IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE SUPREME COURT
ACCRA – AD.2026
CORAM: PWAMANG JSC (PRESIDING)
AMADU JSC
KULENDI JSC
ASIEDU JSC
KWOFIE JSC
CIVIL MOTION NO: J5/13/2026
28TH JANUARY, 2026
THE REPUBLIC
VRS.
HIGH COURT
(COMMERCIAL DIVISION) TAMALE. …………… RESPONDENT
EX PARTE:
1. MATHEW NYINDAM …………… APPLICANT
DANIEL NSALA WAKPAL …………… 1ST INTERESTED PARTY
2. THE ELECTORALCOMMISSION …………… 2ND INTERESTED PARTY
3. THE CLERK OF PARLIAMENT …………… 3RD INTERESTED PARTY
RULING
MAJORITY OPINION
KULENDI JSC:-
A. INTRODUCTION
Having regard to the many election petitions that flood our courts after each general election, one cannot help but agree with Niccolo di Bernardo dei Machiavelli in his book titled “The Prince” when he said;
“The desire to acquire power is truly very natural and common; and men who succeed in doing so are always praised, not blamed.”
(The Prince, 1532, ch. III)
However, in a constitutional democracy such as ours, the pursuit of political power is attained through the ballot box and persons who are aggrieved by the outcome or processes may have solace in the court of law. In other words, elections are the constitutional moment when the sovereignty of the people is not only affirmed in language but performed in practice. They are, in reality, the periodic renewal of the social contract in the Hobbesian, Lockean or Rousseauian sense and because elections are the clearest expression of collective self-government, disputes concerning them are, at their core, disputes about the conditions under which public authority becomes legitimate.
That is why the judicial role in electoral disputes is both delicate and indispensable. It is delicate, because courts must not displace the people as the ultimate authors of political authority; and indispensable, because courts must ensure that the people’s choice is expressed through processes the Constitution recognises as lawful.
On this account, a judge who is privileged to adjudicate on an election petition must exercise an unwavering fidelity to the law and be deaf to the passions of the heart. The Court’s duty must be to protect the broader constitutional idea that the people’s will, when expressed through elections, is entitled to be counted honestly, transparently, and within law.
Our task therefore, is twofold. First, to be faithful to the democratic imperative that electoral outcomes should not be lightly unsettled. Second, to be faithful to the constitutional imperative that no public power, electoral or judicial, is immunised from law. The tension between these imperatives is part of the design of constitutional governance. The Court’s duty is to hold them in principled balance, ensuring that finality does not become injustice, and that correction does not become destabilisation. It is from this perspective that we consider the application before us.
This is an application which invokes the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court and seeks to quash the decision of the High Court, Tamale, delivered on 24 November 2025, in Suit No. NR/TL/HC/E13/22/25, entitled Daniel Nsala Wakpal v. Matthew Nyindam & Anor. In that decision, the trial judge invalidated the results of the 2024 parliamentary election for the Kpandai Constituency and ordered a rerun.
The Applicant, Mr. Matthew Nyindam, challenges the jurisdiction of the High Court to have entertained the election petition in the first place. The issue before us is therefore narrow and purely jurisdictional: whether the High Court was clothed with jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition, having regard to the strict timelines that govern parliamentary election petitions.
BACKGROUND
The said Applicant, Mr. Nyindam, and the 1st Interested Party, Mr. Wakpal, contested in the 7th December, 2024 Kpandai constituency parliamentary elections organized by the Electoral Commission of Ghana, the 2nd interested party, on the ticket of the New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress respectively.
Mr. Nyindam states that polls were successfully conducted in all 152 polling stations in the Kpandai constituency and the results declared in the various polling stations. After collation, Mr. Nyindam was declared as winner of the Parliamentary Election and the election results were published in the Gazette No. 234 dated 24th December, 2024. The gazette notification of the parliamentary election results has been attached to Mr. Nyindam’s affidavit as “Exhibit MN”.
On 25th January, 2025, Mr. Wakpal filed an election petition at the High Court, Tamale disputing the outcome of the parliamentary elections and sought the following reliefs from the Court.
A declaration that the Parliamentary Election held in the Kpandai Constituency on 7th December, 2024 was void by virtue of the irregularities and inconsistencies contained in FORM 8A (Regulation 32(7) and 39(2) Statement of Polls for the Office of Member of Parliament (Pink Sheet) for Forty-one (41) polling stations out of a total of One hundred and fifty-two (152) polling stations in the Kpandai Constituency.
A declaration that the irregularities and inconsistencies contained in FORM 8A (Regulation 32(7) and 39(2) Statement of Polls for the Office of Member of Parliament (Pink Sheet) for Forty-one (41) polling stations out of a total of One hundred and fifty-two (152) polling stations in the Kpandai Constituency have so extensively prevailed and have reasonably affected the results of the election held in the Kpandai Constituency on 7th December, 2024.
A declaration that the non-compliance with Regulations 39 of the Public Elections Regulations, 2020 (C.I. 127) affected the parliamentary election results of Forty-one (41) polling stations out of a total of One hundred and fifty-two (152) polling stations in the Kpandai Constituency held in the Kpandai Constituency on 7th December, 2024.
A declaration that the non-compliance with Regulations 43 of the Public Elections Regulations, 2020 (C.I. 127) affected the entire results of the parliamentary election held in the Kpandai Constituency on 7th December, 2024, thereby rendering the said results as void.
An order setting aside the declaration of the parliamentary election results affecting the Forty-one (41) polling stations out of a total of One hundred and fifty-two (152) polling stations in the Kpandai Constituency by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents was given on the 7th of December, 2024.
An order directed at the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to conduct a rerun of the parliamentary elections in the affected Forty-one (41) polling stations out of a total of One hundred and fifty-two (152) polling stations in the Kpandai Constituency on a date determined by the court.
OR In the Alternative,
an order directed at the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to re-collate the results in the affected Forty-one (41) polling stations on a date determined by the court.
An order of interlocutory injunction directed at 4th Respondent restraining the 4th Respondent from swearing in the 1st Respondent as Member of Parliament of the Kpandai Constituency on the 5th of January 2025.
An order setting aside the parliamentary elections results of the Kpandai Constituency for non-compliance with Regulation 43 of the Public Elections Regulations, 2020 (C.I. 127).
An order directed at the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to conduct a rerun of the entire parliamentary elections in the Kpandai Constituency on account of the non-compliance with Regulation 43 of the Public Elections Regulations, 2020 (C.I. 127) which rendered the entire results of the parliamentary elections in the Kpandai Constituency void.
OR In the Alternative,
An order directed at the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to re-collate the results in the Kpandai Constituency in compliance with Regulation 43 of the Public Elections Regulations, 2020 (C.1. 127).
An order of interlocutory injunction restraining and preventing the 1st Respondent from holding himself out as Member of Parliament elect for the Kpandai Constituency until the final determination of this suit.
An order of interlocutory injunction restraining and preventing the 1st Respondent from having access to the Chamber of Parliament until the final determination of this suit.
An order of Perpetual Injunction restraining and preventing 1st Respondent from having access to the Chamber of Parliament as Member of Parliament elect for the Kpandai Constituency.
Any other order(s) that this Honorable Court may deem fit to make.
In November, 2025, the High Court, Tamale upheld the election petition and on the basis of various stated infractions, ordered a rerun of the parliamentary election for the Kpandai Constituency.
Mr. Nyindam, in the application before us, raises a jurisdictional objection, contending that the petition was filed outside the twenty-one (21) day period prescribed by law following the gazetting of the results. On that footing, he argues that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition and that its judgment was a nullity. Accordingly, Mr. Nyindam invokes the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court and prays for an order of certiorari to quash the judgment of the High Court delivered on 24 November, 2025.
CASE OF THE 1ST INTERESTED PARTY (MR. WAKPAL)
Mr. Wakpal opposes the application before this Court and in an affidavit running into eighty-four (84) paragraphs, he alleges, among other matters, that the Applicant engaged in fraud. He states that on 23rd December, 2024 he filed an election petition, Suit No. NR/TL/HC/E13/15/25, challenging the declaration of Mr. Nyindam as the Member of Parliament–elect for the Kpandai Constituency. He further deposes that he paid the prescribed security for costs on 3rd January, 2025 in compliance with the statutory requirements.
According to Mr. Wakpal, upon being served, Mr. Nyindam entered a conditional appearance and filed a motion on notice seeking to dismiss the election petition on the ground that it had been filed prematurely. In that motion, Mr. Nyindam contended that the results of the parliamentary election conducted in the Kpandai Constituency on 7th December, 2024 were gazetted on 6th January, 2025. A copy of that alleged Gazette notice was exhibited to the motion as “Exhibit JS 3.”
The Mr. Wakpal proceeds to state that.
“The High Court, Kumasi and I believed and relied on the Applicant’s representation… about the said gazette of 6th January 2024.”
In fact, in paragraph 32(i) of the Affidavit in opposition, Mr. Wakpal deposes as follows.
“That in reliance on(sic) the depositions in the Applicant’s Supplementary Affidavit that the 2nd Interested Party published the Election results in the Gazette on 6th January, 2025, I filed a Notice of Discontinuance and wholly discontinued the 23rd of December, 2024 Petition with suit number NR/TL/HC/E13/15/25 and caused a fresh Election Petition with suit number NR/TL/HC/E13/22/25 to be filed on the 25th of January, 2025, since the Applicant had not filed an Answer to the Petition.”
37. I am advised by Counsel and verily believe same to be true that the Applicant’s conduct is fraudulent because he induced me to act to my detriment to secure any unfair advantage before this Honourable Court by bringing an application for Judicial Review in the nature of Certiorari for an order of court quashing the judgment of the High Court, Commercial Division, Tamale, dated 24th November, 2025, as well as the proceedings and processes leading to the said judgment.
42. That the Applicant acquiesced to whatever alleged want of jurisdiction attended the Tamale High Court’s judgment by his own conduct of having knowledge of a December, 2024 gazette, and yet accepting, consenting to, participating and relying on all proceedings of the Election Petition with suit number NR/TL/HC/E13/22/25 of the trial High Court, Commercial Division, Tamale, leading to judgment. This Honourable Court ought to shut its doors of discretionary remedy of Certiorari to the Applicant as he cannot be allowed to file into court, rely on and seek to benefit from the gazette dated 24th December, 2024, in a Certiorari Application before this Honourable Court.”
In sum, Mr. Wakpal contends that Mr. Nyindam cannot be allowed to take inconsistent positions in the same matter. Put differently, he cannot be permitted to “blow hot and cold” or, in the language of the law, to approbate and reprobate.
He further contends that Mr. Nyindam has already benefited from the High Court (Tamale)’s award of costs in the sum of Seven Thousand Ghana Cedis (GHS 7,000), made following the discontinuance of the earlier election petition in Suit No. NR/TL/HC/E13/15/25.
GROUNDS FOR THE APPLICATION
Mr. Nyindam anchors the present application on the following grounds;
The learned High Court Judge committed a jurisdictional error when he wrongfully assumed jurisdiction to hear and determine the Parliamentary Election Petition filed by the 1st Interested Party on the 25th day of January 2025 in respect of the Parliamentary Election held at the Kpandai Constituency on 7th December, 2024 after the expiration of statutory twenty-one (21) days from the date of the publication in the Gazette of the election results to which the petition relates.
The trial Judge committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record when he proceeded to hear and give Judgment on the Petition filed by the 1st Interested Party on the 25th day of January 2025 contrary to and in breach of section 18 of the Representation of The People Law, 1992, P.N.D.C.L. 284 thereby rendering his Judgment dated 24th November, 2025 void and a nullity.
RELIEFS SOUGHT:
On the basis of the said grounds, Mr. Nyindam seeks the following reliefs:
A declaration that the Parliamentary Election Petition filed by the 1st Interested Party on 25th January, 2025, in respect of the Parliamentary Election held at the Kpandai Constituency on 7th December, 2024, thirty-two (32) days after the publication of the gazette notification of the Results to which the Petition related was invalid and same could not have properly invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court, Commercial Division, Tamale, and that, any processes, proceedings and judgement or Order founded on same is void and of no effect.
An Order of Certiorari by this Honourable Court quashing the Judgement of His Lordship Justice Emmanuel Bart-Plange Brew sitting at the High Court, Commercial Division, Tamale, dated 24th November, 2025, delivered pursuant to the said invalid Petition as well as any process and proceedings founded on the said invalid Petition.
Any other Order(s) as the Court deem fit.
E. EVALUATION:
Our supervisory jurisdiction has, in recent times, become one of the most frequently invoked jurisdictions of this Court. It is therefore not surprising that the authorities on its nature and scope are legion. This Court, speaking through Amadu Tanko JSC, in a judgment dated 22nd June, 2023, in Suit No. J5/54/2023, Republic v. High Court, Cape Coast; Ex parte Asiedu, stated as follows:
“In the hierarchy of courts, only two courts, the Supreme Court and the High Court are vested with the jurisdiction to exercise supervisory powers over courts below them or adjudicating bodies. The supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is provided under Article 132 of the 1992 Constitution…”
The effect of this statement is that the supervisory jurisdiction is an exceptional authority, vested in this Court to safeguard the integrity of our justice delivery system and to preserve the architecture of our democracy it is therefore not an ordinary jurisdiction and is exercised sparingly, and only in well-defined circumstances, particularly where the decision of the High Court or the Court of Appeal is shown to have been made without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, in palpable error of law, or in breach of the rules of natural justice. This position has been reiterated in a long line of decisions and does not require any extended elaboration here. By way of illustration, in a ruling of this Court dated 14th October, 2020, in Civil Motion No. J5/62/2020, entitled Republic v. High Court (Land Division), Accra; Ex parte Kennedy Ohene Agyapong (Susan Bandoh, Interested Party), which I had the privilege of authoring on behalf of the Court, we reiterated the scope of our supervisory jurisdiction in the following terms:
“The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court is a great residual jurisdiction that allows this Court to streamline the activities of the lower courts. Our control is limited to three main areas: against want or excess of jurisdiction; against patent errors of law on the face of the record; and against breaches or denial of natural justice.”
Accordingly, our function, in proceedings such as this, is not to substitute our view for that of the court below, or to re-open contested factual issues, or to entertain dissatisfaction that properly belongs to the appellate structure. Rather, our task is more fundamental: to determine whether the proceedings under challenge were undertaken without lawful authority, that is to say, whether the court below acted without the requisite jurisdiction.
Having determined that the present application falls within the jurisdictional limb of our supervisory jurisdiction, the central question is whether the learned trial judge of the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the election petition in the first place.
Jurisdiction is, in its simplest sense, the legal authority of a court to hear and determine a cause or matter brought before it. Where a court lacks jurisdiction, any decision delivered or order made is a nullity. (See: Ghana Bar Association v. Attorney General [1995-96] 1 GLR 598 – 623], per Bamford Addo JSC; Edusei no.2 v. Attorney General [1998-1999] SCGLR 753). Jurisdiction is not assumed; it is conferred by law, whether by the Constitution or by statute. Accordingly, where a statute defines the nature, scope, and limits of a court’s jurisdiction, it is those provisions that govern the court’s competence. Any proceedings conducted in breach of those limits, however well-intended, may resulted in a nullity.
Further, in a ruling of this Court dated 1st February, 2023, in Civil Motion No. J5/82/2022, Republic v. High Court (Commercial Division), Accra; Ex parte Yvonne Amponsah Brobbey, which I had the privilege of authoring on behalf of the Court, we cautioned in these terms:
“We must reiterate the learning that the jurisdiction of a Court is one which is properly conferred and circumscribed by law. Therefore, no Court has the power, by judicial fiat, to assume jurisdiction that is not properly conferred or extend its jurisdiction beyond the scope or remit granted it by law. The arrogation to itself of jurisdiction which is not conferred by law constitutes an error patent on the face of the record and which goes to jurisdiction. Needless to say, the purported exercise of same will not only occasion a want of jurisdiction but also a nullity.”
The point has also been ably captured with clarity by the venerable Adinyira JSC in Halle and Sonns A.S. v. Bank of Ghana and Warm Weather Enterprise Ltd [2011]1SCGLR378[2011] 1 SCGLR 378[2011]1SCGLR378, where the Her Ladyship observed that:
“Our Courts have now come so far that any wrong step taken in legal proceedings should not have the effect of nullifying the Judgement or proceedings, except in those cases where the Court has no Jurisdiction.”
The message from these authorities is that where the defect allegedly goes to jurisdiction, the proceedings cannot stand, because the court had no lawful authority to embark on such a task, in the first place.
PRELIMINARY COMMENT
By way of preliminary comment, we would be remiss in our duty if we failed to address the allegations of acquiescence and deceit raised by the 1st Interested Party in aid of his earnest prayer that this application be dismissed.
On his own showing, Mr. Wakpal contends that both he and the High Court were “induced” to act to his detriment by Mr. Nyindam. The substance of his complaint is that Mr. Nyindam represented to the High Court that the parliamentary election results for the Kpandai Constituency were gazetted on 6th January, 2025, and that this representation influenced him to discontinue the earlier petition filed on 23rd December, 2024 and to refile his subsequent petition, the subject matter of this application, on 25th January, 2025. He further contends that the Applicant, having participated in the proceedings from commencement to judgment, cannot now be heard to challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court.
