IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE SUPREME COURT
ACCRA – A.D.2026
CORAM: PWAMANG JSC (PRESIDING)
GAEWU JSC
ADJEI-FRIMPONG JSC
DZAMEFE JSC
AMALEBOBA JSC
CIVIL APPEAL
NO: J4/46/2023
28TH JANUARY, 2026
MRS MARGARET WINFUL …… PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT/RESPONDENT
VRS
MUSTAPHA DAUDA ……. DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT/APPELLANT
JUDGMENT
ADJEI-FRIMPONG, JSC
My Lords, this is a routine land litigation between the parties. According to the Plaintiff (who is before us as Plaintiff/Appellant/Respondent) she acquired the subject plot of land which is situate at North-West Odorkor from the Asere Stool in 1987. The Stool, represented by Nii Nikoi Amontia IV, who, acting with the consent and concurrence of his principal elders issued her with an indenture which she later registered. She immediately took possession of the plot and constructed a building foundation on it. She had remained in possession until around November 2014 when the Defendant, (before us as Defendant/Respondent/Appellant) laid adverse claim to the plot and sought to take possession of it. In the result, she caused the arrest of the Defendant’s agent one Yusif Mohammed by the Anyaa police. When the police requested the agent to produce documents to back the claim of his principal, he could not.
Further, the Plaintiff claims to have conducted a search at the Lands Commission, Accra which showed a lease of the land to her in 1987 by her grantor. Claiming that the Defendant had wrongfully taken her plot and clandestinely developed same, she sought the following reliefs in the trial Court:
a. Declaration to all the piece and or parcel of land situate lying and being at North West Odorkor, Accra in the Greater Accra Region of the Republic of Ghana and bounded on the North-East by Lessor’s land measuring 130 feet more or less, on the North West by Lessor’s land measuring 110 feet more or less, on the South-East by proposed road measuring 110 feet more or less, on the South West by Lessor’s land measuring 130 feet more or less which piece or parcel covering an approximate area of 0.35 acre.
b. Perpetual injunction to restraining Defendant his agents, assigns and successors from entry onto the land or having anything to do with the land by way of conveyance or interference.
c. Recovery of possession
d. Damages for trespass.
e. Costs.
The Defendant on the other claims the plot through the Charbukwei Family of Anyaa. According to him, it was his late father, Alhaji Mamoudu Issah Dawuda who in 1989, acquired the plot from the said family. The father in his lifetime exercised acts of possession by developing a five-bedroom foundation up to window level and an additional three chamber and hall building in which he put tenants. After the father’s death, there was an attempt by the caretaker to sell a portion of the property. His family therefore decided that the title of the property be ‘regularized’ in his name following which a lease dated 30th November 2004 was entered between himself and the Charbukwei Family represented by its head Augustus Kpakpo Brown.
In Defendant’s further pleading, the Yusif Mohammed the Plaintiff mentioned was a mere caretaker of his land and was therefore in no position to produce documents to the Anyaa police. He challenged the capacity of the Asere Stool to make the grant to the Plaintiff since the land belonged to the Charbukwei Family which is part of the Sempe Division of the Ga Traditional Area.
At the trial, the Plaintiff testified through one George Ofori Dei Twum Ampofo, her son-in-law and attorney and called her only witness William Fynn Otoo. The Defendant testified in person and called two witnesses, namely Clement Sisera Botchway, head of the Charbukwei Family and one Shadrack Allottey also of the same family.
The learned trial Judge found grounds to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claim as unproven. She reasoned that unlike the Plaintiff who failed to call her grantor to testify in proof of her root of title, the Defendant’s first witness, the head of the Charbukwei Family of Anyaa gave credible traditional evidence to prove the ownership of the family in the Anyaa lands of which the subject plot forms part. The same witness was the secretary to the family at the time the grant was made to the Defendant’s father and her account was found credible.
The learned Judge also attached considerable weight to a 1948 judgment of the Native Court in the case intituled ANYA ADUKOI VRS OTOH & GRUNSHIE KOFI & NII AYIKU (Suit No. 65/1948) and a registered Statutory Declaration tendered by the Defendant to prove ownership of his grantor in the land. She also found that the Defendant had been in physical possession of the land for over 27 years and that granted the Plaintiff had any interest therein at all, her inaction amounted to acquiescence.
