By
Her Honour Judge Sedinam Awo Kwadam (Mrs.),
Circuit Court 7 Accra, Ghana.
LLM. Candidate, International Criminal Law and Justice,
Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA),
Accra, Ghana.
16th March, 2025.
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the implications of Rodrigo Duterte’s arrest and transfer to The Hague, positioning it as a watershed moment in international criminal law and justice. It explores the complexities of accountability for state leaders accused of grave crimes and evaluates the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) role in combating impunity. The paper critically analyzes the ICC’s dual nature as both a beacon of global justice and equity, and a source of contention, particularly for Africa, where perceptions of bias and selective enforcement have strained relationships with the Court. Drawing on insights from former ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda and leading legal scholars such as Kamari Maxine Clarke, and Margaret deGuzman, the paper delves into jurisdictional debates, the structural inequities of international law, and the evolving dynamics of global accountability. Duterte’s case is presented as an opportunity for the ICC to reaffirm its universal mandate, demonstrating its capacity to prosecute powerful figures beyond African leaders and address criticisms of selective enforcement. For African nations, this development underscores the importance of balancing sovereignty with global accountability. The paper highlights the need for reforms to address perceptions of bias within the ICC and emphasizes the potential of strengthening regional criminal justice and accountability mechanisms, such as the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. Duterte’s arrest serves as a pivotal reminder of the enduring relevance of international criminal law in safeguarding human rights and ensuring justice on a global scale. This piece offers a compelling call to action for the international community to leverage this critical moment to reform and fortify global justice mechanisms and encourage cooperation with international justice systems, ensuring a fairer and more equitable approach to international accountability while confronting impunity wherever it occurs.
Contents
Rodrigo Duterte: The man at the heart of issues. 3
Geopolitical realities and Controversies surrounding Arrest Warrants for Heads of State. 6
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. 7
Former President Omar al-Bashir. 8
Africa’s Critique of the ICC and Counter Arguments from Experts. 8
Reaffirming the ICC’s Mandate. 10
Strengthening Arguments for Cooperation. 11
Challenging Perceptions of Bias. 11
Balancing Sovereignty and Justice. 12
Broader Implications for International Criminal Law and Justice. 13
Universal Jurisdiction and Accountability. 13
INTRODUCTION
The recent arrest, surrender and transfer of former Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte to the ICC in The Hague represents a defining moment in the global pursuit of accountability for crimes against humanity. Duterte’s apprehension, arising from his controversial anti-drug campaign marked by extrajudicial killings,[1] has sparked polarized reactions. While many human rights advocates have hailed this development as a victory for international justice,[2] others, including Duterte’s supporters, criticize it as an infringement on Philippine sovereignty.[3]
Duterte’s case exemplifies the challenges and complexities of international criminal law, particularly regarding state cooperation, sovereignty, and the jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals.[4] Beyond the Philippines, the case reverberates globally, reigniting discussions on the ICC’s role in the pursuit of international criminal justice vis-a-vis its strained relationship with certain regions, notably Africa. This paper explores the broader implications of Duterte’s arrest, analyzing how it intersects with Africa’s contentious relationship with the ICC and its broader stance on international criminal justice.
By examining the ramifications of Duterte’s arrest, this paper seeks to address critical questions: Does his arrest reaffirm the ICC’s commitment to universal justice, or does it merely expose the persistent structural imbalances within the international justice system? What lessons can African nations draw from this event, particularly concerning their criticisms of the ICC and their aspirations for regional justice mechanisms? Through this lens, the paper delves into the philosophical and practical tensions between the ideals of universal accountability and the realities of political and regional dynamics in enforcing international criminal law.
Rodrigo Duterte: The man at the heart of issues
Rodrigo Duterte, a Philippine politician, served as the 16th President of the Republic of the Philippines from 2016 to 2022. Before his presidency, he held the position of Mayor of Davao City, where he became known for his stringent policies against criminal activity. His presidency was notably characterized by an aggressive anti-drug campaign that resulted in thousands of fatalities[5] and attracted significant international criticism for alleged human rights violations.[6]
On March 11, 2025, Mr. Duterte was apprehended at Manila’s international airport upon his return from Hong Kong, pursuant to a warrant issued by the ICC.[7] The ICC has charged Mr. Duterte with crimes against humanity, including murder, in connection with extrajudicial killings carried out during his anti-drug initiatives as both Mayor of Davao City and President of the Philippines.[8] Following his arrest, he was transported to The Hague, Netherlands, where he is currently held in ICC custody awaiting trial.[9]
The arrest has sparked polarized reactions within the Philippines. Families of victims of what has been described as a bloody anti-drug campaign have hailed the development as a critical step toward justice while Mr. Duterte’s supporters, including his daughter and current Vice President, Sara Duterte, have denounced the arrest as an infringement on the Philippines’ sovereignty.[10] The administration of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has publicly stated its intention not to cooperate with the ICC,[11] citing the Philippines’ withdrawal from the Rome Statute in 2019.[12]
Notwithstanding the Philippines’ withdrawal, the ICC has asserted jurisdiction over crimes allegedly committed while the Philippines was a state party to the Rome Statute, thereby allowing the proceedings against Mr. Duterte to advance.[13] Mr. Duterte has publicly acknowledged his role in the anti-drug campaign and has expressed anticipation of a protracted legal process at the ICC.[14]
Duterte’s Arrest: A Victory for Global Accountability?
