PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE UNDERMINED: HOW GHANA’S 2018 CRIMINAL DISCLOSURE REGIME VIOLATES THE RIGHTS TO SILENCE AND INNOCENCE; A CASE FOR A TWO-PHASED CASE MANAGEMENT REGIME IN CRIMINAL TRIALS.
Her Ladyship Justice Sedinam Awo Kwadam (Mrs.)*
29th December, 2025.
ABSTRACT
This paper critically examines Ghana’s 2018 Practice Directions on Disclosures and Case Management in Criminal Proceedings, issued under the leadership of then Chief Justice Sophia Akuffo JSC, pursuant to the Supreme Court decision in Eugene Baffoe Bonnie and 4 Ors V The Republic, which sought to streamline criminal trials and curb delays. While the objective of procedural efficiency is legitimate, certain provisions, particularly Sections 2(3)(a), 2(3)(b), and 3(3), raise profound constitutional and human rights concerns. These provisions compel accused persons to disclose the identities, addresses, and statements of their defence witnesses at the case management stage, well before the prosecution has established a prima facie case. Such anticipatory disclosures, the author argues, erode the constitutional presumption of innocence, undermine the accused’s right to silence, distort the adversarial structure of Ghana’s criminal process, and contravene international human rights guarantees under Article 14 of the ICCPR and Article 7 of the African Charter. To confront these systemic and procedural deficiencies, the paper proposes a two-phased disclosure and case management framework predicated upon the sequential allocation of evidentiary obligations. Under this model, the prosecution bears the initial and comprehensive duty of disclosure, while corresponding defence obligations crystallize only upon the judicial establishment of a prima facie case or a case to answer. Such a calibrated sequencing obviates premature or compelled defence revelation, mitigates the risk of procedural exploitation, and preserves the accused’s right to silence and to be presumed innocent, thereby maintaining the structural integrity of the adversarial process. In doctrinal terms, the model aspires to reconcile procedural economy with constitutional fidelity and the imperatives of fair trial rights, thereby reinforcing the legitimacy, rational coherence, and normative integrity of Ghana’s criminal justice architecture.
- INTRODUCTION
Imagine this scenario:
The courtroom is silent as the trial judge turns to defence counsel.
“Counsel,” she says, “by the next adjourned date, you must file your witness list, their addresses, and summaries of the testimony you intend to rely on. Failure to do so will leave the court with no choice but to proceed. Defence counsel rises, hesitant. The accused sits behind him, eyes fixed on the floor. The prosecution has not yet been called upon to prove a prima facie case. No evidence has been tested, no witness cross-examined. Yet the defence is being compelled to reveal its entire strategy, witnesses, evidence, and theory of the case. Reluctantly, counsel complies, filing the disclosure as directed. Days later, when the parties reconvene, the prosecution requests leave to amend its proposed evidence. Armed with knowledge of the defence’s intended witnesses and evidence, the state recalibrates its strategy, plugging evidentiary gaps and reshaping its narrative. The court grants the request. In that moment, the balance of the adversarial trial collapses. The accused, who should be cloaked in the presumption of innocence and protected by the right to remain silent, finds himself unwittingly assisting the very prosecution seeking to convict him. Instead of standing as an equal contestant against state power, he has been procedurally disarmed before the first piece of evidence is even tested.[1]
