RE: COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND IMPRISONMENT: A REVIEW OF GHANA’S CRIMINAL LAW IN THE CASE OF DANIEL AYAREBA V ATTORNEY GENERAL

BY FELIX ANTWI OPPONG¹

 

GRATITUDE

Rebecca Akosua Bawa, for reviewing this work.

 

INTRODUCTION

In his article published on January 13 2025, Oswald K. Azumah reviewed the case of Daniel Ayareba v Attorney-General (2017) JELR 65402 (CA)² (Ayareba’s case) ably. In his work, the writer discussed the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in reaching its decision. He then reviewed a number of legal principles and made a brief comparative analysis to reach the conclusion that there were some errors attendant to the ruling of the Court of Appeal in Ayareba’s case. He particularised the errors thus:

“1. Disregard for the presumption of innocence…

2. The court erred in its disregard for the principle of legality…
3. Lastly, the court erred by applying a wrong proposition of law from the Supreme Court…”

As I started to peer into the argument of the writer, I found myself at odds with him. Behind those beautifully structured words of the writer hid a serious denouncement; that the Supreme Court’s judgment in Sabbah v Republic [2015] GHASC 133 (11 June 2015) (Sabbah’s case), particularly, the factors the highest Court in the land itemised for consideration by the courts where an application is brought under Article 14 (7) of the 1992 Constitution, are flawed. In effect, the writer criticised not one but two decisions of the courts. I do agree with the writer on some points of his article, especially his discourse on those principles of law he found relevant to the subject, but I doubt the correctness of his analysis of the ruling in Ayareba’s case, the judgment in Sabbah’s case and his conclusions therefrom. So strong is my doubt that I felt compelled to send in a rejoinder to the publisher.

In this paper, I seek to introduce another way of looking at Article 14 (7), the ruling in Ayareba’s case and by extension the judgment in Sabbah’s case. In the areas where I disagree with the writer, I shall indicate my opinion accordingly. The first part of this rejoinder shall deconstruct the writer’s work to lay bare its fundamental assertions as is understood by the present writer. In the second part, the present writer responds to those assertions in a fashion that blends opinions and legal authorities in support of the same. The final part of this paper shall embody some comments and the conclusion.

PART I

THE ARTICLE

In Compensation for Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment: A Review of Ghana’s Criminal Law in the Case of Daniel Ayareba v Attorney General,³ the writer held up two principles of law – the presumption of innocence and the principle of legality – and decried a “complete innocence” doctrine which the writer indicates operates against these two principles. This the writer says is because “when the state interferes with [the right to personal liberty] and at the end of the said interference, it is proven that the interference was unwarranted, the individual is naturally entitled to compensation from the state…” The writer relies on Article 14 (7) in support of this assertion. The writer was of the view that the ruling of Kusi-Appiah JA sitting as a single Justice of the Court of Appeal in Ayareba’s case did not take into account the principles mentioned above. The writer then presented a brief of Ayareba’s case. Next was Sabbah’s case where the writer quoted Wood CJ as well as Benin JSC including His Lordship’s list of considerations a court should undertake before granting an application under Article 14 (7). Sabbah’s case is important because the court in Ayareba’s case based its analysis on the factors laid down in Sabbah’s case. From here followed discussion of a number of legal matters the writer deemed relevant to the subject of Article 14 (7). Under wrongful conviction, the writer insisted that “… for wrongful conviction to exist, there must have been a grave inaccuracy with the trial at first instance, leading to a substantial miscarriage of justice which makes the appellate court absolve the accused.” He mentioned instances which may give rise to wrongful convictions including mistaken eyewitness identifications and false confessions. The writer queried why a court would refuse an application under Article 14 (7) where wrongful conviction has occasioned unjust incarceration. Next, the writer considered the notions of factual innocence and procedural innocence. He insisted that where a person comes under Article 14 (7), “… it is not for the court hearing the application to say he may or may not have committed [the offence].” So, whether the acquittal resulted from factual or procedural innocence, it makes no difference – the prosecution would have failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the principle of presumption of innocence, it was submitted that the principle being constitutionally cemented, one whose conviction is quashed on appeal is automatically reverted to the state of innocence. According to the writer, the results of the reversion are two; firstly, all that was done to restrict the acquitted person during the criminal trial and the carrying out of the sentence, in hindsight invariably becomes a disturbance of the liberty of that person; and secondly, that no person so acquitted could be said to be incompletely innocent. The writer under principle of legality submitted that the denial of the right of compensation under Article 14 (7) “to an applicant who has been wrongfully punished by the court only on the basis that his acquittal was based on “technicality” is in fact upholding the impugned conviction and punishment…” And this is against the principle of legality embedded in Articles 19 (5) and 19 (11). The writer next considered the options available to a lower court in light of binding precedent and advised that the court in Ayareba’s case was not bound by the ratio in Sabbah’s case but rather by the Constitution directly. Finally, a brief comparative analysis followed in which the writer found support in Queen (Adams) v Secretary of State for Justice⁴ for his argument that procedural innocence should also entitle an applicant to compensation under Article 14 (7). Although the writer throughout the article appeared to suggest that all qualified applicants under Article 14 (7) must be certified for compensation, he cautioned after his conclusion that it was not his submission that an applicant under Article 14 (7) “is automatically entitled to compensation” but that the Supreme Court’s formulation “fails the legal test and ought to be revised.”

