IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE SUPREME COURT
ACCRA – A.D. 2026
CORAM: AMADU JSC (PRESIDING)
PROF. MENSA-BONSU (MRS.) JSC
KULENDI JSC
DARKO ASARE JSC
DZAMEFE JSC
25TH FEBRUARY, 2026
ELORM KWAMI GORNI ………… APPLICANT/APPELLANT/APPELLANT
VRS
1. VODAFONE GHANA LIMITED RESPONDENTS/REPONDENTS/
2. ATTORNEY GENERAL LIMITED RESPONDENTS
3. NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS AUTHORITY
JUDGMENT
MAJORITY OPINION
PROF. MENSA-BONSU (MRS) JSC:
“Good name in man and woman,
…Is the immediate jewel of their souls.
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed.”
William Shakespeare.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 6th February 2025.
Facts and Background
The 1st respondent is a telecommunications company (Telco) in Ghana. The 3rd respondent is a statutory body established under the National Communications Act, 2008 (Act 769). Sometime in September 2021, the Ministry of Communications and Digitalisation launched a national exercise, the National Sim Card Registration Exercise (NSCRE) aimed at registering about 40 million subscribers of its services.
In compliance with this directive, the 1st respondent put modalities in place to register Subscriber Identity Module (SIM). The process which commenced on 1st October 2021….. involved submitting one’s Ghana Identity Card (Ghana Card) to the Telco for personal details to be recorded and the card linked to the SIM accordingly.
The appellant in the affidavit in support of his application says that he is a customer of the 1st respondent. On 2nd May 2023, the plaintiff/appellant (hereinafter referred to as ‘appellant’ discovered that his Ghana Card) had been linked to a Vodafone Number 0203618193 that he did not know and without his consent or authorization. On 22nd May 2023, he discovered that his Identity card had been de-linked from the telephone number 0209103682., again without his consent or authorisation.
The appellant filed an application at the High Court on 12th June 2023, seeking redress at the Human Rights court under article 33 of the Constitution, 1992. By an amended originating motion on notice for redress under Article 33 of the 1992 Constitution and Order 67 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2004 (C.I 47), the appellant prayed the High Court for the enforcement of his fundamental human rights under Article 18 of the Constitution of Ghana,1992. On 31st July, 2023, at the instance of the 2nd respondent, the High Court ordered that the application be amended to include the
3rd respondent in the suit as a party. Subsequently, the appellant brought the amended application for the inclusion of those parties as ordered by the court, and sought the following reliefs:
1. A declaration that the 1st and 3rd Respondents breached the Appellant’s privacy under Article 18 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.
2. An order directed at the Respondents to furnish the Applicant with the true copies of the registration details of Vodafone Number 0203618193 since the creation of the number and all records including the Vodafone Cash Statement and call logs of the Vodafone Number 0203618198.
3. Damages and costs against the 1st and 3rd Respondents.
THE CASE OF THE APPELLANT
The appellant in the affidavit in support of his application says that he is a customer of the 1st respondent with Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) number 0209103682. In compliance with the directives of the 3rd respondent, his Ghana Card is linked to his SIM card and his biometric details have been duly captured.
It is the appellant’s allegation that on 2nd May, 2023, he discovered that the 1st respondent had registered a Vodafone number, 0203618198, in his name and with his Identity documents without his consent, knowledge or authorization. The same number had his name and identity on its Vodafone Cash registration details, without his knowledge or consent.
The appellant further says that on 22nd May, he discovered that the 1st respondent had removed the said 0203618198 from his registration records without his consent, knowledge or authorization.
It is the appellant’s case that the 1st respondent does not have the power to use appellant’s biometric data and identity to register the number 0203618198 and later unregister the same number which previously had appellant’s details.
The appellant says that his fundamental human right to privacy has been breached while he has been put in fear and apprehension of what his identity may have already been used for.
1ST RESPONDENT’S CASE
In its Affidavit in Opposition, the 1st respondent denied having used the appellant’s biometric Data for any purpose without “the knowledge, consent and approval of the Applicant.” The 1st respondent then went on to state at paragraph 6 of the affidavit “That the 1st Respondent says that the national SIM registration database is owned and managed by the National Communications Authority (NCA) and that the 1st Respondent only acts as an agent in collecting the required [data] for users of Vodafone SIM numbers.”
Further, the 1st respondent admitted that SIM number 0203618198 had been partially registered “to the applicant’s name with his identity card.” In paragraphs 12,14 and 15 the 1st appellant averred thus:
“12. That the 1st respondent says that prior to the commencement of the SIM Re-Registration exercise …by the Government through the NCA in the year 2021, there were several “pre-registered SIM cards on the market.”
“14. …that prior to the SIM registration exercise, the right procedure for acquiring a mobile or SIM number for use was to purchase the SIM number and have it registered in your name using any known identity card, example Drivers’ License Passport, National Insurance card etc.”
“15. that it became apparent that at the point of purchase of SIM numbers many people were not able to produce an identity card and so the salespersons resorted to pre-registering some SIMs and putting them on sale to those who may not have their identity cards with them at the time of purchase.”(emphasis mine)
The 1st respondent indicated that in accordance with NCA directives, there were two clear and distinct stages for the registration exercise, and that a SIM number was duly re-registered only when both stages one and two of the registration exercise had been completed. The 1st respondent therefore believed that anyone with access to the applicant’s Ghana Card could get through the Stage One and so the use of the Ghana Card could not be blamed on them, since “the commencement and conclusion of Stage One of the exercise can be done by any person who has access to the Ghana card number of any person (including the applicant himself) (see paragraphs 21, 22 and 40 of the affidavit).”
The 1st respondent then went on to describe stage two by resorting to a press Release by the Ministry of Communications and Digitalisation – ‘EXHIBIT ES3’. Further that “starting and completing stage one of the SIM registration exercise without completing stage two gives you almost the same results as the registration regime that existed prior to the commencement of the SIM registration exercise and its attendant deficiencies.”
The 1st respondent then avers that stage two involves steps which were communicated to the public as follows: [ROA p20]
“a. Visit a SIM card registration center. You will need your Ghana Card and Ghana Post digital address code.
b. Present your SUUID to the registration agent
c. The Agent will start the registration process by matching your SUUID (unique registration code for stage 2) to your phone number (MSISDN).
d. If there is a match, Agent will proceed to capture the details of your Ghana Card.
e. A picture of the front and back Ghana Card will be captured.
f. The Agent will proceed to capture a picture of your face – This will be biometrically matched against the picture on your Ghana Card. (The SIM card registration application uses a special algorithm to ensure the subject is alive)
g. The Agent will proceed to capture your fingerprints from both hands. Thumbprints are not captured. (This biometric information is not verified against NIA biometric database).
h. As a final step, the Agent will input your Ghana Post digital Address code
i. The details are then submitted, and you will receive confirmation that SIM card registration is complete.
When you check your registration status by dialling *400#, you will see that your biometric Capture (BCAP) status would have changed from ‘NO to ‘YES’.” (emphasis added.)
The 1st respondent went on to make averments in paragraph 28 and 29 of the affidavit to confirm their processes as follows:
“28. That the 1st Respondent says that without the presence of the holder of the Ghana Card (which is described as the property of the Government of Ghana) and the SIM card, the SIM number cannot be registered to the name or the identity of any individual, including the applicant.”
“ 29. That the 1st Respondent says that partial registration implied a start and or completion of only stage one of the two staged SIM registration exercise.”
One is left in no doubt as to the subtle accusation being made as to the culpability of the appellant himself for the state of affairs of which he complains in paragraphs 41-42 as follows:
“41. That the 1st Respondent … and says that a closer look at the Applicant’s Exhibit EKG2 indicates that 2 Vodafone numbers (0203618198 and 0209103682) are linked to his name and that the Applicant complaints[sic] of only one of the numbers, 0203618198 and not the number 0209103682.
42. That the 1st Respondent repeats paragraph 41 above and says that the filing of no complaint against the linking of Vodafone number 0209103682 to the Applicant’s Ghana card is an indication that the said number is a number that the Applicant took steps to re-register in his name and freely provided his biometric data to aid the registration process.”
This is a puzzling averment because the 1st respondent admits that the applicant is making no complaint about 0209103682, yet he is complaining about 0203618198. What does his complaint about 0203618198 have to do with the registration of his proper number such that he cannot complain about one if he does not complain about the other? Clearly this is not intended to suggest that if the applicant consented to what he accepts as his number then he must have consented to the processes leading to the registration of 0203618198 which he denies knowing anything about. This is very strange reasoning indeed.
As regards the complaint concerning the opening of the Vodafone Cash account the 1st respondent maintained that its system was programmed such that once the first stage of the registration was completed, a Vodafone Cash account would be automatically provided for that number. However, the Vodafone Cash Account for that number could not be activated unless the second stage of the registration exercise had been completed.
The 1st respondent therefore indicated with confidence though it provided no evidence of same, that although the number complained of by the appellant was provided with a Vodafone Cash account, the account was never active as the second stage of registering that number was never completed. Thus, the number could not be used to carry out any transaction successfully and therefore the evidence attached to appellant’s affidavit should not be taken as proof of a successful transaction on that number. The 1st respondent averred in paragraphs 30-32 thus:
“30. …1st respondent says that its system is set up in such a way that activation and completion of stage one of SIM registration automatically provisions a Vodafone Cash Account for the number that is being registered.
