ltd,[15] where applicants sought to resile from a consent judgment entered by their lawyer, Francois JSC held:

‘The last ground for rejecting the settlement is in effect a criticism of the applicants own counsel for ineptitude. But there is good sense and good reason for the rule that you take your counsel as you find him. At law, where a client induces by his conduct, his solicitor to believe that he is authorized to make a compromise on his behalf, he is bound by it: see Little v Spreadbury [1910] 2 KB 658.’

In Nsiah v Osei,[16] the High Court held that the failure of counsel to appear could be deemed the absence of the party despite the party being physically present, a position recently affirmed by the Court of Appeal.[17] The binding nature of counsel’s actions was succinctly summed up by Atuguba JSC in The Republic v High Court, Accra (Fast Track Division) Ex Parte: Debora Atakorah and Billy Cudjoe:

‘it is settled law, that but for limited exceptions, when counsel is instructed by his client to settle an action and he does so, his authority so to do cannot afterwards be arbitrarily withdrawn by the client.’[18]

Like in agency, the actions of a lawyer acting within authority bind their client.

• The Critical Distinction: Instruction is Not Control

The final element the principal’s control over the agent marks a fundamental and decisive divergence between agency and the lawyer-client relationship. It is upon this rock that any attempt to characterize the lawyer as the client’s agent must founder. This distinction is central to exposing the misunderstanding that underlies the wrongful endorsement.

In the classic formulation of agency, the agent derives authority from the principal, who not only defines the scope of authority but retains the right to control the manner and means by which authorized acts are performed. The principal may override the agent’s judgment, prescribe the precise method of executing instructions, and countermand the agent’s decisions. Where an agent departs from instructions, liability attaches to the principal only where the agent’s conduct can objectively be traced to a representation of authority sufficient to found ostensible authority. The agent is, in a real sense, the principal’s alter ego.

By contrast, the source of the lawyer’s authority to practice is found not in the client but in statute.[19] A lawyer’s authorization to practice emanates from enrolment on the Roll of Lawyers kept by the Judicial Secretary,[20] and not from any delegation of power by the client. The legal significance of a client’s instructions is itself defined by law, which subjects the lawyer, when acting as such, to ‘the liabilities that attach by law to a solicitor.’[21] While a client’s instructions circumscribe the ends to which the lawyer’s services are directed, the obligation to act upon those instructions competently, ethically, and lawfully arises as a matter of legal and professional responsibility. The lawyer is not subject to the client’s control through instructions, but bears responsibility, in the exercise of independent professional judgment, for determining the lawful means by which the client’s objectives are pursued, consistently with professional ethics.

Significantly, the enabling statute expressly constitutes the lawyer an officer of the court,[22] thereby imposing an overriding duty to conduct professional affairs in a manner that furthers the administration of justice. The lawyer’s primary allegiance is thus owed to the law and the courts, rather than to the client, in a manner fundamentally inconsistent with the principal–agent relationship. The duty to exercise independent professional judgment is accordingly non-derogable and cannot be waived by agreement or instruction.

Nene Amegatcher JSC, writing extra judicially in the Law of Advocacy and Legal Ethics Study Manual for Professional Law Students, explains the duty of the lawyer in realizing the client’s instructions thus:

‘You, not the client are in control. Being in control means ensuring that adequate discussions have been made. Choices still have to be made and the solicitor, not the client is in the best possession to identify at what point those choices should be made and should identify the range of choices that will need to be made.’[23]

The specific contours of the authority of counsel while prosecuting a client’s instructions were the subject of extensive discussion by the Supreme Court of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in Adewunmi v Plastex Nigeria Ltd.[24] In his judgment, Karibi Whyte JSC remarked on the nature of the lawyer-client relationship thus:

‘I do not think there is any doubt that the transaction between counsel and client arises from contract. The contract relates to the services or service which counsel has agreed to render in respect of and on behalf of the client. Thus the relationship between counsel and his client is sometimes expressed as if it were that of agent and principal. Analysis of the nature of the services rendered by counsel and the measure of control of the manner of its performance by the client discloses that such analogy is not quite apt. It is generally accepted that counsel acts on the general instruction of his client. He must adhere to the instructions given by or on behalf of his client. However, counsel is entitled to insist, and as a general rule, has complete control over how these instructions are to be carried out. The dominant instruction of the client in all cases where litigation in court is involved is that counsel should conduct the litigation in court to its finality. Hence the actual legal relationship between counsel and his client is akin to that of an employer and an independent contractor. It is not between one of principal and agent. It is conceded that where the client gives specific instruction to counsel, such specific instructions must be adhered to. Where there is conflict with the manner of discharging his duties the client or counsel may decide to terminate the relationship. Where counsel is in control of the conduct of a case, his authority extends, when not expressly limited, to the action and all matters incidental to it and to the conduct of the trial to its finality, in what in his opinion is in the best interests of his client. Counsel is clearly not a servant of his client. The test distinguishing an independent contractor from a servant or agent is the degree of control which the employer is entitled to exercise. An independent contractor is one who is not bound generally to obey such orders as his employer may from time to time give, but is free to act as he thinks fit within the terms of his contract.”[25]

This reasoning mirrors the principles established under Ghanaian law as explained above, which allows the lawyer an ample degree of autonomy and independence in the conduct of a client’s case. The key distinction turns on the conceptual difference between the agent ‘acting as’ the principal and the lawyer ‘acting for’ the client. The latitude allowed in the latter is consistent with the lawyer using expertise to further the client’s cause, rather than acting as if they were the client, which is the case in the agency relationship. It can thus be safely concluded that the lawyer-client relationship is not an agency relationship.