PART II

THE COMPLETE INNOCENCE DOCTRINE

In my humble opinion, there is no so-called complete innocence doctrine as presented by the writer. With due deference to the writer, my view is that a critical study of the judgment from which the writer derived this doctrine shows that the Supreme Court did not intend to lay down any such doctrine. As shall become clear below, the Supreme Court went out of its way to explain that applications under Article 14 (7) must be considered on a case by case basis, not to be governed by some mechanical doctrine. Instead, each appellate court before which such an application is made is to consider several factors before arriving at a decision whether or not to grant the application. Somewhere in 1993 two brothers were arrested and charged with the offences of conspiracy to murder and murder. Both were convicted on the charges and sentenced to death by the High Court. One of the brothers, Dodzie Sabbah, mounted a successful appeal against both his convictions in the Court of Appeal, but not before he had served about two years as a prisoner on death row. He applied to the Court of Appeal (differently constituted) for certification to the Supreme Court that he be paid compensation under Article 14 (7). The Court of Appeal refused the application. The applicant appealed that ruling in the Supreme Court in the case Sabbah v Republic.⁵ Very happily, the Supreme Court embraced the opportunity to pronounce on Article 14 (7). Wood CJ said “The full scope and effect of article 14 (7) has however never been subjected to judicial scrutiny…”⁶ Adinyira JSC said “The appeal before us is the first time that a claim for compensation for wrongful conviction and imprisonment has been raised for determination in the Supreme Court and turns on the interpretation of Article 14 (7)…”⁷ And Benin JSC stated that “The court thus has an opportunity to determine the meaning and scope of [Article 14 (7)].”⁸ And so the court did.

THE NATURE OF ARTICLE 14 (7)

The main point of the present writer’s submission is founded on the description to be given to the provision under Article 14 (7). It is submitted that Article 14 (7) describes a cause of action, one for compensatory relief. From the Ninth Edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, a cause of action is “A group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing.” The Supreme Court in Ampratwum Manufacturing v Divestiture Implementation Committee⁹ adopted a similar definition given by Diplock LJ. The court stated thus “To institute an action against a party, one must have a cause of action against the defendant. Diplock LJ in Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232, CA said,

