IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE SUPREME COURT
ACCRA – A. D. 2026
CORAM: PWAMANG JSC (PRESIDING)
LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS.) JSC
PROF. MENSA-BONSU (MRS.) JSC
ASIEDU JSC
KWOFIE JSC
DARKO ASARE JSC
ADJEI-FRIMPONG JSC
REVIEW MOTION
NO. J7/17/2025
24TH MARCH, 2026
BENJAMIN YAW OSEI ………. PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT/RESPONDENT
APPLICANT
VRS.
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ………. DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT/APPELLANT
RESPONDENT
R U L I N G
MAJORITY OPINION
KWOFIE JSC:
This is an application for a review of the judgment of the ordinary bench of the court delivered on 23rd day of July, 2025. This judgment was by a majority decision of three to two. Under rule 54 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (C.I.16) the grounds entertaining a person to invoke the review jurisdiction of the Court are stated as follows:
“a) exceptional circumstances which have resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
b) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant’s knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decision was given”
The applicant herein in paragraphs 40 and 41 of his affidavit in support of the application stated that:
“40) The judgment of the Supreme Court is erroneous and the review is necessary to avoid irremediable harm to the applicant
41) That the circumstances are exceptional and that in the interest of justice, there should be a review and for the judgment of the Court of Appeal to be affirmed”
Thus, the applicant’s application for review is anchored on the first part of rule 54 of C.I. 16 that is the exceptional circumstances which has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
In the case of In Re: Krobo Stool (No. 2); Nyamekye (No.2) vs. Opoku 2000 SCGLR 567, this court per Edward Wiredu JSC (as he then was) stated as follows with regard to rule 56 of C.I. 16:
“Thus, rule 56 of C.I. 16 requires the applicant’s affidavit and statement of case to set out clearly and argue fully all relevant grounds on which the applicant relies. This requirement means that rather than a mere recitation of one of the grounds stipulated in rule 54, the applicant must specify the attendant circumstances which would necessarily and prima facie, place his case for review under one of the grounds. A mere repetition of the appeal arguments is therefore not enough. Furthermore, as was pointed out by Adade JSC in Ribeiro vs. Ribeiro (No.2) 2 GLR 130 at page 143 S.C:
“the court must be satisfied that special circumstances exist to warrant a review; small pinpricks here and there is not enough”
In the case of Mechanical Lloyd Assembly Plant vs. Nartey (1987-88) 2 GLR 598 at 599, the review jurisdiction of this court was summarized as follows:
“the review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was a special jurisdiction to be exercised at the discretion of the court in exceptional circumstances where a fundamental and basic error might inadvertently have been committed by the court resulting in a grave miscarriage of justice. The court would consequently not permit a review to be used merely to re-argue an appeal or as an automatic next step from an appeal. The fact that there was a good ground upon which the judgment could be set aside on appeal was not therefore of itself a sufficient ground for granting review. And although there was however no specific definition as to what constituted exceptional circumstances or sufficient grounds that would warrant the exercise of the review jurisdiction, in either situation the interest of justice must require that there should be a review. It was therefore up to the court to determine the matter on the facts and circumstances of each case and as dictated by the ends of justice….”
