ABAYE vs. AKATIA AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 1072
17 June 1982 · ANSAH-TWUM J · ≈ 14 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Ashiemoa v. Bani [1959] G.L.R. 130.
(2) Donkor v. Danso [1959] G.L.R. 147.
(3) Gyimah v. Kumah [1959] G.L.R. 196.
(4) Anane v. Mensah [1959] G.L.R. 50, C.A.
(5) Akrofi v. Akrofi [1965] G.L.R. 13.
(6) Nyarkoa v. Mansu [1967] G.L.R. 523.
(7) Nkrumah v. Manu [1971] G.L.R. 176.
(8) Tanor v. Akosua Koko [1974] 1 G.L.R. 451, C.A.
(9) Ibrahim v. Amalibini [1978] G.L.R. 368.
NATURE OF PROCEEDING
APPEAL from a decision of a district magistrate court in which the appellant’s claim for damages against the respondents for the destruction of his backyard farm crops during the funeral rites of a chief was dismissed. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Bodza Lumor for the plaintiff-appellant.
Fosu for the defendant-respondents.
[p.1074] of [1982-83] GLR 1072
JUDGMENT OF ANSAH-TWUM J.
This is an appeal against the judgment of the district court grade II, given on 18 May 1981 at Half Assini. The appellant’s complaint here is against the dismissal of his claim which runs as follows:
“The plaintiff claims from the defendants, jointly and severally the sum of 1,000 cedis being the total cost of the plaintiff’s garden crops to wit quantity of standing plantains, grown yams and standing sugar-cane grown by the plaintiff in the plaintiff’s backyard garden which unreasonably, the defendants on 17 September 1980, marched a number of youngmen to the plaintiff’s backyard garden and destroyed such crops during the opening of the funeral rites of one Madam Musu and one alleged Tufuhene Ampah.”
The only ground of appeal argued by learned counsel is ground 3 (b) which reads as follows. “The trial magistrate seriously erred in relying on an illegal and obnoxious custom in entering judgment for the defendant.”
It is evident from the judgment in question that the plaintiff-appellant (hereafter called the plaintiff), did on 7 November 1980, amend his writ of summons as follows:
“The plaintiff herein seeks against the defendants herein jointly and severally a declaration of title to the plaintiff’s backyard garden situate lying and being in the eastern part of Nuba”
“(a) 1,000 cedis special damages made up as follows:
(1) 300 cedis being the cost of the plaintiff’s 45 plantain trees destroyed by the defendants by cutting down the trees of the plantain, (2) 150 cedis being the cost of the plaintiff’s 100 tubers of yams destroyed by the defendants by cutting off the stem of the yams.
(3) 100 cedis the cost of the plaintiff’s 40 planted sugar-cane destroyed by the defendants by cutting down the sugar-cane.
(4) 450 being general damages for trespass into the plaintiff’s said backyard garden.”
The evidence adduced before the trial court would not have supported the claim for declaration of title since apparently title was not in issue, and the plaintiff clearly led no evidence necessary to establish a claim for declaration of title; for instance, the description of the land claimed and the limits thereof were not given in the evidence before the court. It seems to me, however, that a look at the original claim and the evidence adduced, leaves no room for any doubt that
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the plaintiff’s chief complaint is that the defendants had wrongfully entered his backyard garden and damaged his food-crops for which he seeks damages.
The question, therefore, was mainly, did the defendants wrongfully enter the plaintiff’s backyard garden and did they cause the damage being complained of? It does not appear that the defendants are seriously challenging the plaintiff’s claim that they had either themselves destroyed or caused to be destroyed certain foodcrops which the plaintiff had grown in his backyard garden. What the defendants are saying is that whatever they did in the plaintiff’s garden was done in the course of the performance of certain well-known and accepted customary funeral rites, and that, therefore, as natives of the locality concerned, they incurred no liability entitling the plaintiff to institute these proceedings against them.
The trial court appears to have upheld the view taken by the defendants, and had found that the custom under which the defendants claim to have acted was, in fact, an accepted custom observed in the entire Western Nzima area. The trial magistrate again appears to have found that the man Ampah, at whose funeral the alleged offending custom was performed, was in fact, and in law, the Tufuhene of Nuba. The following appears in the judgment:
“There is no dispute of the fact that the destruction of crops in backyard gardens is an accepted custom in the Nzima Area, at least in the Western Nzima under the paramountcy of the Omanhene of Benyin when a Tufuhene died. In the evidence of the plaintiff he admitted that it is an accepted custom. The plaintiff had the following to say:
‘If Ampah were Tufuhene at the time he died the custom performed would have been proper.’”
The trial magistrate did, therefore, upon these findings make the following observations:
“There is no dispute between the parties as regards the recognition of this custom in the Western Nzima Traditional Area to which they all belong. The controversial issue in this case is the position Ampah held when he died; was he the Tufuhene at the time or not?”