We struggle to sympathize with Mr. Wakpal’s claim that he discontinued his first petition on the strength of Mr. Nyindam’s deposition before the High Court that the petition was premature because it was filed prior to the gazetting of the results. Apart from the Applicant’s say so, this is not directly borne out by the record. In any event and with respect, the responsibility for that decision to withdraw Mr. Wakpal’s 1st Petition cannot be laid at the doorsteps of Mr. Nyindam.
In the first place, it is the duty of a party who comes to court to vindicate his rights to ensure that he has properly invoked the court’s jurisdiction. Our system of adjudication being adversarial, it is, to say the least, regrettable for a litigant to contend that he relied on his opponent’s representation as the basis for withdrawing a case which, by his own assessment, he ought not to have withdrawn.
More importantly, Mr. Wakpal’s narrative, as framed, does not fully account for the legal position. Whether the operative gazette notice is taken to be 24th December, 2024 or 6th January, 2025, the petition filed on 23rd December, 2024 was, on either view, filed prematurely. This is because Section 18(1) of The Representation of the People Law, 1992 PNDCL 284, the enabling statutory regime permits the commencement of a parliamentary election petition within twenty-one (21) days after the gazetting of the election results. A petition commenced before gazetting, is by that very fact, not in conformity with the statutory scheme.
In these circumstances, Mr. Wakpal’s objections cannot, without more, provide justification and/or a sound legal basis for shutting out a jurisdictional inquiry that this Court is otherwise bound to undertake.
On the issue of acquiescence, the fact that Mr. Nyindam participated in the proceedings at the High Court from start to finish, cannot cure a defect that goes to statutory compliance and jurisdiction. This Court has consistently held that estoppel, waiver or acquiescence is no answer to a breach of a mandatory statutory requirement. A party cannot, by consent or conduct, confer jurisdiction on a court where the law has withheld it, nor can participation in proceedings validate what the statute renders invalid.
Indeed, I have had occasion to caution, in a unanimous decision of this Court in Suit No. J1/07/2022, Justice Abdulai v. Attorney-General, that parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a court where none exists, and that an improper assumption or exercise of jurisdiction will, in most cases, render the resulting decision vulnerable to being set aside as a nullity. We stated, in plain terms, that:
“…parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a court where there is none and an improper exercise of jurisdiction may almost always lead to the resultant decision being susceptible to be set aside for nullity.”
Also, in a judgment of this Court dated 27 March 2024, in Writ No. J1/18/2023, Francis Osei-Bonsu v. Attorney-General, which I had the privilege of delivering on behalf of the majority, this Court reiterated the point in the following terms:
“It is trite learning that parties cannot by agreement or acquiescence, confer jurisdiction on a Court where the exercise of such jurisdiction is prohibited, or not provided for by law.”
In our view, therefore, the fact that Mr. Nyindam participated in the proceedings culminating in the impugned judgment does not, without more, foreclose a jurisdictional challenge. If it is ultimately established that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, participation by a party cannot validate proceedings that the law treats as void. The Court cannot decline an invitation to quash a decision merely because the applicant took part in the process that produced it, where the foundational complaint is that the entire proceedings were conducted without jurisdiction.
In any event, a litigant’s responsibility to ensure that a cause of action he/she seeks to ventilate before a court is duly accrued and vested, does not in any way derogate from the court’s gate-keeping duty to ensure that even where it clearly has substantive jurisdiction over such a cause of action, all procedural jurisdictional pre-conditions and/or pre-requisites are met before delving into an enquiry of the substantive matters implicated in the suit.
QUESTION OF JURISDICTION:
As referenced in paragraph 33 supra, the timelines for invoking the High Court’s jurisdiction in parliamentary election petitions are prescribed by section 18 of the Representation of the People Law, 1992 (PNDCL 284), which provides as follows:
“18—Time for Presentation of Petition.
(1) An election petition shall be presented within twenty-one days after the date of the publication in the Gazette of the result of the election to which it relates, except that a petition questioning an election on an allegation of corrupt practice and specifically alleging a payment of money or other award to have been made on his behalf to his knowledge, may be presented within twenty-one days after the date of the alleged payment.”
The twenty-one (21) day timeline is therefore an express statutory prescription governing the invocation of the High Court’s jurisdiction in parliamentary election petitions. The statute does not provide any dispensation and/or discretion by which the Court may extend time beyond the mandatory period. The words, “shall be presented within twenty-one days”, are cast in unmistakably mandatory terms. Accordingly, the High Court must act strictly within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred by law, and it has no authority to entertain an election petition filed outside the prescribed twenty-one days. Needless to say, courts of law cannot, by adjudication, validate or excuse a breach of statute or law..
It is worth underscoring that the High Court’s jurisdiction in election petitions is not an inherent jurisdiction. It is a express jurisdiction conferred by Article 99(1)(a) of the Constitution and specifically regulated by PNDCL 284. The requirements in section 18(1) impose a mandatory pre-condition to the assumption of the jurisdiction. In other words, compliance with section 18(1) is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a proper invocation of the Court’s jurisdiction.
Given this express statutory command, the High Court’s general power to extend time under its procedural rules, including C.I. 47, is necessarily displaced. As this Court held in Yeboah v. Mensah (JH) [1998-99]SCGLR492, the twenty-one-day period is a jurisdictional “statute of repose”, a legislative choice designed to ensure that electoral disputes are initiated timeously or not at all. This is particularly important in a representative democracy such as ours where the mandate of elected officials are term bound. Electoral outcomes under this Constitutional architecture cannot be kept permanently open to contestation without undermining the legitimate will of the people.
Indeed, across constitutional democracies, legal systems insist on strict filing windows and compressed decision periods not out of fetish for procedure, but because democratic term bound electoral outcomes require closure to ensure the certainty and stability of the electoral process.
The effect, therefore, of proceedings commenced in clear breach of a mandatory statutory requirement is to render the proceedings a nullity. Such a breach goes to the very foundation of the court’s authority, and any step taken in contravention of the statute is legally ineffective. This Court reinforced the principle in Gaizie Hughes & Co. v. Loders Crocklaan BV [2012]1SCGLR363,368-369, where it stated:
“Proceedings commenced in clear violation of mandatory statutory requirements might not escape the scrutiny of the law. It seems to us that this is a useful tool in the hands of the court by which we are enabled to strike down proceedings even though the default in complying with mandatory requirements might have escaped notice in the courts below. It is a weapon that enables us to uphold the rule of law as to do otherwise would have the effect of condoning breaches of statute.”
DATE OF GAZETTE:
In resolving the jurisdictional objection, it is necessary first to determine the operative Gazette publication date for the parliamentary election results for the Kpandai Constituency. That is, whether the results were published in the Gazette on 24th December, 2024 or on 6th January, 2025.
This question matters because section 18(1) of the Representation of the People Law, 1992 (PNDCL 284) aforesaid makes the Gazette publication the event that triggers the High Court’s jurisdiction. If the Kpandai results were gazetted on 6th January, 2025, then the petition filed on 25th January, 2025 would, on the face of it, have been presented within time, and the High Court would have been properly seized of jurisdiction. If, however, the results were gazetted on 24th December, 2024, then the petition filed on 25th January, 2025 would plainly have been filed outside the statutory twenty-one (21) days and would not have properly invoked the High Court’s jurisdiction, at all.
In addressing this dilemma, we have not proceeded on a blank slate. We have had regard to the ruling of this Court in Civil Motion No. J5/37/2025, The Republic v. High Court 3, Koforidua; Ex parte Ernest Yaw Kumi, where a differently constituted panel had occasion to resolve the same factual controversy as between the 24th December, 2024 Gazette and the 6th January, 2025 Gazette.
As the apex Court, and a policy Court in every meaningful sense, our fidelity to judicial consistency is central to the integrity of adjudication. We are enjoined by Article 129(3) to treat our prior decisions as binding, and to depart only where compelling reasons make it right so to do. Accordingly, where this Court has previously pronounced on the propriety, validity, or legal effect of the competing Gazettes, we must acknowledge that decision and either apply it or if we are minded to depart, do so with clear and cogent reasons.
In Ex parte Ernest Yaw Kumi (supra), this Court, confronted with the same contest between the two Gazettes, stated in terms that:
“From the affidavit evidence before this Court, it was established that the Gazette notification No. 234 dated 24th December 2024 was the valid one. We therefore had no difficulty finding that the results … were gazetted on 24th December 2024 and not 6th January 2025.”
The situation before us is materially indistinguishable. Once again, we are presented with a Gazette dated 24th December, 2024, and another dated 6th January, 2025. Again, the results of the Kpandai parliamentary election appear in both publications.
In our view, the Gazette publication of 24th December, 2024 constitutes the relevant publication for purposes of Article 99 of the Constitution and section 18(1) of PNDCL 284. That Gazette has not been alleged, let alone proved, to be fraudulent, irregular or not emanating from the proper authority mandated by law to publish such notices. In the absence of such proof, this Court must treat it as the operative publication of the Kpandai election results which are stated therein at a page marked 8123. For after all, an official duty is presumed to be regularly performed unless the contrary is proven (See; section 37 of the Evidence Act, 1975 NRCD 323).
At most, the Gazette dated 6th January, 2025 may fairly be regarded as a later republication, either of the earlier results already published together with four (4) additional constituencies, the election results of which had not been resolved as at the 24th of December, 2024. However, there is no jurisprudential gymnastics by which this later republication can, without doing violence to the statutory scheme, be construed as resetting the jurisdictional clock.
To compute the statutory period from 6th January, 2025 instead of 24th December, 2024 would lead to an untenable result. It would mean that a republication of results in the Gazette automatically renews or restarts the statutory time limit under section 18(1). Taken to its logical end, this approach would imply that whenever there is an initial Gazette publication and a later Gazette publication, the later publication restarts time and potentially destabilizes legal steps already taken on the strength of the first publication. That would confer an undue and dangerous power on political actors and public institutions to affect the administration of electoral justice by manipulating Gazette publications. The law cannot be read to permit such manipulation.
We also note from the record of proceedings of the very first petition filed on the 23rd of December, 2024, that the fact of a Gazette publication on 24th December, 2024 was not unknown to Mr. Wakpal. Indeed, on his own affidavit evidence, when Mr. Nyindam sought to terminate the earlier petition on the basis that the results were gazetted on 6th January, 2025, Mr. Wakpal opposed that contention and maintained that the results had been officially gazetted on 24th December, 2024. In paragraph 9 of an affidavit in opposition filed on his behalf, exhibited as Exhibit DNW4, he stated:
“That … as at the 24th of December, 2024, [the Electoral Commission] had officially gazetted the parliamentary election results … including the Kpandai Constituency…”
This affidavit was filed before he discontinued the earlier petition. The unavoidable conclusion is that Mr. Wakpal knew, or at the very least ought to have known, that the Kpandai Constituency Parliamentary elections results had been gazetted on 24th December, 2024.
In the circumstances, we have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the results of the Kpandai parliamentary election were gazetted on 24th December, 2024. The statutory twenty-one (21) day period therefore began to run from that date. On any fair computation, a petition challenging that election, other than on the specific corrupt practice exception stated in section 18(1), ought to have been presented no later than 14th January, 2025.
The petition that initiated the proceedings culminating in the judgment now under review was filed on 25th January, 2025, that is, thirty-two (32) days after the Gazette publication of 24th December, 2024. It was, therefore, filed out of time, in clear breach of section 18(1) of PNDCL 284. This Court cannot lend judicial approval to a violation of the express terms of Statute.
In the result, we are unable to uphold the proceedings before the High Court since to do that will be to sanction a statutory breach. Jurisdiction is the foundation of adjudication; where it is absent, the court’s most conscientious effort cannot supply it, and the most persuasive merits cannot redeem it. The statutory twenty-one (21) day period prescribed by section 18 of PNDCL 284 is therefore not an inconvenient technicality to be relaxed in hard cases. It is a deliberate legislative command, rooted in the need for certainty, stability and the timely settlement of electoral disputes. To treat it otherwise would be to replace law with discretion, and to divine a regime where jurisdiction depends not on statute, but on sympathy.
For these reasons, we hold that the High Court was not clothed with jurisdiction to entertain the election petition filed on 25th January, 2025. The judgment delivered on 24th November, 2025 is consequently a nullity.
CONCLUSION:
Accordingly, let the parliamentary election petition filed by the 1st Interested Party, Mr. Daniel Nsala Wakpal, on 25th January, 2025, in respect of the parliamentary election held in the Kpandai Constituency on 7 December 2024, together with all proceedings, rulings, and judgments founded upon it, including the judgment of His Lordship Justice Emmanuel Bart-Plange Brew, sitting at the High Court (Commercial Division), Tamale, delivered on 24th November, 2025, be brought up to this Court for the purpose of being quashed and same is hereby quashed for nullity.
(SGD.) E. YONNY KULENDI
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
CONCURRING OPINION
TANKO AMADU JSC:-
INTRODUCTION
On the 28th day of January 2026, I was part of the majority of four which granted an application for judicial review in the nature of certiorari at the instance of the Applicant herein. I now proceed to give reasons for my position.
In that application, the Applicant whose membership of Parliament for the Kpandai Constituency was challenged by the 1st Interested Party and upheld, invited this court to quash the judgment of the High Court, (Commercial Division) Tamale, per Bart-Plange Brew J. dated 24th November 2025, which had annulled the Applicant’s election as Member of Parliament (MP) and ordered a parliamentary by-election.
The central contention of the Applicant is that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the underlying election petition because it was commenced outside the strict statutory time limit. The Applicant further contends that the petition was incurably incompetent and that, in any event, the allegations of irregularities in forty-one (41) polling stations were insufficient to affect the overall outcome of the election.
The 1st Interested Party, being the original petitioner and the losing candidate, opposed the application and alleged, inter alia, that the Applicant acted fraudulently by presenting inconsistent dates as the official Gazette publication of the Parliamentary Election results.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On 7th December 2024, General Parliamentary Elections were conducted nationwide, including in the Kpandai Constituency in the Northern Region. The Applicant contested the election on the ticket of the New Patriotic Party (NPP), while the 1st Interested Party, Daniel Nsala Wakpal, stood as the candidate of the National Democratic Congress (NDC). Following the polls, votes from all one hundred and fifty-two (152) polling stations in the Constituency were duly counted and collated, upon which the Applicant was declared the winner of the Parliamentary Election. The Electoral Commission, the 2nd Interested Party herein, officially gazetted the Kpandai Parliamentary Election results, among others, on 24th December 2024, in accordance with law. The Applicant was subsequently sworn into office as the Member of Parliament for Kpandai in January 2025.
Dissatisfied with the outcome, the 1st Interested Party initially filed an Election Petition in the High Court on 23rd December 2024, even before the Gazette publication of the results. That earlier petition was apparently withdrawn or discontinued by the 1st Interested Party, who then filed a fresh Election Petition on 25th January 2025 in the High Court, Tamale. In that Petition, (Suit No. NR/TL/HC/E13/22/25), the 1st Interested Party challenged the Applicant’s election on grounds of alleged irregularities in 41 Polling Stations out of the 152 polling stations in the constituency.
The 1st Interested Party sought various reliefs, including a declaration that the Kpandai Parliamentary Election held on 7th December 2024 was void by reason of the alleged irregularities. The 1st Interested Party further prayed for an order for a rerun of the election, whether in whole or in part, or alternatively for a re-collation of the results. In addition, the Petition sought injunctive reliefs restraining the Applicant from being sworn in or from holding himself out as the duly elected Member of Parliament. Notably, the Petition averred that the irregularities and inconsistencies affecting the results from the forty-one (41) polling stations— “have so extensively prevailed and have reasonably affected the result of the election” in the Constituency.
The Applicant was named as the 1st Respondent in the said High Court petition. He promptly raised a preliminary objection that the petition had been filed out of time and failed to comply with the mandatory statutory requirements governing election petitions. In particular, the Applicant (then Respondent) filed a motion to dismiss the petition for non-compliance with article 99(1)(a) of the 1992 Constitution and section 18 of the Representation of the People Law, 1992 (PNDCL 284), being the law applicable to parliamentary election disputes, on the ground that the petition was presented outside the stipulated twenty-one (21) day period after publication in the Gazette and without the provision of security for costs within that period.
This objection on limitation raised a jurisdictional issue, as section 18 of PNDCL 284 prescribes a strict time limit within which election results may be challenged. The 1st Interested Party opposed the application for dismissal, contending that the petition was not statute-barred. It was argued, inter alia, that the Electoral Commission issued a second Gazette on 6 January 2025, which purportedly superseded the Gazette of 24 December 2024, thereby rendering the filing of the petition on 25 January 2025 proper.
The 1st Interested Party further argued that, the Applicant had not raised the issue of statutory time limit in his pleadings at the trial and further alleged that, the Applicant misled him about the proper gazette date, an issue which later morphed into an allegation of fraud against the Applicant in the instant certiorari proceedings.