“A cause of action is simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person.””  A cause of action is made up of a set of predefined factual elements and these elements must exist in order to qualify a party to approach the court. In Spokesman (Publications) Ltd v Attorney-General,¹⁰ Azu-Crabbe CJ explained that “A party has a cause of action when he is able to allege all the facts or combination of facts which are necessary to establish his right to sue.”¹¹ It is submitted that although the Supreme Court in Sabbah’s case expressly did not utilise the term ‘cause of action’, the interpretation the court placed on Article 14 (7) aligns with this postulation. When that constitutional provision is seen in this light, it becomes clear quickly that an applicant must satisfy three main requirements before bringing such an application.¹² In the words of Dotse JSC in Sabbah’s case, “1. The applicant must have been convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment by a court of competent jurisdiction. 2. Must have served part or the whole of the sentence. 3. Must have been acquitted on appeal by a court of competent jurisdiction…”¹³ These requirements mean that one who is acquitted before or after a criminal trial is not qualified to approach the court under Article 14 (7) as well as one in whose case the Attorney-General files a nolle prosequi or one who is issued a pardon under Article 72. This is what Adinyira JSC said in Sabbah’s case, “Here in Ghana, the right to compensation does not extend to a person granted a Presidential pardon.”¹⁴ The above has been to establish the present writer’s view that Article 14 (7) gives a successful convict-appellant who meets certain requirements a mere opportunity to be awarded compensation. It is submitted that consideration under Article 14 (7) is not an extension of the trial of the convict-appellant nor is it an extension of the successful appeal. It is a fresh action for compensation the requirements of which are listed by the 1992 Constitution and the respondent is always the State. Where a person is disqualified from bringing an application under Article 14 (7), there may yet be options available to him. It is submitted that such action under Article 14 (7) does not derogate from other rights of a person restrained such as under Article 14 (5) where the respondent may be any person. That provision reads:

“A person who is unlawfully arrested, restricted or detained by any other person shall be entitled to compensation from that other person.”

The requirements of this provision allow any person who is unlawfully restricted to bring action for compensation in the High Court.¹⁵ In Nana Kwesi Osei Bonsu v Inspector General of Police  & Anor,¹⁶  the High Court granted compensation under Article 14 (5) against the Ghana Police Service. Unlike Article 14 (7), this provision does not require that the applicant be acquitted on appeal. Neither does the provision require certification to the Supreme Court. Moreover, actions in tort exist independently of these constitutional provisions. This is because applications under Article 14 (5) are determined by the High Court whereas those under Article 14 (7) generally are determined initially by an appellate court and finally by the Supreme Court. Yet, actions based on the torts of malicious prosecution and false imprisonment may be brought in the District and Circuit Courts.¹⁷ These examples underline the inevitable truth that Article 14 (7) only creates a cause of action and just like any other cause of action, it is not a given that the courts would grant the prayer by the mere appearance of the qualified applicant before the court.

THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION UNDER ARTICLE 14 (7)

