Division: IN THE SUPREME COURT
Date: 30 JUNE 1964
Before: MILLS-ODOI, OLLENNU AND AKAINYAH JJSC
JUDGMENT OF OLLENNU JSC
Ollennu JSC delivered the judgment of the court. The appellant was convicted by the Circuit Court, Kumasi, of the offence of fraud by false pretences, contrary to section 131 of the Criminal Code, 1960.1 He was charged and tried jointly with another person who was the second defendant but that other person was acquitted. He appealed against his said conviction to the High Court, Kumasi, but the same was dismissed, and he has now appealed to this court against the decision of the High Court upholding his conviction.
Six grounds of appeal were filed, these were argued in two groups, namely, grounds one and two together, and grounds three, four, five and six also together. The essence of these two sets of grounds are: (1) the charge is bad because the particulars failed to allege “defrauding” or “intent to defraud,” and (2) the false pretence of which evidence was given is at variance with the pretence alleged in the charge.
Each of these two questions of law was argued in the circuit court as well as in the High Court. As regards the first point the learned circuit judge held that “by section 133 [of the Criminal Code, 1960, (Act 29)] it is not necessary to allege ‘intention to defraud’ in a charge of fraud by false pretences as is the case in England where the Larceny Act, 1916, section 32 which creates the offence is so worded that the ‘intention to defraud’ must be alleged”; and that even if it were so here in Ghana, section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 19602 cures such defect. As regards the second point, he held in effect that the representation proved was the same as that alleged. As regards the first point the learned judge of the High Court held3 that by virtue of section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960, which prescribes the form in which a charge and the particulars thereof should be framed, the “obvious object” of particulars of a charge4 “is to give the appellant reasonable information as to the legal nature of the charge” and therefore that “those particulars are not expected to set out all the ingredients of the offence.”
He continued5:
“The nature of the offence in this case as I understand it, is that it was alleged by the prosecution that the fraud of which the appellant stood charged, consisted in his obtaining cash from the complainant by a false pretence. The latter ingredient is very copiously statutorily defined in section 133 of the Criminal Code, 1960, and contains an intent to defraud.”
He concluded6: “The particulars in this case gave the appellant reasonable information as to the nature of the charge and are, in my opinion, sufficient.” As regards the second point the learned judge said7:
“It is not difficult to see why, in England, the slightest variance between the pretence alleged and the one proved by the evidence is deemed to be fatal. This seems to me to be because the pretence can be reproduced verbatim in the words of the person accused. In this country, it would normally be in a Ghanaian language which must be reduced as accurately as possible into English.”
Upon that reasoning he held8: “I am wholly unable to say that there was anything like a fatal variance between the pretence alleged and the evidence adduced in this case.”
The charge preferred against the appellant reads9:
“Statement of Offence
Fraud by false pretences: Contrary to section 131 of Act 29 of 1960.
Particulars of Offence
1. Kofi Akowuah District Commissioner
2. Kwaku Fobi II, Odikro of Agyamasu, during November, 1961 at Bekwai in Ashanti Circuit and within the jurisdiction of this court, did obtain the sum of £G200 from one Opanin Kwasi Kokor by a false pretence, namely, that the said Opanin Kwasi Kokor was wanted for arrest and detention under the Preventive Detention Act and that if he paid the said sum Kofi Akowuah could prevent his arrest and detention.”
Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the omission of the words “with intent to defraud” or “defrauded” from the charge is fatal and rendered the charge bad. He submitted that without those words the charge, i.e. the statement of offence together with the particulars of offence, disclosed no triable offence. He cited the following local cases among others in support of his submission: I.G.P. v. Amuah,10 and I.G.P. v. da Silva,11 cases of fraud by false pretence in each of which it was held that omission to include the words “with intent to defraud” or “defrauded” in a charge is fatal; R. v. Bandoh,12 a case of perjury where it was held that failure to include an averment that the defendant knowingly falsely swore or did not believe what he swore to be true is a fatal defect if not cured by amendment. He also relied on the following English cases: R. v. Schweller,13 R. v. Hyde,14 and R. v. Franks.15 He distinguished those cases from R. v. Igbinovia16 which he submitted is not applicable for
two reasons, namely, (1) it was based on the principle that in Nigeria different principles apply to the framing of charges on summary trial and on indictment and (2) the report is so scanty that it does not disclose the essential points upon which the decision was based; next the case of R. v. McVitie,17 which he submitted was based upon principles other than those in issue in this case. Counsel submitted quite fairly that the McVitie18 case conflicts with the previous cases on the point, and so it was for this court to make up its mind as to which of the two conflicting views would follow.