Appeal in the Court of Appeal
The Plaintiff’s appeal in the Court of appeal was successful. The learned Justices of the Court were not satisfied that either party adduced satisfactory evidence to establish their root of title to meet the requirement of the law on such claims. Whilst their Lordships observed that the Plaintiff called no evidence to prove her root of title, they also did not find the traditional evidence of PW1 as well as the 1948 judgment and the Statutory Declaration sufficient proof of title in the Charbukwei Family. Their Lordships however dwelt heavily on the Plaintiff’s evidence of payment of ground rent to the Administrator of Stool lands and a search from the Lands Commission showing a lease in her favour to conclude that the Plaintiff proved a better title. Again even though their Lordships found evidence of the Defendant’s possession over a period of time, they took the view that the Defendant’s long possession did not upset the superior title established by the Plaintiff.
Appeal in the Supreme Court
The Defendant’s appeal in this Court is on the following grounds:
1. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is against the weight of evidence.
2. The Court of Appeal erred in holding that the Defendant/Respondent/Appellant failed to call his grantors to give evidence.
3. The Court of Appeal failed to acknowledge, recognize and give necessary weight to the adverse possession of the Defendant/Respondent/Appellant on the land for over 20 years.
4. The Court of Appeal failed to recognize that the land claimed by the Plaintiff/Appellant/Respondent could be totally different from the Defendant/Respondent/Appellant’s land.
The second ground of appeal listed above excites our immediate attention as it appears an “Aunt Sally”. Nowhere did the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal hold that the Defendant failed to call his grantors to give evidence. That was rather said of the Plaintiff which from our reading was accurately the case. What the learned Justices said of the Defendant was rather that the evidence he adduced (the testimony of the head of the Charbukwei Family (DW1 inclusive) was not sufficient to prove his root of title. The recognition that the Defendant indeed called his grantor to give evidence is captured at page 8 of the judgment [Page 26 Vol.2 ROA] this way:
“In Defendant’s effort to claim that the lands of Anyaa belongs to the Charbukwei family but not stool lands belonging to Nikoi Olai Stool, it procured DW1, Clement Sisera Botchway, the head of Charbukwei family of Anyaa to testify on its behalf. DW1 also repeated the claim that there was a statutory declaration in its favour since 1972. And that the family had been the owners of the lands of Anyaa since time immemorial. DW1 further asserted that the ownership of the Charbukwei family to the lands has been confirmed in a judgment intituled Anya Adukoi v Otoh & Grunshie Kofi & Ayiku in suit no. 65/1948.”
We do not find any part of the judgment that states that the Defendant failed to call his grantors to give evidence. The ground of appeal therefore does not emanate from the judgment. It does not flow from the findings of the trial court. Such a ground of appeal cannot be admissible in law. The principle well understood is that a ground of appeal is a complaint against a specific finding of the lower court in the decision complained of. It must therefore relate to, arise or flow from the decision complained of. Consequently, a ground of appeal that is not related to, or does not arise or flow from the decision appealed against is incompetent by reason of it disclosing no reasonable ground of appeal. Such grounds are liable to be struck down. See MERCANTILE BANK OF NIGERIA PLC & ANOR VRS LINUS NWOBODO (2005)7 S.C.N.J 569; (2005)5 N.W.L.R (PT 917) 184; DAGACI OF DERE & ORS VRS DAGACI OF EBWA & ORS (2006)7 N.W.L.R. (PT. 979) 382. We therefore strike down the second ground of appeal.
The 3rd ground of appeal alleges a failing on the part of the Court below to pay due consideration to the Defendant’s evidence of adverse possession of the land. The 4th ground touches on the potential differences in the identities of the lands the parties were laying claim to thus, raising the issue of identity of the Plaintiff’s land. We see that both grounds involve determination of evidential matters, in particular whether the learned Justices properly evaluated the evidence adduced on record in reaching their decision. Those two grounds could conveniently be subsumed under the omnibus ground of appeal which essentially tasks us to review the entire record to determine whether the findings and conclusions of the learned Justices of the Court below were well-founded. We shall therefore proceed to resolve the three grounds together. We do so having in mind the ultimate question to determine which is, which side of the divide in the end made a stronger case to tilt the balance of probabilities of ownership of the land in its favour. See QUARCOOPOME VRS SANYO ELECTRIC TRADING CO. LTD [2009] SCGLR 213; OPPONG VRS ANARFI [2011]2 SCGLR 556; NORTEY (NO.2) VRS AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF JOUNALISM AND COMMUNICATION & ORS (NO.2) [2013-2014]1 SCGLR 703; KORANTENG & ANOR VRS KLU [1993-94]1 GLR 280; TUAKWA VRS BOSOM [2001-2002] SCGLR 61.
