ADUSAH vs. ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1981] GLR 228
26 February 1981 · CHARLES CRABBE JSC · ≈ 20 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Darkwa v. The Republic [1981] G.L.R. 241, C.A.
(2) Hare v. Horton (1833) 110 E.R. 954; 5 B. and Ad. 715; 2 Nev. and M.K.B. 428; 3 L.J.K.B. 41.
(3) R. v. Caledonian Railway (1850) 16 Q.B. 19; 20 L.J.Q.B. 147; 16 L.T.O.S. 280; 15 Jur. 396; 117 E.R. 782.
[p.230] of [1981] GLR 228 (4) Thames (River) Conservators v. Smeed, Dean & Co. [1897] 2 Q.B. 334; 66 L.J.Q.B. 716; 77 L.T.
325; 61 J.P. 612; 45 W.R. 691; 13 T.L.R. 524; 41 S.J. 675 C.A.
(5) Docksteader v. Clark (1903) 11 B.C.R. 37.
(6) Turgeon v. Dominion Bank [1930] S.C.R. 67; [1929] 40 D.L.R. 1028; 47 Que. K.B. 383; 10 C.B.R.
212.
(7) Salmon v. Duncombe (1886) 11 App.Cas. 627; 55 L.J.P.C. 69; 55 L.T. 446, P.C. (8) Richards v. McBride (1881) 8 Q.B.D. 119; 51 L.J.M.C. 15; 45 L.T. 667; 46 J.P. 247; 30 W.R. 120. (9) R. v. Wimbledon Justices; Ex parte Derwent [1953] 1 Q. B. 380; [1953] 1 All E.R. 390; [1953] 2 W.L.R. 350; 117 J.P. 113; 97 S.J. 116; 51 L.G.R. 432, D.C.
(10) Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Henderson Brothers (1888) 13 App. Cas. 595; 58 L.J.Q.B.
152; 59 L.T. 697; 37 W.R. 449; 4 T.L.R. 703; 6 Asp. M.L.C. 338, H.L.
(11) Crawford v. Spooner ( 1846) 6 Moo. P.C.C. 1; 4 Moo. Ind. App. 179; 13 E.R. 582, P.C. (12) Lord Howard de Walden v. I.R.C. [1948] 2 All E.R. 825; 3 O.T.C. 345, H.L.
(13) Magor and St. Mellons R.D.C. v. Newport Corporation [1951] 2 All E.R. 839; [1952] A.C. 189;
[1951] 2 T.L.R. 935; 115 J.P. 613, H.L.
(14) Gwynne v. Burnell (1840) 7 C1. and Fin 572.
(15) Practice Direction [1973] 2 G.L.R. 39, C.A.
(16) Harlley v. Ejura Farms Ltd. [1977] 2 G.L.R. 179, C.A. (full bench).
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against the adverse findings made by the committee appointed under the Committee of Inquiry (Recent Disturbances in the Police Force) Instrument, 1979 (E.I. 38). The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of the court.
COUNSEL
M. Atadika for the appellant.
Mrs. Zwennes, Principal State Attorney for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF CHARLES CRABBE J.S.C.
Charles Crabbe J.S.C. delivered the judgment of the court. The appellant in this case is invoking the jurisdiction of this court conferred by the provisions of article 198 (2) of the Constitution, 1979. He is appealing against the adverse findings of the committee established under the Committee of Inquiry (Recent Disturbances in the Police Force) Instrument, 1979 (E.I. 38). His complaint is against; [p.231] of [1981] GLR 228 “(a) The decision recommending that the appellant should be prosecuted in the courts for the offence of corruption of a public officer.
(b) The finding that the conduct of the appellant in signing the vouchers was negligent and that it was the said negligent conduct which made the Winneba recruits fraud possible—a finding which completely ignored the explanations of the appellant.
(c) The decision recommending the premature retirement of the appellant.”
The reliefs he seeks are:
“(a) All adverse findings, conclusions, decision and comments of the committee made by the committee against the appellant be set aside, reversed, overturned or disturbed and judgment be entered or delivered in favour of the appellant.
(b) The appellant be restored to his appropriate position in the Police Service.”
Counsel for the appellant argued that the committee did not do its work as required by law. It was required to carry out an investigative inquiry. A cardinal principle of such an inquiry is the injunction to give a fair and an impartial hearing. The principle of audi alteram partem must be strictly adhered to. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council in its Proclamation, 1979, had accepted the idea of the rule of law. There was, in fact, no hearing as required by law. This was so fundamental, such that its absence knocks the bottom off the inquiry. Therefore any finding would be null and void once that fundamental matter was in the favour of the appellant.