The criminal justice system in every constitutional democracy must balance the state’s interest in law enforcement with the individual’s rights when accused. In Ghana, this tension is starkly illustrated by the 2018 Practice Directions on Disclosures and Case Management in Criminal Proceedings, issued under former Chief Justice Sophia Akuffo.[2] Though intended to reduce delays, the Directions have, to a large extent, restructured Ghana’s adversarial trial model in ways that threaten core constitutional guarantees. Sections 2(3)(a) -(b) and 3(3) impose anticipatory disclosure duties, compelling accused persons to reveal witness identities, addresses, and intended testimony before the prosecution has established a prima facie case, and to serve such disclosures two days before the case management conference.[3] This sequencing departs from settled adversarial norms, undermining the presumption of innocence and the right to silence under Article 19 of the 1992 Constitution.[4]
This paper contends that disclosure obligations, if required at all, must arise only after the prosecution has discharged its evidentiary burden at the close of its case. Premature defence disclosure wrongfully places a burden of proof on the defence, exposes defence strategy to prosecutorial recalibration, and erodes adversarial fairness. It also compromises Article 19(5)’s protection against self-incrimination by coercing accused persons into premature participation under fear of adverse inference.[5] Adopting a doctrinal, comparative, and normative framework, this paper critiques the relevant provisions of the 2018 Practice Directions both under Ghana’s Constitution and international human rights regimes, drawing on jurisprudence such as Saunders v United Kingdom (ECtHR).[6] The analysis reveals that the Practice Directions fail to meet the essential constitutional tests of necessity, proportionality, and fairness, thereby rendering them constitutionally fragile. In light of this, the paper proposes a two-phased reform of Ghana’s case management and disclosure regime, one designed to realign prosecutorial and defence obligations with constitutional guarantees. It argues that disclosure duties imposed on the defence must arise only after the establishment of a prima facie case, to preserve the presumption of innocence and the right to silence. The paper concludes that while judicial efficiency and the reduction of delays are both legitimate and important objectives, they cannot be pursued at the expense of fairness and due process. Ghana’s criminal procedure must therefore be recalibrated to restore the structural coherence of the adversarial system, one that is at once rights-protective and constitutionally faithful.
- HISTORICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
- Criminal Procedure in Ghana; Disclosure Regime
Ghana’s criminal justice system, though reshaped since independence, still bears the imprint of its colonial past. Rooted in English common law, it has gradually evolved under the 1992 Constitution into a rights-based framework that guarantees presumption of innocence, equality before the law, legal representation, and fair trial rights under Article 19.[7] To address chronic delays, the 2018 Practice Directions on Disclosures and Case Management sought to streamline trials. While laudable in intent, they created new constitutional tensions. By requiring accused persons to disclose their defences, witnesses, and strategies in advance, the Directions compromise the adversarial system, where the prosecution bears the burden of proof, until shifted by the establishment of a prima facie case, and the defence has the right to silence[8] unless called upon to answer the case established by the prosecution. This compromise risks undermining the presumption of innocence, equality of arms, and the constitutional right against self-incrimination. It effectively forces the defence to assist the prosecution, exposing accused persons to tactical disadvantage. International human rights standards make clear that efficiency cannot come at the cost of fairness.[9] Thus, a reform meant to cure delays inadvertently threatens substantive justice. Borrowing civil case management tools for criminal trials, without safeguarding constitutional rights, risks distorting adversarial fairness. What is needed is a recalibration, one that secures both speedy trials and the deeper guarantees of due process and fair trial.
