Charges and indictments in Ghana case law.

I agree with the 3rd Appellant that without an amendment, the trial judge on her own motion could not change the provision under which he was charged by stating same as that of the 1st Appellant. Especially so, when the 3rd Appellant did not plead to the charge under section 179(3) (a).

REPUBLIC V. CASSIEL ATO FORSON & 2 ORS (2024) H2/22/2023 [2024] SLR (CA) 5 · Court of Appeal · 2024 · ACKAAH-BOAFO JA

The District Magistrate, however, is recorded as finding that these two appellants were “not guilty of stealing, but guilty of fraud by false pretences”. In this the learned Judge of the Divisional Court supported him. (His lordship read Section 39 of the Criminal Code and Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code, as reproduced in the headnote, and continued:—) In our opinion, the combined effect of these two provisions is (1) that if upon a charge of stealing it be found that the facts do not support such a charge, but do support a charge of fraud by false pretences, an accused person may be found guilty of such a charge by substitution although it formed no part of the indictment; but (2) that if the facts do support a charge of stealing, it is upon that count, and that count alone, that an accused person must be dealt with and convicted, and if wrongly acquitted upon such a charge the same facts cannot be used in order to convict him on a substituted charge, particularly where it appears (as it does in the instant case) that the ownership of the money was not severed from the person who handed it to the accused by way only of a temporary loan. The same reasoning would apply to Section 155 of the Criminal Procedure Code. A person wrongly acquitted on a charge of false pretences cannot on the same facts be convicted of stealing unless the facts support a charge.

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE v. BONNEY & ORS. [1959] GLR 237 [1959] SLR (CA) 20 · Court of Appeal · 1959 · GRANVILLE SHARP JA

This count was bad for duplicity, for from the evidence at the trial there appear to have been allegations of two separate and distinct offences, and they have been charged in one count instead of being made the subject of two counts, as the law requires. It is very trite learning in criminal pleadings that no more than one offence may be charged in any one count.

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE v. SENCHEREY [1959] GLR 225 [1959] SLR (CA) 49 · Court of Appeal · 1959 · VAN LARE AG CJ

At the risk of being repetitive, it must be made clear that the Respondent has not been charged under the facts but under the charge sheet which includes the particulars of offence. Thus although the facts of the case as narrated by the Prosecution may be quite illuminating for the accused, it does not absolve the Prosecution of its obligation to sufficiently and reasonably set out the particulars of offence in the charge sheet. Whether or not reasonable information has been given an accused person in the particulars of offence is on a case by case basis. Each case will have to be examined within its own peculiar facts and circumstances. The particulars of offence should provide the basic facts which will have to be proved at the trial.

THE REPUBLIC V. ERNEST THOMPSON & 4 ORS WRIT NO: J3/05/2020 [2021] SLR (SC) 1 · Supreme Court · 2021 · AMADU JSC

The conclusion to which these definitions lead are that deceit by itself is no offence however annoying and improper it may be; therefore the essence, the bed rock of the offence of fraud by false pretences is “intent to defraud.” In other words intent to defraud is not a particular which is necessary merely to give reasonable information as to the nature of a charge of “fraud by false pretences.”

AKOWUAH v. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [1964] GLR 475 [1964] SLR (SC) 46 · Supreme Court · 1964 · OLLENNU JSC

Now, the offence of perjury consists in deliberate or reckless false statement made on oath in material respect which may lead to miscarriage of justice. Therefore (i) the making of the statement on oath, and (ii) knowledge that what is sworn to in material respect is false, or absence of reasonable ground for belief in its truth, are not just particulars necessary to give reasonable information as to the nature of the charge; they are of the essence of the offence itself, as distinct from the nature of the charge, going to its very root; without any of them the charge will disclose no triable offence.

AKOWUAH v. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [1964] GLR 475 [1964] SLR (SC) 46 · Supreme Court · 1964 · OLLENNU JSC

An interpretation of section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960, reveals that some particulars of a charge are only necessary for giving “reasonable information as to the nature of the charge,” while others are “of the essence” or “constitute the gravamen” of the offence charged. Thus two principles emerge from the allegedly conflicting authorities cited, they are as follows: (i) While the particulars are only necessary for giving reasonable information as to the nature of the charge, omission to aver those particulars in the charge or indictment renders the charge merely defective, and that the defect caused by the insufficient particulars can be cured by evidence which supplies the omission; in that case the proviso to section 15 of the Courts Act, 1960, could be prayed in aid and (ii) If the particulars are of the essence, or form the gravamen of the offence charged their omission from a charge or indictment is fatal, because no offence would be disclosed, and cannot be cured except by amendment.