31. That the 1st Respondent repeats paragraph 30 above and says that the provisioning of Vodafone Cash account for a number which has initiated and or completed stage 1 of the SIM registration exercise was only a partial registration and that the wallet could only be activated after the complete registration of the SIM number, that is the completion of stage 2 of the registration process.
32. That the 1st respondent says that no one could have operated the provisioned Vodafone cash account on the number 0203618198 because stage 2 of the SIM registration process for that number had not been done and was never done.”
Therefore, the 1st respondent maintained, that the appellant’s application is grounded on a complete misunderstanding of the SIM registration exercise and that Vodafone Cash account was never activated as the process was incomplete at the time the number was taken off the appellant’s number. That being the case, the appellant had lost nothing by the act of attributing a Vodafone number and a Vodafone Cash account he did not know to him, and the application should be dismissed for disclosing no cause of action.
In its amended Affidavit in Opposition, the 1st respondent essentially averred that it was the Network operators’ responsibility to ensure that their customer’s Ghana Card details were linked to the customer’s SIM. (ROA 62) By paragraph 6 of the amended affidavit the 1st respondent averred that it was the NCA that owned and managed the National SIM registration database and that they were mere agents in collecting the required data for users of Vodafone SIM numbers”. Therefore, if anything had gone wrong with information on the database, it had to be laid at the door of the NCA.
CASE OF 2nd RESPONDENT (ROA 91)
The 2nd respondent in the same vein as the 1st respondent purported to rely on the two-stage process devised by the 3rd respondent as proof that the number could not have been active. The 2nd respondent, in paragraph 12 of its affidavit, maintains that
“…that the alleged linking of the Applicant’s Ghana Card Details to the SIM number 0203628198 could have been done by any person who has direct physical access to the Ghana Card of the Applicant, simply by following the processes which were given by the National Communications Authority.”
Further at paragraph 16 there is the following averment:
“That the 2nd respondent says further that corrections effected or errors and omissions which may be committed and rectified by the 1st Respondent are incidental to the 1st Respondent’s work and operations in offering quality service to its customers, and may be done without recourse to its affected customers and for that matter the Applicant.”
These averments both hint at unidentified persons who have access to the applicant’s Ghana Card (including the applicant himself) could be responsible for the number being wrongly linked to the appellant’s details. Being the office charged with prosecution of crimes it is concerning that they rely on such an averment. Clearly, were any criminality attributed to the strange number, the applicant would have had a hard time exculpating himself from the 2nd respondent’s prima facie case against him by the unwillingness to hold the 1st and 3rd respondents accountable for the mishandling of any subscriber’s data.
CASE OF 3RD RESPONDENT (ROA 97)
By paragraph 6 of the affidavit, the 3rd respondent averred that the applicant (appellant herein) had not been able to demonstrate how the 3rd respondent was connected to his claim, or how it failed to protect applicant’s rights. They stated further that they set up a 24-hour dispute resolution mechanism to assist subscribers to respond to challenges they might face in the registration process under Regulations 119-130 of the Electronic Communications Regulations 2011 (LI 1991).
The 3rd respondent further averred that the applicant’s application to the court was premature since he had neglected to avail himself of the Consumer Resolution Processes made available by 3rd Respondent before resorting to court. The 3rd respondent therefore urged on the court to stay proceedings and order the applicant to exhaust the Consumer Resolution Processes, and that the application as it stood disclosed no cause of action.
HIGH COURT’S DECISION
The High Court on 16th November, 2023 after considering the processes and hearing the parties held that the appellant’s action was premature and accordingly dismissed same.
The appellant on 29th November, 2023 appealed to the Court of Appeal on the following grounds:
i. The learned trial judge erred in law when she held that the Applicant’s application for redress under Article 33 of the 1992 Constitution was premature to be determined by the High Court
ii. The judgment is against the weight of evidence
The Court of Appeal unanimously held that the appellant had a right to seek the enforcement of his fundamental human rights at the High Court and did not have to wait on the internal mechanism that had been set up, as this could delay the vindication of the right and frustrate the redress the appellant was seeking. Therefore the decision of the High Court on the issue of the suit being premature had to be overturned. On the merits of the matter, however, the Court of Appeal on 6th February, 2025 dismissed the appeal on the basis that the appellant failed to discharge the requisite burden of proof to show that his rights to privacy were violated.
Still aggrieved and dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeal, the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court by a notice of appeal filed on 17th February, 2025 on the following grounds:
i. “The Court of Appeal erred in finding that the Appellant did not adduce sufficient evidence to demonstrate a violation of his right to privacy under Article 18(2) of the Constitution of Ghana,1992:
Particulars of misdirection or error of law
a. The Court of Appeal failed to appreciate the Appellant’s exhibit EKG 2(1 and 2) as evidence, violating his right to privacy of property under Article 18(2) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.
b. The Court of Appeal has failed to appreciate the Appellant’s exhibit EKG 3[1 and 2] as evidence, violating his right to privacy of property under Article 18(2) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana
ii. The Judgment is against the weight of evidence.”
The appeal was fought mostly on whether or not there had been a breach of the appellant’s right to privacy by the re-registration of SIM cards that took place in October 2023 and whether the judgment was against the weight of evidence.
It is trite law that an appeal is a rehearing and the appellate court must review the evidence to ascertain if the assessment was supported by the evidence adduced. In Tuakwa vs Bosom [2001-2002] SCGLR 61 and Agyeiwaa vs P& T Corporation [2007-2008] SCGLR985 the Supreme Court clarified that it is the duty of the appellate court to analyze the entire record of appeal before arriving at its own decision on whether the lower court was right in its decision. See also: Ackah vs Pergah Transport Ltd [2010] SCGLR 728.
The task of the appellant at the second appellate court is made even more onerous where an appellant is seeking to challenge concurrent findings of two lower courts. The position of the law has been reiterated in several authorities of the Supreme Court that an appellate court should be slow to disturb the concurrent findings of facts by two courts unless the findings are so perverse and unsupported by the evidence on record. These principles were espoused in the following cases: Obrasiwah II v. Otu, [1996-97] SCGLR 618; Achoro v. Akanfela [1996-97] SCGLR 209; Kogles (No. 2) v Field [2000] SCGLR 175; Adu v. Ahamah [2007-2008] SCGLR 143 and Fosua and Adu-Poku v. Dufie (Deceased) and Adu-Poku, Mensah [ 2009] SCGLR 311.
In Acquie v. Tijani [2012] SCGLR 1252, Anin Yeboah JSC delivering the unanimous judgment of the court stated at p.1257 of the report that “This court is the second appellate court before which this ground has been canvassed to invite it to reverse the decision made by the lower court” and that the onus lay on the appellant’s case to demonstrate clearly that the findings were perverse and unjustified. See also: West African Enterprise Ltd v. Western Harwood Enterprise Ltd. [1995-96] 1 GLR 155-176; and Fosua & Adu-Poku Mensah [2009] SCGLR 310.
However, this posture reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of what amounts to “concurrent findings of facts by two lower courts”. In Choro-Padoh Kwanimbi Hamza v. Inspector General of Police & Attorney-General, Suit No. JA/32/2020; delivered on 13th July 2022; (Unreported), this honourable court addressed the issue and made the observation below at paragraph 36:
“36. In any case, the principle as it pertains to the respect to which the findings of a trial court must be given is in respect of facts found on the evidence, and not the law as applied by the trial court. Were that the case, there would be no point setting up appellate courts since they could neither review the facts nor law as applied. The trial court in the instant case applied the law incorrectly, and the majority opinion set it straight.”
The appellant in the instant case is essentially complaining about a breach of his right to privacy, which is a matter of law, and not just of fact. Perhaps the appellant’s Exhibits EKG2 and EKG3 do not meet the threshold. However, it was not his fault that he did not possess the records with which to prove his claim definitively. At all material times, it was only the respondents who could have control of the information that the appellant would require to satisfy the evidentiary burden. It was the 1st and 3rd respondents who had custody of those records, as well as the means to make or delete those records. It was thus for good reason that the appellant sought the second order from the High Court for the respondents to be ordered to produce the records of numbers registered under his identity card. Therefore, no one but the 1st and 3rd respondents could produce those records and the blame for same could not be put at the door of the appellant.
The real question the 1st and 3rd respondents had to answer was: “Did the systems they set up for the re-registration process adequately protect the privacy rights of the consumers?” The respondents did not answer that except to show that they gave consumers the means to check which numbers had been registered to their identity details. Although it is important to state that the appellant’s Exhibit EKG2 was made possible by the 3rd respondent’s idea of short code *402*1# for the detection of fraudulently registered SIMS linked to peoples’ Ghana Card for the necessary action to be taken, it was not sufficient to prevent the breach in the first place. The 1st respondent was conscious of the fact that their own representatives in the field had previously registered SIM numbers fraudulently, without the appropriate identification documents. In their own words in paragraphs 14-15 of the amended affidavit, they averred,
“14. That 1st Respondent says that prior to the SIM registration exercise the right procedure for acquiring a mobile SIM number for use was to purchase the SIM number and have it registered in your name using any known identity card, example Drivers’ license, Passport, National Insurance card, etc
15. That 1st respondent says that it became apparent that at the point of purchase of SIM numbers many people were not able to produce an identity card and so the salespersons resorted to pre-registering some SIMs and putting them on sale to those who may not have their identity cards with them at the time of purchase.”
