IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE SUPREME COURT
ACCRA – AD.2026
CORAM: PWAMANG JSC (PRESIDING)
KULENDI JSC
KWOFIE JSC
BARTELS-KODWO JSC
AMALEBOBA JSC
17TH FEBRUARY, 2026
THE REPUBLIC
VRS.
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION), ……….. RESPONDENT
ACCRA.
EX-PARTE:
KLENAM CONSTRUCTION LIMITED ………. APPLICANT
1. FALCON CREST INVESTMENT LIMITED
2. SAMUEL KOFI DIAME
3. NUUMO ADJEI KWANKO II INTERESTED PARTIES
(Substituted by Nummo Badu Odaano
Odiapenser I) OSABO-AYIKU WULOMO
RULING
________________________________________
KULENDI JSC:-
INTRODUCTION:
1. The Applicant herein has invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court seeking an order of certiorari directed at the Court of Appeal, to quash, for nullity, the judgment and consequential orders delivered on 13th November, 2025 in the case titled Klenam Construction Ltd v. Falcon Crest & 2 Others, Suit No. H3/130/2025, coram: Anthony Oppong (Presiding), Emmanuel Ankamah, and Jerome Noble-Nkrumah JJA. which said judgment had overturned the judgment of the High Court dated 28th March, 2024 previously delivered in the same suit.
2. This application was mounted on the following grounds;
a. The refusal by the Court of Appeal to uphold the Applicant’s objection to His Lordship Anthony Oppong JA’s membership of the panel constituted for the hearing of the appeal on June 16, 2025 and the subsequent delivery of the judgment of the Court of Appeal on November 13, 2025 when it was clear that His Lordship Anthony Oppong JA was prejudiced and lacked impartiality, by reason of his judgment in Suit No.: LD/04424/2017 entitled Rainsford Addoquaye & 3 Ors. vrs. Falcon Crest Investment Ltd & 2 Ors which gave rise to the Applicant’s suit entitled Klenam Construction Ltd vrs. Falcon Crest & 4 Ors, Suit No. GJ/182/2018, constituted a breach of Article 19(13) and Article 296(a) & (b) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana and therefore rendered the judgment delivered on November 13, 2025 a nullity and of no legal effect.
b. The judgment of the Court of Appeal dated November 13, 2025 was delivered in breach of the rules of natural justice specifically nemo judex in causa sua thereby rendering the said judgment a nullity.
BACKGROUND:
3. On 5th February, 2018, the Applicant issued a Writ of Summons and accompanying Statement of Claim against the Interested Parties in this suit. In this application, the Applicant contends that the central issue in the said writ was the determination of whether ownership of the lands situate at Okpoi Gonno, the subject matter of the dispute, is vested in the Nungua Stool or in the Kle Musum Quarter of Teshie.
4. While the Applicant contends that the disputed land forms part of Nungua Stool lands, the Interested Parties assert that the land is vested in the Kle Musum Quarter of Teshie.
5. The Applicant further avers that the institution of the substantive suit became necessary following the actions of the Interested Parties, who, purportedly in execution of a ruling of the High Court delivered in their favour on 8th November, 2017 by the venerable Anthony Oppong J (as he then was) in Suit No. LD/0424/2017 entitled Rainsford Addoquaye & 3 Others vrs. Falcon Crest Investment Ltd & 2 Others, proceeded to demolish the Applicant’s structures situated on the disputed land.
6. In Rainsford Addoquaye ruling supra, the said learned Justice summarily dismissed the suit commenced by Rainsford Addoquaye, the Plaintiff therein, and upheld the Interested Parties’ (the Defendants therein) counterclaim on the basis of estoppel per res judicata, holding that ownership of the Okpoi Gonno lands had been conclusively determined in favour of the Kle Musum Quarter of Teshie.
7. It was in consequence of the foregoing that the said writ was issued by the Applicant herein against the Interested Parties, and the Interested Party relied extensively on the said Rainsford Addoquaye ruling in their Amended Statement of Defence and Counterclaim filed on 18th July, 2022. Indeed, in the said pleading, the following references were made to the ruling, which further underscored the centrality of the said ruling to the Interested parties’ case before the Court.
