1. AWUDU ALHASSAN SULEMANA @ DOZER 2. MOHAMMED SULEMANA @ BANANA 3. SALAMATU KARIM @ MOTHER VRS. THE REPUBLIC CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. J3/1/2020 29TH JULY, 2026 -

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

IN THE SUPREME COURT

ACCRA – A. D. 2026

CORAM: ASIEDU JSC (PRESIDING)

GAEWU JSC

KWOFIE JSC

DARKO ASARE JSC

BARTELS-KODWO JSC

CRIMINAL APPEAL J3/1/2020 29^TH JULY, 2026

AWUDU ALHASSAN SULEMANA @ DOZER

MOHAMMED SULEMANA @ BANANA APPELLANTS/APPELLANTS
SALAMATU KARIM @ MOTHER

VRS.

THE REPUBLIC ………. RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

KWOFIE JSC:

This is an appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered on 15th November 2018 affirming the convictions and sentences imposed by the High Court, Accra, sitting with a jury, upon the three appellants for offences arising out of the brutal killing of one Abdul Karim on 15th June, 2013.

The 1st appellant, Awudu Alhassan Sulemana alias “Dozer”, was convicted of murder contrary to section 46 of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29), and conspiracy to commit murder contrary to sections 23(1) and 46 of Act 29. The 2nd appellant, Mohammed Sulemana alias “Banana”, was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder. The 3rd appellant, Salamatu Karim alias “Mother”, who was the wife of the deceased, was convicted of abetment of murder contrary to sections 20(1) and 46 of Act 29. Following the unanimous verdict of the jury, each appellant was sentenced to death. The Appellants thereafter made an appeal to the Court of Appeal, which appeal was dismissed, leading to the present appeal before this Court.

Facts

The facts giving rise to this appeal are that the deceased, Abdul Karim, aged about fifty years, was married to the 3rd appellant. They resided together with their three children at ACP Estates, Pokuase. The 1st appellant was the brother of the 3rd appellant, whilst the 2nd appellant was his associate.

On the night of 15th June 2013, at approximately 9:35 p.m., the police received a distress report from the 3rd appellant that unknown robbers had attacked her residence and murdered her husband while she was taking her bath. When police officers arrived, the deceased had already been conveyed to the hospital where he was pronounced dead.

A post-mortem examination subsequently established that the deceased had suffered multiple severe injuries, including a fractured skull, fractured mandible and extensive traumatic injuries resulting in traumatic shock. The cause of death was therefore consistent with a sustained and violent assault.

Initial investigations proceeded on the basis of the report made by the 3rd appellant. However, police investigations later took a different course when one Kofi Nyagbedzi (PW1), who had been arrested in an unrelated attempted robbery matter, informed investigators that he possessed information concerning the murder.

PW1 implicated the 1st and 2nd appellants. Acting upon that information, the police arrested them at Dodowa.

The prosecution’s case was that during interrogation the 1st and 2nd appellants voluntarily made confession statements admitting participation in the killing. They further implicated the 3rd appellant as the person who had planned the murder of her husband, recruited them, admitted them into the house, concealed them in the bathroom, identified the deceased, supplied them with weapons and promised payment after the killing.

The appellants denied these allegations. They maintained that the confession statements were extracted by force and inducement while they were in police custody. They further denied any conspiracy among themselves and challenged the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

Before the High Court, the appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges leveled against them.

During the trial, objection was taken to the admissibility of the confession statements attributed to the 1st and 2nd appellants. The learned trial judge therefore conducted a mini trial to determine whether the statements had been voluntarily made.

After hearing evidence from both sides, including the independent witness and the investigating officer, the learned trial judge ruled that the statements had been voluntarily made and admitted them into evidence.

At the conclusion of the trial, the learned judge summed up the evidence and applicable law to the jury.

The jury unanimously returned verdicts of guilty against all three appellants.

The learned trial judge accordingly entered judgment on the verdicts and imposed the sentence prescribed by law.

Being dissatisfied with their convictions and sentences, the appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court held, among other things, that:

the confession statements had been properly admitted;
section 120 of the Evidence Act had been complied with;
the trial judge’s summing-up was balanced, accurate and fair;
the jury had been properly directed;
the evidence overwhelmingly supported the convictions.