This conclusion is not merely academic. It carries profound implications for the proper interpretation of Order 2 rule 5(1)(b). If the lawyer-client relationship is not one of agency, then the reference to ‘agent’ in that rule cannot possibly refer to the lawyer acting for their client. The rule must therefore be referring to something else something that, unlike the lawyer-client relationship, does constitute a genuine agency relationship. That something, as the next section demonstrates, is the relationship between one lawyer and another where the former acts as agent for the latter.

 

3. THE ARCHITECTURE OF INDORSEMENT

If the lawyer–client relationship is not one of agency, the question arises: for whom, and for what purpose, do the Rules of Court employ the language of agency in Form 1? This section traces the historical emergence of the practice of lawyers acting as agents for other lawyers, its consolidation within British procedural law, and its eventual incorporation into Ghana’s procedural framework. In doing so, it further exposes the misunderstanding underlying the wrongful endorsement.

• The Forgotten Office of the Correspondent Lawyer

The Georgian legal profession was bifurcated into an upper and a lower branch. Barristers who comprised the upper branch enjoyed rights of audience before the superior courts, while the lower branch consisted of attorneys, solicitors, and proctors, practicing respectively before the common law, equity, and ecclesiastical courts.[26] While the professional standing of barristers was largely unquestioned, the lower branch, rightly or wrongly, suffered a poor reputation, being associated with frivolous litigation, delay, and self-interest.[27] This perception was so deeply ingrained in popular consciousness that it found enduring satire in the fictional case of Jarndyce v Jarndyce.[28]

The pursuit of professional respectability consequently became a defining concern for solicitors, prompting leading members of the profession to advocate legislative reforms aimed at stricter regulation of training, admission, numbers, and professional conduct.[29] The introduction of systematic licensing requirements, and in particular the issuance and renewal of practicing certificates, emerged as a mechanism for promoting discipline and ethical practice.

Significantly, the regulatory framework stratified the issuance of practicing licenses along geographical lines, providing for two classes of practicing licenses: Country licenses and London licenses. Halsbury’s Laws of England speak of the stratification thus:

‘Practising certificates are of two kinds, London certificates, and country certificates. They are issued by the Law Society as Practising Registrar of Solicitors…A solicitor holding only a country practicing certificate is not entitled to carry on business within ten miles of the General Post Office, London; he may at any time, however, by payment of the extra duty and, in litigious matters, by providing himself with an address for service within three miles of the principal entrance to the Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, carry on a London business. A solicitor who has only a country certificate must, if he desires systematically to do work in London of either a contentious or a non-contentious character, employ a London agent; and the employment of a London agent is within the scope of his authority.’[30]

What emerged was a practice where provincial lawyers who had regular business in London employed London solicitors to act as their agents. As between the solicitor and their London agent, the usual incidents of an agency relationship, as described in earlier sections, applied. The client could neither sue the London agent directly for negligence nor misconduct, nor could the agent recover fees directly from the client.[31] The practice was gradually formalized in statute. For example, section 60(1) of the County Courts Act 1984 expressly vested ‘any solicitor engaged as an agent by a solicitor on the record’ with the right of audience before the court. More particularly, Order 4 rule 1 of the inaugural Rules of the then newly constituted Supreme Court of Judicature[32] provided as follows:

Indorsement of address

In all cases where a writ of summons is issued out of the Central Office, the solicitor of a plaintiff suing by a solicitor shall indorse upon the writ and notice in lieu of service of a writ the address of the plaintiff, and also his own name or firm and place of business…. And where any such solicitor is only agent of another solicitor, he shall add to his own name or firm and place of business the name or firm and place of business of the principal solicitor.[33]

In effect, the erstwhile British rules explicitly distinguished between a solicitor issuing a writ in their own capacity and one acting as an agent for another. The phrase ‘only agent of another solicitor’ leaves no room for ambiguity: the agency contemplated is exclusively between solicitors. The principal solicitor, the one on whose behalf the agent acts, is himself a solicitor, not the lay client.