The High Court, Tamale, nevertheless proceeded to hear the petition on its merits. On 24th November 2025, the High Court, per Plange-Brew J., delivered judgment in favour of the Petitioner (1st Interested Party). The Court annulled the entire Parliamentary Election in the Kpandai Constituency and declared the results void, having accepted that the irregularities alleged in the forty-one (41) polling stations compromised the integrity of the election as a whole. The High Court consequently ordered the Electoral Commission to conduct a fresh election in the Constituency within thirty (30) days of the judgment. As a result, the Applicant’s status as the duly elected Member of Parliament was nullified by the said decision, and steps were anticipated towards the conduct of a by-election.
Aggrieved by the High Court’s assumption of jurisdiction and the eventual decision, the Applicant invoked the supervisory jurisdiction by this Court for certiorari to lie against the judgment of the High Court. The Applicant contended that, the High Court committed a jurisdictional error apparent on the face of the record by entertaining a petition that was a legal nullity, having been filed 32 days after the gazette notification of the results of the election.
THE APPLICANT’S CASE
The Applicant contended that such an invalid petition could not invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court, thereby rendering the entire proceedings and any resultant judgment void. The Applicant further maintained that, even if jurisdiction were properly vested, the substantive claims in the petition were without merit, as irregularities in forty-one polling stations, even if established, could not have materially affected the overall result from the one hundred and fifty-two polling stations.
THE CASE OF 1ST INTERESTED PARTY
The 1st Interested Party, on the other hand, contended that the High Court acted within its jurisdiction. He argued that the question of compliance with the 21-day rule involved factual determinations, which were not suitable for summary dismissal or for review by way of certiorari. He further alleged that the Applicant engaged in fraudulent conduct, asserting that the Applicant had initially represented a later gazette date—allegedly inducing the 1st Interested Party to abandon his first petition of 23rd December 2024 and to refile on 25th January 2025—only to later rely on the earlier date of 24th December 2024 in this Court. According to the 1st Interested Party, the Applicant’s inconsistent positions constituted a fraud on the Court and should disentitle him from the equitable remedy of certiorari.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
From the parties’ arguments and the record, I have identified the following principal issues for determination:
What was the operative date of the Gazette publication of the Kpandai Election result, and what are the implications under Section 18 of the Representation of the People Law, 1992 (PNDCL 284)?
Whether the 1st Interested Party filed the Election Petition within the 21-day statutory period (and furnished the required security for costs within the same period)? If not, did the failure render the petition incompetent, thereby depriving the High Court of jurisdiction to hear it?
Whether the alleged irregularities and inconsistencies in 41 polling stations (out of a total of 152 polling stations), even if taken as proven, were sufficient to materially affect the outcome of the parliamentary election?
Whether the 1st Interested Party’s allegation of fraud on the part of the Applicant, premised on the Applicant’s presentation of inconsistent dates for the Gazette publication rendered the instant application meritless?
I proceed to analyze each of these issues within the context of the applicable statute, the Constitution, and precedents of this Court and other Superior Courts in our jurisdiction.
ANALYSIS
It is not in dispute that, under the statute regulating Parliamentary Elections, the publication of election results in the Gazette triggers a short window within which any challenge to a Parliamentary Election must be initiated. Section 18 of the Representation of the People Law, 1992 (PNDCL 284), regulates the time for the presentation of a Parliamentary Election Petition. Section 18(1) provides as follows: “An Election Petition shall be presented within twenty-one days after the date of the publication in the Gazette of the result of the election to which it relates,” except in certain limited cases of alleged corrupt practices, which are not relevant to the instant proceedings.
Furthermore, section 18(2) of the Representation of the People Law, 1992 (PNDCL 284) stipulates that a petition shall not be deemed to have been validly presented unless the petitioner, within the same twenty-one (21) day period, furnishes security for costs in an amount as determined by the High Court. The law is emphatic that; “the time limit provided by this section for the presentation of an Election Petition shall not be extended.”
These provisions are mandatory and were enacted to secure the expeditious resolution of electoral disputes and to bar stale or belated claims. They embody the public policy that the outcome of elections should not be held in suspense indefinitely; accordingly, any challenge must be mounted promptly or not at all.
Our election jurisprudence is replete with decided cases forming part of our body of case law, which are binding on the High Court. In REPUBLIC VS. HIGH COURT, SUNYANI; EX-PARTE ALHAJI COLLINS DAUDA (No. J5/12/2009), dated 8 April 2009, this Court, speaking through Date-Bah JSC, emphasised that an election petition may only be brought after the official declaration of results. Even where a petition is founded on allegations of corrupt practices, the Court, upon a combined reading of the provisions of PNDCL 284, concluded that any challenge must await the declaration and gazetting of the results by the Electoral Commission. An undeclared election was thus deemed “inchoate or incomplete”. Consequently, the twenty-one (21) day limitation period begins to run only upon gazetting of the results. This Court further held that, “our interpretation of Section 18 of PNDCL 284 as impliedly requiring the declaration of the election result, even in the case of an allegation of corrupt practice, is buttressed by the provisions in Sections 19 and 20 of the Law. The language of Section 19 impliedly asserts that an Election Petition can be brought only after a candidate has been declared elected. It is in the following terms: “19. After the hearing of an election petition the High Court may make any of the following orders:
declare that the election to which the petition relates
is void;
declare that a candidate other than the member
whose election is questioned was duly elected, or
dismiss the petition and declare that the member
whose election is questioned as duly elected.” The reason why we consider that this provision assumes that an election petition may be brought only after a declaration of the results is that an election can hardly be declared void, under paragraph (a) above, if it has not been completed and declared by the Electoral Commission. It can be cogently argued that an election whose results have not yet been declared is an inchoate or incomplete election, rather than an election. Section 19(b) contains the expression “member whose election is questioned”. This expression, in our view, implies that the member’s results have been declared. Section 19(c) also contains the expression: “member whose election is questioned” which, to us, again implies that the member’s results have been declared. Similarly, Section 20 of the Law assumes that a candidate has been declared elected and gives the High Court power to declare the election void on the grounds set out in its subsections. Accordingly, our conclusion from reading these provisions of PNDCL 284 together is that, even in the case of an allegation of a corrupt practice, an Election Petition may only be brought after the Electoral Commission has declared a result in relation to the election. This means that the interested party’s petition before the Sunyani High Court was premature and the High Court lacked jurisdiction to enter into its merits.” Date Bah JSC (as he then was)
In a more intricate development, the Court of Appeal, constituted as a panel, in RICHARD AKUOKO ADIYA & ANOTHER v. AKWASI ADUSEI & ANOTHER, No. HI/46/2014, dated 29th May 2014—where I had the opportunity to deliver the lead judgment—squarely addressed the legal consequences of non-compliance with the statutory 21-day timeline. In that case, a Parliamentary Election Petition challenging the December 2012 results for the Ahafo Ano North Constituency was filed within the prescribed period. However, the Petitioner failed to have the security for costs determined and paid within twenty-one (21) days after gazette. Notwithstanding this default, the High Court proceeded to hear the matter and even purported to extend the time for compliance by recourse to other statutory provisions. On appeal, the Court of Appeal overturned that approach and dismissed the petition outright for non-compliance. The Court held that, once the statutory preconditions were not satisfied within the stipulated 21 days, the High Court was divested of jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Accordingly, the petition and all proceedings founded upon it were declared null and void. The appellate court emphatically rejected the trial judge’s attempt to relax the timeline, holding that section 18(3) expressly barred any extension whatsoever.
In the present case, the Electoral Commission (EC) officially gazetted the Kpandai Constituency Parliamentary Election results on 24th December 2024. This fact is evidenced by the Gazette notification (Exhibit “MN” in the Applicant’s affidavit) and is not seriously disputed by the parties. Indeed, the Applicant asserts that the gazette date was 24th December 2024, a fact which the 1st Interested Party ultimately conceded, acknowledging that a Gazette notice was issued on that date (albeit contending that it was later superseded). Computing twenty-one days from 24th December 2024, the statutory timeline for filing any election petition expired on 14th January 2025. It is undisputed that the 1st Interested Party’s election petition was filed on 25th January 2025, well outside the prescribed timeline. By that date, thirty-two (32) days had elapsed since the gazette publication, exceeding the legally permissible period by eleven (11) days.
In consequence of the petition having been filed out of time, the required security for costs was necessarily not furnished within the stipulated 21-day window either, the security typically being provided at the time of, or immediately after, filing. The Applicant contended—and it stands to reason—that, having filed the petition late on 25th January 2025, the 1st Interested Party could not have satisfied the mandatory security requirement by the 14th January 2025 deadline. Indeed, even where a petition is filed within time, failure to provide security for costs within the same period renders the petition invalid ab initio. Thus, on the face of the timeline, the 1st Interested Party’s petition violated both limbs of section 18 of PNDC Law 284, having been presented out of time and without the requisite security as required by law.
The 1st Interested Party, however, contends that the operative “date of publication in the Gazette” was not 24th December 2024. He argues that the EC issued a second Gazette Notice on 6th January 2025, and that this later publication ought to be treated as the relevant date for the purposes of computing the 21 days.
It is asserted that the 6th January 2025 Gazette “superseded” or replaced the earlier publication, perhaps because the earlier one might have been provisional or incomplete. I have examined the record and submissions on this point. The Applicant strongly refutes the existence of any valid “second Gazette” that could reset the clock. He maintains that the only legally recognized Gazette publication of the Kpandai Parliamentary Election result was on 24th December 2024, and that any subsequent notice (if it existed) did not nullify the first.
From the affidavit and attachments before the Court, I do not find any statutory or factual basis for the 1st Interested Party’s claim that a later gazette replaced the earlier one. As a general principle, once an election result is gazetted, the time for challenging it begins to run from that date. A subsequent republication or correction, absent clear legal authority, would not ordinarily invalidate the initial publication for limitation purposes—particularly where the petitioner was evidently aware of the result and had, in fact, attempted a challenge earlier (on 23rd December). The contention by the 1st Interested Party that the time for filing the Parliamentary Election Petition began to run from 6th January 2025, rather than 24th December 2024, is therefore wholly untenable.
The Applicant’s motion to dismiss the petition before the High Court was premised on a fundamental misrepresentation of fact, namely that the relevant Gazette Notice was published on 6th January 2025. That assertion is plainly erroneous. The Gazette Notice lawfully affirmed for the purposes of computing time is the Gazette Notice published on 24th December 2024.
That Gazette Notice constitutes a statutory instrument duly issued pursuant to law and was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Kumi as legally binding in respect of all constituencies contained therein, including Kpandai. It is, therefore, the operative Gazette Notice, and not any purported publication dated 6th January 2025, nor any deposition by a party asserting that the applicable Gazette Notice is that of 6th January 2025 rather than 24th December 2024.
In the circumstances, the High Court is deemed to take judicial notice of a Gazette Notice published in accordance with the law regulating the functions of the Electoral Commission and ought not to have been swayed by a factual misrepresentation advanced by the Applicant.
The constitutional framework buttresses this conclusion. Article 99(1)(a) of the 1992 Constitution vests jurisdiction in the High Court to hear “any question whether a person has been validly elected as a member of Parliament,” but this jurisdiction is “subject to” the law. Section 16 of PNDCL 284 reiterates that an MP’s election may be questioned only by petition presented to the High Court, while Section 18 imposes the time limitation. Consequently, a petition that is not brought within 21 days of gazettement is a nullity and does not properly invoke the High Court’s jurisdiction. Our law has consistently treated such time limits in election petitions as imperative and jurisdictional. As this Court stated in JOHN DRAMANI MAHAMA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION & NANA ADDO DANKWA AKUFO-ADDO (No. J1/05/2021) dated 4th March 2021, a court must not assume jurisdiction where issues of limitation have been raised and proven; if a claim is time-barred, the court ought not to delve into the merits. The duty of the court is first to ensure that a case before it is properly and timeously brought, for jurisdiction is fundamental and cannot be conferred by consent or ignored for convenience.
Having established the relevant dates, I find that the Election Petition in the instant case was presented outside the statutory period prescribed by Section 18(1) of PNDCL 284 and, ipso facto, the statutory security for costs was not provided within the prescribed time. On Issue 1, I find that the operative Gazette publication date was 24th December 2024, and, having failed to file the Petition by 14th January 2025 and provide security within that period, the 1st Interested Party fell foul of Section 18 of PNDC Law 284. The 21-day rule is an absolute statutory condition precedent to a valid petition; no extension or indulgence is permitted. What then is the implication of this finding on the jurisdiction of the High Court?
ISSUE 2: ON THE EFFECT OF LATE FILING
In view of the finding that the petition was not presented within the mandatory timeframe, the necessary legal consequence is that the petition is incompetent ab initio. A court’s jurisdiction to hear an election petition is invoked only by a valid petition that meets the statutory prerequisites. Where those prerequisites, such as the timing and security requirements, are not satisfied, the petition is a nullity and cannot confer jurisdiction on the High Court. In the words of the Applicant’s counsel, the petition in this case was “ineffective and impotent to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court.” I agree with that characterization.
The High Court ought to have declined jurisdiction once it became apparent that the petition had been presented out of time. Jurisdiction is a threshold, or gateway, issue that courts are obliged to consider, even if the parties do not raise it. In this case, the issue was indeed raised by the Applicant by way of a preliminary objection and in an application to dismiss the petition for non-compliance. The High Court, however, proceeded to hear the case on its merits, effectively overlooking or overruling the time-bar objection. In doing so, the High Court committed a fundamental error of law.
A rich line of judicial authority from this Court establishes that where a lower court assumes jurisdiction when it has none, or where it wrongfully declines to recognize a clear lack of jurisdiction, its decision is a nullity and is amenable to the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by way of certiorari.
In REPUBLIC VS. HIGH COURT, ACCRA; EX-PARTE APPIAH (2000) SCGLR 389, this Court held that, an order of certiorari will issue where a lower court’s decision was made without jurisdiction, whether because the court exceeded its jurisdiction or lacked jurisdiction altogether. Ampiah JSC noted as follows:
An order of certiorari would be made where the order sought to be quashed has been made, inter alia, without jurisdiction either because the court has exceeded its jurisdiction or lacks jurisdiction. It is also said that a court having jurisdiction may lose that jurisdiction if its decision is made in bad faith, if it has failed in the course of the inquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice; or if it had refused to take into account something which it was required to take into account or it might have based its decision on a matter it has no right to take into account. See ANISMINIC LTD. VS. FOREIGN COMPENSATION COMMISSION [1969] 2 AC 147 AT 171, HL. The list cannot be said to be exhaustive. However, where the court has jurisdiction to entertain the action, its judgment or ruling cannot be impeached on the mere ground that its decision is wrong. Under those circumstances the proper thing to do is to appeal against that decision. Where however upon the face of the proceedings themselves it appears that the decision of the court is wrong in law, certiorari to quash it will be granted. See R VS. NORTHUMBERLAND COMPENSATION APPEAL TRIBUNAL; EX-PARTE SHAW [1952] 1 KB 338.”
Similarly, in BIMPONG-BUTA VS. GENERAL LEGAL COUNCIL [2003-2004] SCGLR 1200, this Court emphasized that, jurisdiction is so fundamental that even if not questioned by the parties, a court must be mindful of it to ensure a valid outcome. In the words of Akuffo JSC; (as she then was). “Jurisdiction is always a fundamental issue in every matter that comes before any court and, even if it is not questioned by any of the parties, it is crucial for a court to advert its mind to it to assure a valid outcome.”
Applying those principles to the instant case, once the petition was filed out of time, the High Court lacked jurisdiction ratione temporis (by reason of the elapsed time) to entertain it. Any proceedings founded on that petition were therefore void. The rule, as established in McFoy v. United African Company Ltd. (1961) 3 All ER 1169, is that one cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stand. The petition being a nullity, all orders flowing from it, including the High Court’s judgment and the consequential orders for a rerun of the election, are equally nullities. I therefore hold that the learned High Court Judge erred in law and acted in excess of jurisdiction by hearing and determining the time-barred petition. The resulting judgment dated 24th November 2025 was delivered when the court was bereft of jurisdiction, and is therefore void ab initio.
The 1st Interested Party’s counsel argued that the question of whether the petition was time-barred was a mixed question of fact and law, which should have been determined by the High Court rather than by the Supreme Court on certiorari. He contended that the Applicant ought to have raised the issue of limitation in his Answer to the petition at trial (pursuant to Order 11, Rule 8 of the High Court Rules), and that by failing to do so, the Applicant “acquiesced” to the High Court’s jurisdiction or waived the point. I find little merit in that argument, which, with all due respect, is bereft of legal learning. The law is clear: no party to an action can, by his acts or omissions, confer on a court a jurisdiction that is conferred solely by statute.
Indeed from the processes before us, the Applicant did in fact raise the issue in limine by a motion to dismiss the petition on 21st January 2025 (even before filing a substantive Answer). There was thus no acquiescence; rather, the issue was squarely joined.
