Division: HIGH COURT, ACCRA
Date: 10 JULY 1974
Before: ABBAN J
CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Yeboah v. Boateng VII [1963] 1 G.L.R. 182, S.C.
(2) Glinski v. McIver [1962] A C. 726; [1962] 2 W.L.R. 832; 106 S.J. 261; [1962] 1 All E.R. 696, H.L.
(3) Aubin v. Ehunaku [1960] G.L.R. 167, C.A.
(4) Tewari v. Singh (1908) 24 T.L.R. 884, PC.
(5) Brown v. Hawkes [1891] 2 Q.B. 718; 60 L.J.Q.B. 332; affirmed [1891] 2 Q.B. 725; 61 L.J.Q.B. 151; 7 T.L.R. 607, C.A.
(6) Malz v. Rosen [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1008; 110 S.J. 332; [1966] 2 All E. R. 10.
(7) Savile v. Roberts (1698) 1 Ld. Raym. 374; 1 Salk 13; 3 Salk 16.
(8) Berry v. British Transport Commission [1962] 1 Q.B. 306; [1961] 3 W.L.R. 450; [1961] 3 All E.R. 65; 105 S.J. 587, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
ACTION by the plaintiff for damages for malicious prosecution. The facts are set out fully in the judgment.
COUNSEL
W. K. Achiampong for the plaintiff.
Dr. M. Okyere-Boateng for the defendant.
JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J
The action is for the recovery of 010,000.00 as damages for malicious prosecution. The parties come from a town called Maase near Tafo in the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Area. At the time the cause of action arose, the plaintiff was the mankrado of that town.
In or about 1968, the plaintiff and some elders of the town preferred destoolment charges against the chief of the town before the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council. The chief failed to appear before the said council to answer the charges, and he was declared destooled by the council. On appeal by the chief to the then Chieftaincy Secretariat (which
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at that time had appellate jurisdiction in chieftaincy matters) the judgment of the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council was set aside, and a retrial was ordered. The said decision of the Chieftaincy Secretariat was published in the Ghana Gazette.
Owing to the constitutional dispute, the town of Maase had become divided into two opposing factions. One faction was in favour of the destoolment of the chief, and the other was against the said destoolment. The plaintiff was the leader of the faction which was bent on destooling the chief, while the defendant was one of the principal advisers and supporters of the chief.
It seems the decision of the Chieftaincy Secretariat, referred to above, was published on Friday 3 May 1968, and it became known to some of the people in the town, including the parties herein, on Saturday 4 May 1968. The plaintiff said on the next day, Sunday 5 May 1968, in the early hours of the morning at about 5.30 a.m., one Opanyin Kwasi Marfo called at the plaintiff ‘s house. The purpose of the visit was to find out from the plaintiff how and when the funeral rites of their relative, who had been buried on the previous day, were going to be performed. After the plaintiff and Opanyin Kwasi Marfo had discussed the subject for some time, they decided to go and see one Kwame Sei, another relative of theirs, for the final decision. But before they left the plaintiff s house, they heard a noise which indicated that there was fighting going on in the town.
When they came out of the house, the plaintiff found that fighting had broken out between the plaintiff s supporters and those of the chief. The plaintiff attempted to separate those engaged in the fight; but when he realised that the fighting was fierce, and it was becoming dangerous, he hired a lorry to take him to Tafo Police Station to make a report. It may be observed that because of the destoolment charges pending against the chief of the town, the chief had been suspended and the plaintiff, as the mankrado, had been appointed by the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council to act as the regent.
At Tafo Police Station, the plaintiff asked the inspector-in-charge to send policemen to the town of Maase to restore order. Incidentally, Opanyin Kwasi Marfo, who had been with the plaintiff since 5.30 a.m. that day, accompanied the plaintiff to Tafo Police Station. The inspector agreed to despatch some of his men to Maase as requested by the plaintiff; but while the policemen were making preparations to go along with the plaintiff, the defendant also arrived at the police station. In the presence of the plaintiff, the defendant told the inspector-in-charge that the plaintiff had threatened to kill the defendant. The defendant then demanded that the inspector should arrest and charge the plaintiff.
The plaintiff denied the defendant’s said complaint as false and contended that he had not even seen the defendant that day. But the defendant insisted that the complaint was true. Consequently, the plaintiff was taken into custody by the inspector and put behind the counter at the charge office. The plaintiff was then asked to find someone, apart from his companion Opanyin Marfo, to stand bail for him.