Having made these admissions tending to show that their “salespersons”, who were persons who had been selected and engaged by them and given access to the recording machinery had perverted the system for commercial gain on a previous occasion, why did they persist in pushing the idea that their two-tier system was fool proof when it could be perverted for commercial gain? Why did they insist that only persons with physical access to the appellant’s card could have completed stage one and so the appellant was to blame if a strange SIM number had been registered with his identity documents? If those who are to implement the system can do it fraudulently for commercial gain, why persist in the belief that there was no wrongdoing on the part of the agents of 1st respondent. Perhaps Exhibit EKG2 was evidence of the effort of the respondents to secure the privacy of rights of consumers but could it have been too little too late? On the Exhibits, it was not until 26th April that the Director-General of 3rd respondent announced that the possibility of people checking the numbers linked to them was being explored and that it would go live on 1st May. Were 1st respondent’s processes backed by a dependable and well-trained field staff? Was it possible that those with access to their systems could have fraudulently completed stage two for commercial gain? The respondent’s do not address these questions or to produce the records in their custody that disprove appellant’s allegations.
What findings of fact were made herein? All three respondents maintained that a “foolproof system” had been put in place and that anyone (including the appellant) could have done what he had complained about. The records which were in the custody of the 1st respondent for onward transmission into the data base of the 3rd respondent could not have been produced by the appellant. The appellant on the authority of Awuni v. West African Examinations Council (WAEC) [2003-2004] 1 SCGLR 471 submitted that the subsequent dismissal of the substantive appeal on the grounds of insufficient evidence, without a thorough consideration of the evidence presented undermines the very principle of swift and effective redress that Article 33 of the 1992 Constitution seeks to guarantee. The Court of Appeal agreed with that contention.
He further submitted that if access to the court is readily granted, but the threshold for proving a violation is set impossibly high, then the constitutional guarantee of redress becomes illusory. Therefore, given the evidence at his disposal and which was adduced and the constitutional imperative of protecting fundamental human rights he had made a good case. The appellant submits further that he met the standard threshold of proof in civil cases-balance of probabilities citing Miller v. Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372; Dzaisu & Ors v Ghana Breweries Ltd [2007-2008]1 SCGLR 539 and sections 10, 11,12 and 14 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (Act 323). Having discharged that burden the Court of Appeal could not have found otherwise.
The appellant tendered Exhibit EKG 1 which was the advertisement calling for the registration of SIM Cards by 3rd respondent. According to the appellant, a Ghana Card was needed to undertake the registration of the SIM Card and the means of confirming registration is by dialing *402# to confirm the success of the process.
The appellant tendered Exhibit EKG 2 which shows that an unknown and unfamiliar number, 0203618198 had been registered with the details of his Ghana Card. The appellant also tendered Exhibit EKG3 which shows that the same 0203618198 is registered on Vodafone Cash with his Ghana Card details without his consent.
The appellant argues that Exhibits EKG2 and EKG 3 are not mere assertions but verifiable electronic records, generated directly from the systems of 1st respondent. It is the case of the appellant that the exhibits tendered constitute direct and cogent evidence that the Vodafone number 0203618198 were registered and also enabled for Vodafone Cash transactions in his name without his knowledge, consent or authorization.
The appellant further argues that the respondent’s admission that what took place was partial registration is sufficient evidence of breach of the Data Protection Act, 2012 (Act 843) and same constitute an actionable interference with his privacy rights under Article 18(2) of the 1992 Constitution. He says that technical or evidential barriers should not be used to deny him his constitutional guaranteed rights (FEDYAG v. Public Universities of Ghana & Ors. [2010] SCGLR 54.)
The appellant argues again that the constitutional guarantee in Article 18(2) extends to both tangible and intangible forms of property and communication. In his view, personal identity information such as Ghana Card Number and full name, is property within the meaning of article 18(2) of the Constitution. The respondents’ failure to protect the appellant’s data, and their unauthorized use of same, violates both the Data Protection Act and the spirit of the 1992 Constitution.
The appellant states that the action of the respondents has caused him emotional distress, reputational anxiety, and a well-founded fear of wrongful accusation and apprehension. On that basis, the appellant is praying for the award of compensatory damages for the violation of his rights. (Agyei-Ampofo v. Accra Metropolitan Authority [2007-08] SCGLR 611 and Awuni v. WAEC supra cited.
Indeed, the original application to the High Court sought the following orders.
“A declaration that the 1st and 3rd Respondents breached the Appellant’s privacy under Article 18 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.
An order directed at the Respondents to furnish the Applicant with the true copies of the registration details of Vodafone Number 0203618193 since the creation of the number and all records including the Vodafone Cash Statement, call logs of the Vodafone Number 0203618198.”
What then were the “concurrent findings of fact” that had been made by the two lower courts on affidavit evidence to ground an invitation to the Supreme Court to dismiss the action?
The 3rd respondent argues that the appellant has not been able to show in what ways the decision of the learned justices of the Court of Appeal “failed to appreciate these exhibits as evidence which resulted in a misdirection or error of law in their ruling.”
It is the view of the 3rd respondent that the appellant was simply unable to persuade the court that on the preponderance of probabilities, the 1st and 3rd respondents used his Ghana Card details to register a SIM Card without his knowledge and consent.
The 3rd respondent says that as the regulator of the communications space, it anticipated that some fraudulent and unscrupulous persons who had access to other people’s Ghana Card details could attempt to use same for the registration of their SIMS. Hence, the two-stage control factor was activated to ensure that a subscriber’s SIM card registration was considered complete and active for use only if the second registration stage of biometric verification had been successful done. The short code *402*1# was generated by the 3rd respondent to detect SIMS that had fraudulently been linked to Ghana Card for the necessary action to be taken. With respect, this argument has been undermined by evidence proffered in the 1st respondent’s own affidavit in opposition (see paragraphs 13,-15 above) that field staff for commercial reward, were capable of the self-same fraudulent conduct which had been perpetrated in the earlier exercise. The 1st respondent does not indicate what training and other measures were put in place to render such capacity impotent in the re-registration exercise.
The 3rd respondent indicated that as a result of the above action, about 11 million of such fraudulently linked SIMS cards were deleted in the process, and that the appellant’s Exhibit “EKG2(1) was one of such examples. Further, the 3rd respondent relied on Denning J’s (as he then was) dictum in Miller v Minister of Pensions, supra, that if the evidence is such that the tribunal can say “we think it more probable than not, the burden is discharged, but if the probabilities are equal it is not.” Consequently, the 3rd respondent submits that it agrees with the Court of Appeal’s decision that the appellant failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that on a balance of probabilities that his Ghana Card was used by the 3rd respondent to link his SIM number as any other person’s number could have been. As between the appellant and the respondents, which of them would have the required evidence in their custody?
This was a bold posture to adopt as the 1st respondent was hinting at other people having the opportunity to perpetrate the wrong against its customers. What is clear is that the system was designed to depend on the integrity of “the Agent” of the 1st respondent. The “Agent” of the 1st respondent was selected or chosen by the 1st respondent and was for all practical purposes the representative of the 1st respondent’s responsible for the critical steps in the registration process. Such an “Agent” who operated on behalf of the 1st respondent and interfaced with the public, was the one who had access to 1st respondent’s machinery and other mechanisms for registration. The processes for registration had been designed by the 1st respondent and therefore any flaws in the system or any wrongful acts done intentionally or negligently could be placed at the door step of the 1st respondent.
The right to privacy
Article 18 (1) and (2) provide for this right under the Constitution, 1992. The Data Protection Act, 2012 (Act 843) was enacted to give substance to article 18(2) and essentially protects data or information of/about a person in the custody or possession of, or likely to come into the custody of the data controller. The Act therefore subjects data controllers and data processors to strict privacy responsibilities or obligations and fleshes out some of these protections as they pertain to the protection of one’s personal information. Section 17 provides as follows:
“A person who processes data shall take into account the privacy of the individual by applying the following principles:
(a) accountability,
(b) lawfulness of processing,
(c) specification of purpose,
(d) compatibility of further processing with purpose of collection,
(e) quality of information,
(f) openness,
(g) data security safeguards, and
(h) data subject participation.
It does not end there. Section 18 (1) (a) and section 20 (b) and (d)also make the following provisions in respect of a person’s privacy rights:
Section 18: “(1) A person who processes personal data shall ensure that the personal data is processed
(a) without infringing the privacy rights of the data subject;
(b) in a lawful manner; and
(c) in a reasonable manner.” (emphasis supplied.)
Section 20. (1) A person shall not process personal data without the prior consent of the data subject unless the purpose for which the personal data is processed is
“(a) necessary for the purpose of a contract to which the data subject is a party;
(b) authorized or required by law;
(c) to protect a legitimate interest of the data subject;
(d) necessary for the proper performance of a statutory duty; or
(e) necessary to pursue the legitimate interest of the data controller or a third party to whom the data is supplied.” (emphasis supplied)
From these provisions under Act 843, there is no doubt at all that there is a responsibility placed on persons and institutions who handle the personal details of persons resident in the country to protect their privacy.
The responsibilities are further elucidated in sections 28 and 29 as follows:
“28. (1) A data controller shall take the necessary steps to secure the integrity
of personal data in the possession or control of a person through the adoption of
appropriate, reasonable, technical and organisational measures to prevent
(a) loss of, damage to, or unauthorised destruction; and
(b) unlawful access to or unauthorised processing of personal
data.