There were various findings. Allegations of bribery and corruption had been made involving ¢5,000. The appellant never had the opportunity to hear the evidence given to substantiate such allegations. He never had the opportunity to face his accusers. Indeed, there was no investigation at all. The committee itself did not have before it the evidence of the complainant. The committee called the appellant and asked him to explain about the ¢5,000. The appellant did not know whoever made the allegations. The complainant was not called to give evidence. Mr. Annan who made the complaint did not come forward to establish the allegations. The money was alleged to have been given on 7 July. It was not until 13 July that he was summoned to the office of the Inspector-General of Police. He denied the allegations. There was no other evidence before the
[p.232] of [1981] GLR 228 committee. And there was no basis for the contention of the committee that it had considered “oath against oath.” There was therefore no basis for the recommendations of the committee. Their own comments, that they “do not find the particular allegation proved ,” show that they had their doubts.
On the question of negligence, counsel submitted that the finding was not supported by any evidence. The appellant gave an adequate explanation. He was relying on his subordinates. The findings were not fair to him, because of the explanation—a reasonable explanation. No evidence was taken from the persons who did the pre-auditing. Various people had dealt with the vouchers. They were all available in the Police Service. The committee failed in its duty since there was no proper investigation and inquiry. He finally submitted that the findings should be vacated.
Counsel for the respondent raised the question of jurisdiction. She submitted that the court should address its mind to section 3 (2) (a) of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Tribunal and Other Matters) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 23). An interim report had been submitted. That would bring the case within the ambit of section 17 of the First Schedule to the Constitution, 1979, and as such sections 10 and 11 of that Schedule would not be applicable. She argued that the expression “said committee” should be dealt with in relation to section 3 (2) (a) of A.F.R.C.D. 23. The report was a judicial act. On the merits, she felt it would not be wise to address the court on the issue of audi alteram partem. She conceded that point. She also conceded that there was no evidence to support the finding on the bribery issue. But on negligence, counsel for the respondent concluded, she would argue that each officer assigned to check a financial document must satisfy himself that the claim was a just and proper one.
We have dealt, in our ruling in Republic v. Darkwa [1981] G.L.R. 241, C.A. with the question of jurisdiction. That ruling affects this appeal. For under the provisions of article 121 (3) of the Constitution, 1979, this court is bound by its own previous decisions. We understand that there has been no appeal against that ruling. An attempt was made; but no appeal has, in fact, been lodged.
It behoves us however, since counsel for the respondent had very kindly drawn our attention to the provisions of section 3 (2) (a) of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Tribunal and Other Matters) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 23), to consider that aspect of the issue. It has been argued that this court in the Darkwa case (supra) did not address its mind to that provision. If it had, the ruling would have been otherwise. Section 3 (2) of the Decree under discussion states:
[p.233] of [1981] GLR 228
“(2) The committees of inquiry referred to in subsection (1) of this section are —
(a) all committees of inquiry established by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council;
(b) all committees of inquiry established at any time whose reports were submitted by such committees to the Government of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.”
The relevant provisions of subsection (1) which refers to committees of inquiry are:
“(b) shall have exclusive jurisdiction to try all criminal offences disclosed by or arising out of the reports of the committees of inquiry described in subsection (2) of this section; and (c) shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review the adverse findings of any such committee of inquiry, on the application of any person aggrieved by any such finding.”
This looks like renvoi. But not quite. All that section 3 (2) of the Decree does is to define what are the committees over which the special tribunal had been given certain powers of trial and review. Section 3 (2) is, therefore, no more nor less than a definition. The section should, therefore, be read as a whole.
Section 3 (2) (a) deals with all committees established by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. This definition, by necessary implication, excludes all committees of inquiry not established by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. This is based on the well known maxim of statutory interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The earlier examples of the application of the maxim can be found in Hare v. Horton (1833) 110 E.R. 954 and R. v. Caledonian Railway (1850) 16 Q.B. 19.
Section 3 (2) (b) deals with all committees of inquiry established at any time. The words “all” and “at any time” are significant. “All” means all not some. “At any time” embraces any moment of time. The definition in section 3 (2) (b) thus includes all committees established by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. Were not that the intention, the word “other” would have been used and the definition would have read, “all other committees of inquiry established at any time . . .”