“4. The 1st to 3rd Defendants say the 3rd Defendants quarter and family has obtained Judgements over the land in dispute situate at Okpoi Gonno against the Plaintiff grantors in the following case …iv. Suit No. LD/0424/2017 entitled: Rainsford Addoquaue & 3 Ors v Falcon Crest Investment Ltd and 2 others
5. The 1st to 3rd Defendants obtained Judgement in Suit No. LD/0424/2017 entitled: Rainsford Addoquaye & 3 Ors v Falcon Crest Investment Ltd and 2 others against the Nungua Stool and its grantor over Okpoi Gonno land and which Judgement was duly executed by the Deputy Sheriffs of this Honourable Court
6. The 1st to 3rd Defendants shall contend that Plaintiff is bound and estopped by the Judgements herein before mentioned for claiming any interest in the land in dispute through the Nungua Stool, Maufid El-Adas and Sadac Builders Ltd or the Tsie We family of Teshie.
19. The 1st to 3rd Defendants say by another letter dated the 12th day of June, 2022 from the 2nd Defendants lawyers to the Director, Land Title Division of the Lands Commission and received on the 13th day of June 2022, 2nd Defendant again informed the Director, Land Title Division of the lands Commission that he obtained his Land Certificate based on the Judgement in Suit No. LD/0424/2017 entitled: Rainsford Addoquaye & 3 Ors v Falcon Crest Investment Ltd and 2 others, after he has duly been put in possession by the Deputy Sheriff of the Court and further informed the Director, Land Title Division of the Lands Commission that the Court of Appeal has remitted this case to be tried de novo at the High Court and urged the plaintiff to maintain the status quo in respect of the 2nd Defendant Land Certificate till the final determination of the suit.”
8. Additionally, the Interested Parties tendered the Rainsford Addoquaye ruling in evidence at trial as Exhibit 4(c) and made copious references to same in their written submissions before the High Court as follows:
“0.43 – Again, Exhibit 4(c) at page 1126 of Vol 4 of the records of appeal tendered by the appellants is a judgement of the High Court in SuitNo. LD/0424/2017 entitled: Rainsford Addoquauye & 2 Ors v Falcon Crest Investment Ltd & 2 Ors, over Okpoi Gonno land which the 3rd appellants family obtained judgment against the Nungua Stool and its grantees on the 8th day of November, 2017 over Okpoi Gonno land
0.44 – In Exhibit 4(c), some subjects of Nungua Stool and the Nungua Stool represented by King Dr Odaifio Wulentsi III, sued the appellants herein over the same subject matter of dispute situate at Okpoi Gonno.
0.45 – The High Court in exhibit 4(c) dismissed the claim of the Nungua Stool and its subjects and granted the counterclaim of the appellants herein at page 13 of the Judgement as follows:
“In Conclusion, to the extent that the parties are talking about the same lands at Okpoi Gonno which lands have been adjudged to belong to Kle Musum Quarter of Teshie by so many subsisting judgements of the superior courts, plaintiffs action, which calls into issue whether the land in dispute is Teshie lands or Nungua lands which issues happen to be the main issue in the case but which has been determined by the superior courts of the land all in favor of Kle Musum Quarter of Teshie, is caught by estoppel per res judicata.
Accordingly, the instant application praying the court to dismiss the entire suit of plaintiffs on grounds of estoppel per res juducata is granted, Plaintiffs action is dismissed and the counterclaim of the defendant granted with cost of GHC 8000.00 against Plaintiffs in favour of the Defendants.”
0.46 – the Nungua stool and its subjects did not appeal against the Judgement in Exhibit 4(c) …
Paragraph 0.47- The Respondent who now claims through the Nungua Stool is bound by the Judgement in Exhibits 4 series particularly exhibit 4(c) from contending that Okpoi Gonno forms part of Nungua Stool and could not re-litigate the issue of title over Okpoi Gonno lands by virtue of the Judgement in exhibit 4(c) tendered by appellants and Exhibit D tendered by respondent as same would constitute an abuse of Court process.”
9. At the end of trial, upon considering the evidence on record and the addresses filed by the parties, the High Court, on 28th March, 2024, entered judgment in favor of the Applicant herein, holding that the disputed land, though part of Okpoi Gonno was vested in the Nungua Stool and not the Kle Musum/Tsie We family of Teshie.