Adade JSC shedding light on the ambit of the courts discretion in determining what amount to an “exceptional circumstances” or “sufficient grounds” quoted with approval from the commentary on the Indian rule, quoted from Woodroffe and Ameer Ali’s Civil Procedure in British India (2nd edition) at 1360-1362 as follows:
“The cases do not limit the discretion of the Court, in saying what reason is good and sufficient or what may be so far requisite to the end of justice as to support an application for review. The court must decide this in each case on its own circumstances. The reason must be one sufficient to the court before which the application for review is made. It may depend upon a question of law or upon a question of fact or mixed law or fact. In each case, the court must consider and decide whether a review is necessary to correct any evident error or omission or is otherwise requisite for the end of justice”
In the case of Afranie III vs. Quarcoo & Another (1992) 2 GLR 561 in holding 2 at 563, the court outlined the circumstances in which its review jurisdiction will be exercised as follows:
“Under the law, the only ground for review of a decision of the Supreme Court was that the circumstances were exceptional and that in the interest of justice there should be a review. Although what exactly constituted exceptional circumstances had not been spelt out on the authorities, the court has found exceptional circumstances where;
a) The circumstances were of a nature as to convince the court that the judgment should be reversed in the interest of the justice indicated clearly that there had been miscarriage of justice
b) The demands of justice made the exercise extremely necessary to avoid irremediable harm to the applicant;
c) A fundamental and basic error might have been inadvertently committed by the court resulting in a grave miscarriage of justice; or
d) A decision had been given per incuriam for failure to consider a statute or a binding case law or a fundamental principle of practice and procedure relevant to the decision and which would have resulted in a different decision
e) The applicant had sought for specific relief which materially affected the appeal and had argued grounds in support but the appellate court failed or neglected to make a decision on it. The misconstruction of the words of a statute upon which the decision of a case depended was such an error that it would deprive the court of jurisdiction to decide the matter”
The established jurisprudence of the court is that its review jurisdiction was to be cautiously exercised so as to prevent its abuse by disgruntled losers before the ordinary bench to re-argue their appeals. Shedding light on this cautious approach by the court in the exercise of its review jurisdiction, this court in Ribeiro vs. Ribeiro (No. 2) (1989-90) 2 GLR 130 speaking through Francois JSC stated thus:
“Our attempts to halt the abuse of the review jurisdiction of this court by frowning upon attempts to turn the exercise into another avenue for appeal, must be matched by an equally genuine willingness for introspection. Where a fundamental error has occurred, to be prepared to admit and correct it. Otherwise, the exercise of review would only amount to a confirmation of a previous stand and the mere endorsement of a majority view”
Facts Giving Rise To The Application
Sometime in the year 2015, the then Chief Justice received a petition from the petitioner Anas Aremeyaw Anas concerning allegations of the applicant Benjamin Osei receiving bribes to acquit and discharge an accused person in the case of Republic vs. Kwaku Boakye. This allegation was against the applicant herein who until his removal from office on 7th December 2015 served as a Circuit Court judge in Kumasi. The petition was forwarded to the Judicial Council who after deliberating on it, decided to suspend the applicant and refer the matter to the Disciplinary Committee of the Judicial Council to investigate. The applicant was written to by letter dated 4th September 2015 and informed of the allegations of bribery with details and particulars of what he was alleged to have done and requested to respond or react thereto. He was also informed that the Judicial Council has constituted a committee to investigate the matter and that he was to appear before the Committee and may do so with counsel of his choice. The applicant reacted to the letter of the 4th of September 2015 and subsequently appeared before the Disciplinary Committee with his lawyer.
After the Disciplinary Committee, set up by the Chief Justice, had held due inquiry into the charges, the Committee found the charges proved and directed that the applicant be removed from his position as a Circuit Court judge without benefits. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the outcome of the Disciplinary Committee proceedings, the applicant instituted an action at the High Court, Accra challenging the Committee’s decision. He sought inter alia, the following reliefs:
a) A declaration that the removal of plaintiff from office as a Circuit Court judge was wrongful as there was no evidence per the audio visual compact disc or at all that established the allegation that he was given an amount of GH¢500.00 and another occasion GH¢400.00 in the matter of the Republic vs. Kwaku Boakye in his office and at his residence in Kumasi respectively to influence him to find the accused not guilty
b) A further declaration that the plaintiff’s removal from office on the allegation that he acquitted and discharged Kwaku Boakye (accused) based on bribery is wrongful as he on the contrary convicted and sentenced Kwaku Boakye to one-year imprisonment with hard labour and further ordered that the GH¢360.00 realised from the sale of the stolen palm fruits by the accused to be restored to the complainant by the Registry of the Court
c) A further declaration again that the rules of natural justice were breached when the plaintiff was removed from office on the basis of a finding of ex parte communication when he was never charged with any such offence.
d) Another declaration that the 2nd defendant never received any petition from the said Tigereyepi which at all material time of its alleged reception of an investigation report did not exist in law as a person and therefore the claim of 2nd defendant receiving an investigation report in the letter dated 4th September 2015 is false.