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On that day, 5 May 1968, the plaintiff was kept in the said police station until very late in the afternoon when one Agyapong from Tafo was allowed to bail the plaintiff. The plaintiff was later charged with threatening the defendant with unlawful harm, contrary to section 74 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29). He was put before the district court grade II, holden at Kibi. The plaintiff, having pleaded not guilty, was tried and eventually he was acquitted and discharged. The plaintiff contended in the present action that the prosecution was maliciously brought about by the defendant and that there was no justification for it.
The defendant did not dispute that the plaintiff was arrested and charged with the offence of threatening the defendant with unlawful harm. The defendant averred that on Sunday, 5 May 1968, he was sent for by the chief of the town of Maase. The defendant left his house at about 6.30 a.m. to attend the chief s call. In the house of the obaapanyin, the defendant met the chief sitting among the following persons, namely, Wiafe Dankwa, the obaapanyin, Kwasi Agyekum and Kwabena Ansah. All those persons, including the defendant, were the principal supporters of the chief in the constitutional dispute. On the defendant’s arrival a copy of the Gazette which contained the decision of the Chieftaincy Secretariat, already referred to, was produced by Wiafe Dankwa who was the brother of the chief. It was read and explained to the effect that the chief had won his appeal from the decision of the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council.
Everybody at the gathering rejoiced at the hearing of the contents of that Gazette, and the chief immediately invited certain persons to play the drums at the chief ‘s palace to celebrate the occasion. After jubilation, the drummers stopped playing; and so the defendant took leave of the chief. But when the defendant came out of the obaapanyin’s house, the defendant saw the plaintiff with a crowd entering the chief s palace. Fighting then ensued between the plaintiff s supporters and those of the chief. The defendant did not go near the place where the fighting took place, but he went away to his house. Later the defendant left his house for that of his wife. By that time the fighting had ceased. When the defendant got to his wife’s house, he found that his wife was not in, so he decided to go back to his own house. The defendant said when he reached the front part of his house, he met some women, Adjowa Sarpomaah and Abena Dade (his first and second witnesses) and two other women, standing in front of the defendant’s said house.
The defendant joined those women and while they were, apparently, engaged in conversation the defendant saw the plaintiff coming from the outskirts of the town; and that was between 8.30 a.m. and 9.00 a.m. The defendant contended that when the plaintiff got to the spot where he and the women were standing, the plaintiff threatened to kill or maim the defendant. According to the defendant, after the plaintiff had uttered those threatening words, the defendant demanded from the plaintiff the reason for wanting to kill the defendant; and the plaintiff replied that it was because the defendant had been financing the chief in the constitutional dispute and had been telling a lot of lies to the chief.
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After some altercation, the defendant went and stood on the steps of his house, opened his door and invited the plaintiff to enter the defendant’s house to do the killing. The plaintiff refused to enter the house and left the scene; but the plaintiff went back to the front part of the defendant’s house at 1.00 p.m. again, to threaten the defendant with unlawful harm. Because of the threats the defendant stayed indoors throughout the whole day; and on the next day, which was Monday, 6 May 1968, the defendant said he went to Tafo Police Station to lodge a complaint of threat against the plaintiff, and in due course the plaintiff was charged and prosecuted before the district court. The defendant was the principal witness for the prosecution.
The evidence of the witnesses for the parties will be discussed later. However, on the evidence of the plaintiff and the defendant it is clear that as a result of the accusation which the defendant made against the plaintiff, the plaintiff was arrested, charged and prosecuted for threatening to kill the defendant and that the prosecution ended in the acquittal of the plaintiff. But the most important questions are, whether the prosecution was without reasonable and probable cause, whether the defendant was actuated by malice and, finally, whether the plaintiff in consequence of the said prosecution, suffered any damage? The plaintiff will only succeed if the answers to these questions are in the affirmative. In Yeboah v. Boateng VII [1963] 1 G.L.R. 182 at p. 185, S.C. Azu Crabbe J.S.C. (as he then was) said:
“The first duty of a plaintiff in an action for malicious prosecution is to prove that the defendant instituted criminal proceedings against him or was actively instrumental in putting the law in force against him in proceedings which terminated in his favour. But proof of this fact alone will not avail him unless he proves further that the defendant acted without reasonable and probable cause and was guilty of malice. Lastly, the plaintiff must prove that he suffered damage as a result of the prosecution.”