10. Dissatisfied with the said decision, the Interested Parties appealed. Significantly, the very first ground articulated by the Interested Parties in their appeal was as follows:
“ a. The trial judge erred in failing to hold that the plaintiff/respondent is bound by the judgments in Suit No. L303/2011 titled Nuumo Adjei Kwanko II vrs. 1. Lebanon Society & 2 Ors that ended at the Supreme Court, Suit No. FT(IV)/8/2003 entitled Sadac Builders Ltd 2. Nii Abraham Adjei Kwei vrs. Regimanuel Gray Ltd & 5 Ors, and Suit No. LD/0424/17 entitled Rainsford Addo Quaye Addotey & 2 Ors vrs. Falcon Crest Investment Ltd 2 Ors, situate at Okpoi Gonno forms part of Tsie We Family but not Nungua Stool land.”
11. On the 16th of June, 2025, the date on which the appeal was scheduled for hearing, Counsel for the Applicant, upon noticing that Justice Anthony Oppong had been empanelled to sit in adjudication of the appeal, objected to the learned Justice’s empanelment on grounds of apparent bias arising from his earlier decision in Rainsford Addo Quaye Addotey & 2 Ors vrs. Falcon Crest Investment Ltd & 2 Ors. However, this objection was unanimously dismissed by the Court of Appeal.
12. Subsequently, on 13th November 2025, the Court of Appeal, by a majority decision of two to one, allowed the appeal; Anthony Oppong JA and Noble-Nkrumah JA constituted the majority, with Anthony Oppong JA delivering the lead opinion, while Emmanuel Ankamah JA delivered a dissenting opinion.
APPLICANT’S CASE:
13. The Applicant, in summary, contends that the refusal of the Court of Appeal to uphold the objection of bias and the continued participation of Anthony Oppong JA, constituted a grave violation of Articles 19(13) and 296(a) and (b) of the 1992 Constitution, rendered the appellate proceedings tainted by apparent bias, and thereby nullified the judgment.
14. The Applicant accordingly prays that this Honourable Court grants the application invoking its supervisory jurisdiction.
INTERESTED PARTIES’ CASE:
15. The Interested Parties contend that, in circumstances such as the present, where the Court was invited to determine whether the matter before the Court of Appeal had already been settled by established precedent and case law, thereby estopping the parties from relitigating the same issues, it cannot reasonably be argued that all the judges who participated in those earlier referenced decisions were thereby prejudiced in relation to the issues before the Court, such that they would be incapable of approaching the matter impartially or of sitting in judgment on it at any level.
16. The Interested Parties further submit that the Applicant had, in any event, slept on its right to challenge the participation of His Lordship Anthony Oppong JA in the delivery of the judgment of the Court of Appeal, having failed to appeal against the Court’s dismissal of its objection or to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to set aside that dismissal.
17. Finally, the Interested Parties argue that the present application has been brought in bad faith, asserting that the Applicant would not have pursued the application had the judgment of the Court of Appeal been delivered in his favor.
EVALUATION:
18. In a landmark decision dated 10th February, 2021 in Suit No.: J5/05/2021 entitled The Republic vrs. High Court, Commercial Division, Accra Ex-Parte: Kwabena Duffour, Attorney-General And 8 Others, this Court reiterated the long-settled position on the scope of its supervisory jurisdiction as follows;
“The grounds on which the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court may be invoked has been stated ad nauseam. In the Republic V. High Court, Accra Ex-parte; Ghana Medical Association (Chris Arcmann-Akummey-Interested Party) [2012] 2 GLR 768, the Court referred to its previous decision in Republic V. Court of Appeal; Ex-parte Tsatsu Tsikata [2005-2006] SCGLR 612 and reiterated that the grounds upon which this court proceeds to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction are as follows;
1. Want or excess of jurisdiction.
2. Where there is an error of law on the face of the record.
3. Failure to comply with the rules of natural justice, and
4. The Wednesbury principles.”
19. The Applicant contends that Anthony Oppong JA breached the second head of the rules of natural justice, namely nemo judex in causa sua, in that having already sat in judgment of a case pertaining to essentially the same subject matter, he had a certain preconceived perspective or predetermined opinion of the Appeal, which tainted his objectivity, neutrality or impartiality to sit in judgment of this Appeal.