AKOWUAH v. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [1964] GLR 475 [1964] SLR (SC) 46 · Supreme Court · 1964 · OLLENNU JSC

It must be pointed out here that specifying the acts and/or omissions constituting the offences charged is a totally different incident from providing the evidence required to prove the particularised act and/or omission. Informing the accused person of the very act and/or omission that he has engaged in and which is the reason for which he has been charged with the offences does not amount to making available to the accused person the evidence required to prove those acts and/or omissions. Providing the details of the acts and/or omissions on the basis of which the person is facing prosecution will enable the person prepare well to defend the charges.

THE REPUBLIC V. ERNEST THOMPSON & 4 ORS WRIT NO: J3/05/2020 [2021] SLR (SC) 1 · Supreme Court · 2021 · AMADU JSC

The particulars of offence are to give reasonable information as to the nature of the charge. In a charge of stealing, the particulars of offence, going by section 125 of Act 29, will have to tell the accused what item or article he is alleged to have appropriated and that he did so dishonestly and that the particular item or article did not belong to him. These will be sufficient particulars as far as the definition of stealing goes. Other details like who the owner of the thing is and the date or time of the theft or both are not essential to give sufficient particulars, for a person can be charged with stealing a thing, the owner of which is unknown, and so can a person be charged with stealing a thing even when the precise date or time that the thing got lost was not known to its owner.

BREMPONG II V. THE REPUBLIC [1995] SLR (CA) 1 · Court of Appeal · 1995 · BENIN JA

The date or time may become important in a charge sheet where the accused is not established to be in possession or custody of the article alleged to have been stolen by him and he is merely suspected of having stolen it, and he decides or intends to plead alibi. In such a situation, failure to establish the date or time of the alleged theft may prove fatal to the prosecution.

BREMPONG II V. THE REPUBLIC [1995] SLR (CA) 1 · Court of Appeal · 1995 · BENIN JA

The authorities just reviewed are all in agreement that in criminal procedure, the only circumstances in which a charge can be deemed to be properly laid is where the particulars of the charge sufficiently inform the accused person of the specific acts and/or omissions that the accused person engaged in which resulted in the event; the reason for which he is being prosecuted.

THE REPUBLIC V. ERNEST THOMPSON & 4 ORS WRIT NO: J3/05/2020 [2021] SLR (SC) 1 · Supreme Court · 2021 · AMADU JSC

The Osei Kwadjo case (supra) encapsulates the position of the courts on what the particulars of the offence in respect of which a person is charged must contain in order to comply with the constitutional requirement that the person charged is entitled to and must be given details of the offence the subject matter of the charge before he can be properly prosecuted on the charge(s). The particulars of the offence as I have earlier pointed out must state such particulars of the offence as may be necessary for giving reasonable information as to the nature of the charge. This requires that the particulars of offence charged must state with some precision the wording of the section defining the crime and alleging that the accused did an act or omitted to do an act having the ingredients of the offence.

THE REPUBLIC V. ERNEST THOMPSON & 4 ORS WRIT NO: J3/05/2020 [2021] SLR (SC) 1 · Supreme Court · 2021 · AMADU JSC

The prosecution merely repeats the statutory definition of the offence. The particulars of the offence do not state such particulars of the offence as are necessary for giving reasonable information as to the nature of the charge. These observations I have made apply to the offence of wilfully causing financial loss to the Republic stated in counts 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 and 16 of the charge sheet where it is alleged against the Respondent that he caused financial loss to the State in the specific sums mentioned in those counts. In none of those counts is it stated how and what acts or omissions caused the financial loss. They only state the result which is clearly insufficient to meet the constitutional and statutory threshold.

THE REPUBLIC V. ERNEST THOMPSON & 4 ORS WRIT NO: J3/05/2020 [2021] SLR (SC) 1 · Supreme Court · 2021 · AMADU JSC