Is there, then, an overlapping in the definitions? The answer is Yes! Yes, because there would appear to be two provisions governing the same matter. The two definitions are in the same section. And are they in conflict? The definition in paragraph (a) is exclusive. The definition in paragraph (b) is inclusive. In Thames (River) Conservators v. Smeed, Dean & Co. [1897] 2 Q.B. 334, C.A. the Thames
[p.234] of [1981] GLR 228
Conservatory Act set out the powers of the conservation in four paragraphs. Paragraph (a) used the words “the Thames”; paragraph (b) used the words “the bed and channel of the Thames;” paragraph (c) used the words “The Thames” and paragraph (d) used the words “the Thames or … the banks or shores thereof.” It was urged upon the court that because paragraph (d) mentioned the word “shores,” they are excluded from the other paragraphs. Chitty L.J., refused to have truck with this argument. He said at pp. 350-351:
“The leading power is that under (a) to dredge, cleanse, and scour the Thames. This is general, and, in my opinion, includes the shore. The powers under (b), (c) and (d) seem to be subsidiary powers. I can see no sufficient reason for excluding the shores from (b) and (c): they are expressly included in (d). To an Act drawn as this is, I think it would be dangerous to apply the rule expressum facit cessare tacitum. I decline to draw the inference that because shores are mentioned in (d) they are excluded from (a), (b) and (c).”
We would also decline to draw the inference as urged upon us that because “all committees of inquiry established by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council” are mentioned in paragraph (a) they are excluded from committees mentioned in paragraph (b) of section 3 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23.
In a Canadian case, Docksteader v. Clark (1903) 11 B.C.R. 37, it was suggested by Hunter C.J. that in the case of the overlapping provisions considered in that case the maxim abundans cautela non nocet was the one to apply and not expressio unius. In another Canadian case, Turgeon v. Dominion Bank [1930] S.C.R. 67, the Supreme Court dealt with a section of the Bank Act. The section provided that banks were authorised to:
“(c) deal in … bills of exchange, promissory notes and the negotiable securities … ; and (d) engage in and carry on such business generally as appertains to the business of banking.”
It was argued whether the bank could take insurance policies as security for a loan. It was also argued that since paragraph (c) expressly mentioned negotiable securities upon which the bank could lend money, it was not the intention of the legislature that the bank could, under paragraph (d) deal in non-negotiable securities. The Supreme Court refused to accept that contention. It held that paragraph (d) was meant to have its full effect. There was no basis for
[p.235] of [1981] GLR 228 the argument that because non-negotiable securities were excluded from paragraph (c) they were also excluded from paragraph (d).
Can it be said, then, as it was hinted in the course of argument that, there is a drafting error, that is to say, the absence of the word “other” after the word “all” in paragraph (b) of section 3 (2)? The paragraph would then read “all other committees of inquiry. . .” The omission of the word “other” cannot be corrected in this instance. For one thing, there is no ambiguity in the paragraph. And for another, reading paragraphs (a) and (b) together there is no apparent conflict. Nor is there an apparent disharmony reading both paragraphs together. In Salmon v. Duncombe (1886) 11 App. Cas. 627, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council ignored the last words of a section and strained the grammar of the remainder of the section in order to achieve harmony. But the committee could only do so because a literal reading of the section would reduce to a nullity the main object of the statute as stated in the preamble and the title. Parliament could not be taken to have gone through a useless exercise. But then that is not the case here.
But more importantly, Richards v. McBride (1881) 8 Q.B.D. 119 at p. 122, is authority for the proposition that it is not for the courts to assume a mistake and then seek to correct the assumed mistake. And in R. v. Wimbledon Justices; Ex parte Derwent [1953] 1 Q.B. 380, Lord Goddard C.J. said at p. 384, D.C.:
“although in construing an Act of Parliament the court must always try to give effect to the intention of the Act and must look not only at the remedy provided but also at the mischief aimed at, it cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there . . .”
The authorities are numerous. They are unanimous in this that “Judges may not wrest the language of Parliament even to avoid an obvious mischief.” And Lord Halsbury L.C. said in Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Henderson Brothers (1888) 13 App.Cas. 595 at p. 602, H.L., “no case can be found to authorise the construction of the majority of the Court of Appeal altering a word so as to produce a cassus omissus.” And in Crawford v. Spooner (1846) 6 Moo. P.C.C. 1, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council said, “We cannot aid the legislature’s defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add and mend, and, by construction make up deficiencies which are left there.” The case of Lord Howard de Walden v.