Summary of the Defendant’s arguments
It was argued that as the Plaintiff was seeking a declaration of title to land she was to prove her title by cogent evidence. She was obliged to prove her root of title by calling the stool’s representative to prove the stool’s ownership of the land. This the Plaintiff failed to do. This was what led the trial High Court to hold rightly, that the land was owned by the Charbukwei family, as the Defendant, unlike the Plaintiff called his grantor to give traditional and documentary evidence to prove his case.
Further, it was argued that the decision of the Court of appeal to rely solely on the payment of ground rent as proof of the stool’s ownership of the land was misplaced. Payment of ground rent to the Administrator of Stool lands, Defendant contends, was not the determinant of stool ownership of land as the law is settled on how a stool may acquire land; “discovery by hunters or pioneers of stool of unoccupied land and subsequent settlement thereon and use thereof by the stool and its subjects.” OHEMEN VRS ADJEI (1957)2 WALR 275; Lands Act 2020 (Act 1036). In his argument, the role of the Administrator of Stool Lands is only for revenue purposes and that the Administrator has never been the decider of which land is family or a stool land.
Besides, a close examination of the receipts for the payment shows that they lack credibility and continuity. The initial payment was made on 12th April 2002, after which there was no payment till 7th April 2014 to clandestinely cover the twelve year gap. This suggests that the payments were not made in the ordinary course of land ownership or administration but rather a self-serving effort contemporaneous with or preparatory to litigation.
The Defendant argues in addition that the learned Justices of the Court below in a rather perfunctory manner disregarded the traditional evidence he adduced through his grantor including the judgment of the native Court that had determined that the Anyaa lands belonged to the Charbukwei family. Significantly, the traditional evidence was not contradicted in any anyway through cross-examination or a contrary traditional evidence. Not only did the Plaintiff woefully fail to prove her root of title but also presented a weaker case not meriting judgment in her favour in any way.
Furthermore, the learned justices failed to properly consider the extensive evidence of the Defendant’s possession of the land spanning over twenty-seven (27) years. Although, the learned Justices acknowledged the Defendant’s long possession of the land, they strangely held, contrary to the overwhelming evidence on record that the Defendant’s claim was not based on adverse possession. The Justices’ line of thinking was clearly at odds with Section 48 of the Evidence Act (NRCD 323) which enacts possession as presumptive of ownership. NANA AMA AMPONSAH VS FRANKLYN AMOAH NYAMAAH, Civil Appeal No. J4/10/2008; EBENEZER KWAKU & ORS VRS OTIBU IV, Civil Appeal No. J4/53/2021 dated 7th July 2021.
Again the Defendant had adduced sufficient evidence to show that during his long physical possession, the Plaintiff never took any step to assert her claim if any existed and that not only had the Plaintiff been indolent in the eyes of equity (MOST REV. DR ROBERT ABOAGYE-MENSAH & ORS VRS YAW BOAKYE (2022) JELR 109764; DJIN VRS MUSAH BAAKO [2007-2008] 1 SCGLR 686 cited), but her rights had been extinguished by the rules of limitation. ADJETEY ADJEI VRS NMAI BOI [2013-2014]2 SCGLR 1474. That the testimonies of the Plaintiff’s attorney and witness showed clear abandonment of the Plaintiff’s interest if any in the land. Over all, the Plaintiff failed to prove her case to warrant title in her favour and that the judgment of the learned Justices was against the weight of evidence on record.
Summary of Plaintiff’s arguments
The Plaintiff contends that the Court of Appeal’s finding that she proved a better title was supportable on the basis of the Plaintiff’s indenture (Exhibit B), the search result (Exhibit D) and the payment of ground rent to the Administrator of Stool Lands which showed that the land was a stool land and not for the Charbukwei Family. The Court of Appeal was also right on its position that the 1948 judgment did not declare that the Anyaa lands belonged to the Charbukwei Family. In any event, the 1948 judgment which the Defendant relies on has been overruled by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court in AUGUSTUS KPAKPO BROWN VRS (1) S. BOSOMTWE CO.LTD. (2) ADAM KWATEI QUARTEY. [AUGUSTUS KPAKPO BROWN’S CASE]. The decision of the trial Judge was therefore given per incuriam. The land was therefore a stool land and not family land as the Defendant had argued.