So, where a qualified person comes before the court under Article 14 (7), what factors does the court have to consider? The Supreme Court in Sabbah’s case answered this question. It is submitted that the qualified applicant is required to prove to the court, not that he is innocent of the crime for which he has been acquitted, but that he is deserving of compensation under Article 14 (7). The writer said that “when the state interferes with [the right to personal liberty] and at the end of the said interference, it is proven that the interference was unwarranted, the individual is naturally entitled to compensation from the state…” This statement is important because therein lies an admission that it is only “unwarranted” interference that entitles one to such compensation. But how does the court determine whether or not the interference was warranted if not by going into the records and admitting submissions by the parties. In my humble opinion, where an applicant comes before the court under Article 14 (7), he may submit to the court that his detention, trial, conviction and sentence were all unwarranted and that he is deserving of compensation. To enable the court to make a determination whether to certify to the Supreme Court that compensation be awarded to the applicant, that applicant may need to exhibit all the records before the court. Benin JSC in Sabbah’s case advised, “… I think that if this court is to make an award it is entitled to the benefit of the full appeal record as was placed before … the first appellate court which heard the appeal and acquitted the appellant.”¹⁸ Per Wood CJ, “… the law requires all relevant documents to be promptly made available to the court hearing the application … the production of the full record of proceedings and other relevant documents, is a sine qua non, if an applicant must avoid losing the application.”¹⁹ It is submitted that requiring an applicant under Article 14 (7) to demonstrate to the court that he is deserving of compensation is not a retrial; and the refusal of the appellate court to certify the appellant to the Supreme Court for compensation or the refusal of the Supreme Court to grant compensation does not amount to punishment. In the former instance, the applicant would only be assisting the court in the exercise of its discretion. Whether or not Article 14 (7) conferred any discretion on an appellate court was one of the issues firmly resolved by the Supreme Court in Sabbah’s case. Respectfully, I disagree with the writer that the Supreme Court erred and further that the Court of Appeal erred by applying that binding decision. The judgment in Sabbah’s case was well-reasoned and evokes admiration. The Supreme Court was so unanimous in their separate judgments that Benin JSC was able to say that “… I am pleased we have not expressed any significant divergent views on this important matter.”²⁰ As could be expected, the Justices of the Supreme Court made references to various tools of interpretation and individually analysed the provision under Article 14 (7). Wood CJ stated as follows:

“It is clear that at both judicial levels, that is the certifying court as well as Supreme Court, the whole tenor of article 14 (7), as could be judged from the consistent use of the word “may”, is on the exercise of discretionary power … And so along the judicial chain, the only mandatory duty imposed on both the court which issues the certificate and this honourable court is the duty to act judicially.”²¹ Per Akamba JSC, “The award is not intended to be a capricious award based on guesswork but one informed by the circumstances of the totality of events leading to the acquittal on appeal.”²² And Dotse JSC also added “Fact of the matter is that, the wording of the provisions in article 14 (7) are so clear that an acquittal on appeal of a convict does not automatically entitle the person to payment of compensation.”²³ The above should certainly lay to waste any entertainment of some contrary ideas. In Eric Asante v The Republic,²⁴ the Supreme Court through Gbadegbe JSC said of Sabbah’s case that “The effect of the said decision which is binding on us is that the award of compensation is not automatic upon an acquittal on appeal but is discretionary.”²⁵ And this the writer also acknowledged except that he questioned those factors listed by the court which, according to the court, must guide an appellate court before whom an application under Article 14 (7) is brought. On that, it is submitted herein that the main point to be taken is that the court has a discretion under Article 14 (7). This means that those factors listed by the Supreme Court in Sabbah’s case are only to guide a court in reaching a decision. For example, the Court of Appeal in Ayareba’s case relied chiefly on the factors laid down by Benin JSC. In Eric Asante v The Republic,²⁶ the Supreme Court preferred the factors laid down by Wood CJ. Indeed, a perusal of the judgment in Sabbah’s case shows the court’s unmistakable emphasis on a case by case mode of consideration. In the words of Dotse JSC, “For me, the test to apply in situations where applications are made for payment of compensation under article 14 (7) of the Constitution 1992 is to consider each case on its merits such as discloses gross injustice and miscarriage of justice to the applicant…”²⁷ Wood CJ said “Article 14 (7) cannot thus be tied to a fixed set of inflexible criteria; we can only provide indices that, on a case by case basis, may guide courts in arriving at fair and just conclusions.”²⁸ On Adinyira JSC’s turn, Her Ladyship said “… the decision to make an award is discretionary and not automatic or mandatory, and it depends on the circumstances of each case.”²⁹ Per Benin JSC “Hence being a matter of discretion the appellate court will be entitled to consider all the facts and circumstances, as the Court of Appeal rightly held.”³⁰ Per Akamba JSC “The court should be satisfied that the circumstances of the case warrant that the person, so acquitted, be paid compensation.”³¹ The above dicta indicate that the Supreme Court in Sabbah’s case did not intend to lay down any strict checkboxes to be ticked and counted into a sum in the determination of an application under Article 14 (7). Each of the five Justices of the Supreme Court laid down some form of guidelines for the courts. It is true that Akamba JSC in Sabbah’s case stated that “The article under reference also envisages that the Supreme Court sets out guidelines to courts below in fashioning out appropriate instances for complying with the article.”³² However, the learned Justice of the Supreme Court did not lay down a list but said that “The recommending court should satisfy itself that the person, acquitted on appeal, has served a part or the whole sentence imposed by a court. The court should be satisfied that the circumstances of the case warrant that the person, so acquitted, be paid compensation.”³³ Dotse JSC said the court had to bear in mind “a lot of factors too numerous to conjecture at this stage”³⁴ but His Lordship managed to find seven factors to guide an appellate court and or the Supreme Court to wit, the nature or gravity of the offence; time spent in detention; whether there was reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution and whether the prosecution was malicious; if there was reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution, no compensation arises; whether applicant is completely innocent; the effect of the compensation on the public purse; and guidelines for payment of compensation which takes account of the value of money in terms of freedoms and personal liberties of citizens.³⁵ After reviewing the laws relating to compensation for the wrongfully convicted as pertains other jurisdictions and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Adinyira JSC decided that Article 296 should be taken into consideration as well as Section 31 of the Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459) on allowing an appeal where there has been substantial miscarriage of justice.³⁶ In the judgment of Chief Justice Wood, Her Ladyship charged the courts to consider, the underlying rationale of Article 14 (7) being that human activity is prone to errors; section 31 (1) of Act 459; and international treaties such as article 14 (6) of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.³⁷ Her Ladyship added other considerations such as whether the offence the person was charged with is known to our criminal law; and whether the State had mounted an oppressive prosecution against an individual without basis and just cause.³⁸ And where the Justices of the Supreme Court would make reference to the applicant being completely innocent of the charges, such reference would often be made in explanation of whether there was a reasonable and proper cause for the initial arrest of the applicant. Other times, the reference would be in juxtaposition to the issue of acquittal on mere technicalities. For example, Wood CJ said, “A primary consideration for example would be whether or not the acquittal was based on mere technicalities or on substantial grounds that has led to a gross miscarriage of justice. Did the evidence clearly show that the applicant was completely innocent? Were the charges trumped up, and was the evidence led at the trial falsely procured…”³⁹ And Benin JSC stated thus “The appellant herein was thus completely innocent right from the beginning and was thus wrongfully arrested, detained, tried, convicted and sentenced. There was no reasonable cause for the arrest in the first place, there was a reckless prosecution and all the subsequent processes were detrimental to him.”⁴⁰ The foregoing is intended primarily to explain the rationale behind the guidelines as handed down by the Supreme Court which is to guide an appellate court before which an application under Article 14 (7) is brought; it is also to illustrate the non-existence of any complete innocence doctrine which is so overarching as to constitute a requirement for an applicant under Article 14 (7) to prove his innocence subsequent to his acquittal on appeal. In Eric Asante v The Republic,⁴¹ Gbadegbe JSC said “A reasonable inference that can be made from the evidence introduced on appeal to the Supreme Court is that the claimant is innocent of the offence with which he was charged. This concession is a clear indication that the claim has been brought within the statutory remit contained in section 31 of the Courts Act, Act 459 for allowing appeals in criminal cases and in particular that the conviction of the claimant was an instance in which the ends of justice were not well served. It being so, the matter before us is a fit one in which we are entitled under article 14(5) and (7) to make a recompense to the applicant.”⁴² As may be evinced from the preceding quote, the Court considered the circumstances of that case and Act 459 but not any one doctrine in reaching its conclusion.