(2) To give effect to subsection (1), the data controller shall take
reasonable measures to
(a) identify reasonably foreseeable internal and external risks to
personal data under that person’s possession or control;
(b) establish and maintain appropriate safeguards against the
identified risks;
(c) regularly verify that the safeguards are effectively implemented;
and
(d) ensure that the safeguards are continually updated in
response to new risks or deficiencies. (3) A data
controller shall observe
(a) generally accepted information security practices and procedure,
and
(b) specific industry or professional rules and regulations.
29. (1) A data processor or a person who processes personal data on
behalf of a data controller shall
(a) process the data only with the prior knowledge or authorisation of
the data controller, and
(b) treat the personal data which comes to the knowledge of the data
processor or the other person as confidential.
(2) A data processor or a person who processes personal data on behalf
of a data controller shall not disclose the data unless
(a) required by law, or
(b) in the course of the discharge of a duty.”
The Data Protection Act thus places an onerous duty on the data processor to ensure to the highest standard possible, the protection of privacy. Therefore the 1st and 3rd respondents should have had recourse to these provisions as they designed the system of re-registration of SIM numbers to avoid a situation where any agent would commercialise the information provided by registering other SIM numbers without the person’s consent.
In Cubagee v. Asare &2 Ors. [2017-2018] 1 SCGLR 656, supra, Pwamang JSC on the scope of article 18(2) of the Constitution, 1992 stated at p. 664 that :
“Privacy is so broad a constitutional right that it defies a concise and simple definition. It comprises a large bundle of rights some of which have been listed in the article as privacy of the home, property, and correspondence or communication. The list is not exhaustive and the full scope of the right cannot possibly be set out in the text of the Constitution. However, under the right of privacy is covered an individual’s right to be left alone to live his life free from unwanted intrusion, scrutiny and publicity. It is the right of a person to be secluded, secretive and anonymous in society and to have control of intrusions into the sphere of his private life…
Privacy is a very important human right that inheres in the individual and ensures that she can be her own person, have self- identity and realise her self-worth. It guarantees personal autonomy for the individual and without it, public authorities would easily control and manipulate the lives of citizens and undermine their liberty. It is one of the mostly demanded human rights in today’s world for the simple reason that advancements in information and communication technology have made it extremely easy to interfere with privacy rights. As a result, almost all states have passed laws and detailed regulations to protect privacy rights and prescribe circumstances under which public authorities, private organizations and, in some countries, individuals may be permitted to interfere with privacy rights.”
In the Ghanaian case of Abena Ackah v. Agricultural Development Bank [2017-2018] 2 SCGLR 1, the Supreme Court declared the secret recording of the plaintiff as a breach of her right to privacy under the general regime of fundamental human rights. Pwamang JSC held at pp.73-74 that
“The right to privacy is very important for the development of the individual…. Present concerns about the protection of privacy in Ghana and globally can be attributed in part to the tremendous advances in information and communication technology which have made it very easy to intercept, record, store, retrieve and send information about people without those people being aware of the invasions of their privacy…. Ghana enacted the Data Protection Act, 2012 (Act 843) which seeks to protect the privacy of the individual and the processing of data concerning an individual…The Applicant’s right to privacy under Article 18(2) of the Constitution was breached by the recording and subsequent publication of the telephone conversation the applicant had with the third party about matters concerning the respondent.”
In the Canadian case of R. v. Bykovets, 2024 SCC 6, the matter pertained to the IP address of the plaintiff. The issues arose because in the course of an investigation into fraudulent online purchases from a store, the police contacted the third-party processing company that managed the store’s online sales and obtained the IP addresses used for the purchases. The police then obtained a production order compelling the Internet service provider (“ISP”) to disclose the name and address of the customer for each IP address. Police used this subscriber information to seek and execute search warrants, and the plaintiff herein was arrested. He brought an action against the State and prosecutorial authorities for unlawful search. The Supreme Court of Canada examined the privacy provisions of the Canadian Charter [constitution] and said the following in respect of the right to privacy:
“Its principal object is the protection of privacy, including informational privacy, that is, the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is communicated to others. Personal privacy is vital to individual dignity, autonomy, and personal growth. Its protection is a basic prerequisite to the flourishing of a free and healthy democracy. …The intensely private nature of the information an IP address may betray strongly suggests that the public’s interest in being left alone should prevail over the government’s interest in advancing its law enforcement goals. The Internet has exponentially increased both the quality and quantity of information stored about Internet users, spanning the most public and the most private human behaviour. The Internet has not only allowed private corporations to track their users, but also to build but also to build profiles of their users filled with information the users never knew they were revealing. By concentrating this mass of information with private third parties and granting them the tools to aggregate and dissect that data, the Internet has essentially altered the topography of privacy under the Charter. It has added a third party to the constitutional ecosystem, making the horizontal relationship between the individual and the state tripartite….” (emphasis added.)
The protection of the right to privacy has thus been elevated to constitutional protections under Article 18 of the Constitution of Ghana, 1992. The control over one’s personal information, including particulars for registering a SIM number comes within this bundle of privacy rights and the misuse of appellant’s personal information amounted to a violation of his autonomy and a breach of this rights under Article 18. From the Data Protection Act and the authorities cited, there is no doubt that in the internet age, online addresses and personal details linking a person to a particular SIM number is part of the sphere of life deserving of protection under the right to privacy. On the facts of the instant case, the intrusion into, and therefore breach of, the privacy of the appellant was obvious, and the respondents should have conducted themselves differently in this litigation.
It was not as if a strange number linked to one’s Ghana Card could have no consequences for the holder of the card. The consequences were emphasized time and again to ground the need for the re-registration. In Exhibit ES1 (ROA p.25-27), Minister for communications outlined the benefits of SIM registration. In a report of a Press Conference bearing a September 5, 2021 date (ROA p.25) the Minister for Communication and Digitalization was quoted as follows:
“SIM reregistration when undertaken correctly as we intend to do, will reduce or eliminate fraudulent and criminal activities, help authorities ascertain the accurate number of valid and accurate SIMs on the networks, enable operators to build better demographics of their customer base and help them develop products and services to suit the various groupings. The Regulator NCA will also get more accurate data to regulate the industry even better. … It will minimize mobile money fraud and support financial inclusion across the vulnerable sectors.”
The Minister went on to state that. (see ROA p.27) that
“Individuals can register a total of 10 SIM cards across all networks. Let me caution here that people should not think that they can hide a Businesses and register as many SIM cards as they want. All SIM cards registered to a Business will be linked to a Shareholder or Director of the Business and if a Business SIM Card is found to have been engaged in a fraudulent activity, the Shareholder or Director will be held liable.”
Therefore, if anybody maintains as 1st respondent has done in Paragraph 46 of its affidavit that there are no consequences to a person whose identity documents are wrongfully used to support another’s registration process of which the person knows nothing, then this betrays a lack of understanding of the issues at stake in such situation. Consequently, it is regrettable when the 1st respondent averred therein that “…the expressed fears as noted by the Applicant is the Applicant’s own creation and the blame for same cannot be lodged at the doorstep of the 1st Respondent.”
These problems have already attracted a sizeable body of academic research as threats to the financial world emerge from the ease, speed and anonymity with which money can be moved around on mobile networks. In an article by James Whisker, Mark Eshwar Lokanan, “Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing threats posed by mobile Money.”, in Journal of Money Laundering Control, https://doi.org/10.1108/JMLC-10-2017-0061 the authors make remarks that are apposite for our purposes. At p.3, they opine as follows:,
“Considering the scale of worldwide mobile ownership and increasing mpayment
[sic] usage, it is important to consider the potential avenues in which
criminals could commit money laundering activities and create systemic risks.
The threats of mobile money are enabled through the structure of global
information and communication networks and the way that they operate. These
networks create opportunities in which cyber launderers seek to exploit by means
of anonymity, rapidity, ease of use and the ability to operate in different
jurisdictions without being physically present.
The authors go further to point out some other risks where the correct identity of persons moving around is not known, at pp.4-5
“In some cases, mobiles’ connections are enabled through prepaid
services, of which some mobile network operators (MNO) do not require prior
identification or verification to enable telecommunication access and creates
anonymity risks. An equally inherent threat can be created if false identification is
provided allowing persons to establish a mobile money service account. This is especially hard to detect unless proper systems and controls are in
place to prevent such occurrences when there is no face-to-face contact to
conduct customer’s due diligence measures. Such threats can further materialise if there is lacking regulatory and supervisory oversight to
ensure mobile money service providers are enforcing AML [Anti-Money-Laundering] compliance measures throughout their vulnerable business lines.”
Thus, when the Minister made those comments in the Press Release, the issue of how to reduce fraud and other criminal activity were very much at the top of the nation’s agenda.
Assessing further risks posed by the mobile phone technologies when verification controls are weak, the authors further state at p.10 that
“In the case where identification is provided, but there are weak or none existent
verification processes, the individual can commit identity fraud usually due to
two prevailing reasons. First, in cases where there are non-face-to-face
transaction, some jurisdictions may offer financial services and benefits to
facilitate inclusion. Second, the jurisdiction has a weak verification structure. These are usually most prevalent in developing economies and not uncommon in relation to mobile money. …. If false identification is presented when purchasing a mobile phone, subsequent usage from potential criminals using the phone may be unidentifiable. Furthermore, there are concerns that mobiles linked to mobile money accounts may be handed over to criminals or the phone may also be stolen in the hope that transactions may go unmonitored and facilitate fraudulent activities.”