What then is the meaning of “reasonable and probable cause?” It seems the court may hold that there was reasonable and probable cause where it is found that the defendant honestly believed in the truth of the charge which was preferred, and if also there were sufficient grounds or circumstances which could have led any ordinary prudent and cautious man to conclude that the plaintiff was probably guilty. The defendant need not believe in the probability of conviction: see Glinski v. Melver [1962] 1 All E.R. 696 at pp. 714-715, H.L.
In the instant case, if it is true that the plaintiff did threaten to kill or maim the defendant, then the defendant must have had reasonable and probable cause for making the complaint, and the fact that the plaintiff was acquitted of the charge would be immaterial. Because, in those circumstances there would be sufficient grounds for the defendant, or any reasonable person in the position of the defendant, to think that the plaintiff was probably guilty of the offence charged. But was the defendant
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in fact threatened with unlawful harm by the plaintiff on the said Sunday, 5 May 1968 or on any other occasion?
The defendant, in his evidence, said he went to Tafo Police Station on Monday 6 May 1968, to lodge his complaint against the plaintiff, and it was thereafter that the plaintiff was arrested. There were conflicts as to whether the plaintiff was arrested by the police at Maase or at Tafo Police Station. The plaintiff in the earlier abortive trial said he was arrested at Maase and sent to Tafo Police Station. In the present proceedings he said he was arrested at Tafo Police Station. It appears the plaintiff was arrested on two occasions, one in connection with the complaint made by the defendant, and the other as a result of the fighting which took place between the supporters of the chief and those of the plaintiff. I think in giving evidence in the earlier abortive trial, the plaintiff must have confused his arrest in respect of the fighting (which arrest seemed to have taken place at Maase) with his arrest for the alleged crime of threat. All the same, the fact still remained that the plaintiff was arrested on the morning of Sunday 5 May 1968.
In any event, I am of the view that the plaintiff ‘s evidence that he was arrested at Tafo Police Station was the correct version. I have examined and weighed the evidence, and I find that the defendant went to Tafo Police Station in the morning of the said Sunday 5 May to make the complaint and not on Monday 6 May as alleged by the defendant. At the time the defendant was lodging his complaint, the plaintiff and Opanyin Marfo, the plaintiff s second witness, were already in that police station. The plaintiff and his said witness, in fact, left Maase for Tafo Police Station in the morning of the said Sunday for the purpose of reporting to the police the fighting which was then taking place in the town. It was while the inspector-in-charge of the police station was preparing to send some of his men to go along with the plaintiff to Maase to restore order that the defendant also arrived at the said police station and reported to the inspector that the plaintiff had threatened to kill the defendant.
I further find that when the plaintiff denied the defendant’s accusation as false, the said inspector became rather doubtful about the genuineness of the complaint, and he did not seem anxious and prepared to take action on the complaint. It was only after the defendant had threatened to take the matter further to the superior officers of the inspector in Koforidua and in Accra that the inspector gave in to the defendant’s demand and caused the plaintiff to be taken into custody.
It is therefore clear to me that the plaintiff was at Tafo Police Station on that Sunday, 5 May at about 7.00 a.m. The defendant said the first threat was made by the plaintiff between 8.30 a.m. and 9.00. a.m., and the second threat took place at 1.00 p.m. I think these allegations were false. The defendant did not see the plaintiff in the town of Maase that Sunday morning at all. That is, on that Sunday morning before the plaintiff left for Tafo Police Station, the plaintiff never saw or met the defendant. The plaintiff ‘s first meeting with the defendant on that Sunday was at the Tafo Police Station, and as I have said, the plaintiff was at the police station
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from about 7.00 a.m. and did not leave the place until late in the afternoon, and he went back to Maase in the evening.
It was also contended by the defendant that the threats were made to him in front of the defendant’s house and in the presence of Adjowa Sarpomaah and Abena Dade. There were conflicts in the evidence of these witnesses as to how all of them came to the front part of the defendant’s said house. Adjowa Sarpomaah, the defendant’s first witness, said she did not see those who took part in the fight. She had been out that morning to search for her son. She could not find the son and when she was returning to her house she saw Abena Dade, the defendant’s second witness, in front of the defendant’s house, and the defendant was, at that time about to enter his house.