The trial court found that the deceased, Ampah, was the Tufuhene of Nuba at the time of his death. This finding is amply supported by the evidence adduced before the court and must not be disturbed. The evidence, inter alia, is as follows:
“When a Tufuhene is enstooled he is introduced to the Omanhene. His name is entered in the record of Tufuhene which is kept at the paramountcy. Tufuhene Ampah was the Tufuhene of
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Nuba before he died; when he died the Omanhene was informed.”
Upon the overwhelming evidence, and the necessary and correct findings made thereon, the trial magistrate concluded his judgment as follows:
“Concluding from the evidence so far adduced in this case, it is the view of this court that Ampah was the Tufuhene of Nuba before his death and the custom performed was a recognised one and it was performed in good spirit. The plaintiff’s claim must therefore fail and judgment is given to the defendants with costs assessed at 250 cedis.”
It is against this judgment that the plaintiff has brought this appeal and learned counsel for the plaintiff argued only one ground, “that the trial magistrate seriously erred in relying on an illegal and obnoxious custom in entering judgment for the defendants.” Learned counsel for the plaintiff does not appear to quarrel with the trial court’s finding that the deceased, Ampah, was Tufuhene of Nuba at the time of his death and it is a well-recognised and generally accepted custom of the people of Western Nzima Traditional Area to which the parties herein belong that when a Tufuhene dies, the people of the locality concerned are entitled by custom, while performing the customary funeral rites, to go on a rampage through the town or village, slaughtering goats and sheep and destroying food-crops grown in the backyards of houses, as they did in the circumstances of this case.
Learned counsel for the plaintiff has, however, submitted that it being an offence under section 172 of the Criminal Code, 1950 (Act 29), to cause damage to the property of other persons, the court should have held that that custom is outmoded and obnoxious in its contents and its application. Counsel submits a court of law should not rely on a custom to absolve an accused person of a civil liability, if his act or omission constitutes a crime under the Criminal Code.
Counsel submitted further that there are two schools of thought on this subject; one school saying that once a custom is established, whether in the opinion of others it is good or bad, it must be accepted, while the other school says if a custom is unreasonable, illegal and obsolete, the court ought not to accept same. Counsel cited a number of authorities most of which have no bearing on this case. For example, Ashiemoa v. Bani [1959] G.L.R. 130 a case decided before the promulgation of the Constitution, 1960, says a custom contrary to natural justice, equity and good conscience will not be enforced by the Supreme Court. It was a case on title to land. The same principle was stated in Donkor v. Danso [1959] G.L.R. 147 and Gyimah v. Kumah [1959] G.L.R. 196, where the custom which was held to be a void and
[p.1077] of [1982-83] GLR 1072
unenforceable custom, was on slavery. Anane v. Mensah [1959] G.L.R. 50, C.A. is clearly inapplicable here. Akrofi v. Akrofi [1965] G.L.R. 13 which is also inapplicable says custom which discriminates against sex is not in conformity with public policy: Nyarkoa v. Mansu [1967] G.L.R. 523 is inapplicable: Nkrumah v. Manu [1971] 1 G.L.R. 176 says custom must change with times. This may be so but it is my view that the required change must be effected by those who practise it not by the court. It is my further view that the court can only express its disapproval for same and suggest a consideration for its amendment or change.
The court may therefore not be in a position to prescribe sanctions against those who may wish to practise the custom. The courts are bound only to apply sanctions which are prescribed by statute against the practice of certain customs which are in themselves very serious criminal offences carrying death or heavy sentences; for example human sacrifice and other serious offences. It seems to me that where the observance of a particular custom may only amount to a misdemeanour or other minor offences like breach of the peace, unlawful assembly, damage to property, nuisance, etc, the court must be slow to prescribe sanctions or even suggest a change.
There may be a moral objective upon which the practice of a particular custom rests, and even though the set ideal may not commend itself to a modern thinker of a sophisticated mind, the courts must be slow in rejecting outright customs that may not, for some reason, commend themselves to them in these modern times. So in the case of Tanor v. Akosua Koko [1974] 1 G.L.R. 451 at p. 452, C.A. Apaloo J.A., as he then was, said, inter alia:
“There is something to be said for the argument that to banish a teenage girl from home and to compel her parents to disown and disinherit her for, what is after all, a girlish indiscretion, seems out of step with modern notions. Whether this court should deny validity to such sanction today, does not arise for consideration. It would be wrong to hamstring a future consideration of this matter in an appropriate case by expressing any opinion now.”
Archer J.A., as he then was, also said among other things at p. 464. “If the Krobos wish to preserve this custom to enable their maidens to vaunt about their virginity, it is a matter for the Krobos themselves. In any case, I am indifferent.” See also Sarbah Fanti Customary Laws (3rd ed.) pp. 31-32 where the learned author quoting Sir Richard Burton warned that custom must be altered cautiously as follows:
“This is addressed to those who leave their native land and settle in another; they ought to join the people with whom they live, and not pride themselves upon retaining their own manners and customs or attempt to set up new rules. This saying, in a sense a
[p.1078] of [1982-83] GLR 1072 warning, is current throughout the Gold Coast, Asanti, and neighbourhood states.