This historical understanding was recently acknowledged by both the District Court and the County Court in Halborg v Apple (UK) Ltd & Anor, where it was observed that ‘Mr. Halborg is entirely right in what he told me about the origins of solicitor’s agents attending, for instance, hearings in London at the behest of a solicitor’s firm in the countryside, for example.’[34]

• From English Procedure to Ghanaian Law

As with several colonial legislations, the formalization of the solicitor-solicitor agency into British procedure was soon accommodated into Gold Coast law. The Supreme [High] Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A) modelled on the English Rules of the Supreme Court and incorporated the requirement that a solicitor acting as an agent for another must disclose the identity and address of their principal.

In his foreword to Kom’s Civil Procedure, Justice Nii Armah Ollennu JSC acknowledged the lineage of LN 140A, noting the heavy reliance on the RSC, while highlighting its adaptation to the unique Ghanaian context. He observed:

‘It goes without saying that although a major part of the High Court Civil Procedure Rules, 1954, are a reproduction of the Rules of the Supreme Court, England… a textbook on the subject which draws its material both from English decisions and Ghanaian decisions is absolutely necessary for teaching.’[35]

The endorsement requirement survived independence and successive amendments and was reenacted, without material alteration, as Order 2 rule 5 of the current High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (C.I. 47). The rule provides as follows:

Order 2 Rule 5   Indorsement as to Plaintiff

(1) Before a writ is filed by a plaintiff it shall be indorsed:

(a) where the plaintiff sues in person, with the occupational and residential address of the plaintiff or, if the plaintiff resides outside the country, the address of a place in the country to which documents for the plaintiff may be served; or

(b) where the plaintiff sues by a lawyer, the plaintiff shall, in addition to the residential and occupational address of the parties, provide at the back of the writ the lawyer’s firm name and business address in Ghana and also, if the lawyer is the agent of another, the firm name and business address of his principal.

• The Textual Case for Lawyer-Lawyer Agency

The language of Order 2 rule 5(1)(b) is decisive when subjected to close textual analysis. Several features compel the conclusion that the provision contemplates exclusively lawyer-lawyer agency.

First, the phrase ‘if the lawyer is the agent of another’ is followed immediately by the requirement to provide ‘the firm name and business address of his principal’. The word ‘principal’ in this context cannot refer to the client, for two reasons. The client’s details ’the residential and occupational address of the parties’ are already required to be provided elsewhere on the writ under the same subparagraph. It would be redundant to require the client’s details twice. Moreover, clients do not possess ‘firm names’ in the professional sense; that term is reserved for legal practices and other business entities. The requirement to state a ‘firm name’ therefore points unmistakably to another lawyer or law firm.

Second, the structure of the rule distinguishes between three scenarios: (a) the plaintiff suing in person; (b) the plaintiff suing by a lawyer who acts in his own right; and (c) the plaintiff suing by a lawyer who acts as agent for another lawyer. The rule creates a hierarchy of disclosure: the basic requirement is the lawyer’s own firm name and address; the additional requirement (the ‘and also’) is triggered only where the lawyer is an agent for another. This structure makes sense only if the ‘another’ is a distinct legal practitioner whose identity needs to be on record for purposes of service, costs, and professional responsibility.

Third, the mischief the rule seeks to address confirms this interpretation. In the English practice from which the rule derives, the requirement to disclose the principal solicitor served to ensure that where a London agent issued process on behalf of a country solicitor, the country solicitor who bore ultimate responsibility for the conduct of the litigation could be identified and held accountable. The rule was never concerned with the relationship between solicitor and client, as that relationship was already evident from the fact that the solicitor was acting at all. The client’s identity was separately disclosed; the solicitor’s authority derived from the retainer. No additional disclosure was needed to establish that relationship.

The textual, structural, and mischief-based analyses thus converge on a single conclusion: Order 2 rule 5(1)(b) refers exclusively to the situation where a lawyer acts as agent for another lawyer. The phrase ‘Agent for Plaintiff’, where the plaintiff is a lay client, finds no warrant in the language of the rule. Its continued use represents a fundamental misunderstanding, miscomprehension, and misapplication of the provision.

 

4. THE PHENOMENON EXPOSED: MISUNDERSTANDING, MISCOMPREHENSION, AND MISAPPLICATION

The previous section established that the phrase ‘Agent for’ anticipates lawyer-lawyer agency. However, what has emerged in practice is the routine endorsement of ‘Agent for Plaintiff’ even where the lawyer issuing the writ acts directly for the litigant and not as agent for another lawyer. This section exposes this practice as a fundamental misunderstanding, miscomprehension, and misapplication of Order 2 rule 5(1)(b), and analyses the practical repercussions of such endorsement on the lawyer.

• The Nature of the Misunderstanding

The misunderstanding operates at multiple levels. At its core, it represents a failure to distinguish between two conceptually distinct relationships: the lawyer-client relationship (governed by retainer, professional ethics, and the lawyer’s status as an officer of the court) and the lawyer-lawyer agency relationship (governed by the ordinary law of agency and the rules of court that specifically regulate it). The routine use of ‘Agent for Plaintiff’ conflates these relationships, treating the lawyer as if they stood in the same relation to their client as a London agent stands to a country solicitor.

