HIGH COURT, ACCRA
Date: 18 MARCH 1975
ABOAGYE J
CASE REFERRED TO
Hunt v. Luck [1902] 1 Ch. 428; 71 L.J.Ch. 239; 86 L.T. 68; 50 W.R. 291; 18 T.L.R. 265; 46 S.J. 229,
C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
ACTION to eject the defendants from a house on the ground that the defendants had failed to attorn tenant to the plaintiff. The facts are fully set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Kofi-Sackey for the plaintiff.
S. M. Cudjoe for U. V. Campbell for the defendants.
JUDGMENT OF ABOAGYE J.
In this suit the plaintiff, on behalf of his infant daughter, Helen Adu-Sarkodie, claims against the defendants an order for ejectment in respect of house No. E. 323/2, Seventh Avenue, Accra.
It is the case for the plaintiff that on or about 14 December 1973, he purchased house No. E. 323/2, Seventh Avenue, Accra, from one Mr. B. K. Edusei, at ¢70,000.00 for his infant daughter mentioned above. Subsequent to the purchase he found that the defendants were in occupation of the house and that they had been in occupation at the time of the purchase. The plaintiff invited the defendants to attorn tenant to him but they refused to do so.
The defendants deny having refused to attorn tenant to the plaintiff. Their case is that by a lease granted to them by Mr. B. K. Edusei they became tenants of the said Mr. B. K. Edusei with effect from 1 July 1969.
[p.413] of [1975] 1 GLR 411
Under the said lease they were to occupy the house for ten years at a monthly rent of ¢400.00 with an option for renewal for a further ten years. Rent had been paid in advance to Mr. B. K. Edusei under the lease to 31 October 1975. It is the case for the defendants that prior to the purchase of the house by the plaintiff the latter inspected the house and got to know that they were in occupation thereof. By a letter dated 19 March 1974, the plaintiff requested them to negotiate a new tenancy agreement with him but they did not deem that necessary in view of the lease they had entered into with the plaintiff’s vendor.
The defendants resist the plaintiff ‘s claim on two grounds, namely: (1) that they have not refused to attorn tenant to the plaintiff, and (2) that as tenants of the plaintiff they have not committed any acts which entitle the plaintiff to an order for ejectment under the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220).
Although the plaintiff denied in his evidence that at the time he purchased the house from Mr. B. K. Edusei he was aware that it was occupied by the defendants at the rent of ¢400.00 a month, I am satisfied from the evidence of Mr. Evans Quayson and Mr. Osei Mensah who sold the house on behalf of Mr. B. K. Edusei that he was made aware of the defendants’ tenancy at the time he was taken to the house for his inspection. The witnesses gave evidence that when they took the plaintiff to the house they met some steward boys on the compound. There was also erected at the gate the signboard of the defendants. They also stated that Mr. Osei Mensah told the plaintiff before the latter purchased the house that the defendants were tenants in it.
Both Mr. Quayson and Mr. Osei Mensah struck me as truthful witnesses. Mr. Osei Mensah’s evidence that he and the plaintiff were very good friends was not challenged. No reason was suggested by Mr. Kofi Sackey why the two gentlemen should tell lies about the plaintiff and I cannot find one. The plaintiff did not impress me as a person who would pay out ¢70,000.00 without knowing full details of what he is paying for.
The purchaser of a house has, from the fact of the tenant’s occupation, notice of his interest whatever it may be, and he takes, accordingly, subject to the tenant’s rights: see Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 34, para. 644 at p. 366 and Hunt v. Luck [1902] 1 Ch. 428 at p. 433, C.A. where Vaughan Williams L.J. stated that:
“if a purchaser or a mortgagee has notice that the vendor or mortgagor is not in possession of the property, he must make inquiries of the person in possession—of the tenant who is in possession—and find out from him what his rights are, and, if he does not choose to do that, then whatever title he acquires as purchaser or mortgagee will be subject to the title or right of the tenant in possession.”
The plaintiff in this suit did not inquire from the defendants what their rights were and on the authorities he is deemed to have had notice of any rights they might have had in relation to the house. What rights did the defendants have? They claim to be tenants of the house at a monthly rent of ¢400.00 under a lease. It appears that no formal lease was executed
[p.414] of [1975] 1 GLR 411
by the defendants and Mr. B. K. Edusei, their then landlord, but letters embodying the agreed terms of a lease, dated 3 December 1968, and 5 July 1969, respectively, were signed by the parties. The letters were tendered in evidence on behalf of the defendants as the source of their rights against the house acquired by the plaintiff.
It does not appear on the face of exhibits 1 and 2 that they have been registered under the Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122). In any case there is no evidence that they were registered. Section 24 (1) of the Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122) says:
“24. (1) Subject to subsection (2), of this section, an instrument other than,
(a) a will, or
(b) a judge’s certificate,
first executed after the commencement of this Act shall be of no effect until it is registered.”
“Instrument” is defined under section 36 of Act 122 as “any writing affecting land situate in Ghana, including a judge’s certificate and memorandum of deposit of title deeds.” The Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122), came into force on 2 November 1962 (see the Land Registry Act, 1962 (Commencement) Instrument, 1962 (L.I. 234)).
Exhibits 1 and 2 are instruments under the Land Registry Act, 1962, and since they have not been registered they are of no effect and the defendants cannot validly claim any rights under them. The position therefore is that at the time the plaintiff purchased the house from Mr. B. K. Edusei the defendants had no valid rights under the lease of which the plaintiff could take notice.
The defendants were tenants of Mr. B. K. Edusei prior to the sale of the house to the plaintiff. By this judgment their tenancy under the lease granted by Mr. Edusei has been terminated by operation of law. The defendants are, by section 36 of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), therefore statutory tenants and they can only be ejected from the premises under the specific provisions of section 17 (1) of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), the only enactment which regulates the relationship between landlords and tenants in this country. The plaintiff ‘s claim is not based on the Rent Act and he cannot obtain the order he seeks.
DECISION
The claim is accordingly dismissed with ¢200.00 costs.