In response to the Defendant’s argument of long and undisturbed possession of the land, the Plaintiff contends that even so, the Defendant did not plead the statute of limitation and again, the Defendant did not base his claim on adverse possession. The Defendant’s possessory right was not absolute as it was subject to a superior title holder like the Plaintiff in this case. OSEI (SUBSTITUTED BY) GILARD VRS KORANG [2013-2014]1 SCGLR 221; KWAKU & ANOR VRS QUANSAH & ANOR (1977)2 GLR 403 cited.
Resolution
In this determination we keep at the back of our minds that the Plaintiff was the one who sought declaration of title to the subject land. The Defendant had no counterclaim. It could be because he was in possession. By way of allocation of the legal burden, the Plaintiff, as claimant, assumed the initial burden of proof of title to the land she was claiming.
The question of allocation of burden of proof is one of law. In many types of civil proceedings, case law or statute has prescription for the assumption of the burdens. One such litigation is an action for declaration of title to land. In such actions, the law prescribes that a claimant, be it Plaintiff or Defendant must prove title. As a general rule, not an inflexible one, a claimant does so on the strength of his own case and the proof is on a balance of probabilities. In NENE DOKUTSO TEI KWABLA VRS LANDS COMMISSION [2017-2018]1 SCLRG 497 at 509, this Court per Apau JSC stated:
“Again, the argument by the appellant that the standard of proof required in civil suits did not apply to him because his claim stood unchallenged as no other family or group from Ningo came to court despite his family’s claim to Bundase lands is untenable. The authorities are settled on the principle that where a plaintiff has claimed a declaration of title, he still had to lead evidence in proof of his title, notwithstanding the failure on the part of the defendant to even enter appearance. Such evidence must satisfy the only standard of proof required in civil suits which is proof on the preponderance of probabilities. There is no exception to that standard.”
The issue of identity.
Proof of identity of land which includes proof of its exact geographical location is a critical condition to obtain declaration of title to land. Authorities on this requirement which are legion fall into the following tall list: BASSIL VRS GYAMPO (1964) GLR 81; BEDU VRS AGBI (1977)2 GLR 238; ANANE VRS DONKOR (1965) GLR 158; AKOTO VRS KAVEGE (1984-86)2 GLR 365; NYIKPLORKPO VRS AGBODOTOR (1987-88)1 GLR 165; AGYEI OSAE & ORS VRS ADJEIFIO & ORS [2007-2008]1 SCGLR 499; NORTEY (NO.2) VRS AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF JOURNALISM & COMMUNICATION & ORS (NO.2) [2013-2014]2 SCGLR 703; NYAMEKYE VRS ANSAH [2989-90]2 GLR 152.
In this case, the Plaintiff described her land as “…all the piece and or parcel of land situate lying and being at North West Odorkor, Accra in the Greater Accra Region of the Republic of Ghana and bounded on the North-East by Lessor’s land measuring 130 feet more or less, on the North West by Lessor’s land measuring 110 feet more or less, on the South-East by proposed road measuring 110 feet more or less, on the South West by Lessor’s land measuring 130 feet more or less which piece or parcel covering an approximate area of 0.35 acre.” The same description appears in her indenture and the plan attached thereto.
The Defendant describes his land as situate at Anyaa measuring “…an approximate area of 0.45 Acre (0.18 Hect) and bounded on the North-East by family land measuring 134.2 feet more or less on the South-East by a proposed road measuring 139.1 feet more or less and on the south west by family land measuring 143.3 feet more less and on the North-West by family land measuring 144.2 feet more or less…”
The Defendant under the 4th ground of appeal criticizes the Court of appeal for failing to recognize that the Plaintiff’s land could be totally different from the Defendant’s land. As we evaluate the evidence on record, the soundness of this criticism is not doubtful. For it appears the two descriptions in terms of limits and size are not the same granted that North West Odokor and Anyaa refer to the same land. But more importantly, the Plaintiff did not appear to be familiar with the land she acquired, otherwise, she seemed to have lost trace of it in the course of time. This was evident in the account of her only witness. PW1 stated under cross-examination:
“Q. Will you be surprise [sic] to know that the Plaintiff’s Attorney indicated to this court that the Plaintiff returned to the disputed land in 2014?
