ACCRA HEARTS OF OAK SPORTING CLUB vs. GHANA FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION [1982-83] GLR 111
27 May 1981 · ROGER KORSAH J · ≈ 14 min read
[1981] SLR (HC) 18Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Republic v. State Fishing Corporation Commission of Enquiry (Chairman); Ex parte Bannerman [1967] G.L.R. 536.
(2) Lawlor v. Union of Post Office Workers [1965] 1 All E.R. 353.
(3) Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. v. The Football Association Ltd. [1971] All E.R. 215.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for an order of interim injunction to restrain the defendants from implementing the decision to ban the applicants from playing their “home” matches at the Accra Sports Stadium. The facts are fully set out in the ruling.
COUNSEL
E. D. Kom for the plaintiff-applicants.
Nana Akufo-Addo for the defendant-respondents.
JUDGMENT OF KORSAH J.
A simple game of soccer, popularly known as “football” in this country, gave rise to this dispute between Accra Hearts of Oak Sporting Club (the plaintiffs herein) and the Ghana Football Association (the defendants) who, in sporting circles, are dubbed as G.F.A.
It was a match played between Accra Hearts of Oak Sporting Club and Dumas Boys of Ghana Textiles Printing on Sunday, 29 March, 1981. The venue was the Accra Sports Stadium. Many fans and enthusiasts of the game turned up to watch the two teams exhibit their skills in all aspects of the game.
It would appear that the spectators did not like the referee’s handling of the match. They protested against his performance and his decisions during the match. He was accused of robbing spectators of eight minutes of match time. He has since received the accolade of incompetence from Mr. Tommy Thompson—the Executive Chairman of the plaintiff-club.
The dissatisfaction of the spectators was, at the end of the game, vented in a riot which took the form of causing considerable damage to property at the stadium. I think every person who participated in
[p.114] of [1982-83] GLR 111 this wanton destruction of public property must bow his head down in shame. It must be understood that it is the taxes that we all pay that go to provide us with public amenities. If we turn round to destroy these amenities each of us incur the expense of restoring them to their former state. And if all our moneys are used to restore the old amenities instead of creating new ones, will there ever be progress in our general enjoyment of life in this country? It is nothing short of manic for a person to break the chair he is sitting on just because a referee ends the first half of a match three minutes before the scheduled time.
Mr. Tommy Thompson was in sympathy with the spectators over their dissatisfaction with the referee’s handling of the match. But he did not break a chair or join in the wanton destruction of property, at least there is no evidence of it. He sat down and wrote a protest note to the defendants; for it is in the defendants that is vested the management and control of football in the country. That is the lawful and proper manner of registering a protest against a referee’s inefficiency and incompetence.
But Mr. Tommy Thompson was not accorded the courtesy of a reply by the defendants. Incensed by the behaviour of the spectators, the Executive Council of GFA acted in like manner. A press release was issued in these terms:
“The Ghana Football Association has decided that with immediate effect, and until further notice, Accra Hearts of Oak will not play any `home’ match at the Accra Sports Stadium. The decision has been taken as a result of wanton acts of hooliganism and destruction committed by supporters of the club after the Hearts v.
Dumas league match played at the sports stadium on 29 March, 1981.
The Ghana Football Association will from time to time decide the venue Hearts of Oak will play their `home’ matches. The Ghana Football Association cautions that a repetition of any act of its kind will be more severely punished. Meanwhile, the extent of the damage caused to property during the riot is being assessed, and the appropriate action will be taken in due course.”
I do not for one moment dispute the authority and ability of the G.F.A to take the appropriate action in due course. I only wish to emphasise that a polite acknowledgement of a protest note and an invitation to discuss an issue before a decision is taken, can often obviate the necessity of a court action. But these common courtesies are frequently ignored. And all too often, a public servant, vested with power to perform a duty, flexes his muscles and bares his teeth where a little tact, an unbiased consideration of another’s view and a patient explanation of his duty to act would have dispelled any misunderstanding.
[p.115] of [1982-83] GLR 111
The ban from playing any of their “home” matches at the Accra Sports Stadium was imposed without the plaintiffs being given a hearing. The defendants do not deny this. It is obvious to me that the ban was imposed because the defendants believed that the supporters of the plaintiffs were responsible for the disgraceful acts of hooliganism that ensued at the end of the game. How they came by this conclusion, I do not know. It is common knowledge that the loser at a game, who is disgruntled with the result, may take umbrage and protest his dissatisfaction. None of the parties deigned it necessary to educate me about the result of the match which gave rise to this action. And to this day, I am still ignorant of the outcome of this match.
It is also common knowledge that the spectators at any football match do not comprise of only the supporters of the teams that are joined in friendly combat. Enthusiasts, football scientists and persons who for one reason or another cannot travel to watch the teams they support may all flock to watch the spectacle in their neighbourhood of two good teams pitting their strength against each other. Of this conglomerate mass of persons, who is to identify a supporter of Abusua Dwarfs from a Hearts supporter? Who can tell a mad enthusiast or a mad student of scientific soccer from a mad supporter of the plaintiff-club? No arrests were made and there is no evidence before me that identified supporters of Hearts were responsible for the destruction of property that took place at the end of the match. Could it be that the defendants read more into Mr. Tommy Thompson’s protest note than they were logically justified to do?