This conflation is understandable, given the superficial similarities between the two relationships identified in Section 2. Both involve one person acting on behalf of another; both are fiduciary in nature; both involve the power to affect the legal position of the person on whose behalf one acts. But these similarities mask a fundamental difference: the degree of control exercisable by the principal. In the lawyer-lawyer agency relationship, the principal solicitor retains the right to control the agent’s conduct, to give instructions as to how the work is to be done, and to override the agent’s professional judgment. In the lawyer-client relationship, by contrast, the lawyer exercises independent professional judgment and is not subject to the client’s control in the conduct of the litigation. The lawyer’s duty to the court overrides any inconsistent instruction from the client.

The failure to appreciate this distinction leads practitioners to misread Order 2 rule 5(1)(b). Seeing that they act ‘for’ their client, and knowing that in some contexts lawyers are described as agents, they assume that the ‘agent’ referred to in the rule must be themselves. They do not pause to consider that the rule requires them to state, if they are an agent, the firm name and business address of their principal a requirement that makes no sense if the principal is the client, whose details are already separately provided.

• Why the Practice Persists

While no authoritative sources attempt to account for the emergence of this practice, a number of plausible explanations present themselves.

First, the uncritical use of defective templates may be at the root of the persistence of this practice. It is widely known that in contemporary practice, a significant number of writs and other originating processes are not drafted from scratch but are adapted from pre-existing firm templates, often without scrutiny. Where such templates contain faults which are not flagged by the Registry at the point of filing and proceed without objection, culminating in judgment, they acquire institutional authority which, regrettably, dissuades subsequent inspection.

Second, the absence of rigorous judicial oversight cannot be overlooked. Where the Bench has been vigilant about encouraging or quelling a practice as it has in ensuring practitioners before the courts possess valid solicitor’s licences, rates of compliance have been apparent and immediate. The lack of sustained judicial pressure on practitioners to refrain from the practice may have enabled the same to calcify into orthodoxy.

Third, the design of Form 1 itself may contribute to confusion. Providing a designated space for the ‘Agent for’ endorsement directly beneath the space provided for the endorsement of particulars of the issuing lawyer, without explanatory guidance, invites wrongful usage, especially where the conceptual and historical basis of the phrase are not fully appreciated. In the absence of such guidance, the form risks being read literally rather than conditionally.

• Practical Repercussions for the Lawyer

The erroneous ‘Agent for Plaintiff’ endorsement is not merely a technical irregularity, it carries significant professional risk for the lawyer. By mischaracterizing their role, a lawyer may inadvertently forfeit key statutory protections, assume unintended liabilities, and expose themselves to personal and financial jeopardy.

• Erosion of Statutory Immunity and Privilege

Under the Legal Profession Act, 1960 (Act 32), a lawyer enrolled and in good standing enjoys a distinct professional status as an ‘officer of the Courts.’[36] This status confers certain immunities in the conduct of litigation, including qualified privilege for statements made in court and a degree of protection from personal liability for acts done in the legitimate course of representing a client. By declaring oneself a mere ‘agent,’ a lawyer steps outside this protected, sui generis professional category and into the realm of ordinary agency law. Under the principles of agency, an agent can be held personally liable for acts performed on behalf of a principal in certain circumstances, such as where the agent acts without authority, commits a tort, or enters into a contract in a personal capacity. The procedural misendorsement could be cited as evidence blurring the line between the lawyer acting as a court officer and the lawyer acting as a general agent, potentially weakening a defence based on professional privilege.

• Personal Liability in Costs and the Danger of ‘Warranty of Authority’

A critical protection for lawyers in litigation is the general rule that costs orders are made against the client, not the lawyer. However, exceptions exist. Under common law, a lawyer who issues process impliedly warrants to the court and to the opposing party that they have proper authority from their client to act.[37] If it emerges that the lawyer lacked authority (for example, if the client did not instruct them, or if the retainer is disputed), the lawyer may be held personally liable for the opponent’s costs.

The erroneous ‘agent’ endorsement amplifies this risk. It frames the lawyer’s authority purely in terms of private agency, making it easier for an opposing party to argue that the lawyer, by holding themselves out specifically as an agent, has squarely invoked agency law principles, including the strict liability for acting without authority. The clearer, correct endorsement ’Lawyer for the Plaintiff’ roots the lawyer’s authority in their statutory right to practice and their court-recognized role, offering a stronger doctrinal shield against such personal cost orders.

The danger is vividly illustrated by the hypothetical scenario with which we began. Imagine a defendant’s counsel who, upon scrutinizing a writ endorsed ‘Agent for Plaintiff’, discovers evidence of a prior, unresolved dispute between the plaintiff’s lawyer and the plaintiff over the scope of the retainer. Armed with the endorsement, counsel argues that the lawyer, by labelling herself an agent, has given an implied warranty of authority under agency law. When she cannot produce clear evidence of authority, counsel applies for a personal costs order against her. The endorsement that seemed a harmless formalism becomes the basis of personal financial liability.