In other words, Adjowa Sarpomaah met the defendant and Abena Dade standing in front of the defendant’s house. This was denied by Abena Dade who categorically stated that on that morning she walked with Adjowa Sarpomaah and when the two of them got to the defendant’s house they stood in front of that house. Abena Dade further said it was while she and Sarpomaah were standing in front of the defendant’s house that they saw the defendant and the defendant’s wife walking together towards the defendant’s house. The defendant and his wife, then joined Abena Dade and Adjowa Sarpomaah and the four of them stood in front of the defendant’s house, and they conversed for some time before the plaintiff emerged to issue out his threats to the defendant.
The defendant, on the contrary, said when he went to his wife’s house, he did not find his wife and so he left for his own house walking alone. The question then is why should Abena Dade contend that the defendant walked with his wife towards the defendant’s house, while the defendant, according to him, never walked with his wife that morning? Why did Abena Dade say she walked with Adjowa Sarpomaah to the defendant’s house and why should Adjowa Sarpomaah deny having walked together with Abena Dade to the defendant’s house?
My impression is that on that Sunday morning these two women and the defendant never gathered in front of the defendant’s house at all, and they never witnessed any incident in which the plaintiff threatened to kill or maim the defendant. Their story was a fabrication. These two women are the defendant’s relations. Yet, in the course of their respective evidence they made a conscious effort to hide that fact from the court. Unfortunately for them, the defendant gave them away by admitting that they were related to him. I think these women denied their connection with the defendant in order to create the false impression that they were truly independent witnesses. It is interesting to note that they also belonged to the defendant’s faction which supported the chief in the constitutional dispute.
The evidence of Kwaku Kwampah, the defendant’s third witness, had nothing to do with the threat. Kwaku Kwampah was another supporter of the chief. He took active part in the fight and as a result he was charged and put before the district court for causing a breach of the peace. In his
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evidence, he admitted he pleaded guilty to the said charge and was accordingly convicted. He, however, alleged that the plaintiff was among those who engaged in the said fight, but I do not believe it. The plaintiff might have gone to the scene where the fighting was going on with a view to separating the combatants but he never joined in the fight, and could not therefore have injured Kwampah as alleged by the defendant and Kwampah.
In my considered opinion, the charge of threat which was levelled against the plaintiff by the defendant was false and groundless. The defendant gave a dishonest and intentionally lying account about the plaintiff to the police, and he had no genuine belief in the guilt of the plaintiff. I also find that the defendant misled the Tafo police by bringing suborned witnesses, Adjowa Sarpomaah and Abena Dade, to support the charge. By this unlawful conduct the defendant was able to prevail upon the said police to help the defendant to send the plaintiff, an innocent man, for trial.
It was submitted by Dr. Okyere-Boateng, counsel for the defendant, that the defendant merely gave information to the police and the police in their discretion prosecuted the plaintiff. Learned counsel relied on the case of Aubin v. Ehunaku [1960] G.L.R. 167, C.A. The shorter answer to this submission is that the fact that it was the police who preferred the charge and actually conducted the prosecution is neither here nor there. The case of Aubin v. Ehunaku (supra) cannot assist the defendant. The facts of that case are that during the hearing of a civil suit in the native court, one Twi, the co-defendant in that case, died. Aubin applied to be substituted for Twi (deceased). Aubin supported his application with a document purported to have been executed by the head and principal members of Twi’s family, authorising Aubin to represent that family. Ehunaku, the defendant in that suit, challenged the genuineness of the thumbprints on the said document by means of a motion supported by an affidavit.
The native court, on its own initiative, referred the matter to the police for investigation. After investigation, Aubin was charged and prosecuted for forgery. In the course of the trial the police applied to withdraw the charge, and Aubin was accordingly discharged. Aubin then sued Ehunaku in the High Court for malicious prosecution. Judgment was given against Ehunaku but the said judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal (Korsah C.J., van Lare and Granville Sharp JJ.A.) held as appears in the headnote that “for an action for malicious prosecution to lie against a defendant it must have been the defendant who instituted the prosecution,” but in that case the prosecution was instituted “by the police, after they had enquired into matters referred to them by the native court.” There is no similarity between the case of Aubin v. Ehunaku and the present case. It ought to be borne in mind that Ehunaku did not go out of his way to the police to make any complaint against Aubin. It was the native court which, in the exercise of its discretion, reported the alleged forgery to the police and requested them to investigate and to take the necessary action. So that Ehunaku could not be held liable for
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the outcome of the step which the native court took. At pp. 168—169 of the report, Korsah C.J. clearly emphasized this point. The learned judge said:
“In the instant case, all that the defendant is said to have done is to have made a candid statement of alleged facts. The statement was contained in an affidavit sworn by him in support of a motion which he had filed with respect to an application made by the plaintiff in a suit then pending before a native court. The latter was constituted by a panel of members who may be considered to have been exercising jurisdiction analogous to that of a magistrate. The presiding panel of their own motion forwarded the affidavit to the police, and it was the police who (after investigation) instituted criminal prosecution against the plaintiff. Defendant is not responsible for the consequences of any step which the panel, in exercise of their discretion, thought fit to take upon defendant’s affidavit.”