e) A declaration that the removal of the plaintiff based upon the Disciplinary Committee’s report of the 2nd defendant is wrongful as no such report existed at the time of the removal of the plaintiff and/or was bereft of any justifiable evidence that the plaintiff was given an amount of GH¢500 and GH¢400 on separate occasions respectively in the case of Republic vs. Kwaku Boakye
f) A declaration further that the 1st defendant had no right to remove the plaintiff from office as a Circuit Court Judge without benefit as same is not supported by any law and hence wrongful
g) Another declaration that the plaintiff was entitled to a copy of the said investigative report of Tigereyepi assuming without admitting that the alleged entity existed at law and the conduct of the 1st and 2nd defendants in not providing the plaintiff with a copy of the said report breached the rules of natural justice.”
The trial High Court dismissed all the claims of the plaintiff. The applicant dissatisfied with the decision of the trial court appealed against the judgment to the Court of Appeal which by a unanimous decision upheld the appeal and reversed the decision of the trial court. The respondent appealed against the decision of the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court which by a majority decision of 3 to 2 upheld the appeal and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal and restored the decision of the High Court.
The applicant has initiated the instant action by invoking the review jurisdiction of this Court. Before us, as a review panel, the applicant as already stated relies on exceptional circumstances as follows:
a) The Supreme Court did not advert its mind to the admitted and undisputed facts apparent on the face of the record
b) The judgment was obtained by deceit and prejudice
c) The judgment of the Supreme Court of first instance in allowing the appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal is inconsistent with crucial documentary evidence namely the judgment, the commitment warrant and the charge sheet in the case of the Republic vs. Kwaku Boakye (exhibit C, D and E at page 85 to 92 of the ROA VOL.)
d) The review is necessary to avoid irremediable harm to the applicant, the grounds of which constitute exceptional circumstances that resulted in miscarriage of justice.
I will start this review opinion by adopting the introductory statement of my esteemed brother Darko Asare JSC in his dissenting opinion in this case at the ordinary bench wherein he stated:
“This case presents issues of profound significance, that affect not only the appropriate evidentiary threshold prescribed by the 1992 constitution for judicial removal, but also requires examination of the requisite degree of procedural integrity which such removal proceedings warrant”
I need also to remind myself that a review application is not an appeal and is not an opportunity for the applicant to have as it were, a second bite of the cherry.
In paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 of his affidavit in support of the application for review, the applicant deposed therein as follows:
“15) That the judgment of the Court of Appeal found at pages 23 and 24 of the same that the assertion in the report of the Committee of inquiry that I received bribe in a video was not supported by any video tendered in evidence.
16) That the judgment of the Court of Appeal at page 25 made reference to the admission by the defendant/respondent/appellant/respondent about the fact that the video shown to me in any office had no audio and that I could not be heard talking to anyone.
17) That the judgment of the Court of Appeal at page 27 made reference to the admission by the defendant/respondent/appellant/respondent which showed that the conclusion by the Committee that I held ex parte Communication was not related to any known case.
On the other hand, in the statement of case of the respondent, it was stated as follows:
“we submit that the ordinary bench effectually considered, adjudicated upon and emphatically pronounced that there was no breach of the rules of natural justice. The ordinary bench found out that even though the allegation of ex parte communication was not captured in the letter dated 4th September, 2015, the applicant was nonetheless notified of the charge when he appeared before the disciplinary committee on 11th September 2015. The applicant was therefore given ample opportunity to speak to that allegation and present his defence on 24th November 2015 as stated in the report of the Disciplinary Committee”
In respect of the charge that the applicant engaged in ex parte Communication, the ordinary bench of this Court stated as follows:
“I shall commence with a discussion of whether the findings of the High Court that the plaintiff accepted money and engaged in ex parte communication was reasonably supported by the evidence on record; and whether the Court of Appeal erred in holding otherwise. The respondent in his testimony at the trial admitted that in the course of the disciplinary proceedings, he watched the video recording of his interaction with the petitioner in his chambers and in his house. His comment was that it did not constitute sufficient proof and that it was his registrar who is seen in the video counting money. The registrar himself gave evidence in which he said that the money he was seen counting in the video was a refund of money earlier borrowed by one Awudu Salam. But the petitioner’s evidence was clear that after the registrar counted the money, he handed it to the respondent who promised to assist the accused person on whose behalf the payment was made. The trial judge accepted the story of the appellants and disbelieved the respondent and his witness. Since the trial judge saw and listened to all the witnesses, especially the respondent and his witness, has made a finding on the basis of evidence that is on record, I am of the view that his findings ought to be affirmed and that the Court of Appeal erred in holding otherwise”
It is worth reminding ourselves that the charge of having engaged in ex parte communication was originally not part of the charges against the applicant. That charge was made against the applicant by the members of the Disciplinary Committee after they had allegedly watched a video recording made by the petitioner Anas Aremeyaw Anas at a sitting of the Committee. To put the issue in its proper perspective, we need at this stage to pose the question, what is ex parte communication?