The appeal was thus dismissed.

The Appellants have now brought the following grounds of Appeal before this Court:

The Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in holding that the summing-up of the trial judge was not slanted against Appellants;
The Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in holding that the summing-up was clear and simple;
The Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in holding that the trial judge properly directed the jury on the confession statements;
The holding of the Justices of the Court of Appeal that the confession statements were voluntary is erroneous;
The holding of the Justices of the Court of Appeal that the trial judge properly directed the jury on the offence of conspiracy is erroneous;
The holding of the Justices of the Court of Appeal that the trial judge properly directed the jury on the law of conspiracy is erroneous;
The holding of the Justices of the Court of Appeal that the learned trial judge properly directed the jury on the law of abetment is erroneous;
The holding of the Court of Appeal that the summing-up did not occasion miscarriage of justice is erroneous;
The holding of the Justices of the Court of Appeal that 1^st and 2nd Appellants were properly convicted on the charge of conspiracy is erroneous;
The Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in accepting and relying on the evidence of PW1 to sustain the conviction without assessing credibility of PW1;
The Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in importing new facts into the case to justify the conviction of the Appellants;
The Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in holding that the sentence of death was lawfully and properly imposed on the Appellants; and
The judgment is unreasonable having regard to the evidence on record.

The appeal raises four principal questions:

Whether the learned trial judge erred in admitting the confession statements after the mini trial.

Whether the directions given to the jury complied with section 277 of the Criminal and Other Offences (Procedure) 1960 (Act 30) and the settled law governing jury trials.

Whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the offences of conspiracy, murder and abetment.

Whether the Court of Appeal erred in affirming the convictions and sentences.

Whether the learned trial judge erred in admitting the confession statements after the mini trial.

The appellants contend that the confession statements of the 1st and 2nd appellants were obtained through violence, threats and inducement, and that the requirements of section 120 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) were not complied with. They argue that the statements should have been excluded and that, without them, the convictions cannot stand.

Section 120 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) requires the prosecution to prove that a confession statement was made voluntarily where its admissibility is challenged. The section provides as follows:

“(1) In a criminal action, evidence of a hearsay statement made by an accused admitting a matter which

(a) constitutes; or

(b) forms an essential part of; or

(c) taken together with other information already disclosed by him is a basis for an inference of,

the commission of a crime for which he is being tried in the action is not admissible against him unless the statement was made voluntarily.

(2) Evidence of a hearsay statement shall not be admissible under subsection (1) if the statement was made by the declarant while arrested, restricted or detained by the State unless the statement was made in the presence of an independent witness (other than a police officer or member of the Armed Forces) approved by the accused.”

That issue is determined through a mini trial, and an appellate court will not interfere with the trial court’s findings unless they are unsupported by the evidence or disclose an error of law. In the case of Achoro and Another v. Akanfela and Another [1996-97] SCGLR 209, the court stated that the court will only interfere with concurrent findings if

“It was established with absolute clearness that some blunder or error resulting in a miscarriage of justice, was apparent in the way in which the lower tribunals had dealt with the facts. It must be established, e.g., that the lower courts had clearly erred in the face of a crucial documentary evidence, or that the principle of evidence had not been properly applied; or that the finding was so based on erroneous proposition of law that if that proposition be corrected, the finding will disappear … It must be demonstrated that the judgments of the courts below were clearly wrong.”

The record shows that the learned trial judge conducted a mini trial, heard evidence from both sides, and found that the statements were voluntarily made. The Court of Appeal affirmed that finding. I do not see a reason to depart from those concurrent findings.

Although the appellants alleged police assault, the investigating officer denied the allegations, and evidence was led to show that the injuries observed were largely old scars. The trial judge accepted the prosecution’s evidence after observing the witnesses. Bearing in mind that it is the credibility of the prosecution’s witness that is central to the issue, and the principle that the trial court has the discretion to determine a witness’s credibility, I do not think that there is any basis for this Court to substitute its own assessment for that of the courts below.