It is the complaint of the plaintiffs that they were not given an opportunity of being heard before the ban was imposed. And for that reason the decision violates the principles of natural justice and was of an arbitrary nature. By their writ then, the plaintiffs claim, among other reliefs, a declaration that:
“The decision of the defendants that the plaintiffs, until further notice, should not play any `home’ match at the Accra Sports Stadium is arbitrary, capricious and unjust, and an order restraining the defendants and their agents from taking any steps, overt or covert, to prevent the plaintiffs from playing their `home’ matches at the Accra Sports Stadium”.
The plaintiffs now seek an order of interim injunction to restrain the defendants from taking any steps to prevent the plaintiffs from playing their “home” matches at the Accra Sports Stadium.
It is common ground between the parties that the authority of the defendants to organise competitive soccer in this country derives from statute: the Sports Decree, 1976 (SMCD 54). Bye-laws, under that
[p.116] of [1982-83] GLR 111
Decree, to which the parties were subject, were promulgated on 25 January 1981. By section 9(1) of the bye-laws:
“Where there are more than two National League clubs at a centre, the first two clubs on the league table at the end of the league the previous year shall qualify to use the stadium on Sundays whilst the other club uses the stadium on Saturdays. Alternatively the team may at the instance of Ghana Football Association be paired up with another club at its centre, if this is possible.”
As I understand it, all the stadia in the country are under the control and management of G.F.A. By law, I think because the government is mindful of their play, G.F.A is compelled to bestow on the first two clubs, where there are more than two at a centre a right to use the local stadium for their matches on Sundays. This is a right derived from law, and which the plaintiffs may commence proceedings to protect. If, for instance, G.F.A were to grant, for no apparent reason, the third team at a league centre the right to play at the local stadium on Sundays, and to relegate the first team to play on Saturdays, can anyone gainsay the right of the first team to protest a breach of the bye-laws? Such protest can only be founded on the right bestowed on the club by or under the bye-laws.
Another view of the matter is: G.F.A, under the bye-laws, has granted the league clubs leave and licence to use stipulated stadia for their “home” matches. It is common knowledge that a portion of the gate fees goes to the clubs participating in a match. Thus the licence granted by G.F.A to these clubs is a licence coupled with a proprietary interest in the gate fees. Bye-law 35 provides that: “The disbursement of gate proceeds and the payment of transport expenses will be effected according to laid down rules by the National Sports Council.” As Megarry and Wade put it in their famous book, The Law of Real Property (4th ed) at p. 779: “At common law such a licence is both irrevocable and assignable, as an adjunct of the interest with which it is coupled.” Whilst I doubt whether the interest which the plaintiffs have in the case of the stadium is assignable, I am of the view that it is irrevocable except under the conditions laid down in the bye-laws.
Counsel for the defendants has argued strenuously that by our practice, an injunction ought not to be granted unless the applicant establishes a prima facie case. I agree with him. Guided by this principle, our courts have repeatedly refused to grant injunctions unless an applicant makes out a prima facie case. I have never deviated from that rule and I am not about to deviate from it now.
It is his contention that the plaintiffs have disclosed no proprietary interest in the stadium which ought to be protected by the grant of an
[p.117] of [1982-83] GLR 111 injunction. The application is therefore misconceived and ought to be struck out. But as demonstrated above, the plaintiffs do have a proprietary interest in the gate proceeds, and it remains to be seen whether that interest should in law be protected by the grant of an interim injunction.
This application for an injunction is to restrain the defendants from acting upon the press release above quoted, on the grounds:
(a) that as the plaintiffs were not heard before the punishment was imposed, a basic rule of natural justice, the audi alteram partem rule was breached, and (b) the decision contained in the said press release was ultra vires the rule governing football in Ghana.
Counsel for the plaintiffs has reminded me that the rule that no condemnation should be pronounced behind the back of a man who has had no opportunity to appear and defend his interest either personally or by his proper representative dates from the time of Adam. He says, God asked of Adam: “Where art thou? Has thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat?” And the same question was put to Eve also. We are not told whether any question was directed to the serpent. But then it was not a man and the rules of natural justice probably did not apply to it.
To me, the law is clear and unambiguous; all judgments, even foreign judgments of a country which permit condemnation behind the back of a man, when repugnant to this rule of natural justice, cannot be enforced in Ghana. Where, however, a man has been given the opportunity to appear and answer charges against him, and does not avail himself of the opportunity, he cannot be heard to plead a breach of this rule.