Black’s Law Dictionary 4th edition defines ex parte Communication as:
“A Communication between counsel and the court when opposing counsel is not present”
Rule 7 of the Code of Conduct for Judges and Magistrates, Ghana provides as follows:
“A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider any ex parte communication concerning a pending or impending proceedings”
The Commentary to Rule 7 of the Code of Conduct states:
“a) Ex parte Communication which is not sanctioned by law is an attempt to overreach one party to a case before the judge and influence the judge to decide in favour of the party making the contact. An ex parte communication undermines the fairness of the justice delivery system and an ongoing judicial proceeding and creates a dent in public trust in the legal and court system. It is improper for judges to engage in any form of ex parte communication which is not permitted by law with lawyers or parties before them”
From Rule 7 and the explanatory Commentary, it is obvious that ex parte communication cannot take place or exist in the abstract without context. Ex parte Communication must relate to a case or proceedings pending or impending before a judge.
The question that arises immediately is, what case provoked the charge of ex parte communication against the applicant in the first place? At the trial High Court, the secretary to the Disciplinary Committee Samuel Boakye Yiadom the then deputy Judicial Secretary in charge of the Northern Sector who gave evidence for the defendant/respondent/appellant/respondent as DW1 was cross-examined by counsel for the plaintiff as follows:
Q. What is the title of the case affected by the ex parte communication
A. They did not mention the case
Q. I am putting it to you that from your evidence, the ex parte communication was not in reference to Republic vs. Kweku Boakye
A. Yes
Further on the DW1 was asked:
Q. Now the video in his chambers was shown on 11th September 2015
A. That is so
Q. Now that video had no audio on it
A. Yes, my lord
Q. And it was based on that video and after watching that
video that the committee informed the plaintiff that he was to be investigated for engaging in ex parte communication contrary to the Code of ethics for judges and Magistrates in addition to the petition for bribery
A Yes
Q. In fact from the video the plaintiff could not be heard talking to anyone
A Yes
Further, the DW1 was asked:
Q. It is also a fact from the records available to the Committee
that the case of Republic vs. Kwaku Boakye was disposed
of by the plaintiff on 19/01/2015
A. The committee did not go into the case of Kwaku Boakye
Q. What was the title of the case affected by the ex parte
communication
A. They did not mention the case
Q. So, it is your evidence that the Committee could not ascertain which case the so-called ex parte communication was about
A. The report of the committee was prepared by the committee members. My role as secretary was to record what transpired at the hearing so the conclusion of the committee was by the committee members
Q. I am putting it to you that from your evidence your claim of ex parte communication was not in reference to the Republic vs. Kwaku Boakye
A. Yes
Since the video shown to the applicant had no audio and the applicant could not be heard talking to anybody, what was the basis of the charge of having held ex parte communication? Further, if from the evidence of the Deputy Judicial Secretary DW1, the ex parte Communication was not in reference to the case of Rep. vs. Kwaku Boakye, what case did that charge relate to? These fundamental questions were left unanswered and therefore left hanging.