On March 11, 2025, Philippine authorities arrested Duterte in Manila, acting on an ICC warrant issued through Interpol’s Manila office which had received “the official copy of the arrest warrant from the ICC”.[15] He was subsequently transferred to The Hague, where he faces charges of murder as a crime against humanity.[16] Duterte’s arrest follows years of investigations into his controversial anti-drug campaign, which resulted in thousands of extrajudicial killings, disproportionately targeting the urban poor.[17] Despite withdrawing the Philippines from the ICC in 2019,[18] Duterte’s actions during the Philippines’ membership period remain within the Court’s jurisdiction.[19]
This arrest reaffirms the ICC’s capacity to hold even former heads of state accountable, challenging the notion that political power guarantees immunity from prosecution. It also demonstrates the potential of international cooperation, with Interpol and the Philippine government facilitating Duterte’s transfer.
The Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC expressed its appreciation and welcomed the arrest and transfer of Duterte on 11 March 2025 by Philippine authorities. It reported that this action was a significant step in its ongoing investigation into the Situation in the Philippines. The Office alleged that Duterte, as founder of the Davao Death Squad, Mayor of Davao City, and later President, was responsible for crimes against humanity, specifically murder, under Article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute. These alleged crimes occurred between 1 November 2011 and 16 March 2019 as part of a widespread and systematic attack against civilians during the “war on drugs.” [20]
The ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber I, in a warrant issued on 7 March 2025, confirmed there were reasonable grounds to believe Duterte was criminally responsible for these acts and that the case fell within the Court’s jurisdiction, as the alleged crimes took place while the Philippines was a State Party to the Rome Statute.[21]
The Office highlighted the arrest as a critical development in ensuring accountability for the victims of these crimes. It credited the success to its Philippines Unified Team, led by Deputy Prosecutor Mame Mandiaye Niang, along with its Tracking and Information Fusion Section and support from the ICC Registry. The Office emphasized its commitment to preparing for Duterte’s initial appearance and subsequent proceedings before the Court. The Prosecutor’s Office also expressed gratitude to victims, survivors, witnesses, and activists who contributed to the investigation, recognizing their courage and resilience. It encouraged others with relevant information to cooperate through its Witness Appeal portal.
The investigation in the Philippines remains ongoing, and the Office stated its intention to engage with Philippine authorities and rely on partnerships with national and international stakeholders to pursue further accountability and justice for the affected communities.[22]
The cooperation and assistance provided by Philippine law enforcement authorities and Interpol in the apprehension of Duterte underscore the ICC’s structural vulnerability due to its absence of independent enforcement powers. This reliance necessitates full dependence on external enforcement mechanisms and the discretionary cooperation of State Parties in executing arrests, thereby highlighting a fundamental limitation in the Court’s ability to independently uphold its mandate.
Geopolitical realities and Controversies surrounding Arrest Warrants for Heads of State
The International Criminal Court (ICC) holds a pivotal yet highly contested role within the global legal and political framework. As the foremost judicial institution responsible for prosecuting individuals accused of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression, the ICC faces profound challenges in enforcing its mandates. These challenges arise not only from the Court’s jurisdictional constraints but also from the pervasive influence of geopolitical considerations that shape state compliance. The cases of President Vladimir Putin of Russia, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, and former President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan illustrate the intricate interplay between international law and realpolitik, highlighting how the pursuit of justice under the ICC’s framework is often mediated by the political, strategic, and sovereign interests of states and regions.
1. President Vladimir Putin
In 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin was indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged crimes against humanity arising from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The charges focus on the unlawful deportation and transfer of children from occupied regions of Ukraine.[23]
Under the ICC framework, states parties to the Rome Statute are obligated to arrest individuals indicted by the ICC when they are present on their territory.[24] However, Russia is not a state party to the Rome Statute, and since the issuance of the indictment in February 2023, President Putin has predominantly limited his travel to countries outside the ICC’s jurisdiction.
A notable exception occurred in September 2024, was when President Putin visited Mongolia, a state similarly not party to the Rome Statute. Following his departure, Mongolia issued a statement of neutrality[25] while acknowledging its energy dependence on Russia, which may explain the lack of action during the visit. Before the trip, Russian officials expressed confidence that Mongolia would not enforce the ICC warrant.[26] The ICC subsequently declared Mongolia’s failure to arrest Putin a violation of its obligation to cooperate,[27] but the tangible repercussions of this finding remain limited.
2. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
On November 21, 2024, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, accusing him of crimes against humanity in connection with the situation in the Gaza Strip. The ICC has also issued indictments against leaders of Hamas for crimes within the same conflict.[28] Since the warrant’s issuance, Prime Minister Netanyahu has only travelled to the United States, a country not party to the Rome Statute.[29]
In response to the ICC’s actions, the U.S. imposed sanctions on the ICC’s chief prosecutor, Karim Khan,[30] and introduced legislation in the House of Representatives to penalize individuals or entities assisting the ICC in prosecuting certain individuals, including U.S. allies.[31]
3. Former President Omar al-Bashir
Sudan’s former president Omar al-Bashir, who ruled for over 25 years, was indicted by the ICC in 2009 and 2010 on charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes related to the conflict in Darfur.[32] Despite these indictments, al-Bashir continued to travel internationally, exploiting geopolitical realities to evade arrest.[33]
A key example occurred in June 2015, when al-Bashir attended an African Union (AU) summit in South Africa. Legal challenges were mounted domestically to compel South African authorities to arrest him, but al-Bashir ultimately departed unimpeded.[34] South Africa argued that head-of-state immunity shielded al-Bashir,[35] a position later rejected by both domestic courts[36] and the ICC.[37]
The incident occurred within a broader context of tension between the ICC and the African Union, which criticized the court for perceived bias and disproportionate targeting of African leaders.[38] These tensions prompted the AU to adopt resolutions opposing ICC actions against al-Bashir and led to periodic discussions among member states about collective withdrawal from the ICC’s jurisdiction.[39]
Over time, the relationship between South Africa, the AU, and the ICC has fluctuated. South Africa, for example, formally submitted a notice of withdrawal from the Rome Statute in 2016 but reversed its decision following legal challenges and domestic political considerations.[40] Nevertheless, the governing African National Congress has continued to express dissatisfaction with the ICC, with President Cyril Ramaphosa reaffirming in 2023 the party’s desire to withdraw from the court’s jurisdiction.[41]
South Africa’s decision to allow al-Bashir to leave unimpeded in 2015 contrasts sharply with its 2023 referral of Israel and its leaders to the International Court of Justice for allegations of genocide.[42] This juxtaposition suggests that factors beyond legal obligations, such as geopolitical alignments and strategic interests, play a significant role in shaping state behaviour toward international justice mechanisms.
The cases of Vladimir Putin, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Omar al-Bashir underscore the inextricable nexus between international justice and geopolitics. Leaders indicted by the ICC have historically evaded arrest through a combination of limited jurisdiction, personal decisions to restrict travel, and the influence of realpolitik. Explicit or implicit threats of political, economic, or diplomatic repercussions often deter states from acting on ICC arrest warrants. Furthermore, the ICC’s strained relationships with certain regions, particularly those perceiving themselves as disproportionately targeted, further complicate the court’s ability to fulfill its mandate. While the ICC aims to uphold the rule of law, its enforcement mechanisms are limited by state cooperation domestic political considerations, and geopolitical factors. Powerful states and alliances can exert significant influence to shield their leaders or allies from accountability, while some regions contest the ICC’s impartiality. These dynamics highlight the ongoing challenges in balancing the pursuit of accountability with the realities of international politics.
Africa’s Critique of the ICC and Counter Arguments from Experts
Many people have argued that since its establishment, the ICC has undeniably concentrated much of its attention on Africa, an assertion that continues to spark debate. Of the Court’s 31 cases as of 2025, the majority involve African defendants, including high-profile figures such as Sudan’s Omar Al-Bashir[43] and Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta.[44] Critics contend that this focus exposes inherent biases within the Court, accusing it of disproportionately targeting African states while turning a blind eye to egregious abuses by more powerful nations.
The perception of bias has not gone unchallenged. Reacting to the first arrest warrant issued for Al-Bashir in 2009, H. E. Jean Ping, Chairperson of the African Union in 2009, encapsulated the sentiments of many African leaders and scholars at the time with his remark: “International justice seems to apply its fight against impunity only to Africa as if nothing were happening elsewhere—in Iraq, Gaza, Colombia, or in the Caucasus.”[45]
Subsequently, in 2016, a wave of dissent emerged as several African nations, including South Africa, Burundi, and The Gambia, announced their intentions to withdraw from the ICC.[46] Amidst overwhelming support from the African Union,[47] Burundi became the first to exit and so far the only African state party to withdraw from the Rome Statute.[48] Although some later reversed their decisions to withdraw, this movement highlighted a profound disillusionment with the Court among its African states parties. Was this an expression of genuine frustration with the ICC’s operations, or a strategic maneuver by leaders seeking to shield themselves from scrutiny? Perhaps both.
One of the central critiques stems from the Court’s perceived inability to enforce its mandates uniformly. Take, for instance, the case of Omar Al-Bashir. Despite ICC warrants issued in 2009 and 2010 for his alleged crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes in Darfur, Al-Bashir travelled freely to over 30 countries without arrest for years.[49] This failure to secure his detention has been cited as evidence of the Court’s limited enforcement capabilities and the structural challenges inherent in its reliance on state cooperation. Moreover, the ICC’s lack of jurisdiction over non-states parties and the immunity often enjoyed by powerful nations have further exacerbated allegations of selective justice.
Proponents of the ICC contend that the Court’s focus on Africa does not constitute disproportionate targeting but rather reflects the self-referrals by African states and the severity of the crimes under its jurisdiction.
