Certiorari

Supreme Court dismisses certiorari application against KATH

The Supreme Court of Ghana on Tuesday October 15, 2024, dismissed a certiorari application brought by one Kwame Adofo, the immediate past lawyer of the Komfo Anokye Teaching Hospital (KATH) in Kumasi. The Court also ordered him to pay a cost of GHc20,000.00 for wasting the court’s time with such a frivolous application. While still under contract as a legal counsel with KATH, Lawyer Adofo launched series of attacks against the hospital and its Chief Executive, causing its management to initially report his unprofessional conduct to the General Legal Council for investigation and appropriate sanctions. Notwithstanding the complaint to the General Legal Council, Lawyer Adofo continued to denigrate the name of the hospital and its Chief Executive with the release of confidential information about the facility, although he had signed an agreement with the institution to as its legal counsel to protect it. In the light of this conduct, the hospital further took a decision to also sue him at the High Court and to get damages against him for breaching his duty of trust owed to the facility. This was because he had betrayed the interest of the hospital and disclosed confidential information which had come to his knowledge by virtue of his role as lawyer for the Hospital. It was the suit at the High Court that Mr Adofo, instead of filing his defense, rather chose to bring a frivolous application, that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit brought against him because his conduct had already been reported to the General Legal Council. The High Court rejected that application and awarded the cost against him and so he brought the present application to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the case as frivolous and toxic to the law. The Komfo Anokye Teaching Hospital was represented by its current lawyer, Nana Freduah Agyeman Osborn. GNA

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TANDOR VIII & ANOR. v. NTAMNA III & ANOR. AND IN THE MATTER OF THE NATIVE COURTS (SOUTHERN TOGOLAND) ORDINANCE AND IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO ISSUE CERTIORARI PURSUANT TO ORDER 59, R.S.C. [1959] GLR 43

Division:    IN THE HIGH COURT, HO Date:    29TH JANUARY, 1959. Before:    SIMPSON J. JUDGMENT OF SIMPSON J. (His lordship stated the history of the Matter, and proceeded): — Under the Native Courts (Southern Section of Togoland) Ordinance, the powers of a Magistrate in land causes are restricted to transferring a matter to another Court (section 54), and hearing appeals where the subject matter in dispute is under £50 in value (sections 46 and 47). The powers of a Government Agent are not exercisable in land causes (sections 61-63). There is no evidence of the value of the subject-matter in this case, but there is no doubt that the action taken in the Magistrate’s Court was not by way of appeal under the provisions of section 46. [p.44] of [1959] GLR 43 I am satisfied that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to make an order striking out the action in the Native Court. Any such application to strike out should have been made to the Native Court itself. Although it may well be that strong grounds exist for pleading res judicata, I must grant the application for certiorari. I order the proceedings in the suit entitled Nana Kofi Tandor VIII of Tutu kpene and Yaa Kpola, plaintiffs, versus Nana Kwadjo Ntamna III (Successor to the late Nana Oseini of Bontebor) and Reverend Wampah, E. P. Church, Ahamansu, defendants, before the Magistrate’s Court (constituted by the Government Agent) Jasikan, including the ruling given on 26th November, 1958, to be produced and brought before this Court to be quashed, and the same are hereby quashed. DECISION The respondents will pay the applicants’ costs, assessed at 20 guineas. You need to sign up to access this content. Sign Up or Login Username or E-mail Password Remember Me     Forgot Password

TANDOR VIII & ANOR. v. NTAMNA III & ANOR. AND IN THE MATTER OF THE NATIVE COURTS (SOUTHERN TOGOLAND) ORDINANCE AND IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO ISSUE CERTIORARI PURSUANT TO ORDER 59, R.S.C. [1959] GLR 43 Read More »

Republic v. State Fishing Corporation Commission of Enquiry (Chairman);