• Exposure to Allegations of Unlawful Practice and Disciplinary Action

Act 32 strictly prohibits unqualified persons from preparing legal documents or practicing as lawyers.[38] The label ‘agent’ is dangerously non-specific. While a lawyer is clearly a qualified person, the endorsement could be misconstrued, however wrongly, in a malicious or technical challenge as suggesting that the person preparing and issuing the writ is not acting as a lawyer but in some other capacity. This creates an unnecessary vulnerability.

More tangibly, the consistent misapplication of a clear court rule can itself form the basis of a complaint of professional misconduct. The General Legal Council, under Act 32, section 23, prescribes standards of professional conduct, and a persistent, knowing departure from procedural rules could be construed as conduct ‘which is unbecoming of a lawyer’ or which brings the profession into disrepute.[39] While a single instance may attract minor correction, a habitual practice reflects a neglect of the duty to uphold the standards and procedures of the court, potentially leading to disciplinary consequences under section 16.

• Jeopardizing the Solicitor’s Lien and Right to Recover Fees

A lawyer’s right to recover fees and to exercise a lien over client documents is predicated on the existence of a solicitor-client relationship, a relationship governed by a retainer and the professional standards of the legal profession. Framing the relationship as one of simple ‘agency’ risks diluting this special status. In a contentious fee dispute, a client might argue that the relationship was merely one of agency, subject to different rules regarding termination and remuneration. While such an argument may ultimately fail, the erroneous endorsement provides a textual hook for it, complicating fee recovery under Part V of Act 32 and the supporting procedural rules. The lawyer’s statutory right to sue for fees is strongest when the professional character of the relationship is unambiguous from the outset.

• Compromising Protection from Client’s Fraud or Illegality

The principle that a lawyer is not generally held responsible for a client’s fraud, provided they are not complicit, is a cornerstone of professional practice. However, an agent’s legal position is different. The doctrine of constructive notice and duties of inquiry can be more stringent for an agent. By consciously adopting the ‘agent’ label on a court document, a lawyer potentially invites the court to apply agency law scrutiny to their conduct. Should a client’s case later be found to be founded on fraud, a party seeking to implicate the lawyer might point to the ‘agent’ endorsement as evidence that the lawyer should be held to the higher duty of verification sometimes expected of an agent, rather than the more protected role of an advocate advancing a client’s case on instruction.

• Significance of the Error

The wrongful endorsement matters for reasons that extend beyond the direct professional risks to the lawyer.

First, it obscures the procedural role being performed by counsel. Order 2 rule 5 recognizes varying forms of capacity and their attendant disclosure requirements. The casual use of the ‘Agent for’ space blurs the distinction between the lawyer acting in their own right and the lawyer acting as agent for another lawyer, potentially misleading opposing parties and the court as to the true nature of the retainer and the chain of professional responsibility.

Second, it may open the writ to challenge from an attentive defendant. Successful challenges subject the innocent client to substantial costs awarded against them and further costs when re issuing the writ, which may compel them to abandon their claim. Unsuccessful challenges may become the subject of several appeals, thus defeating the overriding objective of the rules to foster speedy and effective justice.[40]

Third, it reflects a broader failure of procedural literacy within the profession. When officers of the court routinely disregard the precise language of procedural rules, it signals a failure of interpretive discipline and erodes the integrity of the litigation process. This casual approach to procedure can spill over into other areas of practice, weakening overall professional standards.

 

• THE LEGAL EFFECT OF THE WRONGFUL ENDORSEMENT

What falls to be determined is the legal effect of such wrongful endorsement. Is the writ a nullity, incapable of supporting any valid proceedings? Or is the defect curable, permitting the action to continue upon amendment?

• Capacity and its Consequences

Order 81 of C.I. 47 distinguishes mere irregularities, which are salvable, from nullities, which are incurable. In The Republic v High Court, Accra, Ex Parte Allgate Co. Ltd,[41] the Supreme Court provided guidance on the scope of missteps which Order 81 may soothe. The Court per Date Baah JSC held:

‘To summarize then, where there has been non-compliance with any of the rules contained in the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2004 (CI 47), such noncompliance is to be regarded as an irregularity that does not result in nullity, unless the non-compliance is also a breach of the Constitution or of a statute other than the Rules of Court or the rules of natural justice or otherwise goes to jurisdiction.’[42]

At the outset, it is important to note that the courts look sternly upon defects that affect the capacity of parties, as such defects are deemed to strip the court of jurisdiction to hear such matters. Indeed, the question of capacity is so fundamental that it behoves a party whose capacity is challenged to produce evidence of the same at any point during proceedings. In the oft cited case of Akrong v Bulley,[43] the Supreme Court per Apaloo JSC observed:

‘I need hardly say that I reached this conclusion with no relish especially as the plaintiff made out an unimpeachable case of negligence against the defendants on the merits. But the question of capacity, like the plea of limitation, is not concerned with merits and as Lord Greene M.R. said in Hilton v Sutton Steam Laundry,