Second, even if the Applicant had failed to raise it, as aforesaid, a jurisdictional limitation of this kind cannot be waived by conduct. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by default or estoppel. A statutory time-limit for instituting an election petition is not akin to an ordinary procedural timeline that can be extended or overlooked; it is a condition attached to the right of action itself. Since the timeline is a statutory precondition, defences founded on estoppel or acquiescence are clearly untenable, for estoppel is not, and cannot operate to suspend or override, the prescriptions of statutes—in this instance, Article 99 of the 1992 Constitution vis-à-vis PNDCL 284. In ABABIO AND OTHERS VS. KARIKARI AND ANOTHER [2001-2002] 1 GLR 381, it was held that: “Estoppel of all kinds was subject to the general rule that it could not override the laws of the land, i.e. where a particular formality was required by statute, no estoppel could cure the defect nor give jurisdiction to a court where statute denied it”.
And as has been entrenched in our jurisprudence, the courts are servants of the legislature. The courts cannot grant immunity to violations of statutes, especially in the midst of the interplay of substantive rights. In KWABENA OBENG & ANOTHER VS. KUMASI METROPOLITAN ASSEMBLY & ANOTHER CIVIL APPEAL NO. J4/53/2016 DATED 14TH JUNE 2017, this Court re-echoed its caution in THE REPUBLIC VS. HIGH COURT (FAST TRACK DIVISION ACCRA, EX-PARTE NATIONAL LOTTERY AUTHORITY (GHANA LOTTO OPERATORS ASSOCIATION AND OTHERS INTERESTED PARTIES) [2009] SCGLR 390 and REPUBLIC VS. MICHAEL CONDUAH, EX-PARTE GEORGE SUPI ASMAH UNREPORTED JUDGMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. J4/28/12 DATED 15TH AUGUST 2013 and held that: “The principle of law which is clearly discernible from the above cases is that unless the provisions in the statute are so manifestly and incurably bad, no Judge or court for that matter has the right or authority to grant immunity to a party from the consequences of the breach of an Act of Parliament or disable the enforcement of the provisions of an Act of Parliament”.
The High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 99 and PNDCL 284 is contingent upon a petition being presented in accordance with the law. Where this condition is not satisfied, the High Court lacks the authority to “assume jurisdiction to determine the merits of the case.” Indeed, Yeboah C.J. stated in the 2021 case of JOHN DRAMANI MAHAMA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION & NANA ADDO DANKWA AKUFO-ADDO (No. J1/05/2021), decided on 4th March 2021, that a court must refrain from assuming jurisdiction where, among other things, a limitation period has expired. His Lordship eruditely stated: “it is always the duty of a court not to assume jurisdiction over a suit where the court had no jurisdiction over either the subject matter of the suit, the parties to the action or where a party to the suit is not clothed with capacity regarding the subject matter in issue. Again, a court may not assume jurisdiction over a case where issues of limitation, estoppel per rem judicata are raised, and proved as preliminary points. In the circumstances of any of the above being applicable the court ought not to assume jurisdiction to determine the merits of the case before it.”
I note from the 1st Interested Party’s submission the contention that the issue of the precise Gazette date is a factual matter requiring evidence, suggesting that the High Court was the proper forum to resolve it. I am not persuaded by this argument. The date of Gazette publication is an objective fact, easily verified from the official Gazette itself, which was exhibited. The 1st Interested Party never truly disputed that a Gazette notice was issued on 24th December 2024; rather, he contended that a later notice supplanted it. Determining which date governs the limitation period is primarily a question of law, arising from the interpretation of Section 18 in the context of potentially multiple Gazette notices. In my view, there was no factual ambiguity requiring a High Court trial for clarification.
In sum, on Issue 2, I hold that the 1st Interested Party’s failure to meet the 21-day statutory deadline (and the concomitant security requirement) rendered the election petition incompetent, such that the High Court never had a valid cause before it. Consequently, the High Court’s jurisdiction was not properly invoked, and its judgment was delivered in disregard of the clear provisions of Section 18 of PNDCL 284.
Having decided the application primarily on this jurisdictional ground, it is, strictly speaking, unnecessary to pronounce on the other issues relating to the merits of the petition. This is particularly so because certiorari is concerned not with the merits of a matter but with procedural propriety. However, for the sake of completeness, and because the parties fully argued these issues and they are of public importance, I will briefly address Issues 3 and 4 as well.
ON THE THIRD ISSUE, ON THE MATERIAL IRREGULARITIES IN 41 POLLING STATIONS OUT OF 152.
The Election Petition at the High Court was fundamentally premised on alleged malpractices or irregularities in the results from 41 polling stations in the Kpandai Constituency. These included claims of inconsistencies on the face of the pink sheets (Form 8A) for those polling stations and non-compliance with certain regulations (Regulations 39 and 43 of C.I. 127) in the collation of results. The 1st Interested Party, as petitioner, contended that these problems “so extensively prevailed” in those 41 stations that they “reasonably affected the result of the election” as a whole. On that basis, he sought to void the entire constituency result or, in the alternative, to annul and rerun the results in those 41 polling stations.
It is important to place the scope of the allegations in context. The Kpandai Constituency has 152 polling stations. The challenges, therefore, concerned roughly 27% of the polling stations. Conversely, no issues were raised regarding the conduct or results of the remaining 111 polling stations, where the votes were presumably regular and uncontested. Nonetheless, the High Court nullified the entire election rather than confining any remedy to the affected stations. This raises the question: even if the irregularities at 41 polling stations were proven, was it legally justifiable to overturn the overall result?
Our country’s electoral jurisprudence, as reflected in both statute and case law, requires that there be a material effect on the outcome before an election result can be invalidated. Section 20 of PNDCL 284 specifies the grounds on which a parliamentary election may be declared void. Under Section 20(1)(b), a proven “non-compliance with any provision” of the electoral laws can be a basis to void an election only if it appears that “the election was not conducted in accordance with the principles laid down by law and that such non-compliance affected the result of the election.” (Emphasis mine).
This clearly means that irregularities or violations, no matter how numerous, will not suffice to overturn an election unless they demonstrably affect the outcome in terms of votes. Furthermore, Section 20(2)(b) expressly provides that if the High Court finds some failure to comply with the law, but also finds that “the failure did not affect the result of the election,” then “the election of the successful candidate shall not because of the failure be void”. In other words, harmless errors or even significant irregularities that do not alter the result must be disregarded.
For clarity and context, the content of Section 20 of PNDCL 284 is reproduced;
“Section 20 – Grounds for Cancelling Election Results.
(1) The election of a candidate shall be declared void on an election petition if the High Court is satisfied-
(a) that general bribery, general treating, general
intimidation or other misconduct or circumstances, whether similar to those specified in this Law or not, have so extensively prevailed that they may be reasonably supposed to have affected the result of the election;
(b) that there has been non-compliance with any
provision of this Law or of regulations made under this Law and that it appears that the election was not conducted in accordance with the principles laid down by law and that such non-compliance affected the result of the election;
(c) that a corrupt or illegal practice was committed in
connection with the election by the candidate or with his knowledge or consent, or by any agent of the candidate; or
(d) that the candidate was at the time of his election
a person not qualified or a person disqualified for election.
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section-
(a) where at the hearing of an Election Petition the
High Court finds that a candidate has been guilty through his agent or representative of a corrupt or illegal practice, and the High Court further finds, that the candidate has proved to the High Court-
that no corrupt or illegal practice was committed by the candidate himself or with his knowledge or consent or approval; or
that even though there was corrupt or illegal practice the candidate took all reasonable steps to prevent the commission of corrupt or illegal practice at the election; and
that in all other respects the election was free from any corrupt or illegal practice on the part of the candidate, then, if the High Court so recommends, the election of the candidate shall not because of the corrupt practice be void or illegal and the candidate shall not be subject to any incapacity under this Law;
(b) where at the hearing of an election petition the
High Court finds that there has been failure to comply with any provision of this Law or of regulations made under it, and the High Court further finds-
that the election was conducted in accordance
with this Law and regulations made under it; and (ii) that the failure did not affect the result of the election, the election of the successful candidate shall not because of the failure be void and the successful candidate shall not be subject to any incapacity under this Law or regulations made under it.
Ultimately, if the margin of victory, or the distribution of the affected votes, is such that the winning candidate would still have prevailed even after discounting or correcting those irregularities, the result should not be disturbed.
In the instant matter, the petition did not convincingly demonstrate that the irregularities in the 41 polling stations actually altered the outcome of the Kpandai election. It is noted that the petition’s assertions were couched in general terms, namely that the “irregularities…have reasonably affected the result,” but notably absent were any particulars as to how the result was affected. The petitioner did not, for instance, show that if the results from the 41 contested polling stations were excluded or recounted, the Applicant’s lead would be erased or the petitioner would have obtained a majority.
The certified figures from the EC indicated a “clear win” for the Applicant, showing that the Applicant had a margin of victory that the 1st Interested Party would need to overcome. Yet, the petition did not specify the vote margin or present a scenario in which the 1st Interested Party would prevail but for the alleged irregularities. In essence, the petition asked the Court to assume that because 41 polling stations had inconsistencies in their result forms, the entire election was compromised—a leap the Court cannot make without supporting evidence.
Even if all 41 polling station results were set aside as void, the question would remain: what was the impact on the overall tally? If, hypothetically, those stations collectively accounted for fewer votes than the winner’s margin, voiding them would not change the outcome (though it might reduce the total votes). If they accounted for more, a tailored remedy—such as a re-run in those stations or a re-collation—might be appropriate, rather than annulling the entire constituency’s vote. The High Court appears not to have undertaken a quantitative analysis of the effect of the 41 polling stations. Instead, it proceeded on a qualitative impression of “irregularities” and applied the maximal remedy of annulling the whole election. In my respectful view, that approach is at odds with Section 20 of PNDCL 284 and established precedent, which places the burden on the petitioner to show that the alleged irregularities did, in fact, affect the outcome.
In summary, on Issue 3, I hold that the alleged irregularities in 41 polling stations, even if assumed to be true, were insufficient to materially affect the overall result of the Kpandai parliamentary election. The High Court’s blanket annulment of the entire constituency election was, in my respectful opinion, not only injudicious but also an erroneous exercise of its powers, as it failed to apply the requisite test of material effect.
ON THE ALLEGATION OF FRAUD.
The final issue concerns the allegation of fraud raised by the 1st Interested Party against the Applicant in the course of these proceedings. The 1st Interested Party contended that the Applicant engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the date of gazette publication of the election results. Specifically, it is alleged that, in the High Court, the Applicant (or his counsel) initially pleaded a different gazette date, or at least suggested that the gazette had not been published as of 23rd December 2024. This representation allegedly induced the 1st Interested Party to discontinue his first Petition filed on 23rd December 2024, only to file the impugned Petition on 25th January 2025.
Now, in this Court, the Applicant relies on the 24th December 2024 gazette date to argue that the petition was filed late—a position that the 1st Interested Party contends is inconsistent with the Applicant’s earlier stance. The 1st Interested Party characterized this as a dishonest switch, arguing that it was “fraudulent and deceitful on the part of the Applicant to now claim before this Court that the publication of the results in the Gazette was on 24th December 2024,” concluding that “the Applicant was dishonest before the trial High Court”.
On this basis, the 1st Interested Party submitted that the Applicant did not come to equity with clean hands and, therefore, should be denied the discretionary remedy of certiorari. In his affidavit in opposition, the 1st Interested Party went further to itemized “PARTICULARS OF FRAUD” to support this contention. Order 11 Rule 8(1) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (C.I. 47) applicable in this court by virtue of Article 129(4) of the Constitution, explicitly requires that any matter alleging “fraud” (or other vitiating factors like illegality or limitation) must be specifically pleaded, so that the party against whom such allegation is made, is not taken by surprise. Moreover, the common law principle which our courts have often echoed is that “no rule was more clearly settled than that fraud must be distinctly proved and that it is not allowable to leave fraud to be inferred from the facts.” In other words, a mere assertion or insinuation of fraud is not enough, the fraud must be demonstrated clearly by the evidence. This position of the law is supported by a rich line of cases including; WILLIAM DAVIES & 3 ORS. VS. ROBERT D. TACKET & ORS. (CIVIL APPEAL NO.J4/27/2004) 2nd January 2005; SAANBAYE BASILDE KANGBEREE VS. ALHAJI SEIDU MOHAMED (NO.J4/44/2012) 4th July 2012; MRS. THERESA OWUO VS. FRANCIS OWUO NO.J4/20/2017, 6th December 2017; ECOBANK NIGERIA PLC VS. HISS HANDS HOUSING AGENCY AND ACCESS BANK (GHANA) LIMITED (NO.J4/49/2016) 6th December 2017.
It is noted that the original election petition filed by the 1st Interested Party in the High Court contained no allegation of fraud against the Applicant; it dealt solely with electoral irregularities. The issue of fraud was raised for the first time in the 1st Interested Party’s affidavit opposing the application in this Court, essentially as a defensive mechanism aimed at portraying the Applicant as having acted in bad faith.
While the 1st Interested Party did list certain “particulars” in his affidavit—such as the sequence of filing and withdrawing the December 2024 petition, and the Applicant’s affidavit of 21st January 2025 in the High Court—these do not, in my view, amount to evidence of fraud. At best, they show that the Applicant took a particular position during the High Court proceedings concerning the date of the Gazette publication, and now relies on a date that the 1st Interested Party finds inconvenient. However, inconsistency is not necessarily fraud, and even if fraud were proven, such conduct alone would not alter the effect of the statute on an adversary, especially where the statute affects the jurisdictional competence of the court to proceed.
For an act to be fraudulent in law, there must be a finding of intentional deception – a knowingly false representation or a reckless disregard for the truth, made to induce another to act to their detriment. See; OKWEI NOI MENSAH VS. THE ADMINISTRATORS OF ESTATE OF STEPHEN EBENEZER LARYEA AND MADAM CHARITY SEDATOR (NO. J4/15/2009) 26th MAY 2010.
In the instant case, the record shows that the Applicant’s counsel, in seeking the dismissal of the first petition filed on 23rd December 2024, argued that at the time of filing, the results had not been gazetted, as the official gazette was published on 24th December 2024. Consequently, the petition was premature and not in compliance with Article 99 and Section 16 of PNDCL 284. That argument was legally sound: a petition filed even one day before gazettement is a nullity, since the election result had not been formally “declared” by gazette, and therefore there was technically no validly declared winner to challenge. The 1st Interested Party evidently conceded this point by discontinuing his 23rd December 2024 petition (Exhibit “DNW 5”).
In any case, Counsel for the 1st Interested Party in pursuing the allegation of fraud against the Applicant ought to have taken into account the decision of this Court in the case of the REPUBLIC VS. HIGH COURT KOFORIDUA EX-PARTE ERNEST YAW KUMI Civil Motion No.J5/37/2025, dated 11th June 2025, where this court made a judicial affirmation of the 24th December 2024 gazette notification in respect of the Akwatia Constituency which included the Kpandai Constituency as against any other gazette notification said to have been republished by the 2nd Interested Party on 6th January 2025 in respect of Parliamentary Election results gazetted earlier in time.
There is no suggestion that the Applicant falsified the gazette date or concealed a publication, which is a statutory document. The 1st Interested Party presumably discontinued his initial petition upon realizing—whether from the Applicant’s motion or otherwise—that the law required gazettement first. If he then chose to wait until 25th January to refile, that was his legal miscalculation, not a result of any fraud by the Applicant. The Applicant had no duty to remind his opponent of the 21-day limit once gazettement occurred. The 1st Interested Party, having entered the election as a Member of Parliament, should have readily ascertained the true gazette date and the applicable deadline.
Furthermore, the 1st Interested Party’s affidavit in opposition contained broad statements such as “the Applicant’s fraudulent conduct involves intentional deception of the High Court… and myself… to gain an unfair advantage by filing this application”. With all due respect, the Applicant’s conduct in the proceedings cannot be said to be fraudulent. On the contrary, it is lawful advocacy. The “deception” alleged is not borne out by any concrete false statement proved to have been made by the Applicant.
Accordingly, I reject the 1st Interested Party’s allegation of fraud as unfounded and unproven. The allegation was neither specifically pleaded in the original action nor properly substantiated, being strangely raised only in an affidavit in opposition before this Court. It lacks particulars of any actionable deceit. Neither fraudulent intent nor any advantage procured by deceit has been demonstrated on the part of the Applicant.
It is my considered view that the contention that the Applicant’s change of position regarding the Gazette publication should not entitle him to the relief he seeks in this Court, notwithstanding the legal and constitutional efficacy of the Gazette Notice, is of no moment. This is a constitutional matter, and the Applicant’s alleged conduct—arguably constituting estoppel by conduct—is inapplicable, as the Court is concerned with the interpretation and enforcement of the Constitution, not an ordinary statute.
In determining whether to grant the Applicant’s prayer for certiorari, I have carefully considered whether the appropriate remedy should instead lie by way of an appeal. Why did I reject the appellate route? Under our constitutional arrangement, the term of Parliament is fixed and time-bound. Were the Applicant confined to the appellate process, he would remain dependent upon the discretionary power of either the High Court or the Court of Appeal to stay the execution of the High Court’s judgment. In the event that both courts decline to grant a stay of the speaking orders contained in the judgment of the High Court, the 2nd Interested Party, the Electoral Commission, would face no legal impediment to proceed with the by-election as ordered by the High Court, as it is duty-bound by law to do so.