All of these instances mentioned above, mean that there could be chilling consequences for one whose identity documents are fraudulently used to register a SIM, and the significance of the risk cannot be downplayed. In a recent case in the High Court of Ghana a case of identity theft was successfully made against a person who had used his employer’s personal details to register himself as a driver on the App of a private taxi company, and wqas operating as such. See Justice Noah Adade v. Bolt Ghana Limited & Bolt Holdings OU ;Suit No. C11/003/2023; (Unreported). (HC). It should thus be a matter of alarm if someone with access to another’s personal documentation could use it to register his or her own or even a third person’s internet identity without the owner’s consent or authorization. See also: Francisca Kusi-Appiah: ‘Consumer Rights and Justice in Ghana: A Legal Compass’ K-App Law, Accra, Ghana 2025, pp 123. 262 and p.419. At p.419, the author discusses the remit of the Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 843). The rights of consumers are therefore protected by statute and any violation cannot be brushed aside as being inconsequential.
In proof of the supposed fool-proof system in the instant case, the 1st respondent stated that the SIM registration exercise commenced in 2021 under the 3rd respondent’s instructions and this involved a two-staged approach. The first stage was the linking of the Ghana Card with the SIM number. The second stage was the owner of the Ghana Card having his/her biometric details captured at the service provider’s office to complete the SIM registration. The 1st respondent further says that stage one could be done by anyone having the Ghana Card or the Ghana Card number and not necessarily the 1st respondent or the appellant. This, in the 1st respondent’s view is what happened to the SIM number the appellant complained of; as it was only linked to appellant’s Ghana Card but the SIM registration was not completed in appellant’s name. The gaps in the respondents’ registration system seem to be overlooked from the respondents’ end.
To compel people who wished to be connected to the telephone networks on this earth, and to make matters worse for the 1st respondent, the Ministry issued a Press Release on 27th February 2023 that subscribers with incomplete registration would be disconnected after 10th March 2023. On 26th April 2023, the Director-General of the NCA gave a Press briefing at which he announced that there were 11 million active but unregistered SIMS and gave a fresh deadline of 31st May 2023 for final deactivation. Having set the deadline of 10th March after which numbers with incomplete registration would be disconnected. However, by Exhibit ES 5A (ROA 42), it was not until 26th April 2023 that the Director-General of NCA announced that they were working with the “mobile network operators to deploy short code *402*1# for subscribers to check the details linked to their Ghana Cards. The effective date for this to be actualized was 1st May, 2023. The appellant lost no time in utilizing the facility and found on 2nd May that there was a strange SIM number linked to his Ghana card. Since this was after the Director-General of NCA had announced that 11 million SIMs were still active though not registered, the appellant became concerned as he was unconvinced that no one was using the number wrongly linked to him. On 22nd May he made another discovery that the number had been delinked from his identification details without him having requested that this be done. This did not mean the number had been deactivated as the real owner or someone else’s details may have been substituted.
The 1st respondent further indicated that the number was delinked from appellant’s name or Ghana Card because it was not registered with the biometric data of the appellant or any other person. There is no knowing what really happened since the appellant had not made a complaint at the time the number was found to have been deleted. It is true the 3rd respondent had earlier issued a directive that after 31st May 2023, the 1st respondent and other Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) together with the 3rd respondent should de-activate all SIM cards that have not been completely registered from their systems to clean up the database. However, the number the appellant complained of was deleted more than one week before the deadline of 31st May 2023, for regularizing the registration with Ghana Card had elapsed. Whoever deleted it knew it was not supposed to be where it was, and not because of the directive whose deadline still had more than one week to run.
When the appellant sought information from the 1st respondent, seeking to answer the question “What had gone on between 10th March and 22nd May with the account, and how could he ascertain for a certainty that nothing that could incriminate him had gone on with that SIM number?” Why did the 1st respondent insist, that the continued existence of that number beyond the deadline of March 10th bore no significance, and even made light of the applicant’s averment in paragraph 18 of applicant’s affidavit that “the Applicant will continue to live in fear and apprehension as he does not know what someone used his identity for.”? Who had unrestricted access to his private account with Vodafone who could insert and delete details at will?
From the evidence, there is no doubt that the appellant’s right to privacy had been breached and that his fears of use or misuse of his identity documents were well founded. The appellant is entitled to the declaration he seeks.
Award of Damages
In Abena Ackah supra, Gbadegbe JSC stated at p.59 that an applicant under article 33 (1) and (2) is only entitled to the reliefs provided thereunder. Therefore, damages may be awarded for the invasion of the applicant’s right to privacy guaranteed under article 18(2) of the 1992 Constitution. As noted by Wiredu J (as he then was) in Anthony v University College of Cape Coast [1973] 1 GLR 299 at 311
“Award of damages under such circumstances has not been a easy tak. The court is called upon to assess and not to calculate taking into consideration the extent of the publication, the status of the plaintiff, the effect of the publication the occasion of the publication and the status of the defendants.”
These are useful principles in such uncharted territory and I accordingly find them suitable for application on this occasion.
The declaration sought in Relief 1 that the 1st and 3rd respondents breached the appellant’s privacy under Article 18 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana is granted.
Relief 2 is refused. Relief 3 in respect of “Damages and costs against the 1st and 3rd respondents”, are granted, but against the 1st respondents only. From the facts, the damages ought to be nominal as this is largely a public interest litigation, and the violation of the privacy rights of the appellant has been unequivocally affirmed. For all the reasons set down above, general damages assessed at Ghc10,000.00 in favour of the appellant against the 1st respondent, should be adequate to affirm the principle. Costs of Ghc 10,000.00 are awarded in favour of the appellant against 1st respondent only. The award of damages made by the Court of Appeal not having yet been paid, no loss has been occasioned to the appellant by way of costs already paid.
Appeal allowed.
(SGD.) PROF. H.J.A.N. MENSA-BONSU (MRS.)
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
(SGD.) I. O. TANKO AMADU
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
(SGD.) Y. DARKO ASARE
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
CONCURRING OPINION
KULENDI JSC:
1. I have read the erudite opinion of Her Ladyship Mensa-Bonsu JSC and I concur entirely in her evaluation and conclusion in this case. As the local akan adage goes however, “the abundance of meat in the soup, does not diminish its sweetness”. Accordingly, I shall proceed to articulate, briefly, my concurring view in support of the majority opinion brilliantly authored by my venerable sister.
2. It does appear to me from the outset, that the 1st Respondent took a rather dismissive view to the claim alleged by the Appellant, contending, rather incorrectly, that to the extent that the sim registration process was bifurcated and was only complete upon the submission and verification of the user’s biometric details, there was no risk of an invasion to the Appellant’s privacy.
3. This, in my considered view, constituted a misapprehension of the regulated and protected context created by the Data Protection Act, 2012 (Act 843) pertaining to the collection, retention and use of the data captured on the face of the Ghana Card, which constitutes personal data within the scope and meaning by the Data Protection Act.
4. Section 96 of Act 843 defines “personal data” to mean, data about an individual who can be identified,
(a) from the data, or
(b) from the data or other information in the possession of, or likely to come into the possession of the data controller;”
5. Accordingly, whilst the individual items of information appearing on the face of a national identity card, such as a person’s name, age, height, sex, or citizenship, may not, taken in isolation, be intrinsically private or confidential, in the sense that there is ordinarily no reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the mere disclosure of such attributes; their collection, compilation, retention, and use as an aggregated set of identifiers on a national identification card triggers a duty of confidentiality in respect of the authority obtaining the said data and a corresponding and/or transferred responsibility of confidentially in the case of an entity that obtains the said body of collated information, whether through access to the database of the National Identification Authority or by virtue of, as in this case, the voluntary submission of the said information by the individual himself.
6. Further, section 88(1) of Act 843 prohibits the knowing or reckless obtaining, retention, or disclosure of the personal data of another person outside the confines of the Act.
“1) A person shall not
(a) purchase the personal data or the information contained in the personal data of another person;
(b) knowingly obtain or knowingly or recklessly disclose the personal data or the information contained in the personal data of another person; or
(c) disclose or cause to be disclosed to another person the information contained in personal data.
7. A conjunctive reading of sections 17, 18, 20, 28 and 29 of the Data Protection Act, 2012 (Act 843) which have been set out in extenso in the lead opinion clearly reveals that the statutory regime governing personal data protection in Ghana is neither passive nor merely prohibitory.
8. Rather, the Act establishes a structured framework of systemic safeguards intended to regulate the entire lifecycle of personal data in the custody of data controllers and processors. Beyond simply prohibiting unlawful disclosure, the Act imposes affirmative duties on entities that collect or process personal information to ensure that the systems through which such data are handled are designed to minimize the risk of unauthorized access, exposure or misuse.
9. Sections 28 and 29, in particular, impose an obligation on data controllers to adopt appropriate technical and organizational or systemic measures to secure the integrity of personal data, while restricting data processors to operate only within the knowledge and authorization of the data controller and under conditions of strict confidentiality.
10. These statutory obligations are further anchored in the normative principles articulated in section 17 of the Act, which requires that any person who processes personal data must take into account the privacy of the individual by adhering to foundational principles such as accountability, lawfulness of processing, specification of purpose, compatibility of further processing with the purpose of collection, quality of information, openness, data security safeguards, and data subject participation.
11. These principles operate as value-based metrics which must inform the operational architecture of any system designed to collect, store or process personal data. The Act therefore contemplates that institutions entrusted with such information must design their processes in a manner that actively safeguards the confidentiality and regulated use of personal data, rather than reacting only after a breach has occurred.