- The Presumption of Innocence in Ghanaian and International Jurisprudence
The presumption of innocence is a cornerstone of Ghana’s criminal justice system and a constitutional guarantee under Article 19(2)(c).[10] It is not a mere formality but a substantive right that shields the accused from state overreach, placing the entire burden of proof on the prosecution. Rooted in international human rights law, from the UDHR and ICCPR to the African Charter and Rome Statute, it is universally recognized as a non-derogable safeguard of fairness and due process.[11] Functioning as both an evidentiary rule and a principle of adjudicative restraint, it protects related rights such as silence and non-self-incrimination. Any erosion of this principle risks compromising the structure of criminal justice by placing on the defence, the burden to show its hand, however subtle. By requiring accused persons to disclose their defence before the prosecution establishes a prima facie case, the Directions undermine the presumption of innocence. Comparative jurisprudence, from Salabiaku v France to ICTY rulings, warns against such procedural reversals.[12]
- The Right to Silence and Protection Against Self-Incrimination
The right to silence, entrenched in Article 19(5) of the 1992 Constitution, is a core safeguard of Ghana’s criminal justice system.[13] Far from a procedural formality, it protects against compelled self-incrimination and affirms the accusatorial principle that the prosecution alone must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462).[14]
This guarantee is undermined by the 2018 Case Management Directions, which compel accused persons to disclose elements of their defence and witnesses before the prosecution establishes a prima facie case.[15] Two dangers follow: first, the accused may be forced to reveal material without full knowledge of the prosecution’s case; second, silence or incomplete disclosure may invite adverse inferences. International jurisprudence, notably Saunders v UK (1996) 23 EHRR 313, confirms that compelled self-incrimination violates fair trial rights.[16]
While efficiency and delay reduction are legitimate aims, they cannot override entrenched rights. Ghana’s constitutional order demands that reforms respect adversarial principles: the accused has no duty to speak until the prosecution has discharged its burden. The right to silence is a constitutional entitlement rooted in dignity, and any procedural reform that dilutes it risks both fairness in individual trials and public confidence in justice.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE 2018 DISCLOSURE REGIME
- Textual Examination of Key Provisions
The 2018 Practice Directions impose extensive disclosure duties on accused persons. Section 2(3)(a) requires advance disclosure of witness names, addresses, and prior statements before the prosecution has closed its case; Section 2(3)(b) obliges the defence to indicate which witnesses need summons; and Section 3(3) mandates serving these disclosures on the prosecution two days before the Case Management Conference.[17] Section 4(3)(c)-(e) further allows parties to amend their narratives and witness lists in light of new disclosures.[18] Together, these provisions compel the defence to reveal its strategy, witnesses, evidence, and tactical approach, prematurely, granting the prosecution an unfair opportunity to recalibrate. This sequencing undermines the adversarial balance, where the burden rests solely on the state until it establishes a prima facie case. Constitutionally, such front-loading erodes protections under Article 19 of the 1992 Constitution: the presumption of innocence, the right to silence, and the privilege against self-incrimination.[19] International bodies, from the UN Human Rights Committee to the ECtHR and ICC (Lubanga), have warned that premature defence disclosure distorts equality of arms and compromises trial fairness.[20] Allowing later amendments does not cure the defect; the harm lies in forcing disclosure before the defence is obliged to act. Efficiency cannot justify procedural designs that conscript the accused into aiding the prosecution. A rights-consistent regime must preserve adversarial symmetry and ensure the state bears the full burden of proof without anticipatory assistance from the defence.
- Constitutional Infirmities
- Presumption of Innocence (Article 19(2)(c))
This procedural regime is constitutionally flawed and incompatible with the 1992 Constitution, particularly Article 19(2)(c), which enshrines the presumption of innocence.[21] That principle does more than prohibit premature assumptions of guilt, it requires that no burden of proof, express or implied, shifts to the defence before the prosecution establishes a prima facie case. By compelling disclosure of defence strategy or witnesses before the prosecution meets its burden, the 2018 Directions corrupts the trial’s structure. The accused, constitutionally entitled to silence, is pressured into anticipatory defence, undermining both fairness and equality of arms. Even absent formal penalties, the risk of adverse inferences from non-disclosure transforms a protected right into a procedural liability. International standards echo this concern. The UN Human Rights Committee (General Comment No. 32, ICCPR) warns that premature disclosure rules violate the presumption of innocence.[22] Courts in the UK (ex parte Smith) and South Africa likewise stress that defence disclosure must not dilute the prosecution’s obligation to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[23] Any rule that mandates or pressures disclosure before a prima facie case is made distorts the trial process, shifting it from adjudication to suspicion. Ghana’s criminal procedure must remain firmly anchored in the presumption of innocence, not as rhetoric, but as a structural safeguard that governs fair trial.