Fatou Bensouda, former ICC Prosecutor speaking at the Online Journal and Forum, stated “…Many African cases were referred to the ICC by African states themselves or by the UN Security Council. For instance, Mali, Ivory Coast, and Kenya supported ICC investigations into crimes within their territories, while African nations, such as South Africa and Nigeria, endorsed Security Council referrals for Libya and Darfur. Additionally, the gravity of crimes in African situations, such as millions of victims in Darfur, the DRC, and Uganda, and the inability or unwillingness of states to prosecute these crimes, has justified the ICC’s involvement.”[50]
Kamari Maxine Clarke, Ph.D, a Professor at Yale University, speaking on the same platform indicated that, “To date, 122 countries have signed and ratified the ICC’s Rome Statute. The United States, China, Japan, India, Pakistan, Israel, and Turkey have not ratified it and thus are not under the jurisdiction of the Court. Of the 122 countries that have signed the Rome Statute, close to one-third comprise African states, and because of the current violence in some of Africa’s key high-resource areas, the ICC is more likely to scrutinize Africa… African submission to ICC jurisdiction exists within political and “structural” inequalities in the global arena, meaning that the ICC’s involvement in Africa is not simply a question of the ICC’s targeting of Africa nor is it a matter of whether African states themselves participated in referring particular cases. Rather, it has to do with which crimes can be pursued, which agents can be held responsible, whether Africa’s violence can be managed by African countries, and whether the crimes of the Rome Statute are sufficient to address the root causes of violence in Africa’s political landscape”[51]
Magaret M. deGuzman, Associate Professor, Temple University Beasley School of Law, also stated “… critics accuse the ICC of acting immorally by discriminating against Africa and Africans in deciding which situations to investigate and prosecute. The evidentiary basis for such claims is weak. The ICC has invoked its own jurisdiction in only one situation. The other situations have all come to the Court through referrals from the States concerned and the Security Council. Moreover, the ICC has declined to investigate only two situations outside of Africa. This small number of decisions provides an insufficient basis to conclude that the ICC is discriminating in its selection practices. Moreover, the ICC has credibly asserted that its decisions have been based on the gravity of the situations.”[52]
Implications of Duterte’s Arrest for Africa
1. Reaffirming the ICC’s Mandate
Duterte’s arrest underscores the ICC’s commitment to its mandate: To investigate and, where warranted, try individuals charged with the gravest crimes of concern to the international community: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression.[53] For African nations, the arrest of Rodrigo Duterte serves as a compelling demonstration that the ICC’s focus is not confined to any single region. Instead, the Court affirms its commitment to upholding justice globally by pursuing accountability for perpetrators of the most egregious crimes within its jurisdiction. Simultaneously, the ICC seeks to deliver justice to victims, reinforcing its mandate to address crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide wherever they occur. This development underscores the universality of the Court’s mission and its dedication to impartiality in the administration of international criminal law. This unequivocal demonstration highlights the ICC’s willingness to pursue justice across geopolitical boundaries.
2. Strengthening Arguments for Cooperation
Duterte’s arrest and transfer was facilitated by Philippine authorities. Philippine Police Major General Nicolas Torre III who played a pivotal role in the apprehension of former President Rodrigo Duterte, provided a detailed account of the dramatic 12-hour standoff that unfolded on Tuesday at Villamor Air Base. This standoff ultimately led to Duterte’s transfer to The Hague, Netherlands, under charges of crimes against humanity brought by the ICC. According to Torre, Duterte was apprehended upon his arrival at Manila’s Ninoy Aquino International Airport. He was accompanied by his common-law wife, daughter, and friends from Hong Kong.
Following the arrest, Duterte was transported under strict security to a presidential lounge at Villamor Air Base, where standard booking procedures for arrested individuals such as fingerprinting were conducted. Subsequently, arrangements were made to transfer him onto a government-chartered Gulfstream G550 executive jet for the long flight to The Hague.
However, the situation escalated as Duterte, supported by his family, legal representatives, and companions, resisted efforts to board the aircraft. Torre noted that this resistance significantly complicated the process and prolonged the standoff, requiring the coordinated efforts of law enforcement to ensure Duterte’s eventual transfer to ICC custody.[54]
The decision to of the Philippine Government to cooperate with the ICC amidst significant political and public opposition underscores the essential role of national governments in promoting and upholding international justice. For African states considering withdrawal from or non-cooperation with the ICC, the arrest of Rodrigo Duterte executed through the collaboration of Philippine law enforcement and Interpol should serve as a pivotal moment. This event underscores the critical importance of state cooperation with the ICC, as the Court’s effectiveness is fundamentally reliant on the active participation and support of its member states. To enhance this engagement, the ICC should adopt multifaceted strategies, including robust diplomatic initiatives, to encourage nations to collaborate with the Court and ensure the enforcement of arrest warrants issued against non-African heads of state and government officials. Additionally, the ICC could prioritize public education through targeted seminars, social media campaigns, and outreach programs aimed at clarifying its mandate, addressing common misconceptions, and emphasizing its role in prosecuting the gravest crimes, delivering justice to victims, holding perpetrators accountable, and combating global impunity.
