Division: IN THE HIGH COURT, ACCRA
Date: 28 DECEMBER 1964
Before: KINGSLEY-NYINAH J
JUDGMENT OF KINGSLEY-NYINAH J
This is an appeal wherein the appellant who pleaded guilty to a charge of stealing before the District Court, Accra, on 25 November 1964, and was duly convicted and sentenced to a fine of £G25 or three months’ imprisonment with hard labour, now prays that the said conviction and sentence be quashed, because, amongst other things, the proceedings were irregular, the contention being that the appellant was induced to change his plea from an original one of “not guilty” to the one whereon he suffered the said conviction and sentence without appreciating the effect of that latter plea of “guilty.”
On the face of things it would appear that there is no remedy open to the appellant because of the fact that he himself pleaded guilty. But an appellate court has full right and power to look at all available evidence before it in order to determine whether or not a miscarriage of justice has been wrought upon an appellant. Where it is clear that no miscarriage of justice has been effected, nothing will be done to upset the decision of the lower court. But where the circumstances show that there is reasonable and compelling justification for entertaining the petition because justice has miscarried, the appellate court will step in to redress the appellant. It is a well-established and infrangible principle of law that an appeal court has full right and inherent power, in the interests of justice and fair-play, to go behind technicalities and do substantial justice.
After giving due and anxious consideration to the arguments and submissions of both learned counsel for the appellant and for the respondent, having especial regard to exhibit A, I am satisfied and convinced that on the two occasions prior to Wednesday 25 November 1964, when the appellant pleaded “guilty,” his plea was a definite and consistent one of “not guilty.” On the first occasion Saturday 14 November 1964, the appellant was granted bail and ordered to report to the police, daily. On the second occasion Saturday 21 November 1964, it is quite clear (although the district court’s records were silent on that point) that the appellant must have pleaded “not guilty,” for he was, on that day “discharged for want of prosecution.” It is highly inconceivable that the appellant would have been so discharged if he had then pleaded “guilty.”
It is significant to note that on the third occasion, as on the two previous ones, the appellant was all alone and by himself, unrepresented by any counsel. Since, on that third occasion, as well as on the two previous occasions, the appellant had not the benefit of counsel; and since, further, the appellant had been arraigned before the very same district magistrate on all the three previous occasions, it is my decided view that the said district magistrate, no matter how busy he may have been, ought to have paused for judicial thought and fully inquired into the circumstances surrounding and leading to the sudden change of plea from “not guilty” to “guilty,” especially as the appellant had previously been discharged, explaining to the appellant in the process of the inquiry, the effect and consequences of his plea of “guilty.”
It is my considered view that our local, lay and district magistrates, and our circuit judges, should always be mindful of the fact that justice is the better and more beneficially administered to the general satisfaction of all concerned if done carefully and painstakingly, rather than hurriedly and carelessly, with one eye constantly on their returns.
It is always more rewarding and meritorious to handle a few cases carefully, and well, doing fair and proper justice to those concerned, than to rush through one’s cases and have one’s returns showing that scores upon scores of cases have been disposed of when in fact, true justice has been denied those concerned and involved in those cases.
If the learned trial district magistrate had but paused for judicial thought and done his duty fairly to the appellant, he would not have failed to appreciate that the two previous pleas of “not guilty” were highly inconsistent with the last plea by the appellant of “guilty.” He would then have been alerted and put on his due guard to inquire fully into the appellant’s sudden change of plea.
I am satisfied and convinced from all the circumstances of the matter now before me, that the appellant’s mind and intention was not with his last plea of “guilty.” I am satisfied, furthermore, that the learned trial district magistrate failed in his duty when he omitted to ask and to record whatever explanations the appellant had to make.
If that had been done, the explanations such as have been urged before me, would have satisfied the trial magistrate as being consistent with a plea of “not guilty” and inconsistent with a plea of “guilty.”
That having been established, the onus would then have been thrown upon the prosecution, the matter proceeding to trial, to prove the guilt of the appellant herein. Section 199 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960,1 provides as follows:
“Where the accused pleads guilty but adds words indicating that he may have a defence or so indicates in answer to the Court, the Court shall enter a plea of not guilty and record it as having been entered by order of the Court.”
There appears upon the record of proceedings, the following inadequate entry, “Facts heard” and then following that: “Sentence: £G25 or three months’ imprisonment with hard labour.” From whom were those “facts” heard: the prosecution officer or the appellant? If it was from the officer prosecuting that those “facts” were heard, were they consistent with the plea of “guilty”? If on the other hand, those facts were from the appellant, what were they, and how did they measure up to the defendant’s plea of guilty? Were those “facts” consistent or inconsistent with his plea of “guilty” ? As to all these vitally essential matters, the record of proceedings is woefully silent, making the said proceedings highly inadequate for the purposes of true justice.
In all the circumstance, I find and am satisfied that the appellant did not deliberately and unequivocally plead “guilty” to the charge of stealing. That plea was not genuinely made, but made rather as the result of some misapprehension.
“The Court of Appeal “ says Ross on Criminal Appeals (1911 ed.), at p.110, “sits to administer justice and to deal with valid objections to matters which may have led to a miscarriage of justice.” I find in this matter now before me that the objections raised against the proceedings before, and the resultant conviction and sentence by, His Worship Mr. W. Y. A. Boateng, District magistrate, Accra, are valid because quite clearly the appellant was embarrassed and prejudiced by the proceedings, which were rushed and incomplete.
Satisfied and convinced, then, in all the circumstances of this matter, that a miscarriage of justice will further be occasioned the appellant if his conviction and sentence were allowed to stand, I hereby and in exercise of the powers conferred upon me under and by virtue of section 330 (1) (a) (i) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960, quash the conviction and sentence recorded against him.
It is ordered that the fine imposed upon and paid by him of £G25 be forthwith refunded to the appellant herein.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
N. A. Y.