THE CASE OF DANIEL AYAREBA

It was on June 25 2015 that a man who had been convicted some five years prior on charges of conspiracy to commit robbery and robbery was acquitted and discharged in the case of Daniel Ayareba v The Republic.⁴³ When he brought an application in the Court of Appeal, it came before Kusi-Appiah JA in the case of Daniel Ayareba v Attorney-General.⁴⁴ As stated above, the court opted for the formulation of Benin JSC in Sabbah’s case, the tests being whether the acquittal was based on complete innocence without a shadow of doubt and whether there was reckless prosecution of the applicant resulting in a miscarriage of justice. However, the writer submitted that the Court of Appeal should have completely disregarded the factors laid down in Sabbah’s case. My view is different. In Ayareba’s case, Kusi-Appiah JA raised three questions in light of the factors His Lordship derived from Sabbah’s case. Those questions were whether the prosecution was based on a reasonable and probable cause and the acquittal on merely technical grounds; whether the applicant was completely innocent of the charges; and whether the prosecution was motivated by ill-will, mere hatred, spite, political consideration, that is, whether it was malicious. The court concluded after reviewing the evidence in Ayareba’s case thus “Consequently, I find that the applicant’s arrest and prosecution was based on a reasonable and probable cause.” Then His Lordship said “It is pertinent to note that in such situation, the applicant is also required by law to satisfy the court, independent of his acquittal by the appellate criminal court, that he is innocent.” It becomes clear when one looks at the entire judgment in Ayareba’s case that His Lordship did not mean literally that an applicant under Article 14 (7) must prove his innocence anew. Immediately before the statement in reference, His Lordship had quoted Dotse JSC in Sabbah’s case to the effect that an acquittal on appeal is not an automatic entitlement to compensation and that the court is to undertake an examination of the facts of the case before granting the application. It is submitted that His Lordship was drawing attention that irrespective of the examination to be carried out by the court, an applicant may increase his chances of success if he were able to establish that his acquittal was based on his actual innocence, not by some technicalities. That appears to be what was on the mind of His Lordship because soon after, His Lordship said “… it is patently clear that the applicant was acquitted on merely technical grounds and not based on his complete innocence.” It bears repeating that His Lordship had at this time already ruled that the arrest and prosecution of the applicant was based on reasonable and probable cause and cannot be said to be unlawful, oppressive, reckless or malicious. And so the decision of His Lordship Kusi-Appiah JA considered all three questions fully, without bias towards the question of complete innocence. The court in Ayareba’s case therefore was justified in following the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in Sabbah’s case. Besides, an appellate court that goes rogue and decides to disregard the Supreme Court’s guidelines does no benefit to the applicant. Article 14 (7) requires that the certificate be transmitted to the Supreme Court which may “upon examination of all the facts and the certificate of the court concerned, award such compensation as it may think fit…” Therefore, the Supreme Court will have the final say in any application under the said article.

PART III

REMARKS ON THE CASE OF DODZIE SABBAH

Article 14 (7) provides that:

“Where a person who has served the whole or a part of his sentence is acquitted on appeal by a court, other than the Supreme Court, the court may certify to the Supreme Court that the person acquitted be paid compensation; and the Supreme Court may, upon examination of all the facts and the certificate of the court concerned, award such compensation as it may think fit; or, where the acquittal is by the Supreme Court, it may order compensation to be paid to the person acquitted.”

An applaudable effort was made by the Supreme Court in interpreting this constitutional provision in Sabbah’s case. Gbadegbe JSC in Eric Asante v The Republic⁴⁵ said this about that judgment: “Although the learned justices of the Supreme Court in the Dodzie Sabbah case (supra) delivered plurality judgments, each such judgment emphasised the discretionary nature of the right to compensation and the relevant factors to be taken into account by the court in making an award under article 14(7) and the related provision contained in article 14 (5), we wish to commend the painstaking effort of the learned justices of the Court. We wish to say that but for time constraints, we would have referred to the various judgments by way of acknowledgement of the remarkable industry that the learned justices exhibited in providing us with a clear and authoritative pronouncement on the scope of the provisions of the Constitution on which this case turns.”⁴⁶