Clearly, from the evidence, it was obvious that if the claim that the applicant had engaged in ex parte communication was not in relation to the case of Republic vs. Kwaku Boakye which was the basis of the charge against the applicant by the committee, then the applicant could not be held to have engaged in ex parte communication. Thus, the whole edifice of ex parte communication levelled against the applicant by the committee crashed completely and that charge should have been thrown out by the trial court. In my view, this should have been the obvious decision of the trial judge having regard to the evidence which clearly shows that the charge was baseless.
In my view, the ordinary bench should have taken a similar position and not taken the view that the charge was sound because the committee had observed the rules of natural justice when it notified the applicant of the charge and gave him ample opportunity to speak to the charge. In our view there was no evidence or basis whatever for the applicant to be accused of engaging in an ex parte communication and we set aside the finding of the ordinary bench to that effect. What is worth commenting on is why the committee charged with investigating the allegations of bribery against the applicant turned itself into a prosecutor for the Judicial Service and filed charges against the applicant and proceeded to find him guilty on those same charges.
In the case of Agbevor vs. Attorney General (2000) SCGLR 403 this court set out the proper procedure to be followed when an allegation is made against a judicial officer like the applicant. Speaking through Kpegah JSC, the court stated at page 413 of the Report that:
“The position now as I see it is that where an allegation is made against a judicial officer like the plaintiff, it is the Chief Justice who decides if any inquiry is to be held, and also directs the type of inquiry, formal or summary, to be held. Written charges are then served on the officer involved. He is then put before the appropriate inquiry officer to enable the accused officer: “to be heard in his defence by himself or by a lawyer or other expert of his choice” see article 151(2) of the Constitution. It is after this that a report will be submitted to the Chief Justice as to the committee’s findings. He is then obliged to put the matter before the Judicial Council in accordance with article 151(1) if a major penalty of the type meted out to the plaintiff is anticipated.”
Thus, in our view when the Disciplinary Committee formed the opinion that the applicant needed to be charged or investigated for engaging in ex parte communication, the committee should have referred that issue to the Chief Justice for him/her to authorize them to investigate that issue. In this case however the Committee members on their own took the view that the applicant had engaged in ex parte communication and therefore proceeded to charge him with it and found him guilty of that charge without reference to the Chief Justice. That made the Committee the complainant and the judge at the same time. We find that conduct clearly unacceptable and improper.
This leads me to the allegation that the applicant received money i.e. Bribe with a view to being influenced in the case of Republic vs. Kwaku Boakye.
The applicant has set out the following grounds for this application:
a) The supreme court did not advert its mind to the admitted and undisputed facts apparent on the face of the record
b) The judgment of the supreme court of first instance in allowing the appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal is inconsistent with crucial documentary evidence namely the judgment, the commitment warrant and the charge sheet in the case of Republic vs. Kwaku Boakye (exhibits C, D, and E pages 85 to 92 of the Record of Appeal vol.1)
d). the review is necessary to avoid irremediable harm to the applicant the grounds of which constitute exceptional circumstances that resulted in miscarriage of justice.
I propose to take all 3 grounds of the application together. In summary the applicant contends that the decision of the ordinary bench ought to be reviewed as same will lead to irremediable harm to him.
Under these grounds the applicant argues that the finding by the ordinary bench that the allegation of bribery against him was proved was contrary to the documentary evidence on record i.e. the judgment in the case of Republic vs. Kwaku Boakye, the commitment warrant and the charge sheet.
The applicant contradicted the case of the defendants by contending that contrary to the assertion of the respondents that he took money to acquit or discharge the accused in the case of Republic vs. Kwaku Boakye, the documentary evidence that is the judgment in the case of Rep. vs. Kwaku Boakye, the commitment Warrant and the charge sheet showed that contrary to the case of respondent, the accused person in the case of Republic vs. Kwaku Boakye was rather convicted and sentenced to a term of one year imprisonment with an order that the GH¢360.00 realised from the sale of the stolen palm fruits by the accused be restored to the complainant by the Registry of the court. This documentary evidence in my view clearly contradicted the case of the respondents that the applicant agreed or was influenced to acquit the accused in the case of Republic vs. Kwaku Boakye.