For any reform to be permanent and enduring, it must be based on and rooted in the principles of the aboriginal institutions. The patient inquirer will discover there is very little that is new on the Gold Coast, if not in all West Africa; persons administering justice may well bear in mind the words uttered by the late Judicial Assessor and first Puisne Judge of the Supreme Court, Sir James Marshall. Speaking at the Colonial Exhibition in London, 1886, he said: ‘The Gold Coast must remain the country of the natives, but with a handful of Europeans among them who have the power by which they rule these people and enforce obedience.
And whenever this rule is carried out and enforced according to European ideas, without consideration of the ideas, equally ancient and equally deep rooted, which pervade the native mind, it may break and destroy, but without securing any real improvement . . . So they have their chiefs and court forms and etiquette, their own customs and mode of living, which will not be improved by ridicule or forced abolition.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
See also Ibrahim v. Amalibini [1978] G.L.R. 368, where Taylor J.’ as he then was, held at p. 397:
As a result after 1 July 1960, the customary laws of the various tribal communities became part of the law of the country and the only test for their validity is whether they fulfil those conditions which under the general law of Ghana must be satisfied by all customary laws. They were no more subject to the imperial repugnancy provision of equity, natural justice and good conscience.”
This was emphasised even in the Constitution, 1979. Under article 4. customary law was stated as part of the law known as common law. And by article 4 (3), the expression “customary law” means the rules of law which by custom are applicable to particular communities in Ghana.
It is common ground here that it is an accepted and settled customary practice in the Western Nzima Traditional Area that when a Tufuhene dies, this very custom, of which the plaintiff is now complaining, is performed and that the plaintiff himself who is on record as having accepted the fact of this being a well-established custom, has himself been taking part in the performance of the custom in the past. On his own showing, therefore, he would have taken part in that performance if he did recognise the late Ampah as Tufuhene of Nuba at the time of his death. Thus having failed to satisfy the trial court
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that Ampah died destooled as Tufuhene, the plaintiff’s acceptance of the custom as being well-established totally defeats his claim. Surely it does not lie in his mouth now to complain when the shoe is on somebody else’s foot.
I think the evidence is that several others whose backyard gardens were destroyed in that rampage have never complained, and there is no likelihood that any of them will ever complain, because of the general awareness and recognition of the existence of the custom. Having himself in the past participated in the performance of this very custom and having thus in the course of performing the custom destroyed other persons’ property, like his, does it now lie in the plaintiff’s mouth to suggest or claim that the custom is bad, obnoxious, and unreasonable, and that, therefore, those who participated in the performance of the custom and did the very thing the plaintiff had done in the past with impunity, because it is a well-settled customary law or practice of the people of the area, should be held liable for damages and mulcted in costs?
I do not think that in the circumstances of this case it would be fair and just for the court to pronounce that the defendants must be held to be punishable because one or two persons at Nuba did refuse to recognise the late Ampah as Tufuhene of Nuba at the time of his death. It is my view that the plaintiff is for ever estopped from complaining against that custom, so long as he remains a subject of the said traditional area, since the chiefs, the elders and all the people of the traditional area have accepted that customary practice, and have in the past together with the plaintiff’s active participation performed the custom at the funerals of other departed dignitaries.
It may well now be arguable that considering the modern trend of affairs and the fact that since the days of “Operation Feed Yourself” in the mid-seventies, the Ghanaian has been made increasingly aware that he must try as much as possible to produce food to feed himself and his family on every available piece of land free for cultivation, be it in the backyard, on the outskirts of a town, or a fallow land, a custom which permits destruction of food-crops like yam, cocoyam, maize, plantain, sugar-cane and vegetables may well be considered to be out of tune with modern thinking and indeed the economics of the times. It may even appear to be in conflict with the general common law of the land and contrary to public policy. But, the moral objective upon which the practice of the custom has rested in the times past, is perhaps somehow obscure, but it is not given to the court to conduct a research into the time-honoured practices in order to pass a judgment on its validity or otherwise. The court is incompetent to do this, I think, for this appears to be one of the functions of the appropriate traditional council in a given case. This appears to be so under section 41 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), which provides:
[p.1080] of [1982-83] GLR 1072
“41. If a Traditional Council considers the customary law which is in force within its area to be uncertain or considers it desirable that it would be modified or assimilated by the common law the Council shall make representations on the matter to the House of Chiefs in the Region.”
And it seems to me that a change, if desirable, can only be lawfully made under the provisions of section 43 of Act 370.
It seems to me that the plaintiff did not appear to have had any cause of action against the defendants or any of them and he should therefore have been non-suited. In any event, I am satisfied that the plaintiff failed to establish his claim against the defendants and therefore the judgment of the trial court, which says precisely so, that the plaintiff’s claim should fail, must not be disturbed. The appeal therefore fails and it is dismissed. The respondents’ costs are assessed at 1,200 cedis.
Court below to carry out.
DECISION
Appeal dismissed.
M. C. N. N.