“Once the axe falls it falls, and a defendant who is fortunate enough to have acquired the benefit of the statute of limitations [and I would myself add, or an unanswerable defence of want of capacity to sue] is entitled, of course, to insist upon his strict right.”’[44]

In affirming this position, Kpegah JSC further held in Republic v High Court, Accra, Ex parte Aryeetey thus:

‘The requirement that a party indorses on the writ the capacity in which he sues, is to ensure that a person suing in a representative capacity is actually invested with that capacity and therefore has the legal right to sue. This includes the submission that the requirement also enables a defendant, if he is so minded, to challenge the capacity the plaintiff claims he has, and such a challenge may be taken as a preliminary issue. This is because if a party brings an action in a capacity he does not have, the writ is a nullity and so are the proceedings and judgment founded on it. Any challenge to capacity therefore puts the validity of the writ in issue. It is a proposition familiar to all lawyers that the question of capacity, like the plea of limitation, is not concerned with merits so that if the axe falls, then a defendant who is lucky enough to have the advantage of the unimpeachable defence of lack of capacity in his opponent, is entitled to insist upon his rights: see the case of Akrong v Bulley.’[45]

It is apparent, therefore, that capacity is essential in the initiation of an action and that issuing an originating process without the requisite capacity, both on the part of the litigant and, where they are represented, their lawyers,[46] carries the dire consequence of invalidating that originating process and all processes and proceedings that flow from it, as nothing can be created from nothingness.[47]

• Misstatement Distinguished from Absence of Capacity

Despite the foregoing, it is worth considering whether a misstatement as to capacity on a writ of summons can be equated to a lack thereof. The wrongful endorsement ‘Agent for Plaintiff’ does not purport to confer upon the plaintiff a capacity they do not possess. The plaintiff remains exactly what they have always been: a lay litigant suing by their lawyer. The error lies not in the plaintiff’s capacity, but in the lawyer’s description of their own role. The question is whether this misdescription goes to the jurisdiction of the court or is merely an irregularity capable of cure.

Order 16 rule 5(4) is instructive on the question. The subrule provides:

‘An amendment to alter the capacity in which a party sues may be allowed under subrule (2) if the new capacity is one which that party had at the date of the commencement of the proceedings or has since acquired.’

The exact contours of the rule have been the subject of extant judicial commentary. In Robertson v Nii Akramah II and others,[48] the plaintiff, who was suing on behalf of his family which was simultaneously a stool family, wrongly endorsed his capacity as ‘the Mantse of Asere Djorshie for himself and representing the stool and subjects of Asere Djorshie’ instead of on behalf of the family. The Court of Appeal explained that an amendment should be allowed in such cases to allow substantial justice to be done. Apaloo JA (as he then was) held:

‘The basic attitude of the Privy Council in this matter, is we think, exemplified by its 1916 decision in the Accra land case of Ababio v Quartey. There, the Privy Council held that if the plaintiff sued in a wrong capacity but that some capacity is disclosed which would have enabled him to maintain the suit, he should not be non suited but that the court should allow all amendments necessary for the purpose of settling the real controversy between the parties. The same philosophy informs the judgment of our domestic courts and this is evidenced by such cases as Appiah v Addai, Chief Gbogbolulu v Chief Hodo, England v Palmer and Wuta Ofei v Dove.’[49]

The principle was refined in Birch v Asempa and another,[50] which concerned a plaintiff who had been granted a Power of Attorney to sue on behalf of the buyer of cement blocks when the administrators of the estate of the deceased seller attempted to resile from the contract. The plaintiff instead sued as joint owner of the cement blocks, a capacity she did not have. Acquah J (as he then was) conducted a detailed analysis of the authorities, both local and foreign, and formulated the principle thus:

‘What is discernible from the above cases and indeed all the cases in which the principle had been invoked, is that the amendment had been effected to reflect what really took place at the trial with a view to sustaining the action and thereby avoid multiplicity of suits. And because the new capacity was impliedly accepted by the party either from his evidence or the manner in which the suit was conducted, no hardship resulted from the grant of such an amendment. I can therefore deduce from the decided cases that the prerequisites for the application of this principle are:

1. That the new capacity must have been impliedly accepted by the plaintiff. In other words he should have fought the action on the basis of that capacity.
2. Such a new capacity must enable the plaintiff or the parties to sustain the action. Thus where it will be pointless to effect such an amendment, in the sense that the amendment cannot enable the action to be sustained, the amendment is not to be made.’[51]

The reasoning of the Court was recently endorsed by the Supreme Court in the case of Obeng v Assemblies of God Church, Ghana,[52] where the apex court noted:

‘In the circumstances of this case, we are of the considered opinion that the Court of Appeal was right in amending the capacity of the plaintiff’s in order to do substantial justice, avoid mere and fanciful technicalities and bring out the real issues in controversy for resolution.’[53]

Although these authorities largely concern the capacity of parties, the principles they articulate are not confined to litigants alone. The jurisprudence on capacity is ultimately concerned with the validity of the originating process and the court’s competence to entertain it. An error in endorsement, whether relating to the party on whose behalf the action is brought or to the legal practitioner through whom the court’s jurisdiction is invoked, raises the same foundational question of whether the process was competently issued.