There was no doubt in Sabbah’s case that the court was not ready to open the floodgates for all persons qualifying under Article 14 (7), without more, to be awarded compensation. This was made very clear when Dotse JSC quoted the case of Egbetorwokpor v Republic⁴⁷ thus “We fully appreciate that in view of the result we have reached, guilty persons may well be escaping justice. If this be so, we cannot but regret it. But our duty is to do justice not according to our own lights, but in accordance with the law as we conceive it.”⁴⁸ One may even fabricate in one’s imagination a case where a completely innocent person makes an unprovoked false confession with a resultant sentence and a later acquittal. May such a person be certified to the Supreme Court for compensation from the State? It is the hope of the present writer that the decision of the Supreme Court in Sabbah’s case may be understood as the court intended it.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this rejoinder is to present the views of Mr. Oswald K. Azumah in respect of the case of Daniel Ayareba v Attorney-General (2017) JELR 65402 (CA) as I understand it and to relate those views to mine. An attempt has been made to present a different way of understanding the nature of the provision at Article 14 (7) in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dodzie Sabbah v The Republic [2015] GHASC 133 (11 June 2015). When the true nature of the article is realised, there follows a fuller appreciation of the Supreme Court judgment and the ruling by the Court of Appeal. I am grateful to Mr. Azumah for his fervent arguments ultimately in support of liberty of the person.

Respectfully Submitted.

 

 

Endnotes

1. Level 300, Faculty of Law and Political Science, KAAF University (Email: oppongfelixantwi (at) gmail (dot) com)
2. Court of Appeal: Criminal Appeal/Motion No: H3/6/2017 (23 Mar 2017)
3. Oswald K. Azumah, “Compensation for wrongful conviction and imprisonment: A review of Ghana’s criminal law in the case of Daniel Ayareba v Attorney General” (Superlawgh.com, January 13, 2025) <https://superlawgh.com/compensation-for-wrongful-conviction-and-imprisonment-a-review-of-ghanas-criminal-law-in-the-case-of-daniel-ayareba-v-attorney-general/ >
4. UKSC/2010/0012
5. [2015] GHASC 133 (11 June 2015)
6. ibid. p2
7. ibid. 25
8. ibid. 85
9. (2009) JELR 68435 (SC)
10. [1974] 1 GLR 88
11. ibid. 91
12. An appellate court that acquits a convict-appellant may on its own also consider whether that convict-appellant qualifies under Article 14 (7) and proceed to determine whether or not to certify to the Supreme Court that the convict-appellant be awarded compensation.
13. [2015] GHASC 133 (11 June 2015) 66
14. ibid. 32
15. Article 33 (1) of the 1992 Constitution
16. (2023) JELR 112154 (HC)
17. Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459) ss 47(1)(a) and 42 (1)(a)(i)
18. [2015] GHASC 133 (11 June 2015) 96-97
19. ibid. 24
20. ibid. 97
21. ibid. 12
22. ibid. 102
23. ibid. 69
24. [2018] GHASC 33 (30 May 2018)
25. ibid. 3
26. [2018] GHASC 33 (30 May 2018)
27. [2015] GHASC 133 (11 June 2015) 68
28. ibid. 16
29. ibid. 37
30. ibid. 93
31. ibid. 103
32. ibid. 102
33. ibid. 103
34. ibid. 72
35. ibid. 72-74
36. ibid. 32-37
37. ibid. 17-19
38. ibid.
39. ibid. 19
40. ibid. 97
41. [2018] GHASC 33 (30 May 2018)
42. ibid. 4
43. (2015) JELR 69917 (CA)
44. (2017) JELR 65402 (CA)
45. [2018] GHASC 33 (30 May 2018)
46. ibid. 3-4
47. [1975] 1 GLR 485
48. [2015] GHASC 133 (11 June 2015) 71