- Right to Silence (Article 19(5))
The impugned Directions violate the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination under Article 19(5) of the 1992 Constitution.[24] This safeguard ensures the burden of proof rests entirely on the prosecution and shields the accused from being coerced into participating in their own prosecution. By requiring early disclosure of alibis or witness information before the state has proved a prima facie case, the Directions invert this principle. They compel the accused to reveal defence strategy prematurely, thereby assisting the prosecution and eroding the adversarial structure of criminal trials. The constitutional logic is well established. In Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462, the presumption of innocence was described as the “golden thread” of criminal law.[25] Ghanaian cases such as Apaloo v Republic [1975] 1 GLR 156 and Dzabatey v COP [2006] SCGLR 498 affirm that the burden of proof never shifts to the accused absent clear statutory authority.[26] Internationally, Article 14(3)(g) of the ICCPR and decisions such as Saunders v UK (1996) 23 EHRR 313 reinforce the universal prohibition against compelled self-incrimination.[27] Comparative jurisprudence, including R v Lambert [2002] 2 AC 545 and R v Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326, further confirms that early disclosure regimes must be narrowly tailored, necessary, and proportionate.[28] The Ghanaian Directions fail this test. In sum, compelling disclosure before the prosecution meets its burden transforms the accused into an involuntary participant in their own conviction. It undermines fairness, equality of arms, and constitutional fidelity. The right to silence must remain an inviolable safeguard of dignity, fairness, and the rule of law.
- Equality of Arms
The impugned Directions undermine the principle of equality of arms, a core element of the right to a fair trial under Article 19(2) of Ghana’s Constitution and Article 14(1) of the ICCPR.[29] Though Section 4(3)(c)-(e) allows both sides to amend witness lists or case theories, this supposed symmetry conceals a real imbalance: the prosecution gains early access to the defence’s strategy, securing a tactical advantage the defence does not share.[30] This forces the defence to commit its case prematurely, often before the prosecution’s evidence is fully tested, thereby constraining strategy and prejudicing the accused. The result is a trial process tilted in favour of the state, contrary to the constitutional demand of procedural parity. Comparative jurisprudence confirms this danger. In Shabalala v Attorney-General (1996) and S v Zuma (1995), South Africa’s Constitutional Court stressed that disclosure must protect balance, not entrench prosecutorial advantage.[31] The ECtHR has likewise held, in Dombo Beheer v Netherlands (1993), that fairness depends on functional equality, not formal symmetry.[32] In Ghana, where the prosecution already wields superior resources and discretion, premature defence disclosure exacerbates systemic inequality and undermines Articles 19(2)(d)-(g), which guarantee adequate facilities, silence, and meaningful preparation.[33] A re-evaluation of the Directions is therefore a constitutional necessity. Rules that distort adversarial balance compromise both fairness and legitimacy. Equality of arms must remain a non-negotiable cornerstone of Ghana’s criminal justice system.
- Practical Consequences
Beyond their doctrinal flaws, the 2018 Practice Directions raise serious practical concerns when measured against Article 19 of Ghana’s Constitution and principles of fair trial.[34] Though intended to streamline litigation, they compromise core safeguards of the adversarial process. First, requiring early disclosure of witness identities before trial heightens risks of intimidation, manipulation, or retaliation, especially in sensitive cases. This deters cooperation with law enforcement and exposes the process to political abuse. Second, compelling the defence to reveal strategy before the prosecution discharges its own obligations creates a structural imbalance. It undermines the presumption of innocence, chills investigation, and erodes the rights to silence and non-self-incrimination protected under both the Constitution and international human rights law.[35] Third, convictions obtained under such conditions are vulnerable to appellate and constitutional challenge, increasing retrials and reversals, straining courts, and weakening confidence in judicial outcomes. The broader effect is a crisis of legitimacy: if procedure is seen to favour state power over fairness, public trust in judicial neutrality erodes, and the courts risk appearing as extensions of the executive. In sum, the Directions are not only constitutionally precarious but also counterproductive. They disturb adversarial balance, dilute protections for the accused, and threaten both fairness and efficiency. A rights-sensitive recalibration is urgently needed to restore fidelity to Article 19 and align Ghana’s criminal process with international standards.