3. Challenging Perceptions of Bias
The Duterte case has presented clear unambiguous evidence against longstanding perceptions of regional bias, particularly the criticism that its focus has disproportionately centered on African states. Recently, the ICC Prosecutor has demonstrated a broader scope by pursuing high-profile cases involving non-African leaders, including the Israeli Prime Minister, Mr. Benjamin Netanyahu, and the former Israeli Defense Minister, Mr. Yoav Gallant. Both were charged with crimes against humanity and war crimes allegedly committed between 8 October 2023 and 20 May 2024, when the Prosecution filed applications for arrest warrants. Despite challenges to its jurisdiction and composition regarding the Situation in the State of Palestine, the ICC has reaffirmed its authority. On 21 November 2024, the Pre-Trial Chamber I unanimously issued two decisions rejecting challenges brought by the State of Israel under Articles 18 and 19 of the Rome Statute.[55]
Also, on 17 March 2023, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the ICC announced the issuance of arrest warrants for the President of the Russian Federation Mr. Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Commissioner for Children’s Rights in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation, Ms. Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova.[56]
These high-level developments, among many other investigations being undertaken by the ICC around the world, highlight the ICC’s commitment to impartiality and its willingness to adjudicate cases involving states and leaders outside of Africa, thereby reinforcing its role as a universal mechanism for justice.
4. Balancing Sovereignty and Justice
A key tension in international criminal law is the balance between state sovereignty and the pursuit of justice. Duterte’s arrest illustrates the challenges of navigating this tension, as governments must weigh domestic political considerations against international obligations; Sovereignty and International Accountability. African nations grappling with this issue may look to the Philippines’ experience for insights. The dissatisfaction with the ICC has spurred efforts to develop regional alternatives. The African Union’s Malabo Protocol, which seeks to expand the jurisdiction of the African Court to include international crimes, represents a significant step in this direction, despite its immunity provision for sitting heads of state and senior government officials. Duterte’s case underscores the importance of robust and independent regional courts to complement the global system.
This debate reveals a profound philosophical paradox: while justice, as an ideal, aspires to universality and impartiality holding all individuals accountable regardless of power or status, its implementation is often shaped by global political dynamics. The influence of power structures, particularly through mechanisms like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and its dominance by the Permanent 5 (P5) members with veto powers, underscores structural inequities in the enforcement of international justice. This dynamic has fueled discontent among many African states, prompting calls for reform of these global systems.
However, the push for functional immunity by some African leaders adds complexity to critiques of the ICC. Provisions such as Article 46A bis of the Malabo Protocol, which grants immunity to African Union Heads of State and senior government officials, suggest that these measures are aimed at shielding leaders from accountability rather than promoting the broader objectives of justice. This raises critical ethical questions: can justice remain just if it exempts those in positions of power? And can selective accountability retain moral and legal legitimacy?
This tension highlights the paradox in Africa’s engagement with the ICC. While African states were instrumental in shaping the Rome Statute, advocating for principles of universality and equality under international law, their resistance to ICC proceedings when “targeting” their leaders undermine these foundational ideals. Such inconsistency risks weakening their calls for reform, as it may appear motivated by political self-preservation rather than a genuine commitment to structural change or the pursuit of equitable justice.
Broader Implications for International Criminal Law and Justice
1. Universal Jurisdiction and Accountability
Duterte’s arrest highlights the principle of universal jurisdiction underpinning international criminal law. The concept of “universal jurisdiction” pertains to the legal principle of allowing national courts to prosecute individuals for grave violations of international law, including crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, and torture. This principle is grounded in the understanding that such offences threaten the international community or global order as a whole, thereby granting individual states the authority to take action to safeguard these shared interests. Universal jurisdiction is typically exercised in situations where traditional grounds for criminal jurisdiction are unavailable. These include instances where the accused is neither a national of the prosecuting state nor committed the offence within its territory, against its nationals, or in a manner directly impacting the prosecuting state’s national interests. This principle ensures that grave crimes are prosecuted regardless of where they occur.[57]
For Africa, adopting and implementing the principle of universal jurisdiction could enhance regional accountability mechanisms, such as the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, thereby reducing reliance on external institutions. This approach necessitates strengthening African law enforcement agencies and judicial systems to align with international standards for investigation and adjudication. Achieving this goal requires significant investment in physical infrastructure, including court facilities, police stations, victim shelters, and transportation resources such as vehicles to facilitate movement. Furthermore, logistical improvements are essential, encompassing the provision of modern investigative equipment, advanced adjudication tools, and software solutions for efficient court and case management systems. Such investments would bolster the capacity of African institutions to deliver justice effectively and independently.
CONCLUSION
The arrest and transfer of former Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte to The Hague signifies a landmark moment in international criminal justice, epitomizing the potential of global mechanisms to hold powerful figures accountable for the most serious crimes of international concern. While Human Rights Watch and other advocates have hailed this development as a victory for justice, dissenters, including Duterte’s supporters, view it as an infringement on the Philippines’ sovereignty. In this case, the ICC’s assertion of jurisdiction demonstrates its resolve to pursue accountability even in the face of domestic political resistance and scepticism regarding its legitimacy.
For Africa, Duterte’s arrest presents a multifaceted narrative that challenges prevailing criticisms of the ICC. African leaders and critics have long accused the Court of regional bias and selective justice, citing its disproportionate focus on African leaders. However, Duterte’s case, alongside recent actions against other non-African leaders like Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu, underscores the ICC’s willingness and ability to transcend geopolitical boundaries and confront politically influential and powerful figures globally. This reinforces the Court’s commitment to its universal mandate and challenges narratives of exclusivity or bias.