“A.I will be surprised because when she came in 2010 she was finding it a bit difficult to locate where the land was. So therefore we have [sic] to get in a Land Surveyor which took out site plan and the master plan of the Lands Commission. By then something popped up she left and left everything in my hands, I was with the land surveyor and to my surprise I didn’t even know there is a diverse [sic] that we can use to trace the location of the land. My Lord the Surveyor picked the numbers of the site plan in addition to the master plan and where we were standing at Lands Commission he told me we have about 15 kilometers.” [Page 160, Vol. 1 ROA].
The above testimony gives the following practical distillation: The Plaintiff was unable to physically locate her land ostensibly by reason of effluxion of time and physical development of the area. So she needed to engage an expert, a land surveyor to trace the land. The expert himself could not use the Plaintiff’s plan alone to locate the land. It required a master plan from the Lands Commission and the use of a device for the exercise. The surveyor who undertook the exercise was never called to give evidence as to how he came by the conclusion that the Plaintiff’s ‘missing’ land was that which the Defendant occupied. This, we think was fatal to the Plaintiff’s case on the issue of identity of the land she was claiming.
Certainly, the burden of proof of identity of the land could not be discharged by a lay opinion. The expert had to come into the box to demonstrate how his conclusion was reached and avail himself for cross-examination if found necessary. It occurs to us that the statutory condition to call for the adduction of evidence pursuant to Section 122 of the Evidence Act (NRCD 323) was triggered. The provision states:
“If the subject of the testimony is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion or inference of an expert will assist the court or tribunal of fact in understanding evidence in the action or in determining any issue, a witness may give testimony in the form of an opinion on inference concerning any subject on which the witness is qualified to give expert testimony.”
This was also against the backdrop that the parties in their pleadings had described the land differently in terms of dimensions, limits and even nomenclature. We will hold that in the absence of the evidence of the surveyor who ‘rediscovered’ the Plaintiff’s ‘missing’ land and given all the circumstances of the case, including the varied descriptions the Plaintiff failed to prove the identity of her land. A key legal requirement of proof of title to warrant a declaration of title to land by a Court of law was not met. The conclusion of the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal that the Plaintiff proved her title to the land the Defendant occupies was not supportable by the evidence on record especially so when their Lordships themselves found thus; “Even though the Plaintiff claimed to have erected a building foundation on the land immediately after the grant, but she did not produce any such evidence…” [Page 29, Vol. 2 ROA]. This is a conclusion we are persuaded to set aside and so we do.
But that is not the end of the matter. The substantial measure of uncertainty about the identity of the Plaintiff’s land was to erode the probative value of the documents she tendered to prove her title. Put in another way, by the confusion generated by the Plaintiff’s own showing, over the identity of her land, there is disconnect between the receipts showing the payment of the rent to the Administrator of Stool Lands and her search results on one hand, and the land the Defendant occupies on the other. What shows that those documents unequivocally affect the land which the Defendant is in physical possession of? To us this is the waterloo of the Plaintiff’s case. Had the learned Justices of the Court below recognized this fatal slit in the Plaintiff’s case, they would not have come to the conclusion that the Plaintiff proved her title to the land the Defendant was in possession of.
The Defendant’s possession
If one point is clear from the record, it is that the two lower Courts concurrently found that the Defendant had been in an undisturbed physical possession of the land for a number of years, a finding we do not find basis to disturb. Their point of divergence was what legal effect the possession had on the rights of the parties having regard to other pieces of evidence on record. The learned trial judge took the following position:
“The Defendant in his evidence showed that they had been in undisturbed possession of the disputed land from the period 1989 to 2014 when the Plaintiff initiated the action against them for declaration of title and other reliefs endorsed on the Plaintiff’s writ of summons. The Defendant had exhibited overt act of ownership by developing a five-bedroom foundation up to window level and 3 chamber and halls with tenants occupying it. The Defendant indicated in his evidence that for a period of about 27 years he has been in peaceful undisturbed possession of the disputed land. The Plaintiff in this matter could not even trace the location of the land they were laying claim to… This is a clear situation where the Plaintiff assuming without admitting that she had a valid grant should be deemed to have acquiesced in the Defendant’s possession of the land beyond years which extinguishes the Plaintiff’s claim to the land in whatever shape or form.” [Page 193-194, Vol. 1 ROA].