In the instant matter, neither the lawyer nor the plaintiff labours under confusion as to the capacity in which the writ was issued. The action has, from its inception, been conducted on the footing that the lawyer acts in his own right and not as agent for another lawyer. The first limb of the Birch criteria is satisfied. Moreover, an amendment to accurately reflect the lawyer’s role as acting in his own stead would plainly enable the action to be sustained.

It follows that whereas the endorsement ‘Agent for Plaintiff’ is a misstatement of capacity which renders the writ defective, such defect does not place the writ outside the curative reach of Order 81. It may be treated as an irregularity for which an amendment can be allowed to do substantive justice.

 

• RESTORING PROCEDURAL FIDELITY: RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT MISENDORSEMENTS

The persistence of the wrongful endorsement underscores the need for clearer guidance and disciplined practice.

First, practitioners must recognize that the routine use of ‘Agent for Plaintiff’ represents a misunderstanding, miscomprehension, and misapplication of Order 2 rule 5(1)(b). They should exercise deliberate care when completing Form 1. The space designated for ‘Agent for’ should be left blank where not applicable or endorsed with ‘N/A’, reflecting the actual capacity in which the lawyer acts.

Second, training of both practitioners and court registry staff on the correct mode of completing Form 1 could mitigate errors. The Ghana Bar Association should incorporate instruction on completing standardized court forms into its Continuing Legal Education programmes, with particular emphasis on the distinction between lawyer-client and lawyer-lawyer relationships and on the practical risks personal liability, disciplinary action, and erosion of statutory protections that attend the wrongful endorsement.

Third, the Judicial Service should issue a Practice Direction on the use of Form 1, formalizing expectations. Judges should be vigilant in identifying and commenting on misendorsed writs during proceedings, and should not hesitate to draw the attention of both counsel and the General Legal Council to persistent or deliberate misapplications of the rule.

Fourth, the Rules of Court Committee may consider revising Form 1 to eliminate ambiguities. The Committee may explore adopting explanatory notes adjacent to the ‘Agent for’ field or redesigning the form to visually distinguish lawyer-client from lawyer-lawyer relationships.

Correct Endorsement Models:

• Where the issuing lawyer acts directly for the client (no inter-lawyer agency):

‘This Writ was issued by [Name of Lawyer], of [Firm Name], [Business Address], Lawyer for the Plaintiff/Defendant.’

• Where the issuing lawyer acts as agent for another lawyer/firm:

‘This Writ was issued by [Name of Agent Lawyer], of [Agent Firm Name], [Agent Address], as Agent for [Principal Firm Name], [Principal Firm Address], Lawyer for the Plaintiff/Defendant.’

By adopting these measures, practitioners, court staff and judges can collectively mitigate the risks posed by mechanical or erroneous endorsements, ensuring that procedural formalities advance rather than hinder substantive justice.

 

CONCLUSION

The central thesis of this paper is simple but consequential: Order 2 rule 5(1)(b) of C.I. 47 does not, and never has, referred to a lawyer acting as their client’s agent. The phrase ‘if the lawyer is the agent of another’ means precisely what it says: agency as between lawyers. The routine endorsement of ‘Agent for Plaintiff’ therefore rests on a fundamental misunderstanding, miscomprehension, and misapplication of the provision, one that conflates the lawyer-client relationship with the historically rooted practice of solicitor-solicitor agency.

The error is not benign. It exposes practitioners to avoidable legal and financial risks personal liability for costs, erosion of statutory protections, exposure to disciplinary action, and complication of fee recovery. It undermines the procedural integrity of the courts and reflects a broader failure of procedural literacy within the profession. Yet, properly understood, it is a curable misstatement, not a fatal nullity. The courts possess ample power under Order 16 rule 5(4) and Order 81 to permit amendments that align the record with reality and do substantial justice.

The task of correction is a shared one. It requires concerted action from the judiciary, the Bar, legal educators, and the court registry. It requires that practitioners understand not merely the ‘what’ of procedural rules, but the ‘why ’: the historical context, the doctrinal foundations, and the practical consequences of getting it wrong. By embracing this clarification, the legal profession in Ghana can strengthen its standards, enhance the administration of justice, and demonstrate a renewed commitment to the principle that in law especially procedure words matter.

So, let the message ring clear and resolute: the time for mechanical complacency is over. The words “Agent for Plaintiff,” scrawled unthinkingly upon a thousand writs, are not a harmless tradition, they are a silent surrender of professional protection, a quiet invitation to liability, and a subtle erosion of the very standards that distinguish our noble calling from mere commerce. The remedy lies not in complex legislation or judicial revolution, but in that most demanding of virtues: vigilance. Vigilance in drafting, vigilance in instruction, vigilance in the relentless pursuit of procedural fidelity. This is not a battle against an enemy without, but against an adversary within, the adversary of habit, of convenience, of the comfortable. 