The perspectives of scholars and practitioners further illuminate the complexities surrounding Africa’s relationship with the ICC. Fatou Bensouda, Kamari Maxine Clarke, and Margaret deGuzman highlight the intricacies of jurisdiction, the gravity of crimes, and structural inequities that shape the ICC’s operations. Their insights reveal that African cases often arise from referrals by African states themselves or the United Nations Security Council, complicating claims of targeted prosecution. Nonetheless, concerns about selective enforcement and the structural limitations of the global justice system remain valid and demand ongoing reform.
Duterte’s case also raises critical questions about balancing sovereignty and justice. The Philippines’ cooperation with the ICC amidst domestic opposition illustrates the importance of state engagement in fostering international accountability. For African nations, this underscores the potential for strengthening regional mechanisms, such as the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, to complement global institutions. However, the push for functional immunity for African leaders, as seen in the Malabo Protocol, risks undermining the broader pursuit of justice and accountability.
From my perspective, Duterte’s arrest serves as a pivotal moment in the evolution of international criminal law, offering lessons for Africa and the broader global community. While the ICC must address its perceived biases and structural limitations, the principles of universality and accountability it seeks to uphold remain crucial. African states should leverage this moment to enhance their regional justice mechanisms while engaging constructively with the ICC to ensure a more equitable and effective global system. Ultimately, the pursuit of justice must rise above political and regional divides, reflecting a united commitment to upholding human dignity and addressing the most egregious crimes of our era. The peace and security of our world is a shared responsibility that transcends borders, compelling all nations, parties to the Rome Statute or not, to embrace a collective spirit of cooperation. Let this commitment inspire a universal resolve to stand with the ICC, championing justice and humanity for the sake of future generations.
[1] Patrice Taddonio, ‘Duterte Arrested: Inside His Rise, Rule and Deadly Drug War | FRONTLINE’ (FRONTLINE11 March 2025) <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/duterte-arrested-icc-warrant-deadly-war-on-drugs-philippines/> accessed 15 March 2025.
[2] Center for Trade Union and Human Rights, ‘Duterte’s Arrest Should Lead to Justice for Rights Violation Victims – CTUHR’ (CTUHR11 March 2025) <https://ctuhr.org/releases/dutertes-arrest-should-lead-to-justice-for-rights-violation-victims/> accessed 15 March 2025.
[3] Reuters Wires, ‘Rodrigo Duterte’s Supporters Demand His Release from ICC | ABS-CBN News’ (ABS-CBN15 March 2025) <https://www.abs-cbn.com/news/nation/2025/3/15/rodrigo-duterte-s-supporters-demand-his-release-from-icc-2358> accessed 15 March 2025.
[4] Devdiscourse News Desk, ‘Duterte’s Hague Standoff: Arrest Sparks Tension and Legal Challenges | Law-Order’ (Devdiscourse13 March 2025) <https://www.devdiscourse.com/article/law-order/3307307-dutertes-hague-standoff-arrest-sparks-tension-and-legal-challenges> accessed 15 March 2025.
[5] Jim Gomez, ‘Duterte’s Arrest Caps an Investigation into One of Asia’s Most Unorthodox Leaders’ (AP News11 March 2025) <https://apnews.com/article/philippines-president-rodrigo-duterte-international-criminal-court-cfc234f22120aefd95248f2785a34b4a>.
[6] The World Organisation Against Torture, ‘Casualties on the Rise in President Duterte’s War on Human Rights…’ (OMCT28 February 2019) <https://www.omct.org/en/resources/urgent-interventions/casualties-on-the-rise-in-president-dutertes-war-on-human-rights-defenders-new-report-says> accessed 13 March 2025.
[7] International Criminal Court, ‘Warrant of Arrest for Mr Rodrigo Roa Duterte’ (International Criminal Court7 March 2025) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/court-record/icc-01/21-83> accessed 15 March 2025.
[8] International Criminal Court (ICC), ‘Situation in the Philippines: Rodrigo Roa Duterte in ICC Custody’ (International Criminal Court12 March 2025) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-philippines-rodrigo-roa-duterte-icc-custody> accessed 13 March 2025.
[9] Joel Guinto, ‘Rodrigo Duterte: Philippines Ex-Leader on Plane to the Hague after Arrest’ BBC News (11 March 2025) <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp9ykn85401o> accessed 13 March 2025.
[10] Herbie G, ‘Duterte Arrest Sparks Outcry from Davao Supporters, Praise from Rights Advocates’ (RAPPLER11 March 2025) <https://www.rappler.com/philippines/mindanao/duterte-arrest-sparks-outcry-davao-supporters-praise-rights-advocates/> accessed 15 March 2025.
[11] Dwight de Leon, ‘Philippine Gov’t Will Not Turn in Duterte to ICC, Says Marcos’ (RAPPLER15 April 2024) <https://www.rappler.com/philippines/marcos-jr-says-government-not-allow-rodrigo-duterte-arrest-international-criminal-court/?utm_source=chatgpt.com> accessed 13 March 2025.
[12] Hannah Ellis-Petersen, ‘Rodrigo Duterte to Pull Philippines out of International Criminal Court’ (the Guardian14 March 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/14/rodrigo-duterte-to-pull-philippines-out-of-international-criminal-court-icc?utm_source=chatgpt.com> accessed 13 March 2025.