The learned Justices of the Court of Appeal however thought:
“The Defendant appears to latch onto the matter of physical possession as having built a three bedroom chamber and a hall with tenants in it. And that Plaintiff did not visit the land from the time of her alleged grant in 1987 till 2014, where she found the presence of Defendant on the land. Even though the Plaintiff claimed to have erected a building foundation on the land immediately after the grant but she did not produce any such evidence. But matters must be placed in their proper context. Defendant did not assert a claim in to the land by virtue of any adverse possession but rather as being the owner due to a valid grant to him which had earlier been granted to his father. The rule is that a person in possession deserves the protection of the court against the whole except [sic] a person with a better title…In this case even though the Defendant claims that he is in possession by physical occupation of the land but against that of the Plaintiff who has shown a better title to the land, possession alone will not suffice…”
We have in this delivery determined that for not calling evidence to prove the identity of her land, the Plaintiff failed to prove title to the land the Defendant occupies. She has not been successful in demonstrating any better title to upset the long and undisturbed physical possession of the Defendant. The evidence shows that the Defendant has extensively developed the land and put tenants in occupation. This is a fact not disputed. The Defendant has exercised not only possession but over acts of ownership. The presumption under Section 48(2) thus: “A person who exercises acts of ownership over property is presumed to be the owner of it” avails him and in the absence of a rebuttal evidence from the Plaintiff, the law recognizes his ownership in the face of which the Plaintiff’s collapsed case of title must fly.
The foregoing conclusion disposes of the appeal. However, we wish to address one contention advanced by Counsel for the Plaintiff. It is that the case of Anya Adukoi v Otoh & Grunshie Kofi & Ayiku on which the Defendant relied has been overruled in the AUGUSTUS KPAKPO BROWN case. We find Counsel’s contention misleading. The following is what happened in AUGUSTUS KPAKPO BROWN (Unreported) Suit No. CA NO. 1/2001 29TH May 2002.
Augustus Kpakpo Brown sued S. Bosomtwe Co Ltd for digging gravels on a piece of land situate at Anyaa in Ga District bounded by the Ablekuma village, Kwashieman village Sowutuom village and Gbawe village. S. BOSOMTWE Co Ltd. claimed the land it dug gravels on belonged to GBAWE KWATEI family
Co-defendant ADAM KWATEI QUARTEY joined the suit describing his family land as lying at the North-Western part of Accra bounded by Asere Stool land, Akumajay and Sempe Stool land and Sakumomo plains, Tetegu, Densu river, Djamang hill, Aboabo Hill, Kubenan Hill and Atuase Hill.
One Nii Charbukwei joined the suit as Co-plaintiff because the land was part of the Anyaa Stool land. The joinder was appealed against and was set aside by the Court of Appeal. So the suit proceeded between the Plaintiff and the Co-Defendant. The trial judge found that the Plaintiff was unable to prove his case and that his evidence has been inconsistent. Judgment was entered for Co-defendant. An appeal to the Court of Appeal and later to the Supreme Court failed. For what is significant, the Supreme Court observed:
“When Nii Chabukwei II applied to join the action as Co-Plaintiff the Plaintiff vehemently opposed the application to the extent that even though the High Court granted the application, the Plaintiff had the order vacated on appeal. Yet it has not been disputed that Nii Chabukwei, the incumbent chief of Anyaa is the owner by succession to all Anyaa lands of which the plaintiff claims a portion. Nii Chabukwei was not even called to give evidence of the boundaries of the Anyaa lands…”
The above quotation is not the ratio of the case even though it appears that Anyaa lands could be stool land but belonging to the Chabukwei Stool of Anyaa. And there is no clarity as to the relationship between the Chabukwei Familly and the Chabukwei Stool of Anyaa which was occupied by Chief Chabukwei II.
From what we gather, the issue of who owns Anyaa lands appears still to be largely unsettled. It is therefore not dispositive of this dispute. The AUGUSTUS KPAKPO BROWN case therefore does not advance the Plaintiff’s cause before us. What is established on our review of the record is that the Plaintiff on a balance of probabilities failed to make a better case. In our final analysis, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 3rd February 2024 and restore the judgment of the High Court dated 5th December 2018, to the extent that same dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendant.
(SGD.) R. ADJEI-FRIMPONG
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
(SGD.) G. PWAMANG
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
(SGD.) E. Y. GAEWU
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
(SGD.) S. DZAMEFE
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
(SGD.) H. AMALEBOBA
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
COUNSEL
FREDERICK ASAMOAH ESQ. FOR THE DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT/APPELLANT
NASHIRU YUSSIF ESQ. FOR THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT/RESPONDENT. WITH JUSTICE ADOMAKO OPOKU ESQ.