The appellants also challenged the evidence of the independent witness, Prosper Tatra, and argued that section 120 had not been complied with. I do not agree with this. Any inconsistencies in the witness’s testimony were immaterial. He remained consistent on the essential facts that he witnessed the recording of the statements, saw them interpreted and adopted by the appellants, and signed as the independent witness. In the case of Effisah v. Ansah (2005-2006) 943, the Supreme Court held as follows:

“…in the real world, evidence led at any trial which turns principally on issues of fact, and involving a fair number of witnesses, would not be entirely free from inconsistencies, conflicts or contradictions and the like. In evaluating the evidence at a trial, the presence of such matters per se, should not justify a wholesale rejection of the evidence to which they might relate. Thus, in any given case, minor, immaterial, insignificant or non-critical inconsistencies must not be dwelt upon to deny justice to a party who has substantially discharged his or her burden of persuasion. Where inconsistencies or conflicts in the evidence are clearly reconcilable and there is critical mass of evidence or corroborative evidence on crucial or vital matters, the court would be right to gloss over these inconsistencies…”

Section 120 does not prescribe a rigid procedure for selecting an independent witness. Its purpose is to ensure the transparency and reliability of confession statements. That purpose was fulfilled. The law is concerned with substance rather than technicalities, and a voluntary confession should not be excluded because of minor procedural irregularities that do not affect its fairness. In the case of Okofoh Estate Ltd v. Modern Signs Ltd and Anor [1995-96] 1 GLR 310 the court stated that

“the courts should aim at doing substantial justice between the parties, and not waste their precious time to attend to unnecessary technicalities”

The trial judge accepted the prosecution’s evidence that the statements were voluntary, and the Court of Appeal affirmed that finding. The appellants have shown no basis for disturbing those concurrent findings. I would therefore uphold the admission of the confession statements.

Whether the directions given to the jury complied with section 277 of the Criminal and Other Offences (Procedure) Act and the settled law governing jury trials.

The appellants argued that the trial judge’s summing-up was unfair because it inadequately explained the law on confession statements, corroboration, reasonable doubt, commented excessively on the prosecution’s case, and encouraged the jury to convict.

I do not believe that there is merit in these arguments. In the case of Agyiri Alias Otabil v. The Republic [1987-88] 1 GLR 1, the court stated that:

‘What a judge may do in a summing up was stated by Lord Goddard C.J. in R v. Derek Clayton-Wright (supra) at 29. His lordship, with particular reference to misdirection, said:

“Misdirection is said to exist not only in an active misstatement of evidence or of law but in failure to direct a jury on a point on which they ought to receive direction. But that does not mean that a Judge at the end of a long criminal trial is to go meticulously through the evidence and refer to every point which has been made in the case or recapitulate the arguments of counsel for the prosecution or for the defence and point out in respect of each argument which is used what the evidence is for or against it. The duty of the Judge in any criminal trial, or, for that matter, in any civil trial, is adequately and properly performed if he gives the jury an adequate direction on the law, an adequate direction upon the regard they are to have to particular evidence on such matters as accomplices or matters which require by law or practice corroboration, and if he puts before the jury clearly and fairly the contentions on either side, omitting nothing from his charge, so far as the defence is concerned, of the real matters upon which the defence is based. He must give to the jury a fair picture of the defence, but that does not mean to say that he is to paint in the details or to comment on every argument which has been used or to remind them of the whole of the evidence which has been given by experts or anyone else.”

A trial judge’s duty is to explain the applicable law, fairly review the evidence, identify the issues for determination, and remind the jury that they are the sole judges of fact. The law does not require a perfect or verbatim review of the evidence.

On the real question as to whether the jury was misled, the record shows that the learned judge properly explained the burden and standard of proof, the offences charged, the law on confession statements, witness credibility, and the respective cases of both parties. The judge also repeatedly reminded the jury that findings of fact were exclusively theirs. The summing-up was balanced, comprehensive, and legally accurate, and did not direct or encourage a guilty verdict. Accordingly, that ground of appeal fails.

Whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the offences of conspiracy, murder and abetment.

Having upheld the admission of the confession statements and the trial judge’s directions to the jury, the issue of whether the prosecution proved the offences beyond reasonable doubt needs to be considered.