- PROPOSED REFORMS TO THE PRACTICE DIRECTIONS
THE TWO-PHASE DISCLOSURE REGIME
A coherent and constitutionally robust alternative to Ghana’s current criminal disclosure framework lies in the adoption of a Two-Phase Disclosure Regime, a sequenced, rights-sensitive procedural model that balances prosecutorial obligations with the protection of defence rights. Such a model is grounded in both the presumption of innocence and the privilege against self-incrimination, and reflects best practices from comparative constitutional and international criminal justice systems.[36] It offers a structured process that preserves the adversarial integrity of the trial, prevents procedural ambush, and ensures that case management evolves as a platform for fair adjudication rather than coercive disclosure.
PHASE ONE: PROSECUTION-FIRST DISCLOSURE AND PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDING
The first phase of criminal case management must be anchored in the cardinal principle that the burden of proof rests exclusively on the prosecution.[37] This principle, enshrined in Article 19(2)(c) of the 1992 Constitution and reaffirmed by long-established common law tradition, ensures that the state alone bears the duty of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused, by contrast, remains entitled to silence until a prima facie case has been established. From this principle flows a corresponding duty: before any substantive engagement with the defence can occur, the prosecution must effect a comprehensive disclosure of its case. This obligation includes the provision of all witness statements, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, as well as exhibits, forensic reports, and any other material evidence the state intends to rely upon.[38] Equally, disclosure must encompass information necessary for cross-examination, as guaranteed by Article 19(2)(e), thereby safeguarding the accused from being deprived of the opportunity to test the state’s evidence. This disclosure stage should culminate in the first Case Management Conference (CMC), convened at the instance of the prosecution. The function of this CMC must remain strictly procedural: to confirm the completeness of disclosure and to allow the defence to request outstanding or potentially exculpatory material. To ensure that this process is not reduced to a hollow formality, disclosure must be made at least five clear days prior to the CMC.[39] Anything less deprives the accused of adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence, contrary to both Article 19(2)(e) and the presumption of innocence itself. Crucially, the Phase One CMC must never serve as a covert evidentiary forum. At this stage, the prosecution has not yet discharged its obligation to establish a prima facie case, and the defence cannot, directly or indirectly, be compelled to reveal its trial strategy. Any attempt at premature “equalization” of procedural obligations distorts the structural asymmetry of criminal trials, in which the state alone bears the singular burden of proof. To allow otherwise would be to erode one of the most fundamental guarantees of adversarial criminal justice.
PHASE TWO: CONDITIONAL DEFENCE DISCLOSURE AFTER PRIMA FACIE CASE
The second phase is constitutionally triggered only after the trial court has determined that the prosecution has established a prima facie case.[40] It is at this juncture, and not before, that a limited, secondary disclosure obligation may shift to the defence. This sequencing is not a mere matter of procedural convenience; it is a constitutional imperative. It preserves the accused’s right to silence under Article 19(5) of the 1992 Constitution and protects against coercive self-incrimination, a principle firmly embedded in both Ghanaian law and customary international human rights law, most notably Article 14(3)(g) of the ICCPR.[41] At this post-prima facie stage, a second Case Management Conference (CMC) may be convened, typically at the instance of the defence. Within this forum, and only on a voluntary basis or under narrowly tailored judicial direction, the defence may elect to disclose the names of its intended witnesses, any documentary evidence or expert reports it intends to rely upon, and legal issues it wishes to contest at trial. Such conditional disclosure reflects the constitutional hierarchy of rights, ensuring that case management remains a procedural safeguard rather than a disguised form of discovery. Above all, the accused must never be conscripted into bolstering the prosecution’s case before the state has crossed its evidentiary threshold. To permit otherwise would invert the adversarial logic of criminal justice and erode the structural protections that anchor the presumption of innocence.