Assume, arguendo that, the 1st Interested Party emerges victorious in the by-election and is sworn in as the Member of Parliament for Kpandai, only for the Applicant subsequently to succeed in overturning the High Court’s judgment, the resulting situation would inevitably generate disorder, imposing needless confusion on the electorate of Kpandai Constituency and, indeed, the nation at large, a scenario precipitated by the failure to exercise the supervisory power of this court when jurisdiction has been properly and appropriately invoked. Such an outcome, in my view, would be unfortunate and tantamount to a disservice to the people on whose behalf we are empowered to administer justice.
Consequently, given the peculiar circumstances of this case, the remedy of certiorari presents itself as the most suitable and effective form of relief. For these reasons, I had no hesitation in granting it.
For the foregoing reasons, and the fuller reasons eruditely articulated by my brother Kulendi JSC in his lead opinion, I supported the grant of an order of certiorari to bring before this Court the judgment of the High Court, (Commercial Division) Tamale, dated 24th December 2024, for the purpose of being quashed, which was accordingly quashed.
(SGD.) I. O. TANKO AMADU
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
CONCURRING OPINION
ASIEDU JSC:-
INTRODUCTION:
My lords, in this application filed on the 1st of December 2025, for the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of this court given under article 132 of the Constitution, 1992 and repeated under section 5 of the Courts Act, 1993, Act 459 as amended by Act 620, the applicant seeks an order of this court in the nature of certiorari to quash the judgment of the High Court, Tamale delivered on the 24th day of November 2025. The grounds for this application, according to the applicant, are that:
“The learned High Court Judge committed a jurisdictional error when he wrongfully assumed jurisdiction to hear and determine the Parliamentary Election Petition filed by the 1st Interested Party on the 25th day of January 2025 in respect of the Parliamentary Election held at the Kpandai Constituency on 7th December, 2024 after the expiration of statutory twenty-one (21) days from the date of the publication in the Gazette of the election results to which the petition relates.
The trial Judge committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record when he proceeded to hear and give Judgment on the petition filed by the 1st Interested Party on the 25th day of January 2025 contrary to and in breach of section 18 of the Representation of the People Law, 1992, P.N.D.C.L. 284 thereby rendering his judgment dated 24th November, 2025 void and a nullity”.
Flowing from the above grounds, the applicant seeks reliefs in the nature of:
“A declaration that the Parliamentary Election Petition filed by the 1st Interested Party on the 25th January, 2025, in respect of the Parliamentary Election held at the Kpandai Constituency on 7th December, 2024, thirty-two(32) days after the publication of the gazette notification of the Results to which the Petition related was invalid and same could not have properly invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court, Commercial Division, Tamale, and that, any processes, proceedings and judgement or Order founded on same is void and of no effect.
An order of Certiorari by this Honourable Court quashing the Judgement of His Lordship Justice Emmanuel Bart-Plange Brew sitting at the High Court, Commercial Division, Tamale, dated 24th November, 2025, delivered pursuant to the said invalid petition as well as any process and proceedings founded on the said invalid Petition”.
The application is supported by an affidavit and a supplementary affidavit. The 1st interested party is vehemently opposed to the application as shown by his affidavit in opposition filed on the 6th January 2026. The 2nd Interested party has also filed an affidavit. The 3rd Interested party failed to file any affidavit notwithstanding the service of the application on him.
FACTS:
It is common knowledge to Ghanaians and the world at large that the Electoral Commission of Ghana organized elections on the 7th December 2024 to elect a President for Ghana and also Parliamentarians for the various constituencies of Ghana. The applicant and the 1st Interested party contested the election in the Kpandai Constituency as Parliamentary candidates. The results of the said election were published in a gazette, exhibit ‘MN’ herein dated the 24th December 2024. The results show that the applicant was declared the winner of the election. Dissatisfied with the results, the 1st Interested party filed a petition before the High Court in Tamale on the 25th January 2025. In the said petition, the 1st Interested party sought to nullify a part or the entire results of the Parliamentary election held in the Kpandai Constituency. After hearing the petition, the High Court, Tamale, gave judgment, exhibit MN3 herein, in which the judge nullified the results of the said election and made an order for the 2nd Interested party to hold a fresh Parliamentary election for the Kpandai constituency.
THE APPLICATION:
The instant application seeks an order from this court to quash the judgment of the High Court, Tamale, dated the 24th November 2025 aforesaid. Paragraphs 17 to 21 and 25 to 29 of the affidavit in support, filed on the 1st December 2025, detail the reasons why the applicant seeks to quash the judgment of the High Court. These paragraphs state that:
“17. That the results of the Parliamentary Election of Kpandai Constituency conducted on 7th December, 2024 which is the election to which 1st Interested Party’s Petition relates was gazetted on the 24th December, 2024.
18. That I am advised by Counsel and believe same to be true that, the Parliamentary election results of the Kpandai Constituency conducted on 7th December, 2024, to which the Petition relates having been gazetted on the 24th day of December, 2024, the 1st Interested Party was required by law to file his Petition on or before the 14th day of January 2025, which is, twenty-one days from the 24th December, 2024, the date of gazette publication.
19. That contrary to the above, the 1st Respondent herein (sic) chose to file his election petition on the 25th day of January 2025 which was more than one (1) month after the Kpandai Parliamentary election results to which the Petition relates had been gazetted.
20. That it is clear that at the time the 1st Interested Party filed his Petition at the registry of the High Court (Commercial Division), Tamale, it was about thirty-two (32) days after the publication in the gazette of the Kpandai Constituency election results.
21. That I am further advised by counsel and believe same to be true that, to the extent that, at the time of the filing of the Petition the statutory twenty-one (21) days permitted for bringing a petition to challenge the Kpandai Constituency election results had expired, the 1st Interested Party’s Petition filed on 25th January, 2025 was invalid and therefore incompetent to properly invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court (Commercial Division), Tamale.
25. That despite the above express provisions of the law, the learned High Court Judge, Justice Emmanuel Bart-Plange Brew sitting at the High Court, Commercial Division, Tamale, entertained and assumed jurisdiction over the Parliamentary Election Petition filed by the 1st Interested Party on the 25th of January, 2025, albeit, wrongfully and unlawfully.
26. That on 24th November, 2025, the High Court Judge, Justice Emmanuel Bart-Plange Brew having wrongfully assumed jurisdiction over the invalid Petition heard same and delivered judgment and annulled the entire Kpandai Constituency Parliamentary Election results and further Ordered rerun of the entire elections within 30 days from the date of the judgment. Attached hereto and marked as exhibit MN2 is a letter applying for copy of the judgment of the High Court dated 24th November, 2025 which judgment shall be filed before this Court upon receipt of same from the High Court, Commercial Division, Tamale.
28. That I am advised by counsel and believe same to be true that the gazette notification of the Kpandai Constituency election results having been published on the 24th December, 2024 and the Petition having been filed on the 25th day of January 2025, long after the expiration of the statutory period for doing same, the Petition was invalid by operation of law and to that extent, it was wrong for the learned High Court Judge to assume jurisdiction to hear the said election petition and proceed to make orders pursuant to same in the form of a judgment.
29. That I am further advised by counsel and believe same to be true that the Election Petition filed by the 1st Interested Party being invalid by operation of law could not have properly invoked the jurisdiction of the court and consequentially, all acts founded on the said petition and the wrongful assumption of jurisdiction by the High Court including processes, proceedings and, the pursuant judgment delivered by the High Court are all void and of no legal effect”.
In effect, the applicant says that the results of the Kpandai Constituency Parliamentary election held on the 7th of December 2024 was gazetted on the 24th December 2024, and that the said publication showed that the applicant won that election and for that matter the petition filed by the 1st Interested party on the 25th January 2025, was filed in breach of the law. That being so, the High Court, Tamale could not have lawfully entertained and assumed jurisdiction over the petition; consequently, the judgment of the High Court, Tamale, dated the 24th November 2025 is a nullity and therefore susceptible to the supervisory powers of this court and ought, therefore, to be quashed by certiorari.
RESPONSE OF 1ST INTERESTED PARTY:
The 1st Interested party opposes the application on a number of grounds. First, the 1st Interested party deposes that he earlier filed a petition to challenge the results of the Kpandai Parliamentary election and that in respect of that petition, the applicant filed a motion with a supporting affidavit to dismiss same. According to the 1st Interested Party, in the said affidavit, the applicant swore that the Kpandai Parliamentary election result was gazetted on the 6th January 2025. The 1st Interested Party, therefore, says that not only is the applicant estopped from asserting a different date for the gazetting of the Kpandai Parliamentary election results, but that the applicant is guilty of fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation and that the applicant acquiesced to the alleged want of jurisdiction in the High Court by participating in the proceedings leading to the judgment, subject matter of the instant application. The 1st Interested party finally deposed at paragraphs 80, 81, 82 and 83 of his affidavit in opposition filed on the 6th January 2026 that:
“80. That I filed a Notice of Discontinuance and wholly discontinued the 23rd of December, 2024, Petition with suit number NR/TL/HC/E13/15/25 and caused a fresh Election Petition, with suit number NR/TL/HC/E13/22/25, to be filed on the 25th of January, 2025, on the basis of the Applicant deposition in paragraph 8 of his 21st of January, 2025, Supplementary Affidavit stating that the Parliamentary results of 7th December, 2024, held nationwide, including that of Kpandai Constituency, were published in the Gazette by the Electoral Commission on 6th January, 2025, labeled as Exhibit JS 3 in his 21st of January, 2025, Supplementary Affidavit before the High Court, Commercial Division, Tamale. (Exhibits “DNW 1” “DNW 5” “DNW 6” “DNW 7” and “Exhibit MN” Refers)
81. That by the Applicant’s own statement and act of intentionally and deliberately making representations before the trial High Court, Commercial Division, Tamale, relating to 6th January, 2025, gazette which caused me to believe same to be true and act upon that believe by wholly discontinuing the 23rd of December 2024 Petition with suit number, NR/TL/HC/E13/15/25, this Honourable Court ought to shut its doors of discretionary remedy of Certiorari to the Applicant so that he does not benefit from a grant of a Certiorari on the back of the said 24th December, 2024 gazette publication. (Exhibit “DNW 1” and “Exhibit MN” Refers)
82. That I am advised by Counsel and verily believe same to be true that an Election Petition shall be presented within twenty-one days after the date of the publication of the election results to which it relates in the gazette.
83. That my Election Petition with suit number NR/TL/HC/E13/22/25 having been filed on the 25th of January, 2025, was thus brought within nineteen days after the Parliamentary election results were Gazetted. (“Exhibit 7’ Refers)”
RESPONSE OF 2ND INTERESTED PARTY:
The 2nd Interested party, the Electoral Commission herein, caused an affidavit to be filed on its behalf by one Samuel Tettey, a Deputy Chairperson of the Commission, on the 10th December 2025. In the said affidavit, the 2nd Interested party admitted that on the 7th December 2025, it conducted a general election in the country. The 2nd Interested party deposed that on the 24th December 2024, it gazetted the results of 271 parliamentary constituencies and on the 6th January 2025, it gazetted the results of the remaining 4 other parliamentary constituencies. The gazette published by the 2nd Interested party was exhibited as exhibit ST1.
CONSIDERATION OF THE CASE OF THE PARTIES:
A critical study of exhibit ST1, the gazette, published by the 2nd Interested party, the Electoral Commission, shows at page 8123 that the parliamentary election results of the Kpandai Constituency were gazetted on the 24th day of December 2024. It also shows that the applicant in the instant matter was declared as the elected candidate in that parliamentary election. The 1st Interested party herein is the candidate who came second. This publication, the gazette notification herein, aligns with the case of the applicant in this matter as far as the date of the gazetting of the Kpandai parliamentary election held on the 7th December 2024 is concerned.
The affidavit of the 1st Interested party does not indeed dispute the fact that on the 24th December 2024, the Kpandai Parliamentary election was gazetted. The 1st Interested party says however that he had, on the 23rd December 2024 filed an election petition before the High Court, Tamale, in suit number NR/TL/HC/E13/15/25 in which he sought to challenge the results of the 7th December 2024, Parliamentary election held by the 2nd Interested party in the Kpandai Constituency, but was deceived by an affidavit filed by the applicant in which the applicant deposed that the said election was rather gazetted on the 6th of January 2025 as a result of which he withdrew the petition filed and then filed the petition suit number NR/TL/HC/E13/22/25, which resulted in the judgment which is the subject matter of the instant application. This deposition is stated clearly at paragraphs 12, 17, 19, 20, 43, 80, 81 of the 1st Interested party’s affidavit in opposition.
I am particularly scandalized and embarrassed by the above depositions poignantly made in the 1st Interested party’s affidavit in support and I wonder the sort of advice given the applicant by his lawyer. The said depositions create the impression that the applicant herein is the sole repository of knowledge about the gazetting of Kpandai Parliamentary election results such that the 1st Interested party is bound to swallow hook line and sinker any story from the applicant in respect of the date of gazetting of the Kpandai parliamentary election results. The gazetting of a Parliamentary election result is a matter of public knowledge. It is a fact about which the Court can take judicial notice as stated in section 9 (1) to (3) of the Evidence Act, 1975, NRCD 323, to the effect that:
“9. Judicial notice
(1) This section governs the taking of judicial notice of facts in issue or facts which are relevant to facts in issue.
(2) Judicial notice can be taken only of facts which are
(a) so generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, or
(b) so capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,
that the facts are not subject to reasonable dispute.
(3) Judicial notice may be taken whether requested or not”.
It is, therefore, not within the right of the 1st Interested party to depose that he relied on a deposition of the applicant to the effect that the result of the Parliamentary election of the Kpandai Constituency was gazetted on the 6th of January 2025. The 1st Interested party cannot constitute the applicant into an agent to inform him of the date that the result of any general election was gazetted. The 1st Interested party is duty bound to correctly educate himself of the date of the gazetting of the result of any general election held in the country.
At any rate, I wish to question the basis of the filing of the election petition by the 1st Interested party on the 23rd December 2024 in suit number NR/TL/HC/E13/15/25 as deposed to in the paragraphs above quoted. This is so because, in paragraph 82 of the affidavit in opposition filed by the 1st Interested party, he says that “that I am advised by counsel and verily believe same to be true that an election petition shall be presented within twenty-one days after the date of the publication of the election results to which it relates in the gazette”. This deposition in paragraph 82 quoted herein is a correct statement of the law as captured in section 18 of the Representation of the People Act, 1992, PNDCL 284 which states that:
“18. Time for presentation of petition
An election petition shall be presented within twenty-one days after the date of the publication in the Gazette of the result of the election to which it relates, but a petition questioning an election on an allegation of corrupt practice and specifically alleging a payment of money or any other award to have been made by the person whose election is questioned or to have been made on behalf of and to that person’s knowledge, may be presented within twenty-one days after the date of the alleged payment”.
The question, therefore, is that: at the time the petition in suit number NR/TL/HC/E13/15/25 was filed on the 23rd December 2024, had the Parliamentary election results of the Kpandai Constituency held on the 7th December 2024 been gazetted by the Electoral Commission? And if it had not been gazetted, then, what was the basis for the filing of the said petition by the 1st Interested party? Clearly, therefore, the petition filed by the 1st Interested party on the 23rd December 2024 in suit number NR/TL/HC/E13/15/25 was still-born, it was pre-mature and therefore invalid having been filed at a time that the result of the Kpandai Constituency Parliamentary election held on the 7th December 2024, had not been gazetted. See the opinion of Ansah JSC in the Republic vs High Court, Koforidua; Ex parte Asare (Baba Jamal & Others, Interested Parties) [2009] SCGLR 460. Once again, the 1st Interested party cannot be heard to depose that he withdrew that petition because he was deceived into doing so by a deposition contained in an affidavit filed by the applicant to have the said petition dismissed. The trial judge in the case was bound by law to dismiss that petition in suit number NR/TL/HC/E13/15/25 which had no basis in law and therefore the affidavit deposed to by the applicant herein in that petition cannot be used as having misrepresented facts to the 1st Interested party herein. A party cannot rely on a deliberate and self-imposed ignorance of the law or fact to seek a remedy in a court of law. Similarly, a party, like the 1st Interested party herein, cannot rely on a deliberate and self-imposed ignorance of a fact which he could easily ascertain to say that he has been misled or deceived by his opponent into believing the existence of an entirely different set or state of facts upon which he relied to his detriment. The 1st Interested party herein cannot be heard to say that he was deceived by a deposition in an affidavit filed by the applicant herein into believing that the Parliamentary election results of the Kpandai Constituency election was gazetted on the 6th of January 2025 instead of 24th December 2024. This is because, the date of gazette of the election results was not within the sole knowledge of the applicant herein but was a matter of public knowledge. In my opinion, therefore, the reliance by the 1st Interested party on fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation and on estoppel as contained in his affidavit in opposition falls short of the requirement of the law by which such facts are measured. The depositions by the 1st Interested party herein in the affidavit in opposition to the instant application is revealing of the willingness of the 1st Interested party to be very economical with the truth before this court. This is because, in exhibit DNW4 filed by the 1st Interested party herein as an affidavit in opposition to an application filed by the applicant herein before the trial High Court to dismiss suit number NR/TL/HC/E13/15/25, the 1st Interested party caused one Gideon Kumor to depose on his behalf at paragraph 9 thereof that:
“9. That in further answer to paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the applicant’s affidavit in support, the Respondent says that the 2nd Respondent, as at the 24th December 2024, had officially gazetted the Parliamentary election results of 274 out of 276 constituencies, including the Kpandai Constituency, the subject constituency of the Respondent’s petition”
The implication of the above deposition vis-à-vis the depositions contained in the instant affidavit in opposition filed by the 1st Interested party is that, at the time he filed his affidavit in opposition in the High Court in suit number NR/TL/HC/E13/15/25 and at the time he filed the instant affidavit in opposition, he knew very well that the result of the Kpandai Constituency Parliamentary election was gazetted on the 24th December 2024. His desire therefore in deposing in the instant affidavit in opposition that he was deceived by the applicant into withdrawing his invalid petition could be aimed at nothing but to throw dust into the eyes of this court; an act which this court deprecates. A person who aspires to occupy a seat as high and as honourable as that of a member of parliament must not shy away from the truth especially before the highest court of the land.