I.R.C. [1948] 2 All E.R. 825 at p. 830, H.L. is also very instructive. And in Magor and St. Mellons R.D.C. v. Newport Corporation [1951] 2 All E.R. 839, the House of Lords held that a court has no power to fill in gaps disclosed in an Act. To do so would be to usurp the
[p.236] of [1981] GLR 228 functions of the legislature. All these are in conformity with the earlier case of Gwynne v. Burnell (1840) 7 C1 and Fin. 572, H.L. where Lord Brougham said:
“If we depart from the plain and obvious meaning on account of such views we in truth do not construe the Act but alter it. We add words to it, or vary the words in which its provisions are couched. We supply a defect which the Legislature could easily have supplied, and are making the law, not interpreting it. This becomes peculiarly improper in dealing with a modern statute, because the extreme conciseness of the ancient statutes was the only ground for the sort of legislative interpretation frequently put upon their words by the Judges. The prolixity of modern statutes, so very remarkable of late, affords no ground to justify such a sort of interpretation.”
The moral of all these authorities, if a moral it can be called, is that where the meaning is plain, then the consequences should be disregarded by the courts.
Then there is the use of the word “review” in section 17 (3) of the First Schedule to the Constitution, 1979, and the use of the word “appeal” in article 198 (2) of the same Constitution. A review is a revision. For some time the full bench of the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction conferred upon it by the provisions of section 3 (2) of the Courts (Amendment) Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 101), to review its own decisions. The Practice Direction [1973] 2 G.L.R. 39, C.A. makes it quite clear that this jurisdiction is limited to questions of law and the issue of miscarriage of justice. Harlley v. Ejura Farms (Ghana) Ltd. [1977] 2 G.L.R. 179, C.A. (full bench) confirms that view.
But “appeal” is a judicial examination by a higher court of the decision of a lower court. In its widest sense “appeal” includes an appeal by way of case stated, or by way of certiorari. In its usual acceptation an appeal is lodged eo nomine by virtue of the jurisdiction conferred by statute. That is the sense in which we understand the use of the word “appeal” in article 198 (2) of the Constitution, 1979.
Another illustration which could help in an appreciation of the matter is the status of the Supreme Court as now established. It is not a court established to review the decisions of the Court of Appeal. It cannot be equated to the previously existing full bench of the Court of Appeal. It is a court entirely different from the full bench of the Court of Appeal. It has original jurisdiction. It has appellate jurisdiction. But its appellate jurisdiction is not limited. Such as was the jurisdiction of the full bench of the Court of Appeal.
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Reading section 17 of the First Schedule to the Constitution, 1979, as a whole, we cannot but wonder whether the whole tenor of that section is not somewhat analogous to the position of the Court of Appeal vis-a-vis its ordinary and full bench. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council were about to leave the scene. They had created certain judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. These bodies were established as part of the major exercise, as stated in section 16 of the First Schedule to the Constitution:
“. . . to purge the Armed Forces of corruption and graft and to restore the image of the Military and to deal with the accomplices of the guilty members of the Armed Forces and other persons guilty of malpractices to the detriment of the economy of Ghana or the public interest or both . . .”
One such body is the committee, the findings of which are the subject-matter of this appeal. By the various amendments to paragraph 3 (d) of its instrument of establishment—E.I. 38—it is obvious that the report of the committee, it was anticipated, could be submitted after the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council had left the scene. Once a committee of inquiry submits its final report its work is done. It has no other function. What happens to its report is not its concern. It becomes functus officio. It is in recognition of this fact that the special tribunal was given jurisdiction to review the adverse findings of any such committee, “whose report [is] submitted . . . to the Government of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.”
Where the report of such a committee is submitted not to the Government of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council but to some other government—in this context, the government in being after that council had left the scene—that government of the day would have full powers to take its own decisions. And the special tribunal would have no jurisdiction whatsoever in order to fetter the hands of the government of the day to take its own decisions on the report—and carry out whatever implementations are called for. The Constitution, 1979, did not envisage that the special tribunal was going to be a permanent feature of the administration of justice in this country.
Hence the significance of the provisions of article 198 (2) of the Constitution. There is thus no conflict between the two provisions. The effect of section 17 (7) of the First Schedule to the Constitution, is to emphasise the need to have recourse to the provisions of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Tribunal and Other Matters) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 23). It also means that that Decree is enforceable whatever the Constitution may say.
[p.238] of [1981] GLR 228
The defects of that Decree, therefore, are its own millstone. And it must hang around its neck—not that of the Constitution.
On the merits of this appeal, there is really very little to say. Counsel for the respondent agrees that the committee did not conduct the inquiry in a manner consistent with the established principles which govern the working of a committee of inquiry. She also conceded that there was no evidence to support one other finding of the committee. On the question of negligence she argued that there was sufficient evidence on which the committee could have found as it did. This is based on the principle that an officer who had a responsibility to check a financial document ought to satisfy himself that the claim is a just and proper one. This is linked with the bribery allegation and the finding that the appellant be prosecuted.
