SUPREME COURT, ACCRA
DATE: 12TH OCTOBER, 1962
BEFORE: VAN LARE, OLLENNU and AKUFO-ADDO, JJ.S.C.
Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960, reads as follows: “When a person is charged with stealing anything and it is proved that he received the thing knowing the same to have been stolen, he may be convicted of receiving, although he was not charged with that offence.” The emphasis in that section is on the clause: it is proved that he received the thing knowing the same to have been stolen. With that emphasis, we think that before a court should resort to the powers given it in the said section, it must be satisfied that the prosecution failed to prove the charge of stealing, but that there is, however, evidence from which it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused person received the subject-matter of the charge knowing that it was stolen, or that the circumstances under which he received it are such that he should know that it must have been stolen or unlawfully obtained. Therefore, a decision by a court to exercise its powers under the section at once calls for a judgment containing a clear statement of the points for determination, and the reasons for the decision to which the judge came on those points.
In this case, therefore, the learned circuit judge should have written such a judgment and not merely have recorded a conviction. Moreover, since this was a trial with assessors, the circuit judge was under an obligation to comply with the mandatory provisions of section 287 (2) which direct that after the assessors have given their opinion.
“The Judge shall then give judgment, and in so doing shall not be bound to conform with the opinions of the assessors, but he shall record his judgment in writing and in every case the judgment shall contain the point or points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision, and shall be dated and signed by the Judge at the time of pronouncing it.”
This court has on several occasions emphasized the need for compliance with these mandatory provisions. In Commissioner of Police v. Asamoah (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 458 at p. 459 the Court of Appeal stated the principle governing this matter as follows: “In our view reasons for a decision are necessary where there is a conviction unless the reason is so clearly obvious and beyond doubt that guilt can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case.
If, however, in any case the reason for a decision is not so obvious to an appellate court then the trial court has erred in not recording its reason. We should remember that what may appear obvious to a magistrate or a judge may not appear to be so to the public. Nobody likes a decision against him, more especially in a criminal matter, if it is given summarily without a reason.”
[p.107] of [1962] 2 GLR 106
And in its judgment in Mensah and Ankrah v. The State [1961] G.L.R. 64, this court said among other things, that failure to comply with those provisions of the section is inexcusable, and make a conviction bad.
(The State v. Andoh, van Lare, Ollennu and Akufo-Addo, JJ.S.C. Judgment of the court delivered by Ollennu, J.S.C.).