- CONCLUSION
The 2018 Practice Directions on Case Management in Criminal Proceedings were introduced to improve efficiency and reduce delays in Ghana’s criminal trials. While these goals are commendable, some provisions, particularly those requiring the defence to disclose its case before the prosecution concludes, raise profound constitutional and human rights concerns.
Four key problems emerge.
First, the Directions undermine the presumption of innocence under Article 19(2)(c) of the 1992 Constitution and Article 14(2) of the ICCPR.[42] By compelling the defence to disclose witness identities and testimony prematurely, they effectively shift part of the burden of proof onto the accused and distort the adversarial model of justice. Second, they erode the right to silence and protection against self-incrimination (Article 19(5)), pressuring accused persons to reveal strategy before knowing the full case against them.[43] These risk turning silence into a liability and compromise a constitutional safeguard recognized globally, including under Article 14(3)(g) of the ICCPR.[44] Third, the framework violates the principle of equality of arms. While the prosecution retains superior institutional resources, the defence is forced to commit to its case without full access to the state’s evidence.[45]This imbalance contradicts Ghana’s constitutional guarantees and international jurisprudence requiring parity between prosecution and defence. Fourth, instead of reducing delays, the Directions have created more disputes, adjournments, and constitutional challenges. The result is greater inefficiency and diminished public confidence in the fairness of the justice system.
Reform is therefore essential. A revised disclosure regime should adopt a two-step model: (i) the prosecution must make full disclosure first; and (ii) only after a prima facie case is established may limited, voluntary defence disclosure follow.[46] This sequencing, used in jurisdictions like the UK and Canada, preserves fairness while enabling efficiency. Additional safeguards are also needed. The current two-day deadline for defence disclosure should be extended to at least 14 days, ensuring adequate preparation.[47] Courts should have discretion to protect defence witnesses where early disclosure could endanger them, particularly in sensitive cases.[48] Finally, Case Management Conferences must be strictly procedural, not forums for coercing premature defence disclosure. Judges must remain neutral, upholding fairness and due process at all times.
In sum, the 2018 Directions, though well-intentioned, compromise core constitutional rights and risk entrenching structural unfairness in Ghana’s criminal process. A recalibrated system, one that protects the presumption of innocence, safeguards the right to silence, ensures equality of arms, and still pursues efficiency, is urgently required. Efficiency is important, but never at the expense of fairness, justice, and human dignity.
Let it be said, and let it be remembered, that the bulwark of a free society does not rest only upon the efficiency of its courts, but upon the inviolable fairness of its proceedings. We stand at a precipice, where the noble pursuit of speed may unwittingly betray the very justice, it seeks to serve. The 2018 regime, forged with the worthy aim of expeditious trial, has in its application forged a chain, a chain that binds not the guilty, but the presumption of innocence itself; that gags not the wicked, but the sacred right to silence.
We shall not equivocate. In fact, we must not. A process that compels a citizen to lay bare his defence while the state’s case remains has not established a prima facie case is not a refinement of justice; it is its subversion. It is a procedural alchemy that transmutes the golden thread of innocence into the leaden burden of premature account. We must, therefore, take our stand. We must declare that the fortress of individual liberty cannot be surrendered for the convenience of the state.
The path forward is not one of retreat, but of restoration. Let us adopt, with resolve, a two-phased citadel of procedure, a fortress where the prosecution must first storm the gates with its full evidence, and only then, if a case stands, may the defence be called upon from its keep. This is not a model of obstruction, but of order; not of delay, but of due process. It reconciles the necessity of motion with the imperatives of right.
Let us go forward together, unwavering in this conviction: that the scales of justice must be balanced before they are set in motion, and that the silence of the accused is not a void to be filled by procedural decree, but a right to be hallowed by constitutional guarantee. For in the end, the measure of our justice system is not how swiftly it reaches a verdict, but how steadfastly it protects the innocent on the journey there. On this principle, we shall not yield.