[13] International Criminal Court, ‘The Philippines’ (www.icc-cpi.int2021) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/philippines> accessed 15 March 2025.
[14] Reuters Staff, ‘Duterte Takes Responsibility for Philippines Drug War, Anticipates Long ICC Battle’ Reuters (13 March 2025) <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/duterte-takes-responsibility-philippines-drug-war-anticipates-long-icc-battle-2025-03-13/> accessed 13 March 2025.
[15] Kathleen Magramo, ‘Former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte in Custody on ICC Warrant for Crimes against Humanity, Government Says’ (CNN11 March 2025) <https://edition.cnn.com/2025/03/10/asia/philippines-rodrigo-duterte-arrest-intl-hnk/index.html> accessed 13 March 2025.
[16] Reuters, ‘Former Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte a No-Show for First Court Hearing in the Hague’ (NBC News14 March 2025) <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/philippines-duterte-icc-hague-crimes-war-drugs-rcna196446> accessed 15 March 2025.
[17] Michelle Xu, ‘Human Rights and Duterte’s War on Drugs’ (Council on Foreign Relations16 December 2016) <https://www.cfr.org/interview/human-rights-and-dutertes-war-drugs> accessed 15 March 2025.
[18] Al Jazeera, ‘Philippines Officially out of the International Criminal Court’ (www.aljazeera.com17 March 2019) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/17/philippines-officially-out-of-the-international-criminal-court> accessed 13 March 2025.
[19] International Criminal Court (ICC), ‘Situation in the Republic of the Philippines: ICC Appeals Chamber Confirms the Authorisation to Resume Investigations’ (International Criminal Court18 July 2023) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-republic-philippines-icc-appeals-chamber-confirms-authorisation-resume> accessed 13 March 2025.
[20] International Criminal Court (ICC), ‘Situation in the Republic of the Philippines: ICC Appeals Chamber Confirms the Authorisation to Resume Investigations’ (International Criminal Court18 July 2023) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-republic-philippines-icc-appeals-chamber-confirms-authorisation-resume> accessed 13 March 2025.
[21] International Criminal Court, ‘Warrant of Arrest for Mr Rodrigo Roa Duterte’ (International Criminal Court 7 March 2025) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/court-record/icc-01/21-83> accessed 15 March 2025.
[22] International Criminal Court (ICC) ICC), ‘Statement of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor on the Arrest of Former Philippine President Rodrigo Roa Duterte’ (International Criminal Court12 March 2025) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-office-prosecutor-arrest-former-philippine-president-rodrigo-roa-duterte> accessed 13 March 2025.
[23] ICC, ‘Situation in Ukraine: ICC Judges Issue Arrest Warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova’ (International Criminal Court17 March 2023) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and> accessed 16 March 2025.
[24] International Criminal Court (ICC), ‘Rome Statute – Part 9. International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance’ (Un.org2020) <https://legal.un.org/icc/statute/99_corr/9.htm> accessed 16 March 2025.
[25] Ketrin Jochecová, ‘Sorry Not Sorry, Says Mongolia after Failure to Arrest Putin’ (POLITICO3 September 2024) <https://www.politico.eu/article/mongolia-failure-arrest-vladimir-putin-international-warrant-international-criminal-court/> accessed 16 March 2025.
[26] Ruth Comerford, ‘Putin Welcomed in Mongolia despite ICC Arrest Warrant’ (Bbc.com3 September 2024) <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwy527yex0no> accessed 16 March 2025.
[27] International Criminal Court (ICC), ‘Ukraine Situation: ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II Finds That Mongolia Failed to Cooperate in the Arrest and Surrender of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Refers the Matter to the Assembly of States Parties’ (International Criminal Court2024) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/ukraine-situation-icc-pre-trial-chamber-ii-finds-mongolia-failed-cooperate-arrest-and> accessed 16 March 2025.
[28] International Criminal Court, ‘Statement of ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC: Applications for Arrest Warrants in the Situation in the State of Palestine’ (International Criminal Court20 May 2024) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-kc-applications-arrest-warrants-situation-state> accessed 16 March 2025.
[29] Al Jazeera, ‘Israel’s Netanyahu Travels to US to Discuss Gaza Ceasefire with Trump’ (Al Jazeera2 February 2025) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/2/netanyahu-travels-to-us-to-discuss-second-phase-of-gaza-ceasefire> accessed 16 March 2025.
[30] The White House, ‘Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court’ (The White House6 February 2025) <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/imposing-sanctions-on-the-international-criminal-court/> accessed 16 March 2025.
[31] Roy, Chip, ‘H.R.23 – 119th Congress (2025-2026): Illegitimate Court Counteraction Act’ (Congress.gov2025) <https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/23> accessed 16 March 2025.
[32] International Criminal Court, ‘Al Bashir Case’ (Icc-cpi.int2019) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir> accessed 16 March 2025.
[33] Reuters Staff, ‘Sudan’s Bashir to Visit China despite International Arrest Warrant’ Reuters (30 August 2015) <https://www.reuters.com/article/world/sudans-bashir-to-visit-china-despite-international-arrest-warrant-idUSKCN0QZ0P2/> accessed 16 March 2025.