12. On the evidence before this court, it is apparent that the 1st Respondent’s own admissions reveal that the data security safeguards required under the Act were effectively absent at the first stage of the SIM registration process. That notwithstanding, the 1st Respondent has attempted to deflect responsibility by suggesting that the Appellant’s Ghana Card details may have been obtained by an unauthorized third party.
13. However, whether the information was obtained through the previously acknowledged practice of unlawful pre-registration of SIM cards by the agents of the 1st Respondent, or through unauthorized access by a third party, the statutory duty imposed by Act 843 remained squarely upon the 1st Respondent.
14. That duty required the implementation of systemic verification safeguards capable of ensuring, at the very least, even if an unauthorized third party obtained the Ghana Card details of some other person, that the person presenting the card for registration was facially identifiable as the holder of that identity document.
15. In my considered opinion, the failure of the 1st Respondent to ensure the effective implementation of such basic verification measures at the initial stage of the registration exercise constituted a clear dereliction of the Respondent’s statutory obligations and effectively created the conditions under which the Appellant’s personal data could be misused, ultimately resulting in the unauthorized activation of a mobile money account in the Appellant’s name, which by all standards, amounted to an invasion of his privacy under Article 18 of the Constitution.
16. It is therefore on the basis of the foregoing, together with the reasons articulated in the lead opinion, that I would grant the instant appeal.
(SGD.) E. YONNY KULENDI
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
DISSENTING OPINION
DZAMEFE JSC:
This is an appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Accra, dated 6th February 2020. In that appeal the Court of Appeal overturned the High Court’s decision that the appellant’s application was premature and ultimately dismissed the applicant’s appeal on the ground that he had not presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate a violation of his privacy rights under Article 18(2) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. This was an application for redress under Article 33 of the 1992 Constitution and order 67 of the High Court (Civil Procedure Rules) 2004 C.I.47.
FACTS
The 2nd day of May 2023, the Appellant discovered that a Vodafone number,
0203618198, had been registered in his name using his identity, without his consent, knowledge, or authorization by the 1st and 3rd Respondents/Respondents/Respondents. On the same day, the Appellant also found out that the 1st and 3rd Respondents/Respondents/Respondents had registered the Vodafone number 0203618198 as Vodafone Cash in his name, again without his consent, knowledge, or authorization. Furthermore, on the 22nd day of May 2023, the Appellant learned that the 1st and 3rd Respondent/Respondents/Respondents had removed the Vodafone number 0203618198 from the Appellant’s registration identity, once more without his consent, knowledge, or authorization. The Appellant believes that the 1st and 3rd Respondents/Respondents/Respondents used his identity in violation of his right. The Appellant sought the following reliefs from the High Court.
1. A declaration that the 1st and 3rd Respondents breached the Applicant’s privacy under Article 18 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.
2. An order directed at the Respondents to furnish the Applicant with the true copies of the registration details of the Vodafone Number 0203618198 since the creation of the number and all records including the Vodafone cash statement, and call logs of the Vodafone Number 0203618198 up to date.
3. Damages and Costs against the 1st and 3rd Respondents
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS’ CASE
The Respondents/Respondents/Respondents, having been served with the Amended Application for redress filed their various Affidavits in Opposition.
The crux of the 1st Respondent/Respondent/Respondent’s hereinafter called ‘the 1st Respondent’) case could be gleaned from Paragraph 5 to Paragraph 47 of the Amended Affidavit of Mercy Dawn Akude for 1st Respondent in response to the Amended motion on notice for Redress filed by the Appellant on the 13th day of October 2023. In summary, the 1st Respondent stated that it acts as an agent in collecting the required data for users of Vodafone SIM numbers, even though it denied all allegations against the Appellant’s application but partially admitted to registering Vodafone number 0203618198 to the Appellant’s name in paragraph 11 of the Affidavit in Opposition which the 1st Respondent claim is only stage one of the registration. 1st Respondent further stated that stage one of the registration exercise can be done by any person who has access to the Ghana card, or the Ghana card number of any person and that stage two of the registration exercise is required to confirm full registration of a SIM number in the customer’s name.
The 2nd Respondent/Respondent/Respondent (hereinafter called ‘the 2nd Respondent’) also opposed the Appellant’s Application for Redress by filing 24-paragraphed Affidavit in Opposition on the 17th day of October 2023. 2nd Respondent claims that the Appellant’s claims are frivolous, unmeritorious scandalous, and an abuse of the court process because the Appellant did not show that he owns the right to the said property, nor did he demonstrate how his rights to enjoy the said property have been unduly interfered with.
The 3rd Respondent/Respondent /Respondent (hereinafter called ‘the 3rd
Respondent’) on the 10th day of November 2023 filed at 15-paragraphed Affidavit in Opposition to the Applicant’s Application for Redress. The 3rd Respondent argued that the Appellant neglected to avail himself to the 3rd Respondent’s Consumer Complaint Resolution Procedure Processes as laid under the Electronic Communication Regulations, 2011 (L.I. 1991) therefore the Appellant’s claims are frivolous, unmeritorious, scandalous, and an abuse of the court process. 3rd Respondent further asks the Court to order the Appellant to comply with the procedural requirements of L.I. 1991
The plaintiff, herein averred he is a citizen of Ghana and a Master of Law student at the University of Ghana, School of Law. He has been a customer of the 1st Respondent and has been operating several services with the 1st Respondent in telecommunications. To be able to maintain a registered SIM card, the plaintiff averred that he complied with the directives of the National Communication Authority. He averred further that the aim of this directive is to assist in curbing fraudulent activities and securing SIM card based transactions.
The plaintiff averred further that sometime on 2nd May 2023, he discovered that a vodafone number, 0203678198, was registered in his name by the 1st Respondent with his identity without his consent knowledge nor authorization. He also realized that on that same day, that number was registered as vodafone cash in his name with his identity without his consent, knowledge or authorization by the 1st Respondent.
It is his contention that the 1st Respondent does not have the power to use the applicant’s Biometric Data and identity to register the number 0203618198 and later decide to unregister the same number for him and by that act the 1st Respondent has interfered with his privacy of property. That the actions of the Respondents have not only breached his fundamental human rights but also put him in fear and apprehension. It is his plea that until the High Court grants his application, he will continue to live in fear and apprehension as he did not know what someone used his identity for.
The plaintiff averred also that the 2nd and 3rd Respondents who are the Principal Legal Advisor to the Government and Statutory body mandated to license and regulate electronic communication activities and services in the Country respectively have failed to protect him.
RESPONSE
The head of Rental and Partner support of the 1st Respondent company in response to the amended motion averred that the plaintiff’s application disclosed no cause of action against the 1st Respondent and that the 1st Respondent has not used the Biometric Data of the applicant for any purpose without the knowledge, consent and approval of the applicant.
She averred that the national SIM registration database is owned and managed by the National Communication Authority and that the 1st Respondent only acts as an agent in collecting the required data for users of Vodafone SIM numbers.
The 1st Respondent averred further that save that the SIM number 0203618198 was partially registered to the applicant’s name with his identity card, the 1st Respondent denies paragraph 10 of the affidavit in support. That prior to the commencement of the SIM Re-registration exercise by the government through the National Communication Authority in the year 2021, there were several “pre-registered” SIM numbers on the market.
The 1st Respondent aver further that no Biometric Data was required in registering SIM numbers prior to the commencement of the SIM registration exercise in year 2021.
JUDGMENT
The trial High Court delivered itself thus;-“Having heard the applicant, as well as counsel for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Respondents and in view of the applicant’s admission of not having filed any complaint for redress with 1st and 3rd Respondents, this court is of the view that the instant action is premature.
The action is dismissed as being premature: No costs will be awarded”
NOTICE OF APPEAL
The applicant dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court launched an appeal at the Court of Appeal on the following grounds;-
a. The learned trial judge erred in law when she held that the applicant’s application for redress under Article 33 of the 1992 Constitution was premature to be determined by the High Court.
b. The judgment is against the weight of evidence.
SUBMISSIONS
Ground A
Counsel referred the Court of Appeal to a plethora of cases that held that “impediments” ought not to be placed in the way of a citizen in the enforcement of his fundamental human rights. There is the need for citizens to be able to freely, and without the burden of undue technicalities, seek redress for flagrant violations of fundamental human rights. That the modern attitude of the courts is that as much as possible pleadings should not disable the doing of substantial justice.
See:- (i) AWUNI vrs WAEC [2003/4] 1 SCGLR 471
(ii) HANNA ASSI (NO.2) vrs. GIHOC REFRIGERATION [2007/8]
1 SCGLR 16.
Counsel submits that Order 67 Rule 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2004, (C.I.47) which forms, in essence, the Fundamental Human Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules in Ghana also provide that;-
“A person who seeks redress in respect of the enforcement of any fundamental human right in relation to the person under Article 33(1) of the Constitution shall submit an application to the High Court”.