Learned Director of Public Prosecutions firstly submitted that the cases cited are not binding upon the court by reason of the provisions of article 42, section (4) of the Constitution, 1960, that
“The Supreme Court shall in principle be bound to follow its own previous decisions on questions of law, and the High Court shall be bound to follow previous decisions of the Supreme Court on such questions, but neither court shall be otherwise bound to follow the previous decisions of any court on questions of law.”
We must say at once that this being a criminal case, we do not consider ourselves bound by decisions of any court whether or not it is a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction whose jurisdiction was taken over by this court; other considerations may apply to civil cases, but those are irrelevant here. In criminal cases what we have to do is to examine each case cited to us critically, and if we find ourselves in agreement with any decision we will adopt it, otherwise we reject it. Here we quote with approval the words of Lord Goddard C.J. in R. v. Taylor,19 where he said:
“I should like to say one word about the re-consideration of a case by this court. A court of appeal usually considers itself bound by its own decisions or by decisions of a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction. For instance, the Court of Appeal in civil matters considers itself bound by its own decisions or by the decisions of the Exchequer Chamber, and, as is well known, the House of Lords always considers itself bound by its own decisions. In civil matters it is essential in order to preserve the rule of stare decisis that that should be so, but this court has to deal with the liberty of the subject and if, on re-consideration, in the opinion of a full court the law has been either mis-applied or misunderstood and a man has been sentenced for an offence, it
will be the duty of the court to consider whether he has been properly convicted. The practice observed in civil cases ought not to be applied in such a case . . .”
The Director of Public Prosecutions next submitted that in Ghana the only words that need be alleged in a charge under section 131 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (supra), are “by false pretences” or “ falsely pretended,” and that the words “intent to defraud” or “defrauded” are not essential, and that the insertion of those words “intent to defraud” or “defrauded” renders section 133 of the Criminal Code, 1960, which defines “false pretence,” useless and unnecessary. He further submitted that while “false pretence” is defined in Ghana to include “intent to defraud,” it is not so defined in England; therefore it is necessary in England to aver “intent to defraud” to constitute the offence. Another reason he gave why averment of those words is essential in a charge of false pretences in England is that in England the offence under section 32 of the Larceny Act, 1916,20 can be committed with one or other of different intents; therefore the intent relied upon in a particular case must be alleged to enable a defendant to know what he is defending. He referred the court to Archbold, Criminal Pleading Evidence & Practice (35th ed.), paragraph 1932 as to the different intents, any one of which may create the offence.
Stopping here for a moment, we would observe that the learned Director of Public Prosecutions is under a misapprehension in his reference to intent in the offence of false pretence in England. Section 32 of the Larceny Act, 1916, reproduced in Archbold, Criminal Pleading Evidence & Practice (35th ed.), paragraph 1932 to which he drew our attention, deals with two separate and distinct offences, namely (i) obtaining foods, money, or valuable security, etc., and (ii) procuring the execution, making, endorsement, destruction, etc. of any valuable security. The first of these, obtaining goods, money, etc.. requires only one intent to make it an offence, that intent is “intent to defraud,” it is the second which may be committed with one or other of two intents; namely, (a) intent to defraud and or (b) intent to injure any other person.