It appears that on this issue what the committee did was to take a report made available to it and cross-examine the appellant on it. Here is the relevant cross-examination:
“Q. Did you give the money to him?
A. No, I didn’t give him money but when I was confronted, when I was put before the Inspector-General of Police he said I gave the money to him on Saturday. It was Friday I was confronted. This has given me light so I am appealing to the committee not to recommend me to court.
Q. Between the two of you we have not the machinery to decide that this man is more credible than the other. The appropriate forum for that type of case is the court. I think you must appreciate our position. That is why we have been given the power to recommend prosecution, because whether you like it or not, there is fiscal money waiting—¢5,000 representing money that you are alleged to have paid as bribe. You should not blame the committee.
A Recently there was a case at Winneba. This Winneba case was investigated by the police. We have a regional paymaster at Cape Coast and then they have officer commanding at the depot. It is CO/Depot who approves of their conveyance. He signs the conveyance. After that, those conveyance orders are sent to the paymaster who is in charge of the region. He certifies them as correct. After this, those vouchers are sent to the auditors who are different from my outfit. The officers would audit these files. In this particular case, the Inspector-General of Police was in. The former Inspector-General of Police had not been arrested. He was in the office. When those vouchers came, which I have seen that those vouchers have
[p.239] of [1981] GLR 228 been signed by the commanding officer, have been authorised by the paymaster, have been re-audited, the best thing I have to do was to authorise the voucher. It came at a time that there was an anonymous letter.”
Based on that evidence, the committee came to the conclusion that it would “leave to the courts to decide on the bribery allegation against [the appellant].” There is a weakness in law in this recommendation. The records show clearly that the committee had before it a report by a chief superintendent, of the investigation conducted at the instance of the Inspector-General of Police on this issue of bribery. Indeed the committee reproduced in their report what appears to be the report of the chief superintendent. This means that the committee was fully seised of the matter. Having studied that report, having cross-examined the appellant on that issue, it recommended that the truth of this matter should be established by a court of competent jurisdiction. It seems to us that the committee had by this abandoned a duty imposed upon it by the instrument to find out the fact of the matter. In that it slipped. There was before the committee sufficient prima facie evidence on which to proceed and come to a conclusion as it was required to do by its instrument. We do not think the committee was deficient to deal with the matter.
The committee found itself faced with “the evidential dilemma of oath against oath.” What in our view the committee meant by this expression is that the principal actors in that particular drama had already met on the stage. But from their performance, as put before them by the report of the chief superintendent, and from the committee’s own cross-examination of the appellant, it was unable to decide upon the truth of the matter. But then the committee had a duty to decide on the fact of the matter.
We do not, also, agree with the other finding complained of—the finding relating to negligence. It is true that each officer who deals with such financial documents as were dealt with in this case has a responsibility to satisfy himself as to the propriety and justness of the claims being made. It is equally true that senior officers are entitled to trust their subordinates. Administration in any area entitled successfully go on if those above do not repose a modicum of trust in those below. Some measure of trust is necessary. And the fact that occasionally one is let down by one’s subordinates does not militate against this sound administrative principle. And we do not think that reliance on such a well-established principle could be described as negligence. Indeed the appellant did tell the committee that the practice obtains in the Accountant-General’s
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Department. There is no evidence to show that this was challenged. The committee’s report clearly shows that a number of police officers and men were involved in the “Winneba recruits fraud deal.” But the committee did not make a proper investigation of the matter. In this the committee failed. We would thus set aside that recommendation.
We do not also support the recommendations for the premature retirement of the appellant. The committee itself had recommended that the courts are more competent to deal with the question of bribery. Bribery is a serious charge to make against any person. That is a serious matter for the determination of the courts. Until that is determined nothing positive has been proved against the appellant. At worst the appellant could be interdicted by the Inspector-General of Police. And we accordingly draw his attention to our observations on re-instatement in Darkwa v. The Republic (supra).
Again the committee had recommended that, “the job of a paymaster is a technical one and that a properly qualified accountant should be in charge of the pay outfit.” This is a recognition by the committee that a square peg was ill-fitted within a round hole. The appellant cannot be held responsible for that. Taking all these circumstances into account we would set aside all the findings of the committee—and accordingly they all are set aside.
We make no order as to costs.
DECISION Appeal allowed.
Findings of committee set aside.
J. K. E. E.
