HIGH COURT, ACCRA
DATE: 24TH APRIL 1962
BEFORE: OLLENNU, J.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
ACTION for damages for wrongful dismissal.
COUNSEL
E.N.P. Sowah for the plaintiff.
I. Amoo-Lamptey for the defendants.
JUDGMENT OF OLLENNU J.
The plaintiff, a quantity surveyor by profession, was employed by the defendant-company upon a written agreement, exhibit A, dated the 4th July, 1960, for a period of eighteen months, expiring on the 31st March, 1962. His said appointment was terminated by the defendant-company by letter dated the 16th February, 1962, with effect from the 23rd February, 1962. The plaintiff contends that he was wrongfully dismissed, he has therefore instituted this action claiming (1) a declaration that he is entitled to ownership and possession of a Jaguar motor car No. AG 8501, and (2) damages for wrongful dismissal.
There are two clauses in the contract of employment exhibit A which deal with the car No. AG 8501.
They are clauses 4 and 5. Clauses 4 provides, inter alia: “The employee after successfully completing his 18 months contract with the Company shall take possession of the car AG 8501, but if resigning within this period the Employee shall surrender the car to the Company”.
and clause 5 provides that: “Upon the termination of this contract the Company shall pay the outstanding balance of the purchase price of the said car to the Employee in order to obtain full possession of the car No. AG 8501”.
The provisions in clause 4 of the contract are not applicable, the contract not having determined by effluxion of time, and the plaintiff not having resigned. Clause 5 however applies, since, rightly or wrongly, the defendant-company have terminated the employment of the plaintiff. It is my view that the plaintiff is entitled to some relief or other with respect to the car, depending upon whether or not his dismissal is justified. The main
[p.288] of [1962] 1 GLR 287
question in the case therefore is whether or not the defendant-company were justified in terminating the employment of the plaintiff. If the dismissal of the plaintiff is justified certain consequences will follow; if it is wrongful other consequences will follow.
In their letter of termination of the plaintiff’s appointment the defendant-company assigned as their reason conduct of the plaintiff which is contrary to their policy as building contractors and which is contrary to public policy.
The defendant-company are building contractors. As admitted by the plaintiff, their business is confined mainly to performing government contracts. That being the case any act or conduct of an officer of the defendants’ which is calculated or which has a tendency to offend the government is bound to jeopardise the interest of the company. But apart altogether from the defendant-company being contractors for the government, any act or conduct of an employee or an individual or institution, whether that employee be a citizen or non-citizen, which has the tendency of raising a false alarm relating to the security of the state, financial or otherwise, is one which any employer who comes to know of it, is under a civil duty not only to discourage but to take active steps to frustrate and nip in the bud. If the employer knowing of such conduct and steps being taken, just ignores it or winks at it, he would certainly be an accessory to the act or conduct, and if, not being checked, it spreads and eventually paralyses or otherwise adversely affects the interest of the state, the people and the institutions in the country including the employee himself will be affected.
Now by a letter exhibit 1 dated the 22nd January, 1962, the plaintiff requested the defendant-company to pay to him an amount of £G1,249. Of that amount £G625 represents three months leave-pay which would not be due to plaintiff until after March, i.e. for the months of April to June, 1962, and £G624 represents air passages which would not have come into the pocket of the plaintiff and which the defendant-company would have had to pay to one airways company or the other. The plaintiff stated the purpose of his request as follows: “…. requested now in order to transfer home before possible extra financial restrictions imposed (as strongly rumoured in about 4 weeks time)”. In other words, the plaintiff requested the defendant-company to aid and abet him to evade financial restrictions which the stability of the Ghana nation might necessitate. In my opinion the plaintiff by that letter, exhibit 1, proved himself insincere and dishonest in the business of his employers, and towards the management of the company, not to mention the state generally. In those circumstances I think that the defendant-company were justified in terminating the employment of the plaintiff in order to frustrate his unpatriotic plans.
Now since his dismissal is lawful, all the relief the plaintiff would be entitled to as far as the car No. AG 8501 is concerned is that the defendant-company should pay to him the outstanding balance of the purchase price and take the car as provided in clause 5 of the agreement exhibit A. But there is no evidence before the court that any balance of the purchase price of the car was outstanding at the date of the termination of the plaintiff’s employment, and if there were, whether or not that balance has been paid by the defendant-company to the plaintiff or to the company from whom the car was purchased. In those circumstances the court cannot make any order in favour of the plaintiff, for the payment of any sum to him.
[p.289] of [1962] 1 GLR 287
The plaintiff’s claim is dismissed and judgment entered thereon for the defendant-company with costs fixed at 15 guineas inclusive.
DECISION
Action dismissed.