20. More specifically, the Applicant contends that said learned Judge was disqualified from determining the appeal on the grounds of bias and lack of the requisite impartiality, arising from the fact that he had previously presided as the trial judge in the case of Rainsford Addoquaye & 3 Others v. Falcon Crest Investment Ltd & 2 Others; the very decision whose execution gave rise to the present suit and which lies at the centre of the dispute.
21. The Applicant asserts that, in that earlier judgment, the learned trial judge had already formed and expressed a concluded view as to the legal and beneficial ownership of the Okpoi Gonno lands, particularly as between the Nungua Stool and the Kle Musum Quarter of Teshie, which is the very issue now implicated in this appeal.
22. This Court has severally held that an order of certiorari will lie to quash any decision or determination where there has been a breach of any of the rules of natural justice, irrespective of the merits or substantive correctness or otherwise of the decision or determination.
23. Indeed, this court, speaking through Dotse JSC in Republic vrs. High Court, Kumasi; Ex Parte Bank Of Ghana & Others (Gyamfi & Others – Interested Parties) [2013–14] 1 SCGLR 477, succinctly underscored that:
“It is well settled that certiorari is not concerned with the merits of the decision; it is a discretionary remedy which would be granted on grounds of excess or want of jurisdiction and/or breach of the rules of natural justice; or to correct a clear error of law apparent on the face of the record.”
24. Similarly, in the case of The Republic vrs. High Court, Accra; Ex Parte Salloum & Others (Coker, Interested Party) [2011] 1 SCGLR 574, Anin Yeboah JSC (as he then was), delivering the majority opinion of the Supreme Court, underscored this position as follows:
“The Courts in Ghana and elsewhere seriously frown upon breaches of the audi alteram partem rule to the extent that no matter the merits of the case, its denial is seen as a basic fundamental error which should nullify proceedings made pursuant to the denial… It is our opinion that as this court has in several cases held that a breach of the rules of natural justice renders proceedings a nullity..”
25. The applicable legal regime governing judicial bias in this jurisdiction has been articulated in a plethora of decisions; foremost among them is the decision delivered on 3rd July, 2019 in Suit No. J5/36/2019, entitled The Republic v. High Court, General Jurisdiction “2”, Accra (Respondent), Ex Parte Alhaji Halidou Aboubakar (Applicant); King George Enterprise (Interested Party) where the venerable Marful Sau JSC opined as follows:
“ What then is the law on judicial bias in Ghana?
This court in the case of Republic v. High Court, Denu; Exparte Agbesi Awusu II (No.1) (Nyonyo Agboada (Sri III) Interested Party) (2003-2004) 2 SCGLR 864, after reviewing a long list of cases on the subject of judicial bias, stated the law as follows:
“a charge of bias or real likelihood of bias must be satisfactorily proved on the balance of probabilities by the person alleging same. Where there existed a real likelihood of bias or apparent bias was an issue of fact determinable on a case to case basis.”
This Court in Exparte Awusu II (No.1), supra at page 872 considered and approved the decision in Adzaku v. Galenku {1974} 1 GLR 198, (as stated in holding (1) of the headnote that: –
“to disqualify the trial magistrate and invalidate his decision, the allegation of bias must be supported by evidence. A mere or reasonable suspicion of bias was not enough: the law recognised not only actual bias but that interest, other than interest of a direct pecuniary or proprietary nature, which gave rise to real likelihood of bias.”
26. More to the point in this case, this Court on the 28th of July, 2021 in Civil Motion No. J7/20/2021.: in the case of Republic vrs. High Court (Criminal Division 1), Accra, Ex Parte: Stephen Kwabena Opuni, Attorney-General (Interested Party), while discussing the range of conduct or situations that could constitute or create an inference of a real likelihood of judicial bias, held that;
“Bias takes different forms as there are many factors that may cause a decision-maker not to be impartial. She may have a pecuniary interest in the subject matter of the enquiry, or she may be related to one party or a witness by family or friendship, or may have dislike for one party or her witness, or may simply have a prejudiced opinion of the issue to be decided. In this case, the nature of bias we are concerned with is an allegation that the trial judge has a prejudiced mind about the case and cannot be expected to be impartial”.