The appellants argued that the prosecution’s case was inconsistent, that PW1’s evidence was unreliable, and that there was no credible proof of conspiracy or the 3rd appellant’s involvement. This is untrue.

The prosecution bears the burden of proving every element of the offence beyond reasonable doubt, but this does not require proof beyond every possible doubt. The evidence must be assessed as a whole.

PW1’s evidence was materially corroborated by the confession statements, the medical evidence, and the surrounding circumstances. The alleged inconsistencies concerned minor details and did not undermine the core prosecution case that the murder was planned, the 1st and 2nd appellants carried it out, the 3rd appellant facilitated it, and the robbery story was fabricated.

The voluntary confession statements of the 1st and 2nd appellants remained admissible despite their retraction and were supported by independent evidence, including PW1’s testimony, the medical findings, and the conduct of the appellants before and after the offence. The post-mortem findings were consistent with a deliberate and sustained assault rather than a failed robbery.

The evidence also established conspiracy through the appellants’ coordinated actions before, during, and after the killing, while the 3rd appellant’s conduct in facilitating entry, concealing the assailants, identifying the deceased, and helping conceal the crime, clearly supported her conviction for abetment.

The jury rejected the appellants’ claims of fabrication, police brutality, and witness dishonesty after proper directions from the trial judge. Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal found the prosecution had proved the offences, and the appellants have shown no basis for disturbing those concurrent findings. We would therefore affirm that the offences of murder, conspiracy, and abetment were proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Whether the Court of Appeal erred in affirming the convictions and sentences.

The remaining grounds of appeal concern the evaluation of witness credibility, the Court of Appeal’s alleged failure to independently review the evidence, and the contention that the convictions were against the weight of the evidence.

The appellants argued that the Court of Appeal merely affirmed the trial court’s decision without conducting its own assessment of the evidence. However, a review of the judgment shows that the Court of Appeal independently examined the record, considered the evidence and applicable law, and gave reasoned conclusions on each of the material issues before affirming the convictions.

The appellants also challenged the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. However, the assessment of credibility is primarily a matter for the trial court, which had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses testify. In the case of Atadi v. Ladzekpo [1980] GLR 218, the court stated:

“On the issue of credibility of witnesses, there is no well-defined guideline on this. The whole matter is left to the judicial discretion of the trial judge who has the advantage of seeing the witnesses and observing them.”

An appellate court will not interfere with such findings unless they are plainly unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence. No such exceptional circumstances have been demonstrated in this case.

Finally, on the submission that the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence, we find that the Appellants failed to discharge this burden. A person who alleges that the verdict is not supported by the evidence on record has the burden of pointing out the lapses in the judgment of the court below. In the case of Tonado Enterprise & Ors v. Chou Sen Lin [2007-2008] SCGLR 235, the court stated that:

“When a party in his ground of appeal states that the judgment is against the weight of evidence, he imposes upon himself the onus of satisfying the appellate court that the evidence led in the trial were not such as to warrant the findings made on it.”

See also the cases of Eugene Addo Larteh v. The Republic (2016) JELR 69587 (CA), Kwabena Agyei v. The Republic (2019) JELR 64813 (CA),Tuakwa v. Bosom [2001-2002] SCGLR 61, Abbey and Others v. Antwi (2010) SCGLR 17, Djin v. Musah Baako (2007-2008) SCGLR 686, and Oppong v. Anarfi (2011) 1 SCGLR 556. The convictions were supported by the confession statements, the testimony of PW1, the medical evidence, and the surrounding circumstances, all of which formed a coherent body of evidence establishing the appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Accordingly, we do not find any basis to disturb the concurrent findings of the High Court and the Court of Appeal, and we deem it unnecessary to deal with the remaining grounds of appeal.

On the whole, we find that the trial of the appellants was conducted in conformity with the rules of procedure and the offences with which the appellants were charged was proved beyond reasonable doubt. We find no reason to disturb the decision of the Court of Appeal and we dismiss the appeal. The judgment of the Court of Appeal, Accra dated 15^th November, 2018 is hereby affirmed.

(SGD.) H. KWOFIE