* Justice of the High Court, Republic of Ghana; LL.M. (Distinction) International Criminal Law and Justice (ICL&J) International Criminal Court (ICC) Elective, Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA) (2025); Valedictorian, 2025 Masters Cohort (GIMPA); Participant, ICC Summer School, Utrecht University (2025); Barrister-at-Law (BL), Ghana School of Law (2012); Best Student, Law of Evidence (2012 Call to the Bar); LLB, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST); Achimota School (2002).
The views expressed are personal and do not reflect the position of any institution.
[1] This scenario illustrates the practical consequences of the 2018 Practice Directions.
[2] Practice Directions on Disclosures and Case Management in Criminal Proceedings 2018.
[3] Ibid, ss 2(3)(a) -(b), 3(3).
[4] Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992, art 19.
[5] Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992, art 19(5).
[6] Saunders v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 313.
[7] Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992, art 19.
[8] Practice Directions on Disclosures and Case Management in Criminal Proceedings 2018.
[9] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR), art 14.
[10] Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992, art 19(2)(c).
[11] Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR), art 11(1); ICCPR, art 14(2); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58 (African Charter), art 7(1)(b).
[12] Salabiaku v France (1988) 13 EHRR 379.
[13] Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992, art 19(5).
[14] Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462.
[15] Practice Directions on Disclosures and Case Management in Criminal Proceedings 2018.
[16] Saunders v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 313.
[17] Practice Directions on Disclosures and Case Management in Criminal Proceedings 2018, ss 2(3)(a)-(b), 3(3).
[18] Ibid, s 4(3)(c)-(e).
[19] Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992, art 19.
[20] UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 32: Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial’ (2007) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32; Prosecutor v Lubanga (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) ICC-01/04-01/06 (29 January 2007).
[21] Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992, art 19(2)(c).
[22] UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 32’ (n 22).
[23] R v Director of Serious Fraud Office, ex parte Smith [1993] AC 1; S v Zuma 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (SA).
[24] Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992, art 19(5).
[25] Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462.
[26] Apaloo v Republic [1975] 1 GLR 156; Dzabatey v COP [2006] SCGLR 498.
[27] ICCPR, art 14(3)(g); Saunders v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 313.
[28] R v Lambert [2002] 2 AC 545; R v Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326.
[29] Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992, art 19(2); ICCPR, art 14(1).
[30] Practice Directions on Disclosures and Case Management in Criminal Proceedings 2018, s 4(3)(c)-(e).
[31] Shabalala v Attorney-General 1996 (1) SA 725 (CC); S v Zuma 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (SA).
[32] Dombo Beheer BV v Netherlands (1993) 18 EHRR 213.
[33] Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992, art 19(2)(d)-(g).
[34] Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992, art 19.
[35] ICCPR, art 14(3)(g).
[36] This model draws from comparative practices in the United Kingdom’s Criminal Procedure Rules and Canada’s Criminal Code.
[37] Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992, art 19(2)(c).
[38] This reflects the principle established in R v H [2004] UKHL 3 regarding prosecution disclosure obligations.
[39] This timeframe aligns with international standards for adequate preparation of defence under ICCPR, art 14(3)(b).
[40] This threshold is consistent with the established test in Ghanaian criminal procedure as seen in cases like Republic v Osei [1976] 2 GLR 298.
[41] ICCPR, art 14(3)(g).
[42] Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992, art 19(2)(c); ICCPR, art 14(2).
[43] Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992, art 19(5).
[44] ICCPR, art 14(3)(g).
[45] Practice Directions on Disclosures and Case Management in Criminal Proceedings 2018.
[46] This model is consistent with the disclosure regime under the UK Criminal Procedure Rules, Part 15.
[47] This extension would better comply with the requirement for adequate time to prepare a defence under ICCPR, art 14(3)(b).
[48] Such protective measures exist in other jurisdictions, such as witness anonymity orders under the UK Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008.