[34] Owen Bowcott, ‘Sudan President Omar Al-Bashir Leaves South Africa as Court Considers Arrest’ (the Guardian15 June 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/15/south-africa-to-fight-omar-al-bashirs-arrest-warrant-sudan> accessed 16 March 2025.
[35] Stephanie Van, ‘South Africa Defends Decision to Ignore ICC’s Bashir Arrest Warrant’ Reuters (7 April 2017) <https://www.reuters.com/article/world/south-africa-defends-decision-to-ignore-iccs-bashir-arrest-warrant-idUSKBN1791FQ/> accessed 16 March 2025.
[36] Staff Writer, ‘Webinar: Navigating the Freeze’ (Southernafricalitigationcentre.org15 March 2016) <https://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/news-release-supreme-court-of-appeal-rules-on-bashir-case/> accessed 16 March 2025.
[37] International Criminal Court (ICC), ‘Al-Bashir Case: ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II Decides Not to Refer South Africa’s Non-Cooperation to the ASP or the UNSC’ (International Criminal Court6 July 2017) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/al-bashir-case-icc-pre-trial-chamber-ii-decides-not-refer-south-africas-non-cooperation-asp-or> accessed 16 March 2025.
Amnesty International, ‘Amnesty International’ (Amnesty.org6 July 2017) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/07/icc-rules-against-south-africa-on-shameful-failure-to-arrest-president-al-bashir/> accessed 16 March 2025.
[38] BBC News, ‘African Union Condemns “Unfair” ICC’ BBC News (11 October 2013) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24489059> accessed 16 March 2025.
[39] International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), ‘AU Strategy for Collective Withdrawal from the ICC a Non-Starter | International Center for Transitional Justice’ (www.ictj.org16 February 2017) <https://www.ictj.org/news/au-withdrawal-icc-non-starter> accessed 16 March 2025.
[40] BBC News, ‘South Africa Revokes ICC Withdrawal’ BBC News (8 March 2017) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39204035> accessed 16 March 2025.
[41] Al Jazeera, ‘South Africa’s Ramaphosa Says Governing Party Wants ICC Exit’ (Al Jazeera25 April 2023) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/25/south-africas-ramaphosa-says-governing-party-wants-icc-exit> accessed 16 March 2025.
[42] International Court of Justice, ‘Proceedings Instituted by South Africa against the State of Israel on 29 December 2023’ (www.icj-cij.org29 December 2023) <https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192> accessed 16 March 2025.
[43] Prosecutor v Al Bashir (Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir) ICC-02/05-01 /09, 4 March 2009 [First Arrest Warrant]; Prosecutor v Al Bashir (Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir) ICC-
02/05-01/09, 12 July 2010 [Second Arrest Warrant]. https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir.
[44] International Criminal Court, ‘Kenyatta Case’ (Icc-cpi.int2019) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya/kenyatta> accessed 13 March 2025.
[45] Al Jazeera, ‘AU Chief Condemns Bashir Warrants’ (Al Jazeera27 July 2010) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2010/7/27/au-chief-condemns-bashir-warrants> accessed 13 March 2025.
[46] Franck Kuwonu, ‘ICC: Beyond the Threats of Withdrawal | Africa Renewal’ (Un.org2017) <https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/may-july-2017/icc-beyond-threats-withdrawal> accessed 13 March 2025.
[47] BBC, ‘African Union Backs Mass ICC Withdrawal’ BBC News (1 February 2017) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38826073> accessed 13 March 2025.
[48] Timothy Jones, ‘Burundi Becomes First Country to Leave ICC’ (dw.com27 October 2017) <https://www.dw.com/en/burundi-becomes-first-country-to-leave-international-criminal-court/a-41135062> accessed 13 March 2025.
[49] Tom White, ‘States “Failing to Seize Sudan’s Dictator despite Genocide Charge”’ (the Guardian21 October 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/oct/21/omar-bashir-travels-world-despite-war-crime-arrest-warrant> accessed 13 March 2025.
[50] Fatou Bensouda, ‘Africa Debate — Is the ICC Targeting Africa Inappropriately?’ (The International Criminal Court Forum2013) <https://iccforum.com/africa> accessed 13 March 2025.
[51] Ibid at 42
[52] Ibid at 43
[53]International Criminal Court, ‘About the Court’ (International Criminal Court2024) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/the-court> accessed 13 March 2025.
[54] PBS News, ‘What Happened during Duterte’s Chaotic Arrest’ (PBS News13 March 2025) <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/what-happened-during-dutertes-chaotic-arrest> accessed 13 March 2025.
[55] International Criminal Court, ‘Situation in the State of Palestine: ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I Rejects the State of Israel’s Challenges to Jurisdiction and Issues Warrants of Arrest for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant’ (International Criminal Court21 November 2024) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-state-palestine-icc-pre-trial-chamber-i-rejects-state-israels-challenges> accessed 13 March 2025.
[56] ICC, ‘Situation in Ukraine: ICC Judges Issue Arrest Warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova’ (International Criminal Court17 March 2023) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and> accessed 13 March 2025.
[57] International Justice Resource Center, ‘Universal Jurisdiction | International Justice Resource Center’ (Ijrcenter.org2012) <https://ijrcenter.org/cases-before-national-courts/domestic-exercise-of-universal-jurisdiction/> accessed 13 March 2025.