*Justice of the High Court, Republic of Ghana; Patron – Federation of African Law Students – Ghana Chapter; Adjunct Lecturer, International Criminal Law and Justice (ICL&J), Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA); LL.M.(Distinction) International Criminal Law and Justice (ICL&J) International Criminal Court (ICC) Elective, Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA) (2025); Valedictorian, 2025 Masters Cohort (GIMPA); Participant, ICC Summer School, Utrecht University (2025); Barrister-at-Law (BL), Ghana School of Law (2012); Best Student, Law of Evidence (2012 Call to the Bar); LLB, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST); Achimota School (2002). ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0009-0002-2932-6728

The views expressed are personal and do not reflect the position of any institution.

 

* Lawyer in Private Practice; LLB (Lond); MA (Conflict, Peace and Security), KAIPTC.

 

[1] [1901] 1 QB 472.

[2] LS Sealy and RJA Hooley, Commercial Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (4th edn, OUP 2009) 95.

[3] Suit No AC 263/2010 (31 May 2017).

[4] American Restatement of the Law of Agency (3rd edn, 2006, para 1.01)

[5] Baah Ltd v Saleh Brothers [1971] 1 GLR 119, 125 126.

[6] PS Investment Limited v Central Regional Development Corporation and Others [2012] 1 SCGLR 611, 646 647.

[7] Oppong Banahene v Shell Ghana Limited Civil Appeal No J4/34/2016 (6 April 2017); Atuguba & Associates v Scipion Capital (UK) Ltd and Holman Fenwick Willian LLP Civil Appeal No J4/04/2019 (3 April 2019).

[8] Arhin v Kisiwaa [1979] GLR 311, 313 314.

[9] [2013-2014] 1 SCGLR 272.

[10] London Scottish Benefit Society v Chorley (1884) 13 QBD 872.

[11] Civil Appeal No J4/70/2018 (3 July 2019).

[12] [1973] 2 GLR 41.

[13] ibid, 45, quoting Cordery on Solicitors (5th edn) 118.

[14] Suit No INTS 25/2015 (18 January 2017).

[15] [1984-86] 1 GLR 453, 457.

[16] [1975] 1 GLR 257.

[17] The Republic v The Judicial Committee, Ajumako Traditional Council, Ex Parte: Nana Yamoah IV, Ebusuapanyin Kobina Ebo and 5 Others Suit No H1/43/2016 (30 January 2017).

[18] Civil Motion No J5/27/2014 (22 July 2014).

[19] Legal Profession Act, 1960 (Act 32).

[20] ibid s 2.

[21] ibid s 2(c).

[22] ibid s 2(b).

[23] Nene Amegatcher, Law of Advocacy and Legal Ethics Study Manual (Ghana School of Law) 9.

[24] SC 26/1985 (20 June 1986).

[25] ibid.

[26] The distinction was rendered otiose following consolidation under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873.

[27] William Rodolph Cornish and others, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, Volume XI: 1820 1914 (OUP 2010) pt 4, ch 4.

[28] Charles Dickens, Bleak House (Bradbury and Evans 1853).

[29] Cornish (n 27) 1113.

[30] Halsbury’s Laws (1st edn, 1914) 26, paras 1189, 1368.

[31] ibid para 1369.

[32] Comprised the High Court Division and the Court of Appeal Division. First renamed, in addition to the Crown Court, the ‘Supreme Court of England and Wales’ under section 1(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 and subsequently the ‘Senior Courts’ under section 59 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which established a distinct Supreme Court of the United Kingdom as the apex court of the country.

[33] RSC Ord 4 r 1 (emphasis added).

[34] Case No: F4QZ598C (3 May 2022) para 15.

[35] Enoch D Kom, Civil Procedure (3rd edn, Buck Press 1990) viii.

[36] Act 32, s 2(b).

[37] Yonge v Toynbee [1910] 1 KB 215.

[38] Act 32, ss 9, 44; Legal Profession (Professional Conduct and Etiquettes) Rules, 2020 (L.I. 2423), r 6.

[39] ibid s 23; see also Republic v General Legal Council, Ex parte Akpandja [2001-2002] SCGLR 742.

[40] Ord 1 r 1(2) of C.I. 47.

[41] [2007-2008] 2 SCGLR 1041.

[42] ibid 1054.

[43] [1965] GLR 469.

[44] ibid 476.

[45] [2003-2005] 1 GLR 537, 544.

[46] The Republic v High Court (Fast Track Division), Accra; Ex parte Teriwajah & Korboe (Reiss & Company (Ghana) Ltd – Interested Party) [2013-2014] 2 SCGLR 1247.

[47] Mosi v Bagyina [1963] 1 GLR 337.

[48] [1973] 1 GLR 445.

[49] ibid 459.

[50] [1992] 2 GLR 416.

[51] ibid 436.

[52] [2010] SCGLR 300.

[53] ibid 325.