Section 21 of the bye-laws provides for the establishment of a disciplinary committee which shall have jurisdiction over all matters of indiscipline that may arise in connection with matters of the national football league, knockout competitions or any other competitions organised by the Ghana Football Association. And section 34 grants to an aggrieved club a right of appeal from any decision of the disciplinary committee to the National Sports Council for redress.
I ask myself, will a right of appeal be granted if the disciplinary committee were empowered to act arbitrarily? Such a right is not in accord with the arbitrary use of power. To my mind, these and other provisions under section 21 requiring consideration of various reports by the committee impose on the disciplinary committee a duty to act judicially. And it is a well established law that any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of citizens, and having the duty to act judicially should give adequate notice to persons likely to be affected by their proceedings or
[p.118] of [1982-83] GLR 111 decisions, so that they may be in a position to prepare their own case, appear at the inquiry and make representations on their own behalf or through a representative: see Republic v. State Fishing Corporation Commission of Enquiry (Chairman); Ex parte Bannerman [1967] G.L.R. 536 and Lawlor v. Union of Post Office Workers [1965] 1 All E.R. 353.
Learned counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that the decision contained in the press release was ultra vires the powers of the disciplinary committee, because the reason on which the decision was based is hooliganism, and section 9(2) of the bye-laws provides that:
“The Ghana Football Association may recommend the closure of any league centre where the safety of visiting clubs and match officials cannot be guaranteed”.
Thus, unless the safety of visiting clubs and match officials is threatened the committee is powerless to act.
I cannot go along with this. Learned counsel omitted the last sentence of section 9(2) which reads:
“The Ghana Football Association may transfer to another venue when it is satisfied that its supporters and players are rowdy.”
G.F.A. in my view, have the authority, under the bye-laws, to transfer a club to another venue if it is satisfied that supporters and players are rowdy. Hooliganism is, perhaps, the worst example of rowdyism. But to take such a punitive decision, the committee is bound by the rules of natural justice to give a hearing to the plaintiffs.
Learned counsel for the respondents have canvassed the view that by the terms of article 48 of the F.I.F.A. rules which provides that:
“National Association, clubs or members of clubs shall not be permitted to bring before a court of justice disputes with the Federation or other Associations, clubs or members of clubs and they must agree to submit any such disputes to an arbitration tribunal appointed by the common consent”, the jurisdiction of the courts is ousted until the parties who have subscribed to the agreement have complied with the condition to submit themselves to an arbitration.
I think counsel’s statement of the law is too wide. I would say that the courts would respect the wishes of parties to an agreement to submit to arbitration where the dispute relates to ordinary conditions of the contract, but whenever there is an allegation of the breach of the rules of natural justice, no preclusive clause in any agreement can exclude the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the matter. The law
[p.119] of [1982-83] GLR 111 is thus stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed.), Vol. 1, para. 77:
“. . . formulae purporting to exclude the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts are ineffective to protect an act or decision tainted with breach of the rule; recourse to extra-judicial appellate machinery prior to resorting to the courts to relief for breach of the rule is unnecessary and may be inappropriate; if recourse be had to such machinery, the person aggrieved is not deemed to have waived his right to object in the courts, and it has been said that a fundamental breach of the rule cannot be waived.”
See also Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. v. The Football Association Ltd. [1971] 1 All E.R. 215 at p. 219.
I am not impressed with the argument that G.F.A. is a public body created by statute and therefore the provisions of the State Proceedings Act, 1961 (Act 51) apply to it. Many government corporations, for instance, State Insurance Corporation, Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation and State Gold Mining Corporation to name but a few – can all be proceeded against and an injunction will lie at the instance of an aggrieved party to restrain them from doing anything which they are not compelled by statute to do. G.F.A. is no different. For as long as it continues performing the tasks that statute has imposed upon it in the manner prescribed by the statute setting it up, these courts cannot interfere with anything done by it. But let them ever transgress so much, and to that extent these courts have the jurisdiction to curb their transgressions.
In my judgment, an act or decision consequential upon a contravention of the audi alteram partem rule may be restrained by prohibition or an injunction or set aside by certiorari.
By far the most persuasive argument pressed upon me by the defendants is that the courts are ill-suited for proceedings of this nature. But where the principles of natural justice are breached, there is no forum superior to the courts where redress can be sought. At the same time I appreciate that the parties to this action must live and work together, and that the courts can only give guidance to G.F.A. but not stultify its rights to maintain discipline in the area of football. I shall therefore grant an interim injunction for a limited period to enable G.F.A. institute a proper judicial inquiry into the occurrences at the Accra Sports Stadium on 29 March, 1981, and to take whatever action they deem fit.
Accordingly, the defendants are hereby restrained and an order of interim injunction is hereby granted restraining the defendants from taking any steps, overt or covert, to prevent the plaintiffs’ team from playing their “home” matches at the Accra Sports Stadium until a
[p.120] of [1982-83] GLR 111 proper investigation has been conducted to ascertain who were responsible for the act of hooliganism perpetrated at the Accra Sports Stadium on 9 March, 1981.
DECISION Application for an interim injunction granted.
K. A. A.