The Director of Public Prosecutions submitted that the case of I.G.P. v. Amuah, (supra), was based upon R. v. James,21 which was decided before the Indictments Act, 1915,22 and therefore was not applicable since the provisions of the Indictments Act, 1915, as to the form of the indictment or charge, re-enacted by section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960, have laid down the form with which a charge or indictment should comply, and therefore the court has to look within the four corners of section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960, to ascertain what averments are essential.
He next referred to the said section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960, which provides:
(1) Subject to the special rules as to indictments hereinafter mentioned, every charge, complaint, summons, warrant, or other document laid, issued, or made for the purpose of or in connection with any proceedings before any Court for an offence, shall be sufficient if it contains a statement of the specific offence with which the accused person is charged, together with such particulars as may be necessary for giving reasonable information as to the nature of the charge.
(2) The statement of the offence shall describe the offence shortly in ordinary language, avoiding as far as possible the use of technical terms, and without necessarily stating all the essential elements of the offence, and, if the offence is one created by an enactment, shall contain a reference to the section of the enactment.
(3) Where an enactment applies to acts committed before its commencement a charge under the enactment in respect of such an act shall contain a reference to the section of the enactment under which the accused is charged, notwithstanding that the enactment was not in force at the time when the act is alleged to have been committed.
(4) After the statement of the offence, necessary particulars of the offence shall be set out in ordinary language, in which the use of technical terms shall not be required.”
Learned Director of Public Prosecutions emphasised that by subsection (1) thereof, all the particulars which the law requires a charge or indictment to contain are matters which are necessary for giving a defendant “reasonable information as to the nature of the charge,” and that by subsection (4) thereof, the charge “shall be set out in ordinary language, in which the use of technical terms shall not be required.” He contended that the term “fraud by false pretences” is not a technical term, that in law it bears the ordinary dictionary definition, and therefore when used in a charge it does not require any further explanation in any other ordinary language.
The learned Director of Public Prosecutions therefore contended that although it is proper that the words “with intent to defraud” or “defrauded” should be inserted in the particulars their omission is not necessarily fatal because the statement of offence “fraud by false pretences’ charged is a known offence and so at its very worst the charge is only defective by reason of incomplete particulars. Such a case, he submitted, is one in which the court is bound to apply the proviso to section 15, subsection (1) of the Courts Act, 1960,23 and if the court should consider that in spite of the defective particulars, no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred, to dismiss the appeal.
Section 15 (1) provides:
15. (1) The Supreme Court on any appeal under section 14 against conviction shall allow the appeal if such court thinks that the verdict should be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence or that the judgment of the Court before which the appellant was convicted should be set aside on the ground of a wrong decision of any question of law or that on any ground there was a miscarriage of justice, and in any other case shall dismiss the appeal:
Provided that the Court may, notwithstanding that the Court is of opinion that the point
raised in the appeal might be decided in favour of the applicant, dismiss the appeal if it
considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred.”
In this case, he said, there is sufficient evidence proving that the pretence alleged was made with intent to defraud, and so no miscarriage of justice has occurred. In support of this proposition the Director of Public Prosecutions cited R. v. McVitie, already cited by counsel for the appellant, and emphasised the fact that it was a case decided by the full court of five judges of the Court of Criminal Appeal in England; he submitted that it was the only one of the cases cited to us on the point at issue which was properly decided, and which should have strong
persuasive force with the court. He contended finally on this point that the only issue necessary for the court to determine in the appeal is whether a substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred in consequence of the omission of the words “with intent to defraud” or “defrauded”; in his submission no miscarriage of justice of any form has occurred. In support of the submission he cited Opale v. The ueen24 C.O.P. v. Mutari,25 State v. Lawmann,26 among others; the last of which, Lawmann’s case, he submitted is binding upon us as a judgment of this court.
We have made careful examination of the leading cases in the two sets of authorities cited to us by both sides, which both counsel for the appellant and the Director of Public Prosecutions allege conflict, and so request the court to choose which of the two sets it accepts as having the more persuasive force. As a result of our examination we have come to the conclusion that each of the leading cases on both sides was rightly decided, and that the two sets are reconcilable as will appear presently.