The Electoral Commission, the 2nd Interested party herein, as one of its functions under article 45(c) of the Constitution and section 2(c) of the Electoral Commission Act, 1993, Act 451, is tasked with the conduct and the supervision of public elections and referenda. After the conduct of a Parliamentary election certain procedures, steps and due process are required to be exercised by the Returning Officer appointed by the Commission for the Constituency as stipulated under regulation 43(1) of the Public Elections Regulations, 2020, CI.127. Thereafter, regulation 43(2) of CI.127 states that:
“The Commission shall, on receipt of an endorsed writ,
Publish in the gazette a notice stating the name of the person elected and the total number of votes cast for each candidate; and
Inform the Clerk of Parliament soon after that, of the name of the candidate elected”.
If one looks carefully at regulation 43(1)(d), one will be in no doubt that before the Commission publishes in the gazette the name of the candidate who has been duly elected, the Returning Officer of the Commission would have “publicly declared as elected in a parliamentary election the candidate who had the highest votes” in the Constituency in question. This first declaration is made in the Constituency by the Returning officer of the Constituency at least for the information of the members of the public in the Constituency in question. However, under regulation 43(2) the Commission is required by law to publish in the gazette the results of the election of the Constituency and the purpose of this second publication in the gazette is to inform the whole world of the candidate who won the election in a particular constituency. To gazette is to publish in an official newspaper of the Government acts of the State and other legal matters affecting the State. See Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th edition. Indeed, the duty of the Electoral Commission to conduct and supervise public elections as far as Parliamentary elections are concerned, comes to an end with the publication in the gazette of the name of the candidate who won a particular election. The gazetting therefore signifies the official announcement and publication of the results of the election and, a fortiori, the name of the candidate who won a particular election. It was thus pointed out by this court in Amidu vs. Electoral Commission and Another [2001-2002] 1 GLR 457 at page 467 that:
“Thus, it is clear from these provisions, particularly paragraph 41(2)(a) of CI 15 that the act of publishing the Gazette is an operational or functional one whose sole purpose was to give formal notice of the existence of a certain outcome from the parliamentary elections. Indeed, the function of any published Gazette is merely to notify the public of the facts contained therein and intended to be notified thereby. As was correctly noted by the plaintiff in his written submission, this position is clearly stated in section 154 of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323) as follows:
“154. All proclamations, Acts of State, whether legislative or executive, nominations, appointments, and other official communications appearing in the Ghana Gazette are prima facie evidence of any fact of a public nature which they are intended to notify.”
That being the case, the Electoral Commission does not have the power in law or in fact to re-publish by gazetting or otherwise the results of an election which had already been gazetted. To do so is to seek to indirectly change the fortunes of an election or even the results of the election or confer rights of various forms to persons affected by the published results. This has the potential to create chaos in the constituency such as the instant matter where the 1st Interested party, disingenuously, seeks to rely on a supposed re-gazetting of the results of the Kpandai Constituency parliamentary election on the 6th of January 2025 to file a petition on the 25th January 2025. It must therefore be stated in clear and explicit language that the publication by the Electoral Commission of a gazette on the 6th January 2025 in which the results of the Kpandai Constituency Parliamentary election, which had already been gazetted on the 24th December 2024, was re-gazetted was very unlawful and the Electoral Commission lacks the legal basis to do that, and therefore, to the extent that the re-gazetting included the results of the Kpandai Constituency Parliamentary election, that gazette is invalid. Indeed, once an election result is gazetted, it is only the High Court that can change that result after observing due process in accordance with article 99(1) of the Constitution and the provisions of the Representation of the People Law and other laws governing elections in the country.
My lords, the issue as to which of the gazette publications of 24th December 2024 or that of 6th January 2025 is valid, as far as the constituencies contained in the gazette dated 24th December 2024 and re-published in the gazette dated the 6th January 2025, is not a question confronting this court for the first time in the instant matter. In civil motion number J5/37/2025 (unreported) dated the 11th June 2025, titled The Republic vs High Court 3, Koforidua, Ex parte Ernest Yaw Kumi (Hon. Henry Boakye Yiadom and 2 Others, Interested Parties), this court, differently constituted, was confronted with the issue of the validity of the gazette notification dated the 24th December 2024 and that of the 6th January 2025 with respect to the Akwatia Parliamentary Constituency election held on the 7th December 2024. After analysing the affidavit evidence presented to the court by the parties thereto, the court held, per Adjei-Frimpong JSC at page 7 of the judgment of the majority of the court that:
“From the affidavit evidence before this Court, it was established that the gazette notification No. 234 dated the 24th December 2024 was the valid one. We therefore had no difficulty finding that the results of the Akwatia Parliamentary elections were gazetted on the 24th December 2024 and not 6th January 2025”.
Although the above conclusion is a finding based on the facts presented in that case, the facts which confront this court in the instant matter are not different from the facts presented in the Akwatia Parliamentary election case. There is no difference at all. The facts are the same which are whether the gazette notification published on the 24th December 2024 is valid or whether the gazette of 6th January 2025 is valid with respect to the Kpandai Parliamentary election already gazetted in the 24th December 2024 gazette. This court, therefore, has no reason to depart from the finding of fact made in the Akwatia case. Consequently, I hold that as far as the Kpandai Parliamentary election is concerned, the gazette published on the 24th December 2024 is valid and supersedes the re-publication made by the 2nd Interested party on the 6th January 2025. When it therefore comes to the determination of the date on which the rights of any person seeking to challenge the results of the Kpandai Constituency Parliamentary election accrued, that date ought to be reckoned with respect to the gazette of 24th December 2024 and not the re-published gazette of 6th January 2025 as the 1st Interested party disingenuously seeks to urge on this court despite his own deposition on oath which I have hereinbefore quoted.
The 1st Interested party has admitted in his affidavit in opposition to the instant application invoking this Court’s supervisory jurisdiction that the petition which he filed to challenge the results of the Kpandai Constituency Parliamentary election was filed on the 25th January 2025. Indeed, at paragraph 83 of the said affidavit, the 1st Interested party deposed as follows:
“That my election petition with suit number NR/TL/HC/E13/22/25 having been filed on the 25th of January 2025, was thus brought within nineteen days after the Parliamentary election results were gazetted (exhibit 7 refers)”.
See also the deposition contained in paragraph 80 of the affidavit in opposition of the 1st Interested party quoted above.
Section 18 of the Representation of the People Act, 1992, PNDCL 284 states in very concise language that:
“18. Time for presentation of petition
(1) An election petition shall be presented within twenty-one days after the date of the publication in the Gazette of the result of the election to which it relates, but a petition questioning an election on an allegation of corrupt practice and specifically alleging a payment of money or any other award to have been made by the person whose election is questioned or to have been made on behalf of and to that person’s knowledge, may be presented within twenty-one days after the date of the alleged payment.
(2) The presentation of an election petition under subsection (1) is not valid unless within the time specified in subsection (1), the petitioner gives as security for costs an amount of money determined by the High Court.
(3) The time limit provided by this section for the presentation of an election petition shall not be extended”.
In my opinion, it is clear that whereas the results of the Kpandai Constituency Parliamentary election were gazetted on the 24th December 2024, the 1st Interested Party filed his petition on the 25th January 2025. Thus, the petition was filed about thirty-two (32) days after the results of the election had been gazetted instead of being filed within twenty-one (21) days after the gazette as required by law. It follows therefore that the petition was contrary to and in flagrant disobedience of the law as provided in PNDC Law 284. The said petition, in suit number NR/TL/HC/E13/22/25 is therefore invalid and could not have invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court, Tamale. The High Court Judge did not, therefore, have jurisdiction to entertain the petition at all let alone hear the case and make pronouncement on same. The Judge was duty bound to first establish and come to a concrete legal conclusion that he had jurisdiction to embark upon the enquiry before hearing the case and this duty which the law casts on the trial Judge was not taken away by the fact that the parties failed to raise the issue for consideration. See, Justice Abdulai vs. Attorney General [2020-2022] 1 GLR 91 SC and Republic vs. High Court, Sunyani; Ex parte Collins Dauda (Boakye-Boateng Interested Party) [2009] SCGLR 447.
It has been submitted on behalf of the 1st Interested Party that the applicant is estopped from raising the issue of the lack of jurisdiction of the High Court to hear the petition before this court because, he failed to raise that point before the High Court, Tamale. This submission shows a clear misunderstanding of the position of the law on the subject. The fact that the parties herein, especially the applicant, failed to formally raise the issue of the lack of jurisdiction in the trial Judge to entertain the instant petition does not confer jurisdiction on the Judge to hear the instant petition and make pronouncement on it. Parties and their lawyers before our courts cannot by agreement or acquiescence or out of the lack of exercise of due diligence or skill confer jurisdiction on the courts where none exists except a statute specifically says so, as, for example, the provision in section 42(3) of the Courts Act, 1993, Act 459 (as amended) which gives parties before the Circuit Court, the power to agree that the Circuit Court may proceed to hear an action notwithstanding that the amount being claimed or the value of the property being claimed exceeds the jurisdiction given the Circuit Court under the Courts Act.
It has always been the position of our jurisprudence that the issue of jurisdiction and the lack of it can be raised at any stage of the proceedings and even for the first time before the apex court. See, Fatal vs. Wolley [2013-2014] 2 SCGLR 1070 and Francis Osei-Bonsu vs. Attorney-General, Writ No. J1/18/2023 delivered on the 24th April, 2024. SC.
My lords, the scope of the public remedy of certiorari has been explained in a countless number of cases. In Republic vs. High Court, Accra; Ex parte Appiah and Others [1999-2000] 2 GLR 420, the view was expressed by this court to the effect that:
“An order for certiorari would be made where the order sought to be quashed had been made, inter alia, without jurisdiction, either because the court had exceeded its jurisdiction or lacks jurisdiction. A court having jurisdiction might nevertheless lose that jurisdiction if its decision was made in bad faith; or if it had failed in the course of the inquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice; or if it had refused to take into account something which it was required to take into account. The list could not be said to be exhaustive. However, where the court had jurisdiction to entertain the action, its judgment or ruling could not be impeached on the mere ground that its decision was wrong. Under those circumstances, the proper thing to do was to appeal that decision. Where however upon the face of the proceedings it appeared that the decision was wrong in law, certiorari to quash it would be granted”.
In Republic vs High Court, Koforidua; Ex parte Asare (Baba Jamal & Others, Interested Parties) (supra), this court stated at page 509 of the report that:
“Where a statute has made provisions for certain steps to be taken in order to comply with the requirements of the law, then no other steps other than those prescribed must be taken or followed. In this case, once the 1st Interested parties have failed to strictly adhere to the provisions of PNDCL 284 … it follows that their actions falls flat in the face of the law. This must not be countenanced by a court of law, especially the Supreme Court for that matter. This is because it is from the Supreme Court that all other courts take direction and guidance, because of the principle of stare decisis”.
“A court cannot shut its eyes to the violation of statute as that would be very contrary to its raison d’etre. If a court can suo motu take up the question of illegality even on mere public policy grounds, I do not see how it can fail to take up illegality arising from statutory infraction which has duly come to its notice.” See Network Computer System Ltd vs. Intelsat Global Sales & Marketing Ltd [2012] 1 SCGLR 218.
My lords, it was also submitted on behalf of the 1st Interested party that the issue of lack of jurisdiction was not raised by the applicant before the Trial High Court Judge. As I have already pointed out, the High Court Judge is deemed to know the law and was duty bound to apprise himself of his jurisdiction before embarking upon the hearing of the petition. As was pointed out at page 228 of Network Computer System Ltd vs. Intelsat Global Sales & Marketing Ltd (supra), “that where there is infraction of a mandatory statutory requirement, it matters not that a court in making its order is factually ignorant of the same. That is a very revolutionary and proactive judicial stance towards upholding the supremacy of statutes”.
CONCLUSION:
I am very satisfied that in entertaining the petition of the 1st Interested party herein in suit number NR/TL/HC/E13/22/25 and in delivering judgment in that suit, the High Court, Tamale acted without jurisdiction. Jurisdiction represents the power to entertain and hear a case. So, when it is agreed that a court lacks power to entertain and hear a case, that finding speaks powerfully to the inability of the court to entertain that case pro tanto. Certiorari is not about the merit of the case as is being bandied around. It is about compliance with procedure, statute, the rules of natural justice, issues of jurisdiction and the observance of the wednesbury principles. This court has had occasions to set the scope and the parameters of the public remedy of certiorari. In Republic vs. Court of Appeal, Accra; Ex parte Ghana Cable Ltd (Barclays Bank Ghana Ltd Interested Party) [2005-2006] SCGLR 107, this court made it clear at page 118 of the report that:
“Certiorari is not concerned with the merits of the decision. It is a complaint about jurisdiction or some procedural irregularity like the breach of the rules of natural justice.”
And, in Republic vs. High Court, Sekondi, Ex parte Ampong alias Akrufa Krukoko I (Kyerefo III & Others Interested parties [2011] 2 SCGLR 716, this court came clear that:
“It was well-settled that certiorari was not concerned with the merits of the decision; it was rather a discretionary remedy which would be granted on grounds of excess or want of jurisdiction and/or some breach of rules of natural justice; or to correct a clear error of law apparent on the face of the record. The error of law must be so grave as to amount to the wrong assumption of jurisdiction; and it must be so obvious as to make the decision a nullity.”
In the instant matter, the 1st Interested party woefully failed to comply with the provisions of section 18(1) with respect to the time within which he should have filed his petition to challenge or question the results of the Kpandai Parliamentary election which was held on the 7th December 2024 and gazetted on the 24th December 2024. I will therefore grant the instant application and make an order that the proceedings in that case together with the judgment delivered by the High Court Judge on the 24th November 2025 be brought up to this court to be quashed and I proceed to quash, by the prerogative writ of certiorari, the said proceedings and the judgment dated the 24th November 2025.
(SGD.) S. K. A. ASIEDU
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
CONCURRING OPINION
KWOFIE JSC:-
I have had the advantage of reading the opinions of my respected and able brothers Kulendi, Tanko and Asiedu JJSC and I am in total agreement with their respective opinions. I have however considered it necessary to put down a few words of my own.
The Applicant herein was elected as member of Parliament for Kpandai constituency in the Northern Region after the December 7th 2024, Parliamentary election. He was subsequently sworn in as the Member of Parliament for Kpandai constituency. Thereafter, on 25th of January, the 1st interested party, Daniel Nsala Wakpal, filed a petition at the High Court, Tamale, challenging the Election of the Applicant and in the said petition sought amongst other reliefs, the following.
A declaration that the Parliamentary Election held in the Kpandai Constituency on 7th December 2024 was void by virtue of the irregularities and inconsistencies contained in FORM 8A (REGULATION 32(7) and 39(2) Statement of Polls for the Office of Member of Parliament (Pink Sheet) for Forty-one (41) polling stations out of a total One Hundred and Fifty-Two (152) Polling stations in the Kpandai Constituency.
A declaration that the irregularities and inconsistencies contained in FORM 8A (REGULATION 32(7) and 39(2) Statement of Polls for the Office of Member of Parliament (Pink Sheet) for Forty-one (41) polling stations out of a total One Hundred and Fifty-Two (152) Polling stations in the KpandaiConstituency have so extensively prevailed and reasonably affected the result of the election held in the Kpandai Constituency on 7th December, 2024.
A declaration that the non-compliance with Regulation 39 of the Public Elections Regulations 2020 (C.I 127) affected the parliamentary election results of Forty-One (41) Polling stations out of the one hundred and fifty-two (152) polling stations in the Kpandai Constituency held in the Kpandai Constituency on 7th December 2024.
The trial Judge at the High Court, Tamale, conducted a full trial and on the 24th of November 2025 gave judgment in favour of 1st interested party herein by upholding his claims and ordering a re-run of the Parliamentary Elections for the entire Kpandai Constituency.
Dissatisfied with this decision of the High Court, the applicant herein filed an application for Judicial Review in the nature of Certiorari for an order for this Court to quash the said judgment as well as the proceedings and processes leading to the said judgment on the basis that the High Court judge wrongfully assumed juridiction to hear, determine and give judgment in the said case and also committed errors of law apparent on the face of the record.
