Statement of Fact:
Three plaintiffs, each of whom was a lawyer, sued the Chief Justice, the Judicial Secretary and the General Legal Council. They complained that through the conduct of the defendants, that is, by the issue of certain circulars to judicial officers, they had been denied their right to audience as Barristers in the Courts.
The Judge of the High Court granted an interim injunction against the first two defendants, restraining them both in their personal and official capacity from barring the plaintiffs from holding themselves as Barristers.
The defendants filed for this appeal at the court of Appeal and prayed the Court to set aside the ruling of Anterkyi J at the High Court.
At the appeal, the plaintiffs, now respondents raised objection of the Chief Justice who was a party to the appeal yet had the power to empanel the bench of the Court of Appeal. They respondents contended that that amounted to an offence to the foundation of the principle of natural justice; namely, a man should not be a judge in his own cause (Nemo judex in causa sua).
1. Whether or not the Chief Justice’s power to empanel the bench
of the Court of Appeal offended the principal of natural justice?
1. The Chief Justice alone is enjoined by law to empanel the bench of the Court
It was the function of the Chief Justice to constitute the bench of this Court. He performed that as part of his administrative duties as long as he remains in office and he is in the country and he is not ill. No one is entitled by law to perform his duties for him.
Where a statute clearly enjoins a person to perform an act, he has to do it even if its performance is incompatible with the strict rules of natural justice.
The counsel of the respondents sought to rely on the 17 th Century English case of Day v. Savage[2] in which Hobert C.J. pronounced that where there is a conflict between a statute and the principles of natural justice, natural justice should prevail -so it is the natural justice that must prevail. It is quite important to note that that position was never followed by the English Courts.
However, the Court held that where the clear terms of a statute conflict with natural justice, it is the natural justice that must yield. In the English case of Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Proprietors,[3] it was held that the Lord Chancellor could exercise the discretion vested in him notwithstanding the principles of natural justice.
The Chief Justice is enjoined by law to exercise his discretion and he is mandated to do so notwithstanding the principle of natural justice.
[1] Akufo – Addo and Others v. Quarshie- Idun and Others (1968) GLR 667-688
[2] Day v. Savage (1614) Hob. 85
[3] Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Proprietors (1852) 3 H.L. Cas 759