An interpretation of section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960, reveals that some particulars of a charge are only necessary for giving “reasonable information as to the nature of the charge,” while others are “of the essence” or “constitute the gravamen” of the offence charged. Thus two principles emerge from the allegedly conflicting authorities cited, they are as follows:
(i) While the particulars are only necessary for giving reasonable information as to the nature of the charge, omission to aver those particulars in the charge or indictment renders the charge merely defective, and that the defect caused by the insufficient particulars can be cured by evidence which supplies the omission; in that case the proviso to section 15 of the Courts Act, 1960, could be prayed in aid and
(ii) If the particulars are of the essence, or form the gravamen of the offence charged their omission from a charge or indictment is fatal, because no offence would be disclosed, and cannot be cured except by amendment.
We may illustrate this principle with a charge of stealing: The charge may read thus:
Statement of Offence
Stealing: contrary to section 124 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29).
Particulars of Offence
For that he on the . . . stole the sum of £G100 the property of someone.
It would certainly be better to lay the ownership of the £G100 in Mr. A. if he is known to be the owner, but that would only be necessary to give reasonable information as to the nature of the charge. Its omission therefore is not fatal, if evidence is led, e.g. that the Mr. A. is the owner. On the other hand, if the particulars of the offence read, “For that he on . . . stole £G100,” omitting words like, “property of Mr. A.,” or “property of a person unknown of which he is not the owner”, the charge or indictment will not be merely defective, it will be bad, because the averment that the person accused of the offence is not the owner or words to that effect, are of the essence of the offence of stealing, they go to the very root of it, therefore by their omission the charge as laid is bad, because it discloses no offence.
Now, in R. v. McVitie (supra), the appellant was charged with the offence of possessing explosives contrary to section 4 (1) of the Explosive Substances Act, 1883.27 The said section as amended by section 1 (1) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1948,28 provides:
“Any person who makes or knowingly has in his possession or under his control any explosive substance, under such circumstances as to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that he is not making it or does not have it in his possession or under his control for a lawful object, shall, unless he can show that he made it or had it in his possession or under his control for a lawful object, be guilty of felony, and, on conviction, shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years … and the explosive substance shall be forfeited.”
The statement of offence was set out on the indictment as follows, “Possessing explosives contrary to section 4 (1) of the Explosive Substances Act, 1883,” but the particulars of the offence omitted the word “knowingly which appears in the section under which the charge was laid. Now, both in ordinary language and in law a person cannot be said to be in possession of a thing unless he knows or is conscious that he has such possession. Thus in Amartey v. State,29 a case of possessing Indian hemp, where it was proved that a woman received a carefully made parcel enclosed in a pillow case, and that when the parcel was taken out of the pillow case by the police and was undone, it was found to contain a quantity of Indian hemp, it was held that without the knowledge of the contents of the parcel, her possession of the parcel could not be possession of the Indian hemp to sustain the offence. The charge in that case was laid under section 47 (1) of the Pharmacy and Drugs Act, 1961,30 which makes mere possession of Indian
hemp an offence; the section provides that:
“47. (1) No person shall have in his possession without lawful excuse (proof of which shall be on him) any opium or Indian hemp which is prepared for smoking or any residue from the smoking of opium or Indian hemp.”
In the course of its judgement, the court said31:
“What is the possession, proof of which, without more, makes a person guilty of an offence under the said section 47 (1), unless he proved that his possession is lawful. Upon proper construction of the section, the possession must be possession with knowledge of the nature and quality of the article; awareness that what is possessed is ‘opium or Indian hemp’ or “residue from the smoking of opium or Indian hemp.’ Physical possession without that knowledge is no offence. Without that knowledge there is no legal possession which can support the charge. Therefore to succeed on such a charge, the prosecution must prove legal possession; that is, in addition to proving physical or constructive possession, they must go further to lead evidence which establishes that the defendant had the requisite knowledge, or evidence from which it will be reasonable to presume that the defendant proved to be in possession well knew, or ought to have known, that the article he possessed was ‘opium or Indian hemp’ or was ‘residue from smoking of opium or Indian hemp’.”