Specifically, the grounds in support of the said application were as follows:
The learned High Court Judge committed a jurisdictional error when he wrongfully assumed jurisdiction to hear and determine the Parliamentary Election Petition filed by the 1st Interested Party on the 25th day of January 2025 in respect of the Parliamentary Election held in the Kpandai Constituency on 7th December, 2024 after the expiration of the statutory twenty-one (21) days from the date of the publication in the Gazette of the election results to which the petition relates.
The trial Judge committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record when he proceeded to hear and give judgment on the Petition filed by the 1st Interested Party on the 25th day of January 2025 contrary to and in breach of section 18 of the Representation of The People Law, 1992, P.N.D.C.L. 284 thereby rendering his judgment dated 24th November, 2025 void and a nullity.
Specifically, the applicant sought the following reliefs from this Court
A declaration that the Parliamentary Election petition filed by the 1st Interested Party on 25th January, 2025, in respect of the Parliamentary Election held at the Kpandai Constituency on 7th December, 2024, thirty-two (32) days after the publication of the gazette notification of the Results to which the Petition related was invalid and same could not have properly invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court, Commercial Division, Tamale, and that, any processes, proceedings and judgement or Order founded on same is void and of no effect.
An Order of Certiorari by this Honourable Court quashing the Judgement of His Lordship Justice Emmanuel Bart-Plange Brew sitting at the High Court, Commercial Division, Tamale, dated 24th November, 2025, delivered pursuant to the said invalid Petition as well as any process and proceedings founded on the said invalid Petition.
Any other Order(s) as the Court deem fit.
The application of the applicant was brought under Article 132 of the Constitution, 1992 and section 5 of the Courts Act 1993 (Act 459) as amended, and Rule 61 of the Supreme Court Rules as amended.
Article 132 of the Constitution 1992 provides as follows
“The Supreme Court shall have supervisory jurisdiction over all courts and over any adjudicating authority and may in the exercise of that supervisory jurisdiction, issue orders and directions for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement of its supervisory power”.
The grounds for the grant of Certiorari have been set out in a plethora of cases by the Court, including The Republic vs. High Court Ex-Parte Ampong Alias Akrufa Krukokor (Kyerefo III and others, Interested Parties) [2011] 2 SCGL 716; Republic vs. Court Of Appeal Ex-Parte Tsatsu Tsikata [2005/2006] SCGLR 612 and Accra Recreational Complex Ltd. V Lands Commission [2007/2008] 1 SCGLR 108.
Touching on the grounds for the exercise of the Jurisdiction, Wood JSC, as she then was, in the Republic V Court of Appeal Ex-Parte Tsatsu Tsikata (Supra), stated at page 619
“The clear thinking of this court is that our supervisory jurisdiction under Article 132 of the 1992 Constitution should be exercised only in those manifestly plain and obvious cases, where there are patent errors of law on the face of the record, which errors either go to the jurisdiction or are so plain as to make the impugned decision a complete nullity. It stands to reason then, that the errors) of law alleged must be fundamental, substantial, material, grave or so serious as to go to the root of the matter… A minor, trifling, inconsequential, or unimportant error which does not go to the core or the root of the decision complained of; or stated differently, on which the decision does not turn, would not attract the Court Supervisory Jurisdiction”.
The grounds for the exercise were further highlighted in the Accra Recreational Complex Case (Supra), wherein Brobbey JSC stated as follows:
“In general terms, the grounds for the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of this court are:
“(1) where there has been excess of jurisdiction fixed by the 1992 Constitution or a statute;
where there has been want of jurisdiction, as it happened in Republic v Court Appeal; Ex parte Ekuntan II [1989-90]2 GLR 168 and Republic vs. High Court, Koforidua; Ex parte Otu [1995-96]1 GLR 177;
where there has been error of law patent on the face of the record in such a way as to render the decision a nullity, as illustrated in Republic vs. High Court, Accra Ex parte Industrialization Fund for Developing Countries [2003-2004]1 SCGLR 348 and
(iv) where there is a breach of natural justice: see Aboagye vs. Ghana Commercial Bank [2001-2002]2 SCGLR 797. To these was added a fifth one described as the intervention powers of this court as enunciated in British Airways vs. Attorney-General [1996-97] SCGLR 547.”
In his Affidavit in Support, the Applicant deposed in paragraphs 11, 14, 15, 17,18,20,21 as follows
11. That in accordance with law, the results of the Parliamentary Elections in the Kpandai Constituency was published in the Gazzette on the 24th day of December, 2024. Attached hereto and marked as exhibit MN is a copy of the Gazette Notification of the Parliamentary election results in the Kpandai Constituency dated 24th December, 2024.
14. That I am advised and believe same to be true that the Representation of the People Law, 1992, PND Law 284, being the primary law that regulates Parliamentary Election petition provides as follows: …………………..
15. That per the relevant law, parliamentary election petition may only be brought within 21 days after the election results are gazetted by the Electoral Commission, the 2nd Interested Party herein.
17. That the results of the Parliamentary Election of Kpandai Constituency conducted on 7th December, 2024 which is the election to which 1st Interested Party’s Petition relates was gazetted on the 24th December, 2024.
18. That I am advised by Counsel and believe same to be true that, the Parliamentary Election results of the Kpandai Constituency conducted on 7th December, 2024, to which the Petition relates having been gazetted on the 24th day of December, 2024, the 1st Interested Party was required by law to file his Petition on or before the 14th day of January 2025, which is, twenty-one days from the 24th December, 2024, the date of gazette publication.
20. That it is clear that at the time the 1st Interested Party filed his Petition at the registry of the High Court (Commercial Division), Tamale, it was about thirty-two (32) days after the publication in the gazette of the Kpandai Constituency election results.
21. That I am further advised by counsel and believe same to be true that, to the extent that, at the time of the filing of the Petition the statutory twenty-one (21) days permitted for bringing a petition to challenge the Kpandai Constituency election results had expired, the 1st Interested Party’s Petition filed on 25th January, 2025 was invalid and therefore incompetent to properly invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court (Commercial Division), Tamale.
In opposing the application, the 1st interested Party deposed in paragraphs 6 a, b, d, f and 17,18,19,20 therein as follows
6a. That the Applicant’s conduct of filing a motion to dismiss the 1st Interested Party’s (Petitioner therein) first Petition (suit number NR/TL/HC/E13/15/25) for filing out of time by relying on a Gazette publication dated 6th January, 2025, as the correct date of gazette of Kpandai Parliamentary results and the Applicant’s subsequent conduct of now relying on the 24th December 2024 gazette publication as the date of gazette of the Kpandai Parliamentary result to justify his prayer to quash the judgment of the High Court, Commercial Division, Tamale, amounts to fraud.
6b. That the Applicant’s deposition in paragraph 8 of his Supplementary Affidavit dated the 21st of January 2025 in support of his motion to dismiss the 1st Interested Party’s (Petitioner therein) first Petition to the effect that the Kpandai Parliamentary Election results were gazetted on the 6th of January 2025 and his subsequent sudden u-turn in paragraph 11 of his Affidavit in Support of the instant motion to the effect that the Kpandai Parlamentary Election results were gazetted on the 24th of December 2024 in a bid to get the judgment of the court below quashed amounts to fraudulent misrepresentation.
6d. That the trial High Court, Commercial Division, Tamale, had jurisdiction to hear the Parliamentary Election Petition and rightly assumed jurisdiction to hear the Petition.
6f. That a Certiorari remedy is discretionary and the conduct of the Applicant in this instant Application for Judicial Review in the nature of Certiorari should disentitle him to the remedy.
17. That in response to paragraphs 8, 9, 10,11 and 12 of the Applicant’s motion on notice for Judicial Review in the nature of Certiorari, the Applicant deposed in paragraph 8 of the said 21st of January, 2025, Supplementary Affidavit filed against the Election Petition with suit number NR/TL/HC/E13/15/25 that the Parliamentary Election results of 7th December, 2024, held nationwide, including that of Kpandai Constituency emanated and were published in the Gazette by the Electoral Commission on 6th January, 2025. (Attached and exhibited as “Exhibit DNW 6” is a copy of the 6th January, 2025, Gazette).
18. That the Electoral Commission (2nd Interested Party herein) was at all material times a party to the suit and had been served with all processes up till that point.
19. That in response to paragraphs 8,9,10,11 and 12 of the applicant’s motion on notice for Judicial Review in the nature of Certiorari, I believed and relied on the applicant’s representations in paragraph 8 of the applicant’s sworn deposition in the 21st January, 2025, supplementary affidavit, the gazette document of 6th January 2025 that was exhibited in court, and the conduct of the 2nd Interested party (Electoral Commission) electing not to challenge or Impeach the applicant’s depositions about the said Gazette of 6th January, 2025. (Exhibit DNW 6 refers)
20. That in response to paragraph 8,9,10,11 and 12 of the applicant’s motion on notice for Judicial Review in the nature of Certiorari, I filed a Notice of Discontinuance and wholly discontinued the 23rd of December, 2024 Petition with suit no. NR/TL/HC/E13/15/25, and caused a fresh Election petition to be filed on the 25th of January, 2025, with suit no. NR/TL/HC/E13/22/25, since the applicant had not filed an answer to the Petition. (Attached and exhibited as “Exhibit DNW 7” is a copy of the Election Petition filed on 25th January, 2025).
From the respective affidavits of the applicant in Support and the 1st interested party’s Affidavit in Opposition, the crux of the Applicant’s case is that the 7th December 2024 Parliamentary Election Result including that of Kpandai constituency, were Gazetted on 24th of December 2024 and therefore by law any Petition challenging a Parliamentary Election in any of Parliamentary constituencies ought to be filed within 21 days of the Publication of the Gazette. The applicant further contended that the 1st applicant’s Election Petition challenging the Kpandai Parliamentary Elections result filed on the 25th of January 2025 was filed 32 days after the Gazette Publication and was therefore invalid and void. On the other hand, the 1st interested party contends that the 7th December Parliamentary Elections results, including Kpandai was gazetted on the 6th of January 2025, and therefore the Parliamentary Election petition filed on the 25th of January in respect of the Kpadai Parliamentary Elections was filed within time and therefore valid.
The fundamental issue for determination in this application is: when was the result of the Kpandai Parliamentary election Gazetted? Was it on the 24th December, 2024 as contended by the Applicant in this instant case or 6th January, 2025 as contended by the 1st interested Party?
In my view, this is simply a question of fact. But first, what does the Law regulating Parliamentary Election petition say? The Representation of the People Law 1992, PNDCL 284, being the primary legislation regulating Parliamentary petition provide in section 16 (1) & (2) and section 18(1)(2)&(3) as follows:
Section 16-Methods of Questioning Election.
The validity of an election to Parliament may be questioned only by a petition brought under this Part.
Every election petition shall be presented before the
High Court for hearing.
Section 18-Time for Presentation of Petition.
An election petition shall be presented within twenty-one
days after the date of the publication in the Gazette of the result of the election to which it relates, except that a petition questioning an election on an allegation of corrupt practice and specifically alleging a payment of money or other award to have been made by the person whose election is questioned or to have been made on his behalf to his knowledge, may be presented within twenty-one days after the date of the alleged payment.
(2) The presentation of an election petition under subsection
(1) is not valid unless, within the time specified in
Sub-section
(1), the petitioner gives as security for costs an amount
of money determined by the High Court.
(3) The time limit provided by this section for the presentation of an election petition shall not be extended.
In the case of the Republic vs. High Court Bolgatanga, Ex-parte Hawa Yakubu [2001/2002] 1 GLR 311 @316, this Court held per Acquah JSC (as he then was) as follows:
“The language of section 18(1) of PNDCL 284 is very clear. If the basis of the petition is that of corrupt practice in which money or other award is alleged to have been paid, then the petition should be presented within twenty-one days after the date of the alleged payment. In all other situations, the election petition is to be filed within twenty-one days after the date of the Gazette publication of the results of the disputed election”.
Also, in the case of Isaac Amoo v Rebecca Adotey unreported High Court, Gbedegbe J (as he then was) held that the filing of a Parliamentary Election petition and the payment of security for costs should all be within the 21 days. Then also, in the case of Richard Akuoko Adiya v Akwasi Adusei and another [2015] 87 GMJ 17, though the petition was filed within the stipulated time 0f 21days the security for costs was paid after the 21 days. When the matter was heard in the Court of Appeal, it was held that the filing of Parliamentary Election petition and the payment of the security for costs should all be done within the 21 days stipulated in the Act. Ayebi JA, in his concurring opinion, stated as follows:
“In law, for a petition to be validly laid, it must be filed in the High Court within twenty-one days after the publication in the Gazette of the result of the election being challenged. Further, even though an election petition may be filed within twenty-one days after the Gazette publication, it is not valid if the petitioner does not give as security for costs an amount of money determined by the High Court.
What this means in effect is that the security for costs must be determined by the High Court within 21 days and paid within the same 21 days stipulated under the law…. Indeed, the payment of security for costs is a precondition to the validity of the petition. And it is clear on reading section 18 of PNDCL 284 as a whole that time is of the essence. The section admits of no delay or default for whatever reason in the presentation of a petition. The reason for the stringent timeline is not farfetched. The term of parliament is limited to four (4) years. An election petition cannot be permitted to drag on. It must be determined as swiftly as possible for the parties to know their fate.”
The law is therefore clear that Parliamentary Election petition must be filed within 21days after the results of the Election to which the petition is related have been gazetted. It follows, therefore, that any Parliamentary Election Petition filed before the Election results to which the petition relates is gazetted or a Petition filed more than 21 days after the gazetting of the results of the Election to which the petition relates is invalid.
Now, back to the question, when was the Parliamentary Election results for Kpandai gazetted?
This Court in the case of the Republic vs. High Court 3 Koforidua Ex-parte Ernest Yaw Kumi,(Hon. Henry Boakye Yiadom, Electoral Commission, Clerk of Parliament, Interested Parties) Civil Motion no. J5/37/2025 dated 11th June 2025 had the opportunity to establish that Akwatia Constituency Election results was published in Gazette notification number 234 dated 24th December 2024. This Court, speaking through Adjei-Frimpong JSC, held that:
“The Electoral Commission, as 2nd Interested Party, filed an affidavit to which was attached a Gazette, the same as exhibit 11 filed by the 1st Interested Party. From the affidavit evidence before this Court, it was established that the Gazette Notification No. 234 dated 24th December, 2024, was the valid one. We therefore had no difficulty finding that the results of the Akwatia Parliamentary elections were gazetted on 24th December, 2024 and not 6th January, 2025.”
It is worth noting that the same Gazette Notification No. 234 was attached to the applicant’s Affidavit in Support, and it clearly shows that the Kpandai Constituency Parliamentary Election held on the same 7th December 2024 was published in the same Gazette Notification 234 on 24th December, 2024 and I accordingly find that the Kpandai Parliamentary Election result was Gazetted on the 24th December 2024 and not 6th January 2025.
So, looking at the law on the time for filing Parliamentary Election Petition in terms of section 18 (1) of P.N.D.L 284 and the evidence before me that the Petition of the 1st interested party was filed on the 25th of January 2025, I find that the Petition was filed 32 days after the Publication of the Gazette and therefore filed out of time and therefore invalid.
RE-GAZETTING
Before I conclude, I cannot but comment on the submission made by counsel for the 1st interested party that, in respect of the 7th December Parliamentary Election Petition, there were two Gazette Notifications; that of 24th December 2024 and the second Gazette Notification of 6th January 2025, which counsel describes as Re-gazetting. We reject that contention and the whole concept of Re-gazetting as submitted by counsel for the 1st interested party and state unequivocally that there can only be one Gazette Publication in respect of a Parliamentary Election result. Once there has been a Gazette notification of the Parliamentary election results of 7th December 2024 on 24th December, 2024, there could not be a second gazette of the same parliamentary results on 6th January 2025. This is because once a Gazette is published, there are legal consequences flowing from same. That is to say, the Gazette Publication has an effect on the reckoning of time for filing Parliamentary Election petition, and therefore there cannot be a Re-gazetting of the same results as that will be unlawful and in violation of P.N.D.L 284, which regulates Parliamentary Elections.
On the whole, I am of the view that the application for Judicial Review in the nature of Certiorari is unanswerable and must be granted and accordingly same is granted.
(SGD.) H. KWOFIE
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
DISSENTING OPINION
PWAMANG JSC:-
My Lords, the application before us is for an order of certiorari to quash the
Decision of the High Court, Tamale, dated 24th November, 2025 delivered after a full blown trial of an election petition.
Public elections in Ghana, just as in many other countries of the world, are a critical yet a delicate aspect of the democracy we practice for which our nation has earned global praise. The elections cycle spans several stages and involves several actors including the Electoral Commission, political parties, security agencies and we in the Judiciary. As such, the success of an election depends on how well each of the actors play their role. On this occasion, it is the judiciary’s role in elections dispute resolution that is under scrutiny.