27. Similarly, the erudite Brobbey JA (as he then was) in the case of KWAGYANE & ORS vrs. AGYEI & ORS [1992] 1GLR 189 CA opined as follows:
“ A Judge sitting on a cause or matter in which she had personal interest like the instant one is said to be acting improperly. The impropriety is grounded on the fact that the Judge will not be able to consider the case with the objectivity it deserves. The conduct of the judge and his decision will be susceptible to criticisms on the grounds that his reasoning may be clouded by his own proprietary interest. I consider it of prime importance that this Court does or says nothing to lend support to any notion that in some cases, a person can be a judge in his own cause. There can be no exception to that all important rule of natural justice barring perhaps the extreme instance where the judge may not be aware of his own interest in the case and therefore could not be said in any way to have been influenced by that interest.”
28. Flowing from these authorities, it is clear that, in our jurisprudence, an allegation of judicial bias must rise above mere conjecture or speculation and be grounded in cogent and credible evidence. The party asserting bias must demonstrate the existence of a real interest in the subject matter, a direct or proximate connection to the parties, or some other substantive, and not remote or speculative, circumstance capable of giving rise to a real likelihood of bias.
29. In other words, the facts relied upon must disclose a situation in which it can reasonably be said that the judge’s independence of mind has been compromised, or that there exists a genuine risk that the judge is predisposed either for or against a party to the dispute.
30. Consistent with this position, this Court on 20th October, 2020 in Suit No.: J5/62/2020 entitled The Republic vrs. High Court, Accra Ex parte Kennedy Ohene Agyapong & Anor Suit No.: J5/62/2020 (SC) stated as follows;
“A complaint of bias must be proven satisfactorily based on positive and cogent evidence, which on the balance of probabilities would lead every reasonably prudent man to the conclusion that the existence or the likelihood of bias was more probable than its non-existence. Mere allegation of suspicion of bias will not do. This is because, if this court were to prohibit judges from hearing cases on mere unproven allegations and speculations alone, it would operate as a leeway for litigants and their lawyers to use such an opportunity to engage in forum-shopping and thus abuse the court processes and defeat the ends of justice”.
31. Much earlier, the Court of Appeal had held in Amponsah vrs. Minister Of Defence [1960] GLR 140 AT 141, where Korsah CJ said that:
“To justify an allegation of interest or bias against a judicial officer, it must be established that he in fact has some interest in the subject-matter, or has such foreknowledge of the facts as to make it impossible for him to adjudicate upon the matter with an independent mind and without any inclination or bias toward one side or other in the dispute.”
32. With much deference to the learned Justice of the Court below, it is evident, given the factual background of this case above recounted, that the said Judge could not practically have approached the determination of this appeal with the independence and neutrality of mind required, having previously presided as the High Court Judge who had sat in judgment of the same issue in the Rainsford Addoquaye case supra and found in favour of the Interested Parties herein, in those earlier proceedings.
33. To our minds, therefore, there existed a real likelihood of bias; having previously adjudicated conclusively over the dispute, which concerned the same issue and the same subject matter land, and having delivered judgment in favour of one of the parties, the execution of which precipitated the present suit, the said judge, quite clearly, had already formed and expressed a definitive position on the central issue now arising for determination on appeal.
34. At the risk of repetition, we must emphasise that the exercise of this Court’s supervisory jurisdiction does not entail a review of the substantive merits or correctness of the judgment of the Court of Appeal; indeed, even the most legally and jurisprudentially sound decision, where rendered in circumstances that properly invoke this Court’s supervisory jurisdiction, may be declared void and accordingly quashed.
35. In our view, therefore, the inquiry is not whether His Lordship’s earlier decision was right or wrong; rather, the critical point is that, by reason of his prior adjudication of the Rainsford Addoquaye suit, he approached the appeal with foreknowledge of the facts and issues in dispute, having already formed and expressed a concluded view in favour of one of the parties now appearing before him on essentially the same question on appeal. In such circumstances, it cannot, with respect, be said that His Lordship brought a wholly open and independent mind to the determination of the appeal.