Statement of Facts: The National Liberation Council appointed by an executive instrument, a commission of inquiry to inquire into the management and other matters relating to the State Fishing Corporation. The terms of reference of the commission were set out in the Commission of Enquiry (State Fishing Corporation) Instrument, 1967 (E.I 6). During the sittings of the commission, the assistant marketing officer of the corporation made an allegation of a very serious nature against Mr V. O. Bannerman, the applicant. It was alleged that Mr Bannerman and one Mr Quaye stole 1,100 cartons of fish from the cold store of the Corporation. Mr Bannerman was not invited by the Commission to state his side of the allegations levelled against him. Consequently, by a letter signed by the chairman of the commission Mr Bannerman was purported to have been suspended. A copy of the letter was sent to the Secretary of the National Liberation Council and others. The NLC subsequently wrote a letter purporting to suspend the applicant and three other officers of the corporation. Mr Bannerman therefore initiated the present action at the High Court for writs of certiorari to quash the decision of the commission to suspend him. And he prayed the Court for prohibition to prevent the chairman of the commission from suspending, dismissing, interdicting or in any such manner interfering with his performance of duties as distribution marketing manager of the State Fishing Corporation. The applicant contended that the Commission of Enquiry (State Fishing Corporation) nor its chairman did not have jurisdiction to suspend, dismiss, interdict or interfere with his service contract. He further contended that the commission breached the rules of natural justice in that he was not summoned to appear before it to justify his continued employment by the corporation. Although the chief state attorney, counsel for the respondent quite frankly conceded the grounds for the reliefs sought, he contended that the letter signed by the chairman was not a speaking order since it did not contain any reason for the suspension. He further argued that the letter was meaningless, valueless and of no effect: since it was not written on the basis of the proceedings of the commission. He therefore referred the Court to the letter that was rather written by the NLC. Issues: Whether or not the Commission of Enquiry (State Fishing Corporation) or its chairman was conferred with jurisdiction to suspend the applicant? Whether or not the rule of natural justice was breached? Whether or not the NLC had power to suspend the applicant? Holding: The Commission of Enquiry (State Fishing Corporation) or its chairman was not conferred with jurisdiction to suspend the applicant. The rule of natural justice- audi alteram partem- was breached. The NLC lacked the power to suspend the applicant. Reasoning: The proposition that the commission or its chairman did something of an administrative nature was hard to be accepted by the Court. There was no doubt that the commission had been exercising judicial functions. The administrative duties of the commission or its chairman were stated in Section 6 of the Commission of Enquiry Act, 1964 (Act 250). They included enforcement of attendance of witnesses, production of documents and taking of evidence on commission or by request. The Court found it difficult to see how the chairman, in writing the suspension letter could be said to be acting administratively when his administrative functions did not include suspension of persons that worked in the corporation. The Court therefore took the view that the only motivation for the writing of the suspension letter was the allegation made against the applicant. As a matter of fact the commission or its chairman in suspending the applicant acted in excess of their jurisdiction having regard to the terms of reference in E.I 6. The purported decision to suspend the applicant was ultra vires the commission or its chairman. If even the chairman was acting administratively in suspending the applicant, it was incumbent upon him to adhere to the content of natural justice expounded by Lord Selborne in Spackman v. Plumstead District Board of Works.[2] The trial Judge quoted Lord Selborne to the extent that “…He is not a judge in the proper sense of the word; but he must give the parties an opportunity of being heard before him and stating their case and their view…There would be no decision within the meaning of the statute if there were anything of that sort done contrary to the essence of justice. Further, the Court asserted that the principle of natural justice is usually referred to as audi alterem partem rule and that even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam, before he was called upon to make his defence. In Wood v. Woad,[3] the audi alteram partem rule was explained as “..not confined to the conduct of strictly legal tribunals but is applicable to every tribunal or body of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences to individuals”. Therefore, since the activities of the commission involved judicial function and there was non-compliance with the principles of natural justice, certiorari can issue to quash the decision contained in the suspension letter. Although the State Fishing Corporation Instrument, 1965 (L.I. 397) gave the NLC power to suspend, transfer or dismiss any of the employees of the corporation; the condition precedent was for the NLC to assume control and management of the corporation. Once there was no evidence to show that the NLC assumed such control, its letter to affirm the suspension of the applicant is ultra vires the NLC which acted in excess of its power. Conclusion: The commission of Enquiry (State Fishing Corporation) and its chairman acted ultra vires and therefore the suspension letter is quashed. The Commission or its chairman is prohibited from suspending, dismissing, interdicting or any way interfering with the applicant in the performance of his duties. The NLC acted ultra vires its powers. [1]   Republic v. State Fishing Corporation Commission of Enquiry (Chairman); Ex Parte Bannerman

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