The applicant has planked his case on Section 18 of the Representation of the People Act, 1992 (PNDCL 284) which sets the time frame for challenging the results of a parliamentary election with which we are concerned in this case. It provides as follows;
18. Time for presentation of petition
(1) An election petition shall be presented within twenty-one days after the date of the publication in the Gazette of the result of the election to which it relates, but a petition questioning an election on an allegation of corrupt practice and specifically alleging a payment of money or any other award to have been made by the person whose election is questioned or to have been made on behalf of and to that person’s knowledge, may be presented within twenty-one days after the date of the alleged payment.
(2) The presentation of an election petition under subsection (1) is not valid unless within the time specified in subsection (1), the petitioner gives as security for costs an amount of money determined by the High Court.
(3) The time limit provided by this section for the presentation of an election petition shall not be extended.
The background facts of the application are that the applicant, was declared by the Electoral Commission as the winner of the parliamentary election held in Kpandai Constituency on 7th December, 2024 as part of the national general elections. The 1st interested party herein contested that election but he was declared by the Electoral Commission to have lost. He felt aggrieved with the declaration of the applicant herein as winner on several grounds including allegations of egregious breaches of the electoral laws in the conduct, declaration and publication of the results of the election. He decided to challenge the declaration in the High Court, Tamale and he first filed a petition on 23rd December, 2024. When the applicant was served he entered Conditional Appearance to the petition and filed a motion to dismiss the petition for non-compliance with the statutory time frame for filing petitions. The applicant in that application contended that section 18 of PNDCL 284 provides that a petition to challenge declaration of parliamentary election results must be filed within 21 days after the gazetting of the results and that the 1st interested party’s petition was filed in breach of the provision.
In an affidavit in opposition to the motion to dismiss sworn to on behalf of the 1st interested party herein, it was stated that by a publication online on 24th December, 2024 the Electoral Commission (EC) indicated that it had gazetted the results of 274 constituencies including the Kpandai constituency. In a rebuttal of this deposition the applicant caused a supplementary affidavit to be filed on his behalf on 21st January, 2025 in which it was deposed as follows;
”the results of the Parliamentary Elections of 7th December, 2024 of the Kpandai Constituency were never published in the Gazette or gazetted on 24th December, 2024.”
“That available records show that the Parliamentary Election results of the 7th December, 2024 nationwide including that of Kpandai Constituency were published in the Gazette or gazetted by the Electoral Commission on 6th January, 2025.”
A copy of a complete Gazette of the results of all constituencies including Kpandai which the applicant obtained online was exhibited to his affidavit. The EC did not file any affidavit confirming, denying or explaining any of the dates of gazette publication, but according to the affidavit in opposition filed by the 1st interested party in these present proceedings, the EC were served with the processes of the petition. The 1st interested party states that it was in reliance on the deposition by the applicant which was verified by the copy of the Gazette that he, with the leave of the court, discontinued his petition on 25th January, 2025 and promptly refiled the same petition on the same 25th January, 2025.
From the record before me, the applicant filed a conditional appearance to the second petition and it appears that he filed a motion to dismiss the second petition on the ground that when the first petition was discontinued the court did not specifically add “with liberty” to file another petition. The trial judge dismissed his motion in a ruling dated 26th March, 2025. The respondent thereafter applied and was granted leave and he filed an answer responding to the substance of the petition. The EC too filed an answer on the substance of the petition. In their pleadings, none of them raised any challenge about the timing of the filing of this second petition. Pleadings closed, issues were set down for trial and a full blown trial took place covering the manner the elections in Kpandai constituency were conducted with the petitioner adducing evidence of alleged wrong doings and the respondents countering them. At the close of the trial the lawyers of the parties filed written addresses and the High Court Judge delivered judgment on 24th November, 2025.
In the said judgment the trial judge, upon review of the evidence led, found as follows;
“The addresses filed by the counsel for the respondents are erudite and glorious but they invite this court to white wash the unkempt written figures in some of the pink sheets which have become the regular parody of every election petition since our experiment with universal adult suffrage began in this country in the democratic dispensation…..
It is a fact of judicial notoriety that the scientific arithmetic is a precision aid to engineering, accounting and every field of study including law and one plus one is two except the religionists who maintain that one plus is one for their spiritual scale and where we have two candidates with final figures 27,000 plus and 24,000 plus something ordinarily the former is bigger than the latter but when the documentary answer sheet giving rise to the final figures contains irregularities and inconsistencies, how do we settle the final result that it is the correct rendition of events which took place on the 7th December, 2024.
Let’s put aside the videos and destruction of the ballot materials and BVD machines and the relocation of the collation center to Tamale without notice to the petitioner and the pink sheets summarizes every numerical infraction which goes to the roots of the results and for the numerous authorities cited by both counsel for the respondents in a Siamese fashion as well as the petitioner’s counsel, the fact remains that the pink sheet recordings raise substantial questions as to what has happened since our last two or three elections in which petitions were filed in court and the electoral officers cannot write legibly, is a terrible indictment on the EC’s conduct of elections in this country.
If the 1st respondent won convincingly the pink sheets must authoritatively speak to the fact but when the violent disruption started the respondents’ own versions of the aftermath point to incomplete collation and announcement to relocate and then in another vein relocation to a different venue said to be the Tamale regional office where the collation continued without the petitioner but with some alleged NDC executives the declaration was done or made, and the question is which room number of the regional office was it held and only with the 1st respondent and two persons present.”
He accordingly cancelled the election and ordered a re-run of the Kpandai Constituency election.
The respondent promptly lodged an appeal in the Court of Appeal against the judgment on the grounds that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence and that the trial judge erred in his ruling of 26th March, 2025. It was on 1st December, 2025, and while his appeal is pending, that the respondent filed this present application which he stated to be seeking for judicial review of the decision of the High Court. At the first hearing of the application the court pointed out to counsel for the applicant that this court does not exercise judicial review of decisions of superior courts but may exercise supervisory jurisdiction which counsel conceded and prayed for the court to take his certiorari application under its supervisory jurisdiction.
The crux of the argument of the applicant is that the correct date for reckoning of the timeline for filing a parliamentary election petition against the declaration of the results of the Kpandai parliamentary election of 7th December, 2024 is 24th December, 2024 and that his earlier position that the date is 6th January, 2025 was in error. In the present proceedings in the Supreme Court the EC has now filed an affidavit and exhibited two Gazette notifications on the national general parliamentary elections of 7th December, 2024 wherein the declaration covering Kpandai constituency results are found in the Gazette dated 24th December, 2024 and does not appear in a Gazette dated 6th January, 2025 that covers only four constituencies. The applicant says that the statement by the 1st interested party that it was on the production of the Gazette of 6th January, 2025 by the now applicant bearing the declaration of Kpandai constituency election results and the failure of the EC to challenge the categorical denial of a Gazette dated 24th December, 2024 that led him to withdraw and refile his petition does not change the fact that the actual Gazette was published on 24th December, 2024.
The applicant referred to us the case of REPUBLIV V. HIGH COURT, ACCRA; EX-PARTE APPIAH & 2 OTHERS, (2000) SCGLR 389, and quoted from the case as follows;
“An order of certiorari would be made where the order sought to be quashed has been made inter alia, without jurisdiction either because the Court has exceeded its jurisdiction or lacks jurisdiction. However, a Court having jurisdiction may lose that jurisdiction if its decision is made in bad faith, if it has failed in the course of the inquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice; it has refused to take into account something which it was required to take into account or it might have based its decision on a matter it has no right to take into account. The list cannot be said to be exhaustive. However, where the court has jurisdiction to entertain the action its judgment or ruling cannot be impeached on the mere ground that its decision is wrong. Under those circumstances the proper thing to do is to appeal against that decision. Where however upon the face of the proceedings themselves it appears that the decision of the Court is wrong in law, certiorari to quash will be granted.” [Empasis His]
He also cited the Baba Jamal case which is Republic vrs High Court, Sunyani; Ex-Parte Collins Dauda (Boakye Boateng Interested Party) (2009) SCGLR 447 and Republic Vrs High Court, Koforidua; Exparte Asare (Baba Jamal & Others, Interested Parties) (2009) SCGLR 460
Counsel quoted the following statements from the judgment;
“it is clear from the language of section 18 of the Representation of the People Law, 1992 (PNDCL., 284), that an election petition might not be presented before the results of the election concerned have been declared by the Electoral commission and in some cases, gazetted, Thus the expression in section 18(1) “the person whose election is questioned” must be construed, in its context, as logically implying that an election must have taken place and it results declared by the Electoral Commission. Otherwise, there would be no person whose election was being questioned. And the provision in section 18(1) relating to the time limit of twenty-one days within which an election petition must be brought, where the petition was based on an allegation of corrupt practice and specifically alleging a payment of money or other award, if not read in its context, could be interpreted literally to mean that the petitioner could bring his petition within twenty-one days of the alleged corrupt practice, whether or not the election result had been declared. The court would therefore construe section 18(1) of PNDCL 284 as impliedly requiring the declaration of an election petition by the Electoral Commission, even in the case of an allegation of corrupt practice. The implied construction of section 18(1) was buttressed by not only by the provisions in section 19 (reproduced above) but also those in section 20(1) of PNDCL 284, which carried an assumption that a candidate had been declared elected and has therefore given the High Court power to declare the election void on the grounds set out in section 20 (1). Consequently, the petition brought before the High Court by the interested party was premature and the High Court had no jurisdiction to determine its merits.”
Applicant’s Counsel further referred to the case of Republic v High Court, Bolgatanga, Ex parte; Hawa Yakubu [2001-2002] 1 GLR 311.
On the basis of the above decided cases and others the applicant invites us to interpret section 18 of PNDCL 284 to be binding and applicable irrespective of the circumstances in this case and the initial wrong apprehension of the correct date of the Gazette by all parties which in this case included the EC who is the official repository of the information on declarations of election results. The fact that there has been an otherwise complete judicial examination of what happened on the ground on 7th December, 2024 in the parliamentary elections at Kpandai constituency and the judicial finding that the applicant herein did not win the election fair and square, the applicant says that should be swept under the carpet. When the applicant argues that the High Court Tamale did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition, the distinction ought to be maintained that Article 99(1) of the Constitution confers that jurisdiction on the High Court. What the applicant is talking about is procedural jurisdiction and even though it is contained in an Act of Parliament, it must not be presented as if the High Court Tamale did not have subject matter jurisdiction. The legal consequences arising from the absence of subject matter jurisdiction are not the same as absence of procedural jurisdiction, no matter how elevated one may consider it.
But, the applicant must recognise the nature and scope of the relief that he has prayed for from this court. He has prayed for an order of certiorari and the applicant himself concedes that it is a discretionary remedy and in his statement of case he refers to the case of Republic v High Court, Sekondi; Ex parte Ampong [2011] 2 SCGLR 716.
In REPUBLIC V HIGH COURT, ACCRA; EX PARTE ATTORNEY-GENERAL (DELTA FOODS LTD, INTERESTED PARTY) [1999-2000] I GLR 255 – 282 Acquah, JSC (as he then was) stated the undoubted position of law as follows;
“It is indeed important to appreciate that the prayer for the grant of certiorari must be considered from a very broad perspective. For, being a discretionary remedy it must be demonstrated that there is real justification and benefit for its’ grant. Accordingly, where the results of granting the order achieves no real or just result, the discretion is not exercised. Thus in Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed,) Vol 11, p 141, para 266 it is stated: “Where grounds are made out upon which the Court might grant the order, it will not do so where no benefit could arise from granting it.” See R v Newborough [pg 274] (1869) LR 4 QB 585 at 589; R v Bristol and Exeter Rail Co (1838) 11 Ad & El 202,n; R v Lancaster & Preston Rail (1845) 6 QB 759; R v Unwin (1839) 7 Dowl 578; Peak Joint Planning Board v Secretary State for Environment (1980) 39 P & CR 361; and Republic v Agboka IV; Ex parte Deh III [1984-86] 1 GLR 581, CA.
Indeed, in Miller v Weymouth and Melcombe Regis Corporatian (1974) 27 P&CR 468 at 480-481, the court refused to quash a void decision because the applicant was in no way prejudiced by the said decision. Now by virtue of his involvement as solicitor for the minister, and further participation even in the out-of-court settle¬ment, the Attorney-General was in no way prejudiced by the mere use of the minister as the defendant. Neither did the decision of Nana Gyamera-Tawiah J.”
Again in the case of IN RE APPENTENG (DECD); REPUBLIC V HIGH COURT, ACCRA; EX PARTE APPENTENG (APPENTENGS INTERESTED PARTIES) [2010] SCGLR 327, Atuguba, JSC, faced with an application for certiorari in the Supreme Court to quash a decision of Tanko Amadu J (as he then was) made without jurisdiction in a High Court case said as follows at p 339;
“We have no difficulty in holding that though certiorari is a discretionary remedy, the omission of a party to raise objection to a proceeding in an inappropriate forum should disentitle the applicant to that remedy where the omission was wilful and an abuse of the process of the court. Such is the case here. The fact that Tanko Amadu J was exceeding his authority after the effluxion of the vacation period did not seem to have bothered the applicant until his ruling turned out to be adverse to him. Were it to have been in his favour he would have celebrated it.”
My Lords, the above authorities require us to consider certiorari applications from a broader perspective of the circumstances of each case and we may refuse it even if the grounds for its grant are made out. The applicant referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Baba Jamal and Ex parte Hawa Yakubu but in those cases the objections to the jurisdictions of the High Court on account of the provisions of section 18 of PNDCL 284 were taken at the beginning of the case and before the taking of evidence. In this case, there was no question of wrong time of filing of the second petition raised from the start of the case to finish. The court ought not to close its eyes to the silence of the EC in particular. There has been a completed trial in which the applicant led evidence and cross examined the 1st interested party and his witnesses. As was observed in the above quoted opinion by Acquah, JSC, the applicant has not suffered any prejudice from the apparent breach of the time for filing of the petition.
The Counsel of the applicant has referred to the statement made in Network Computer Systems Ltd v Intelsat Global Sales and Marketing Ltd [2012] 1 SCGLR 218 that; “A court cannot shut its eyes to the violation of a statute..” However, that statement must be taken together with what Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone, L.C, said in Pearlberg v Varty [1972] 2 All ER 6 that; “It is true, of course, that the Courts will lean heavily against any construction of a Statute which would be manifestly unfair.”
Section 10(4)(d) of the Interpretation Act 2009. (Act 792) provides that;
10 Without prejudice to any other provision of this section, a Court shall construe or interprete a provision of the Constitution or any other law in a manner……..
(d) that avoids technicalities and recourse to niceties of form and language which defeat the purpose and spirit of the Constitution and of the laws of Ghana.
The plain purpose and spirit of section 18 of PNDCL 284 is to ensure that persons who intend to challenge declaration of elections do so promptly to enable for the early determination of the challenge and bring early closure to it. Therefore, in construing the section against the background of this case, can it be said that the 1st interested party delayed in challenging the election declaration in favour of the applicant? He certainly did not, so there has been no violation of the spirit of section 18 of PNDCL 284 in this case. In our system of law, election petitions are the main means by which elections are scrutinised and election officials and participants are held to account for their actions and inactions so there is a public interest aspect of election petitions that must not be ignored. If the objection was taken from the outset of the petition, the situation would have been different but not when it is taken after fully participating in the proceedings and I am dealing with a certiorari application in which I have a discretion. If the decision had gone his way, the applicant would have been celebrating.
What the applicant is urging on the court are technicalities and slavish application of the statute but the statute was never intended to trap and exclude persons with genuine grievances, especially after those grievances have been found by a superior court to have real merit. On the facts here, this slavish application will result in a person whose election has been found not to have been won on the ground being kept to represent the people of Kpandai. Meanwhile, the applicant is not without remedy in that he has filed an appeal which will afford him an opportunity to overturn the findings that he did not win the vote on the merits if indeed he won the election.
Where an applicant for certiorari has an alternative remedy that is more just and fair in all the circumstances, the application ought to be refused in the exercise of the undoubted discretion of the court in certiorari proceedings and for the applicant to pursue the alternative relief. See Republic v High Court, Accra; Ex parte Tetteh Apain [2007-2008] SCGLR 1 72.
My Lords, it is for the above reasons that I hereby exercise my discretion and refuse the application for certiorari and advise the applicant to pursue his appeal if he seeks a remedy.
(SGD.) G. PWAMANG
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
COUNSEL
GARY NIMAKO MARFO ESQ. FOR THE APPLICANT WITH HIM SHADRACH OBENG-YEBOAH ESQ, DR. KWEKU AGYEMAN-BUDU ESQ, KOW ABAKA ESSUMAN ESQ AND NANA BAAFI YEBOAH ESQ. LED BY, FRANK DAVIES ESQ.
SIKA ABLA ADDO ESQ. FOR THE 1ST INTERESTED PARTY WITH HER MUSAH MOHAMMED ESQ. GEORGE ADABADZE ESQ. EUGENE AWITY ESQ. SETH NYAABA ESQ. GIDEON ABOTSI ESQ. EFUA NSAH ABAIDOO ESQ. AND EKOW INKOOM ESQ.
JUSTIN AMENUVOR ESQ. FOR 2ND INTERESTED PARTY.
