Specific performance in Ghana case law.

Nowhere in the evidence of either side is a description given of a particular plot as being the subject-matter of the alleged contract of sale. The rule is that the court does not decree specific performance of an agreement unless its terms are certain and unambiguous so that the obligations of the parties are clearly ascertained: see Douglas v. Baynes (supra).

ASARE v. ANTWI [1975] 1 GLR 16 [1975] SLR (CA) 4 · Court of Appeal · 1975 · ANIN JA

In all the circumstances of the instant case, therefore, it seems to me that the ends of justice will best be served by allowing the appeal, setting aside the unconditional judgment for specific performance entered against the appellants, and substituting therefore a conditional judgment for specific performance for the payment by the appellants of the agreed purchase price, upon the respondents taking steps to obtain the legal title in the premises and executing conveyance of the same to the appellants within six months from date, the payment of the purchase price to be made on the day of execution of the whole estate, legal as well as equitable, in the land. In default of such conveyance of the legal estate within six months from date, the respondents’ claim for specific performance to stand dismissed.

BRITISH BATA SHOE CO., LTD. v. ROURA & FORGAS LTD. [1964] GLR 190 [1964] SLR (SC) 8 · Supreme Court · 1964 · ADUMUA-BOSSMAN JSC

There is no doubt that as a general rule the Court will not enforce specific performance of a building contract, but an exception from the rule has been recognised. It has, I think, for some time been held that, in order to bring himself within the exception, a plaintiff must establish three things. The first is that the building work, of which he seeks to enforce the performance, is defined by the contract; that is to say, that the particulars of the work are so far definitely ascertained that the Court can sufficiently see what is the exact nature of the work of which it is asked to order the performance. The second is that the plaintiff has a substantial interest in having the contract performed, which is of such a nature that he cannot adequately be compensated for breach of the contract by damages. The third is that the defendant has by the contract obtained possession of land on which the work is contracted to be done.”

PRAH & OTHERS v. ANANE [1964] GLR 458 [1964] SLR (SC) 49 · Supreme Court · 1964 · MILLS- ODOI JSC

The question in the instant case is whether from the evidence on record the case for the respondent can be brought within any of the exceptions above stated. The first question is whether the work, as described in the contract, is sufficiently defined. I think it is not. The other question is, whether the appellants obtained possession of a piece or parcel of land on which the respondent’s building was to be erected by means of the contract for its erection. Clearly they did not. It seems to me therefore that this case cannot be brought within the exceptions laid down in the Wolverhampton case (supra) and an order for specific performance cannot be made.

PRAH & OTHERS v. ANANE [1964] GLR 458 [1964] SLR (SC) 49 · Supreme Court · 1964 · MILLS- ODOI JSC

The price is a material term in every contract of sale; and unless the price is ascertained by the contract or machinery is provided for its ascertainment, the contract is incomplete and cannot be enforced. Thus in the old case of Bromley v. Jefferies (1700) 2 Vern. 415, where a vendor agreed to sell to a purchaser for a sum less by so much than any other purchaser would give, it was held that there was no contract capable of enforcement, since the price was neither ascertained nor ascertainable.

ASARE v. ANTWI [1975] 1 GLR 16 [1975] SLR (CA) 4 · Court of Appeal · 1975 · ANIN JA

In the event, the plaintiff s, claim ought to have been dismissed on the simple ground that the court cannot decree specific performance of an inchoate agreement; and that, where it is sought to enforce such a decree, the court must be satisfied inter alia that there is a concluded contract in fact which is neither uncertain nor vague.

ASARE v. ANTWI [1975] 1 GLR 16 [1975] SLR (CA) 4 · Court of Appeal · 1975 · ANIN JA