36. Significantly, the Interested Parties sought to justify their destruction of the Applicant’s property by reliance on the learned judge’s ruling in the Rainsford Addoquaye case, a justification which the High Court found wanting. In so doing, they placed the learned judge, now sitting at the Court of Appeal, in the invidious position of having to adjudicate upon the correctness and validity of his own prior legal conclusions.
37. Indeed, portions of the said Judge’s reasoning in the impugned judgement of the Court of Appeal reveal a clear reliance on his earlier findings in Suit No. LD/0424/2017. This lends credence to the Applicant’s contention that the issue had in substance, been pre-determined in His Lordships mind before the appeal was heard. A careful reading of the Judgement of the said judge demonstrates this predisposition.
38. For instance, in the judgement delivered in his determination of the appeal, the learned judge made extensive reference to his very own ruling which he had rendered in the Rainsford Addoquaye case as follows:
“There is another document worth mentioning. It is Exhibit 4(c) found at page 1126 of Volume 4 of ROA. It is evident in that Judgement that some subjects of the Nungua stool represented by King Odaifio Wulentsi sued the appellants herein over the same subject matter of dispute at Okpoi Gonno. The High Court dismissed the claim of the Nungua Stool and its subject and concluded thus: In Conclusion, to the extent that the parties are talking about the same lands at Okpoi Gonno which lands have been adjudged to belong to Kle Musum Quarter of Teshie by so many subsisting judgements of the superior courts, plaintiffs action, which calls into issue whether the land in dispute is Teshie lands or Nungua lands which issues happen to be the main issue in the case but which has been determined by the superior courts of the land all in favor of Kle Musum Quarter of Teshie, is caught by estoppel per res judicata. Accordingly, the instant application praying the court to dismiss the entire suit of plaintiffs on grounds of estoppel per res juducata is granted.
39. The learned Judge continued thus:
“It is instructive to observe that the Nungua Stool and its subjects did not appeal against the Judgement contained in Exhibit 4(c).
40. By reason of the fact that the learned had previously adjudged the Rainsford Addoquaye matter in favor of the Interested Parties’, we find that his participation in the subsequent appeal gave rise to a reasonable apprehension that his mind was already made on the legal ownership of the disputed land. In the circumstances, his continued involvement created a real likelihood of bias, or at the very least, the appearance thereof.
41. In the case of THE REPUBLIC v. HIGH COURT SEKONDI, EX PARTE MENSAH AND OTHERS 1994-95 GBR, Hayfron-Benjamin JSC, cautioned that:
“Where a judge sensed that one or all parties to the litigation has lost confidence in the judge’s impartiality, the proper course for such a judge was to decline jurisdiction.”
CONCLUSION:
42. It is on the basis of the foregoing considerations that on the 17th of February, 2026, this Court held that it was apparent that Anthony Oppong JA, having previously adjudicated on the central issue in Suit No.LD/0424/27, approached the appeal with a preconceived view on the matter.
43. We further found that the failure of the Court of Appeal to uphold the objections raised by the Applicant constituted a breach of the rules of natural justice, specifically, the well-established principle of nemo judex in causa sua and a violation of Articles 19(13) and 296(a) and (b) of Constitution of Ghana, 1992.
44. In the circumstances, this Court is satisfied that the Judgement of the Court of Appeal in suit No. H/3/130/2025 dated the 13th of November, 2025 was rendered in breach of the constitutional requirements for impartial adjudication.
45. Accordingly, we make an order for the judgment of the Court of Appeal in suit No. H/3/130/2025 dated 13th November, 2025 be brought to this Court for the purpose of being quashed and same is accordingly quashed.
(SGD.) E. Y. KULENDI
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
(SGD.) G. PWAMANG
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
(SGD.) H. KWOFIE
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
(SGD.) J. BARTELS-KODWO
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
(SGD.) H. AMALEBOBA
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
COUNSEL
SETH NYAABA ESQ. FOR THE APPLICANT WITH HIM KELVIN TAMAKLOE ESQ.
EDWARD SAM CRABBE ESQ. FOR THE INTERESTED PARTIES WITH KWADWO ANTWI TABI ESQ. AND CLAUDIA ASSIBI BANKA–ARDAY ESQ.