Indeed, the assertion by the trial judge that the applicant admitted receiving money from the petitioner was clearly false as the records show that the applicant vehemently denied receiving money from anybody.
The applicant also argues that the case of bribery against him was not proved by the strange failure of the defendants to tender in evidence at the trial the video recording of the said corrupt act of the plaintiff/applicant allegedly receiving the money. The evidence about the applicant having received the said money was an extremely contentious issue at the trial with the applicant vehemently denying receiving any such money whilst the defendant insisted that the money had been given to the plaintiff/applicant to influence his conduct in the case of Rep. vs. Kweku Boakye. Strangely in the face of the contentious issue of whether the plaintiff received the money or not in issue, one would have thought that the defendants who had custody of the video recording would have tendered same in evidence in line with the best evidence rule. Instead, for whatever undisclosed reason, the defendant refused to tender the video in evidence and rather opted to give evidence on the said controversial issue by calling the DW1 Samuel Boakye Yiadom, the Secretary of the Disciplinary Committee to give oral testimony which basically consisted of his recollection of what was on the video allegedly shown at the committee. The question that arises is why such crucial documentary evidence as the video was not tendered. The defendant who clearly bore the burden of producing evidence in respect of the tendering of the video strangely took the view, at the trial, that it was the plaintiff/applicant who had the burden of tendering the video. How the plaintiff, who was neither in possession of the video nor the maker of same was expected to produce that video is baffling. Such a crucial, material evidence which in my view could have fundamentally tilted the case one way or the other was not tendered by the defendant and that in my view should clearly have gone against the defendant in the evaluation of the evidence. Was that refusal to tender the video recording intended to over reach the plaintiff or the court? In my view no probative value or weight whatsoever should have been attached to the evidence of the DW1 Samuel Boakye Yiadom and that clearly should have tilted the matter firmly in the direction and for the benefit of the plaintiff’s case. For a serious trial which was to determine whether the removal of the plaintiff from his position as a Circuit Court Judge was justified or not, the bar should not have been lowered to favour the defendants. Regrettably, that appear to have been the case both in the manner in which the Disciplinary Committee handled the Disciplinary proceedings and the trial High Court also conducted the trial, causing irremediable harm to the applicant.
In conclusion it is evident from the record of proceedings that given the issues we have raised about the unsatisfactory nature of the Disciplinary proceedings and the fact that the trial High Court accepted hook, line and sinker the report of the Disciplinary Committee, I am therefore satisfied that the judgment of the ordinary bench of this court ought to be reviewed. In so doing, I am aware that I am not sitting on an appeal over a decision of my learned, esteemed and respected senior colleagues. However, I find myself in the invidious position of looking at the issues and problems from a fresh perspective and being completely dissatisfied with the way the applicant was treated by the Disciplinary Committee which at some point was more of a prosecutor which had predetermined the fate of the applicant.
I would thus allow the application for review of the majority decision and restore the decision of the Court of Appeal which set aside the judgment of the trial High Court dated 21st June 2022. Judgment is accordingly entered for the applicant in terms of the reliefs endorsed on his Writ of summons.
CONSEQUENTIAL ORDERS:
Since we have declared, in accordance with the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff/Applicant herein, that the removal of the plaintiff from office as a Circuit Court judge on the 7th December 2015 was wrongful, it follows that the Plaintiff/Applicant herein is entitled to be re-instated in view of the fact that the office which he occupied before his unlawful removal was a public office, qua Judicial Office. See article 191(1) of the 1992 Constitution. We therefore make an order reinstating BENJAMIN YAW OSEI Plaintiff/Applicant herein as a CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE. Consequently, we order that the Plaintiff/Applicant be paid all his SALARIES and ALLOWANCES and all his entitlements from the 7th December 2015 to the date of his reinstatement.
(SGD.) H. KWOFIE
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
(SGD.) S. K. A. ASIEDU
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
(SGD.) Y. DARKO ASARE
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
(SGD.) R. ADJEI-FRIMPONG
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
DISSENTING OPINION
PWAMANG JSC:
My Lords, the review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been held in several cases to be a very narrow avenue by which the Supreme Court may address situations where an applicant can show that the applicant has suffered a miscarriage of justice caused by a fundamental error committed by the ordinary bench of the Supreme Court or on account of discovery of a new matter after the decision of the ordinary bench which matter was incapable of being discovered at the time that the ordinary bench decided the case.