Furthermore, it is provided by Article 140 (1) & (2) of the 1992 Constitution as follows;- “The High Court shall, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, have jurisdiction in all matters and in particular, civil and criminal matters and such original, appellate and other jurisdiction as may be conferred on it by this Constitution or any other law”. Counsel referred the court to the case of Awuni (supra) where the Supreme Court held; – “When Article 33(1) gives to a person alleging that any of his rights and freedoms under Chapter Five has been, is being or is likely to be contravened the right to apply to the High Court for redress, there is an irresistible presumption that such a person may invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court by way of an application rather than by way of a writ of summons. When Fundamental Human Rights have been, are being or is likely to be contravened, access to judicial redress must be as swift and timely as feasible to ensure that such rights or freedoms are not lost or irremediably damaged forever …” it is clear to me that article 33(1) seeks to assure, by making provision for access by an application rather than a writ of summons (a relatively sluggish process), is that such a complaint be disposed of by the High Court with the optimum dispatch…. the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 33(1) is a special one; and by clear constitutional stipulation, it may be invoked by an application” per Sophia Akuffo (JSC) AWUNI VRS WAEC (supra).
The combined effect of reading the various provisions of the Laws stated above shows clearly that there is no barrier that can prevent the Appellant who seeks to enforce his basic right under Article 18(2) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. The Fundamental Human Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules in Article 33 of the Constitution supported by Article 1(2), 12(1), 140 and Order 67 Rule 1 of the C.I. 47, and as established in the Supreme Court decisions manifest clearly, precisely, and unambiguously in their denotation that it is only in the High Court that the Appellant can seek refuge and no other way. Per the provisions of the Constitution stated above the High Court’s decision in the instant case is per incuriam. Again, per the provisions of above authorities mentioned, there is no doubt that the High Court cannot in any imagination rule that the Appellant’s Application for redress was premature and cannot be determined by the High Court. The trial Court is bound by the constitutional provisions and ratio decidendi mentioned above, therefore, the finding of the trial High Court is based on an erroneous proposition of law. It is my humble submission that this Honourable Court should set aside the trial Court’s decision so that Justice will prevail
RESPONSE (1ST RESPONDENT)
Counsel for the 1st Respondent in their response on this ground of appeal submits that on the day of the High Court ruling, the appellant admitted he never complained to the 1st and 3rd Respondent, the parties involved in the SIM registration exercise.
Counsel said under Section 97(1) of the Electronic Communications Act, 2008 (Act 775), the Minister responsible for electronic communications may on the advice of the 3rd Respondent make regulations in relation to;-
(e) Conditions under which claims and complaints of communications services subscribers or customers which are not satisfactorily resolved by the service provider may be submitted to the Authority, and the procedures to be applied by the Authority in handling the claims and complaints.
It is his submission that, the appellant never filed any complaint with the 1st Respondent for resolution when he made his alleged discovery on 2nd May 2023. That even in the absence of a filed complaint to the 1st Respondent, the appellant did not also lodge any complaint with the 3rd Respondent. It is their contention that the appellant did not apply himself to any of the internal grievance procedures provided by statute and proceeded straight to the High Court. Thus not giving the 1st Respondent any opportunity to know about the alleged interference with the appellant’s right to privacy under Article 18(2) of the Constitution, 1992.
Counsel submits that, the appellant cannot complain of interference with his right to privacy under Article 18(2) of the 1992 Constitution when he never complained to neither the 1st Respondent nor the 3rd Respondent for a resolution of his complaint. Counsel invited the Court of Appeal to dismiss this ground of appeal as unmeritorious.
On the part of the 2nd Respondent similar arguments were raised as that of 1st Respondent. The 3rd Respondent also went with the other Respondents for the need to exhaust internal mechanisms before proceeding to court even though his initial beef was that the appellant’s, formulation of the grounds of appeal were against the rules of the Court of Appeal.
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF APPEAL
The Court of Appeal held that the appellant’s formulation of the grounds of Appeal do not sin against the rules of the court. The court also dismissed the 3rd Respondent’s challenge that the appellant’s application for redress under Article 33 of the 1992 Constitution was premature to be determined by the High Court.
Ground 2
Did the High Court err when it held that the appellant first needed to subject this complaints to the “internal” dispute resolution mechanisms of the 1st and 3rd Respondent’s before proceeding to court? On this ground, the Court of Appeal held that the High Court erred when it held that the fundamental Human rights claim brought by the Appellant must first be resolved by the company that he alleged violated his rights and its regulator before he could proceed to court. That ground of appeal succeeded.
The Court of Appeal concluded that the Appellant did not present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his privacy rights have been violated by the 1st and 3rd Respondent’s. That having considered the totality of the evidence presented, the court concludes that the Appellant has not sufficiently demonstrated an infringement of his rights. Consequently, the appeal in substance, failed and was dismissed.
NOTICE OF APPEAL (SUPREME COURT)
The Appellant dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeal launched this appeal to this court on the following grounds:
i. The Court of Appeal erred in finding that the Appellant did not adduce sufficient evidence to demonstrate a violation of his right to privacy under Article 18(2) of the Constitution, 1992.
PARTICULARS OF MISDIRECTION OR ERROR OF LAW
a. The Court of Appeal failed to appreciate the Appellant’s exhibit EKG 2(1 and 2) as evidence, violating his right to privacy of property under Article 18(2) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.
b. The Court of Appeal has failed to appreciate the Appellant’s EKG 3(1 and 2) as evidence, violating his right to privacy of property under Article 18(2) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.
ii. The Judgment is against the weight of the evidence.
RELIEFS SOUGHT
a. Set aside the part of the judgment of the Court of Appeal mentioned in paragraph two (2) and in its place award that party in favour of the Applicant/Appellant/Appellant.
b. Any other order which the Supreme Court may deem most appropriate.
SUBMISSIONS
Ground I:
The Court of Appeal erred in finding that the Appellant did not adduce sufficient evidence to demonstrate a violation of his right to privacy under Article 18(2) of the Constitution, 1992:
PARTICULARS OF MISDIRECTION OR ERROR OF LAW
1. The Court of Appeal failed to appreciate the Appellant’s exhibit EKG 2(1 and 2) as evidence, violating his right to privacy of property under Article 18(2) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.
2. The Court of Appeal has failed to appreciate the Appellant’s EKG 3(1 and 2) as evidence, violating his right to privacy of property under Article 18(2) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.
Counsel for the Appellant in his submission said Art 33 (1) of the 1992 Constitution explicitly provides that where a person alleges a contravention of fundamental human rights, they “may apply to the High Court for redress” without prejudice to any other action that is lawfully available. Counsel said this provision, as interpreted in AWUNI vs. WAEC [2003/04] 1 SCGLR 471 is designed to ensure swift and timely access to judicial redress, recognizing the urgency and importance of protecting fundamental human rights.
Counsel submits further that the subsequent dismissal of the substantive appeal by the Court of Appeal on grounds of insufficient evidence, without a thorough consideration of the evidence presented, undermines the very principle of swift and effective redress that Article 33 of the 1992 Constitution seeks to guarantee. He posited that if access to court is readily granted, but the threshold for proving a violation is set impossibly high, then the constitutional guarantee of redress becomes illusory.
Counsel contends that the Court of Appeal erred in failing to find in favour of the Appellant on the substantive issue, given the evidence adduced and the constitutional imperative of protecting fundamental human rights.
RESPONSE (3RD RESPONDENT)
Counsel for the 3rd Respondent in response to this ground of appeal submits that the Appellant has not been able to demonstrate that the 3rd Respondent conducted itself in any manner contrary to the two stage process requirement they mentioned in their defence to warrant the reliefs against it. Counsel submits that Section 11 (4) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) provides that the burden of producing evidence requires a party to produce sufficient evidence so that on all the evidence a reasonable mind could conclude that the existence of the fact was more probable than its non-existence.
ANALYSIS
Burden of proof and persuasion:
The burden of proof and persuasion remained on the Plaintiff to prove conclusively on a balance of probabilities. This burden hereby shifts, unless and until the Plaintiff is able to produce evidence of relevant facts and circumstances from which it can be said that they had established their case, the burden remains on them. It is trite learning that by the statutory provisions of the Evidence Decree 1975 (NRCD 323), the burden of producing evidence in any given case is not fixed but shifts from party to party at various stages of the trial, depending on the issues asserted and or denied.
i. OSAE & OTHERS VS. ADJEIFIO & OTHERS [2008] 4 GM 149 – BROBBEY JSC
ii. IN RE ASHALLY BOTWE LANDS, ADJETEY AGBOSU & ORS. VRS. KOTEY & ORS [2003/04] 1 SCGLR 444.
The expression, “burden of persuasion” should be interpreted to mean the quality, quantum, amount, degree or extent of evidence the litigant is obligated to adduce in order to satisfy the requirement of proving a situation or fact – YORKWUAH VRS DUAH [1992/3] GBR 278.
A party who makes a positive assertion assumes the onus of proof. The party denying an allegation has no onus to prove the negative. The onus of proof will shift onto the later party after the one making a positive assertion has been able to establish that assertion and the ruling will go against the one making the negative assertion if he leads no evidence in rebuttal of the established positive averment. In most cases proof of the plaintiff’s case will have to be based on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the case of the defendant. The common law has always followed the common sense approach that the burden of persuasion or proving all facts essential to any claim lies on whoever is making the claim. Each party is responsible for adducing evidence that will prove their respective assertions.
What the rule literally means is that if a person goes to court to make an allegation, the onus is on him to lead evidence to prove that allegation unless the allegation is admitted. If he fails to do that, the ruling on that allegation will go against him. Stated more explicitly, a party cannot win a case in court if the case is based on an allegation which he fails to prove or establish.
This rule is further buttressed by Section 17(2) of the Evidence Act which states; – “Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of producing evidence of a particular fact is initially on the party with the burden of persuasion as to that fact”.
See OKUDJETO vrs. AG (NO.2) [2012] 2 SCGLR 867.