In the case herein, it was the defendant who went to the police to accuse the plaintiff, and it was the defendant who was in fact actively instrumental in putting the law in motion against the plaintiff. Upon the whole circumstances of this case, I find that the defendant herein was in reality the prosecutor and that he initiated the proceedings without reasonable and probable cause. The following words of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Tewari v. Singh (1908) 24 T.L.R. 884, P.C. seem to me entirely apposite to the present case:
“But, if the charge was false to the knowledge of the complainant, if he misled the police by bringing suborned witnesses to support it, if he influenced the police to assist him in sending an innocent man for trial before the magistrate, it would be equally improper to allow him to escape liability because the prosecution had not technically been conducted by him.”
The next question is, was the defendant actuated by malice? The burden of proving malice lies on the plaintiff and it can be proved, as stated in Brown v. Hawkes [1891] 2 Q.B. 718 at p. 722:
“[E]ither by showing what the motive was and that it was wrong, or by showing that the circumstances were such that the prosecution can only be accounted for by imputing some wrong or indirect motive to the prosecutor.”
It therefore appears that where the defendant had an honest belief in the accusation made, for the plaintiff to succeed, the plaintiff will have to produce some independent evidence of malice and he cannot rely on the absence of reasonable cause as evidence of malice; and that independent evidence must tend to show that “although the defendant thought the plaintiff was guilty, yet in preferring the charge he was not acting upon that view but from some indirect motive”: see Brown v. Hawkes [1891] 2 Q.B. 725 at p. 726, C.A.
On the other hand, if it is established that the defendant, when he instituted the prosecution, had no genuine or honest belief in the charge,
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as in the presence case, then malice may properly and reasonably be inferred from the want of reasonable and probable cause: see Malz v. Rosen [1966] 2 All E.R. 10 at pp. 13—14, where Diplock L.J. (sitting as an additional judge of the Queen’s Bench Division) said:
“Glinski v. McIver [1962] 1 All E.R. 696 was a case in which a police officer was the defendant, but in the case of an ordinary citizen the law, I am confident, is that if such a citizen goes to the police, gives them an honest and reasonably accurate account of an event which has occurred and is advised by someone appearing to be a responsible police officer that that constitutes a particular offence, then, if the ordinary citizen bona fide believes that advice, he has a complete defence to an action for malicious prosecution. If on the other hand, he goes to the police with an account which he knows to be untrue, then not only has he no reasonable or possible ground for the prosecution but also that fact in itself would be strong evidence of the ingredient of malice necessary for a successful action for malicious prosecution.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
As I have already found, the defendant herein never really believed in the truth of the charge and there was absence of reasonable and probable cause, and from that fact I hold that there was malice on the part of the defendant. In any case, I find that the plaintiff was able to produce independent evidence which clearly showed that the defendant was actuated by improper and indirect motive. To be precise, the defendant was animated by a desire for vengeance, simply because the plaintiff was the leader of the faction which was bent on destooling the chief whom the defendant was supporting. The evidence of George Asamoah, the plaintiff s first witness, clearly bears this out.
Asamoah said in the evening of Saturday, 4 May 1968, he came across the defendant, the defendant s wife and two other persons standing near the defendant’s house. Asamoah overheard the defendant telling the wife and the said two persons that he was going to find ways and means of getting the plaintiff into trouble, now that the chief had won his appeal against the decision of Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council which had declared the chief destooled. Asamoah then and there confronted the defendant and told the defendant that he, Asamoah, was going to inform the plaintiff about what the defendant had said. The defendant did not have any regret for the statement he had made, but he boastfully said he was not afraid of the plaintiff and that Asamoah could go ahead and report what the defendant had said to the plaintiff.
