HIGH COURT, ACCRA
DATE: 5TH MARCH, 1962
BEFORE: OLLENNU, J.
CASE REFERRED TO
Allotey v. Abrahams (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 280
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from an order of Manya Krobo Local Court Aworworso ejecting respondent from certain land and putting the plaintiff in possession thereof.
COUNSEL
Plaintiff-respondent-applicant in person.
J. Quashie-Idun for E. N. P. Sowah for the defendant-appellant.
[p.138] of [1962] 1 GLR 136
JUDGMENT OF OLLENNU J.
[His lordship stated the facts as set out in the headnote and continued:] This application was made originally under regulation 93 of the Local Court Procedure Regulations, and the local magistrate appears to have entertained it upon the strength of that regulation, which reads: “A Local Court may in its discretion make any order within its powers and jurisdiction which it considers necessary for doing justice whether such order has been asked for by the party entitled to the benefit of the order or not, but in a civil cause judgment (save as to costs) shall not be given for a greater sum of money than that claimed in the particulars in the summons.”
It will be noticed that the said regulation 93 came under Part XII of the regulations, the part dealing with judgments and orders. From its very wording it is clear that the discretion given to the local court thereby can only be exercised when the said court is giving its decision in a cause or matter which is properly before it, that is to say in a civil cause commenced by summons or oath as provided in regulation 3 (1), or in a criminal cause instituted in manner provided by regulation 3 (2); and in a matter as provided in regulations 5 (a) and 88, that is to say in an interlocutory application made to the local court while a suit is pending before a local court and until it is finally disposed of in the local court; such jurisdiction is given to the local court by section 120 of Courts Act, 1960.1(1)
Once a local court has delivered final judgment or made final order in a cause or matter it becomes functus officio: it then has no jurisdiction even to review its decision or order save as to judgment given by default against a defendant, see regulation 96. The only applications a local court is empowered to entertain after final judgment or order are applications for the issue of execution in terms of the judgment or an order; the jurisdiction of the local court in that regard is conferred on it by section 118 of the Courts Act, 1960.
The manner in and procedure by which a local court can execute its judgment is laid down in Part XVIII of the Procedure Regulations, 1959. Now the only execution which can issue on the judgment of the Manya Krobo Native Court “A” delivered on March 6, 1956, is execution to enforce payment of the amount of £G15 damages for trespass and the £G13 16s. 0d. costs, a total of £G28 16s. 0d. That judgment did not decree recovery of possession of any land by the plaintiff or ejectment of the defendant from any land. Therefore the order of the local court that the defendant be ejected and the plaintiff placed in possession of land under writ of possession as provided by regulation 159 is ultra vires the local court, and is therefore null and void.
Again the jurisdiction of the local court under regulation 167 to make an order for injunction is strictly limited to interim injunctions; there is no section of the Courts Act which gives the local court jurisdiction to grant a perpetual injunction, and there is no regulation either which empowers it to make an order for perpetual injunction. The local court therefore has no jurisdiction to make an order for perpetual injunction. Consequently the order for perpetual injunction made by the local court in this matter is also null and void as being without jurisdiction: Allotey v. Abrahams.2(2) At a certain stage of the proceedings, the local magistrate appeared to regard the motion as a substantive suit brought in pursuance of a
[p.139] of [1962] 1 GLR 136
judgment which had made declaration of title in favour of the plaintiff in the former suit, hence he rejected the contention of the defendant that the matters complained of by the plaintiff could only come before the local court by a writ of summons issued in the proper way. In this respect the local magistrate misdirected himself. Firstly he erred in thinking that the judgment for damages for trespass could operate as res judicata in a subsequent claim for damages for trespass brought in respect of acts which are complained of as constituting fresh trespass; in other words he erred in thinking that a judgment for damages for trespass amounted to judgment for declaration of title; and secondly he misdirected himself in thinking that a civil suit or civil cause could be commenced by motion. Unlike the procedure which applied in the old native tribunals, the Procedure Regulations governing the local courts lay down only two methods by which a civil cause may be instituted or brought in a local court, that procedure is set out in regulation 3 (1) which says:
“3 (1) Every civil cause shall be commenced by:—
(a) a summons issued at the instance of the plaintiff, or
(b) Oath.”
Therefore insofar as the complaint before the local court was a cause, the same was not properly before the local court, it not having been commenced either by summons or by oath. The local court therefore was not properly seized of it, and should not have entertained it.
It is for these reasons that I allow the appeal and set aside the order of the local court including its order as to costs.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