For purposes of clarity, I shall reproduce the statutory provision on the burden of proof as per the Evidence Act 1975 [NRCD 323].
Section 10—Burden of Persuasion Defined.
1. For the purposes of this Decree, the burden of persuasion means the obligation of a party to establish a requisite degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the court.
2. The burden of persuasion may require a party to raise a reasonable doubt concerning the existence or non-existence of a fact or that he establish the existence or non-existence of a fact by a preponderance of the probabilities or by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Section 11—Burden of Producing Evidence Defined.
(1) For the purposes of this Decree, the burden of producing evidence means the obligation of a party to introduce sufficient evidence to avoid a ruling against him on the issue.
(4) In other circumstances the burden of producing evidence requires a
party to produce sufficient evidence so that on all the evidence a reasonable mind could conclude that the existence of the fact was more probable than its non-existence.
Section 12—Proof by a Preponderance of the Probabilities.
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of persuasion requires proof by a preponderance of the probabilities.
“Preponderance of the probabilities” means that degree of certainty of belief in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the court by which it is convinced that the existence of a fact is more probable than its non-existence.
Section 14-Allocation of Burden of Persuasion.
Except as otherwise provided by law, unless and until it is shifted a party has the burden of persuasion as to each fact the existence or non-existence of which is essential to the claim or defence he is asserting.
It is pertinent to note that in civil proceedings, a party whose pleading raises an issue essential to the success of the case assumes the burden of proving such an issue, it was incumbent on the party to have produced admissible and credible evidence so as to avoid a ruling against him and the absence of that proof will attract or earn such a ruling. In effect that party does not go into the witness box to repeat his averments on oath but obligated to introduce or produce admissible, credible and cogent evidence to establish his allegation or assertion to convince the tribunal or the court the assertion is true. This obligation is dire, especially when the allegation is denied by the opponent. Failure to do so, the assertion is deemed not true.
See (i) Ababio vrs. Akwasi II [1994/5] GBR 11 174
(ii)Memuna Amoudy vrs. Kofi Antwi [2006] 3 MLER 183
The general principle of law is that it is the duty of a plaintiff to prove his case, that is he must prove what he alleges. In other words it is the party who raises in his pleadings an issue essential to the success of his case who assumes the burden of proving it. The burden only shifts to the defence to lead sufficient evidence to tip the scales in his favour when on a particular issue the plaintiff leads some evidence to prove his claim. If the defence succeeds in doing this he wins; if not he loses on that particular issue.
In the instant appeal, the appellant’s case is that the 1st Respondent breached his privacy under Article 18 of the 1992 Constituting of Ghana.
Article 18 states;-
(1) Every person has the right to own property either above or in association with others.
(2) No person shall be subjected to interference with the privacy of his home, property, correspondence or communication except in accordance with law and as may be necessary in a free and democratic society for public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the protection of health or morals, for the prevention of disorder or crime or for the protection of the rights or freedoms of others.
The appellant’s case briefly is that on 2nd May 2023 he realised that a Vodafone number which did not belong to him had been registered in his name with his identity, without his knowledge and consent by the 1st Respondent. He supported this assertion with exhibit ‘EK7’. The appellant again noted on 22nd May 2023, the number that was so registered in his name was no longer listed among the numbers registered in his name. From his words “I discover (sic) that the said vodafone number was taken away from my name without my consent, knowledge and authorization by the 1st Respondent.”
This, according to the appellant, constituted an interference with his “privacy of property” and a breach of his fundamental human rights, causing him “fear and apprehension”, hence this action, seeking his reliefs.
From the appellants originating motion filed, he had the burden of persuasion to establish the following allegations;-
i. Interference with his right of privacy of property and
ii. Fear and apprehension caused him by the 1st Respondent.
The Court of Appeal in its judgment delivered itself thus;-“Having considered the totality of the affidavit evidence before us, and the attachments thereto, we are of the considered view that the appellant did not present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his privacy rights had been violated by the 1st and 3rd Respondents” – [page 193 ROA]
The court went further that “the appellant failed to discharge the requisite burden of proof to establish that his privacy rights were indeed violated by the 1st and 3rd Respondents. Having considered the totality of the evidence presented, this court concludes that the appellant has not sufficiently demonstrated an infringement of his rights. Consequently, the appeal, in substance, fails and is dismissed”. [Page 194 of ROA]
The two lower courts, unfortunately shied away from dealing with the subject matter of the suit, and rather chose procedural rules and technicalities to dismiss the suite.
The Black’s law dictionary 8th Edition page 1350 defines “right of privacy” as the right of personal autonomy. The right of a person and the person’s property to be free from unwarranted public scrutiny or exposure.
It also defines “invasion of privacy” as unjustified exploitation of one’s personality or intrusion into one’s personal activities, actionable under tort law and sometimes under constitutional law.
The appellant based his action on Article 18(2) of the Constitution (supra). The burden of persuasion is on him to lead admissible and credible evidence to establish the interference with the privacy of his home, property, correspondence or communication except in accordance with law. The question here is whether the acts of the 1st Respondent constituted interference with the privacy of the appellant’s correspondence, communication or ownership of his private property and whether the appellant was able to lead any evidence to establish them. I say so because the 1st Respondent denied the allegation by the appellant and so the onus shifted onto the appellant who made the allegation to establish same as the legion of authorities dictate.
According to the evidence before us on the 2nd May 2023, the appellant found a telephone number registered in his name without his knowledge or consent. He reported this to the service provider and on the 22nd of May 2023 it was removed. How does the registration of the vodafone number and subsequent unregistration of the said number from the appellant’s records amount to an interference with this right to privacy of property? In the first place, which property of his has been interfered with? Assuming his own Vodafone number was given to another customer, who used same but in his name which was not the case in this appeal, that would have qualified for “identity theft” but certainly not interference of his right to privacy of property. The appellant no doubt failed to lead any evidence to establish the alleged interference with his privacy of property. Was the 1st Respondent reasonable in dealing with the situation? I say yes because they did the needful on receipt of the appellant’s complaint and within 20 days pulled down the number. This was within reasonable time. This phenomenon in telecommunication is known as “Notice and Takedown” and this occurs when a user makes a complaint to the service provider. It was obviously a mistake from one of their vendors. For better customer service, the 1st Respondent should have traced the vendor who committed the error, and officially apologize to the appellant which unfortunately they failed to do.
There was also no evidence on record that the ‘number’ was used to commit any crime nor used at all by any other person and that removes any suspicion of illegality surrounding the registration of the ‘number’. There is no evidence before this court that the Appellant had led any evidence to establish any harm, damages, fear and apprehension he suffered as a person from the mistaken issuance of that number in is name. Telecom numbers in most jurisdictions are not recognized as “personal property” in the legal sense, but as licensed assignments subject to regulatory conditions. Mobile number assignment disputes are generally treated as commercial or contractual matters depending on the terms of the contract entered into by the parties and not constitutional property rights.
There is no much case law on this exact combination of privacy/property complaints. Mobile phone number being treated as personal property and a telecom provider being sued for its removal, especially in the context of a constitutional privacy or property claim is rare. In our jurisdiction, there is no decision addressing assigned telecom numbers as “property” under human rights or constitutional law. No common law jurisdiction treats the removal of a mobile number as interference with a protected proprietary or privacy interest. Telephone numbers assigned by telecoms, SIM registration issues are not treated as property rights. Mobile phone numbers cannot be treated as property where a service provider’s removal was challenged as unlawful interference. A person, like the appellant in the instant appeal, cannot claim ownership of a mobile number and sue after its removal by a telecom provider on privacy or property grounds.
Cases concerning unlawful surveillance, SIM card registration, or forced data sharing, deal with broader privacy rights and State power are those dealt with as human right issues and not property rights in mobile numbers assigned by telecoms. The national numbering plan constitutes a regulatory resource established, controlled and managed by the designated regulatory authority. Telephone numbers assigned under this framework are allocated to service providers and end-users subject to defined administrative and contractual conditions. Such allocation confers only a right of use, which may be limited, suspended, or withdrawn in accordance with applicable regulatory or contractual terms. This right of use does not amount to a proprietary interest in law. It does not confer real or personal property rights capable of ownership, alienation or constitutional protection as private property. Accordingly a subscriber cannot assert a legal claim to ownership of a telephone number, nor can the assignment of a number be the basis of a claim for unlawful interference with property rights.
Since the appellant failed to lead any cogent evidence to support or establish his assertions, we are constrained but to affirm the Court of Appeal’s decision that the appellant failed to sufficiently demonstrate an infringement of his constitutional right. That ground is dismissed as unmeritorious.
GROUND II
The judgment is against the weight of evidence.
On this ground the Court of Appeal held that having considered the totality of the affidavit evidence before them, and the attachment thereto, there were of the considered view that the appellant did not lead sufficient evidence to establish his claim. We affirm the Court of Appeal’s decision on this ground and dismiss same as unmeritorious.
The Appeal is dismissed.
(SGD.) S. DZAMEFE
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
COUNSEL
APPLICANT/APPELLANT/APPELLANT IN PERSON
MARTIN AGYIN-SAMPONG ESQ. WITH EMMANUEL MURRAY FOR THE 1ST RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT.
YAW BERHENE BONSU ESQ. FOR THE 3RD RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT/
RESPONDENT WITH ADWOA FLETCHER ESQ. AND NANA AMOBEA ANTWI –LARBI ESQ.