The defendant halfheartedly denied that portion of Asamoah’s evidence; and one would have thought that apart from his denial, the defendant would call his wife to testify on his behalf if the evidence of Asamoah was not true. Surprisingly, the defendant did not. I do not find any reason grudge against the defendant and whose why Asamoah (who had no niece is married to the defendant and he is therefore related to the defendant by marriage) should tell the court something which the defendant had never said.
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I accept the evidence of Asamoah and I find that before the said Sunday, 5 May 1968, the defendant had already been possessed of vindictive feelings towards the plaintiff and had determined to inflict injury on the plaintiff. It was in pursuance of that wicked objective that the defendant, on the said Sunday, 5 May went to the police at Tafo to make that baseless complaint against the plaintiff. I therefore hold that the defendant, in initiating the prosecution of the plaintiff, was actuated by malice and not by a genuine desire to bring the plaintiff to justice.
The magistrate who tried the criminal ease seemed to have sensed, right from the beginning of the trial, the frivolous and vexatious nature of the charge. Because, according to page 1 of exhibit A, on the first day the plaintiff was put before the court, the said magistrate readily and unhesitatingly admitted the plaintiff to bail in the plaintiff s own recognizance and on signing a bond for twenty cedis, a comparatively meagre sum for such a serious crime which carried a sentence of imprisonment for three years: see section 74 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), and section 296 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30).
I finally come to the “damage” requirement of malicious prosecution. In the classical case of Savile v. Roberts (1698) 1 Ld. Raym. 374, Holt C.J. laid down three heads of damage, namely, damage to reputation and credit, damage to life or liberty, and damage to a man’s property as where he is compelled to expend his money in necessary expenses to acquit himself of the crime of which he is accused. Proof of any of these three types of damage would be sufficient to ground an action: see Berry v. British Transport Commission [1962] 1 Q.B. 306 at p. 318, C.A. where Devlin L.J. (as he then was) said: “The claim is for malicious prosecution and therefore cannot be sustained without proof of damage under one of the three heads enumerated by Holt C.J. in Savile v. Roberts.”
I think the plaintiff herein suffered all the three types of damage. That the plaintiff expended money by way of costs on his defence cannot be over emphasized. When the destoolment charges against the chief were pending before the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council, the chief was suspended by the said council and the plaintiff, as the mankrado, was appointed to act as the regent pending the outcome of the constitutional dispute. It can therefore be seen that the plaintiff was a person who was held in high esteem, not only in the town of Maase but also in the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Area. In my view, there was a measure of damage to that high esteem as a result of the scandalous charge which was preferred against the plaintiff. Any reasonable man, hearing of those criminal proceedings brought against the plaintiff, would definitely form the view that they were a damaging reflection on the “fair fame” of the plaintiff.
Indeed, the prosecution did not only naturally and necessarily involve damage to the plaintiff s reputation, but also damage to his status as a chief or as an occupant of the mankrado stool. Azu Crabbe J.S.C. (as he then was) made this clear in his judgment in Yeboah v. Boateng VII (supra). In that case the plaintiff who was the Paramount Chief of Kwahu successfully sued the defendants in the High Court for damages for malicious prosecution. On appeal, the then Supreme Court affirmed the
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decision of the High Court. Azu Crabbe J.S.C. (as he then was) in delivering the judgment of the court, at p. 194 of the report, observed: “There is no doubt in my mind that the prosecution brought by the appellants was one likely to damage the fair fame and dignity of a paramount chief.”
Furthermore, the plaintiff was put in danger of losing his liberty, for if he had been convicted of the said charge he could have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The prosecution must therefore have caused the plaintiff considerable inconvenience and anxiety. In the circumstances, I think it is fair and reasonable that I should award the plaintiff 02,800. 00 as general damages.
As regards special damages, I find that the plaintiff paid 0400.00 to his counsel as the counsel’s professional fee in conducting the plaintiff s defence in the criminal prosecution. In all, the said counsel put in eight appearances and since counsel had to travel from Accra, the plaintiff on each occasion paid 020.00 towards counsel’s transport expenses. The plaintiff claimed 03.10 as expenses he made on his own transport and 03.20 as the cost of the food he ate when he attended court. But he never led evidence to substantiate those claims; and I hold that the legitimate expenses which the plaintiff incurred by way of defence in the criminal proceedings amounted to 0560.00, and he is entitled to recover that amount as special damages.
Judgment will therefore be entered for the plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of 03,360. 00 with costs assessed at 0350. 00.
DECISION
Judgment for the plaintiff with costs.
S. E. K.