In the application before us, the plaintiff/appellant/respondent/applicant contends that in the determination of the final appeal, the majority of the ordinary bench of the court committed a fundament error in our judgment against him and that it has occasioned a miscarriage of justice to him. In Afranie II v Quarcoo and Others [1992] 2 GLR 561 at p. 605 to 606 Aikins, JSC catalogued some of the special circumstances stated in earlier decisions of the Supreme Court. He said as follows;
“Exactly what constitute exceptional circumstances are not spelt out, but various decisions of this court contain diverse opinions on what may be regarded as constituting exceptional circumstances. For example:
(a) The circumstances should be of such a nature as to convince this court that the judgment should be reversed in the interest of justice, and should indicate clearly that there had been a miscarriage of justice: see Bisi v. Kwayie [1987-88] 2 G.L.R. 295, S.C.
(b) The jurisdiction is exercisable in exceptional circumstances where demands of justice make the exercise extremely necessary to avoid irremediable harm to an applicant: see Nasali v. Addy [1987-88] 2 G.L.R. 286, S.C.
(c) Where a fundamental and basic error might have inadvertently been committed by the court resulting in a grave miscarriage of justice: see Mechanical Lloyd Assembly Plant Ltd. v. Nartey [ 1987-88] 2 G.L.R. 598, S.C.
(d) Decision was given per incuriam for failure to consider a statute or case law or a fundamental principle of practice and procedure relevant to the decision and which would have resulted in a different decision: see Mechanical Lloyd Assembly Plant Ltd. v. Nartey (supra) and Ababio v. Mensah (No. 2) [1989-90] 1 G.L.R. 573, S.C.
(e) When the appellant had sought for a specific relief which materially affected the appeal and had argued grounds in support, but the appellate court failed or neglected to make a decision on it: see Mechanical Lloyd Assembly Plant Ltd. v. Nartey (supra).”
We have read all the processes filed by the applicant and he has not in our opinion satisfied any of the above stated grounds for a review.
Then in Quartey v Central Services Co. Ltd. [1996-97] SCGLR 398, the Court stated the legal position of review applications as follows:
“A review jurisdiction is a special jurisdiction and not an Appellate jurisdiction, conferred on the court, and the court would exercise that special jurisdiction in favour of an Applicant only in exceptional circumstances. This implies that such an applicant should satisfy the court that there has been some fundamental or basic error which the court inadvertently committed in the course of considering it’s judgment and which fundamental error has resulted in gross miscarriage of justice.
My Lords the arguments that the applicant has made in this review application were all raised in the appeal that was determined by the ordinary bench of the Court so his submissions amount to turning this review application to a further appeal which is not permitted. The two critical questions in this whole case have been, first, whether the applicant who was a Circuit Court Judge acted appropriately when investigative journalists who posed as persons interested in a case pending before him met him in his residence. The second is whether the applicant was afforded a fair hearing when the Judicial Service investigated him for misconduct. These two issues were hotly contested from the trial court up to the ordinary bench of the Supreme Court and the decision by majority of 3-2 was that the applicant acted inappropriately as a Judge and furthermore, he was given a fair hearing especially at the trial in court.
In the circumstances, we fail to see where the error of the majority is that ought to be remedied by a review of the decision. Accordingly, we dismiss the application for review as being without merit.
(SGD.) G. PWAMANG
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
(SGD.) A. LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS.)
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
(SGD.) PROF. H. J. A. N. MENSA-BONSU (MRS.)
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
COUNSEL
JOE ABOAGYE DEBRAH ESQ. FOR THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT/RESPONDENT
APPLICANT WITH AKWASI OPOKU AGYEMANG ESQ.
STELLA BADU (MRS.) (CHIEF STATE ATTORNEY) FOR THE DEFENDANT/ RESPONDENT/APPELLANT/RESPONDENT WITH YVONNE OPPONG (SENIOR STATE ATTORNEY)