Thus the word “knowingly” appearing in section 4 (1) of the Explosive Substances Act, 1883, (supra) must have been put there ex abundantia cautela, it is implied in the word “possession” in any event. Therefore it is a word intended merely to give necessary information as to the nature of the charge; it does not go to the root of the offence. Its omission makes the charge merely defective, by reason of incomplete particulars since it does not go to the root of the offence, because even without it the charge discloses a known offence. Therefore in our opinion the Court of Criminal Appeal came to the proper decision in applying the proviso.
Again, in State v. Lawmann,32 the defendant was tried and convicted upon information which charged him with five counts; the first of which charged him with forgery. The charge reads as follows33
“FORGERY
Contrary to section 314 of the Criminal Code, Cap. 9
PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
PATRICK TIMOTHY TETTEY LAWMANN on a day unknown in or about the year 1932, at Accra in the Eastern Judicial Division of Southern Ghana with intent to defraud forged a certain document purporting to be a Deed of Gift dated 30th November, 1932.”
The particulars, as is patent on their face, do not contain particulars of the forgeries in the body of the document and the site plan. It is quite clear that the particulars omitted are not of the essence of the offence, and do not go to the root of it. The particulars omitted are matters necessary to give reasonable information as to the nature of the charge. In those circumstances this court held34:
“In the present case count one of the indictment disclosed an offence known to the laws of Ghana and despite the omission, all the material particulars were satisfactorily proved at the trial. We do not therefore think that the omissions caused an embarrassment or prejudice to the appellant and consequently there was no miscarriage of justice.”
In our opinion that decision conformed with the principle we have earlier stated.
In R. v. Bandoh,35 and Buabeng v. The Queen,36 the offence charged was perjury contrary to section 378 of the old Criminal Code,37 which read, “Whoever commits perjury shall be liable to imprisonment for ten years.” The section is substantially re-enacted by section 210 of the Criminal Code, 1960. Section 405 of Cap. 9 defined the offence as follows:
“A person is guilty of perjury, if in any written or verbal statement made or verified by him upon oath before any Court, or public officer, he states anything which he knows to be false in a material particular, or which he has not reason to believe to be true.”
The definition is re-enacted by section 211 of Act 29. In Bandoh’s case the words “which he knows to be false in a material particular,” or “which he has no reason to believe to be true” were omitted.
Now, the offence of perjury consists in deliberate or reckless false statement made on oath in material respect which may lead to miscarriage of justice. Therefore (i) the making of the statement on oath, and (ii) knowledge that what is sworn to in material respect is false, or absence of reasonable ground for belief in its truth, are not just particulars necessary to give reasonable information as to the nature of the charge; they are of the essence of the offence itself, as distinct from the nature of the charge, going to its very root; without any of them the charge will disclose no triable offence. For that reason their omission in each of those two cases was held to be fatal. We therefore agree with the Court of Appeal when in the circumstances of the Buabeng’s case it said38:
“We concluded that the charge as laid against the appellants before us is defective not only by reason of the extreme paucity of the information given. It in fact [discloses] no triable offence whatever and we think it right that we should here point out and emphasise the importance of the officers of the Crown when settling informations taking meticulous care that all the essential ingredients of the offence alleged are fully and accurately stated in accordance with statutory definition inasmuch as the law will strongly presume against the commission of a crime . . .”
The same applies to R. v. Hyde,39 a case of arson.
The main question in the present appeal therefore is: are the words “with intent to defraud,” or
“defrauded” which are patently omitted particulars which are necessary to give reasonable information as to the nature of the charge, or are they matters which are of the essence of the offence of fraud by false pretences?
As in the case of perjury or arson, we can obtain the answer to the question from the sections of the Criminal Code, 1960, which create and define the offence. Section 131 creates the offence, and sections 132 and 133 (1) define the technical terms used in the statement of the offence:
“131. Whoever defrauds any person by any false pretence shall be guilty of a second degree felony.”
“132. A person is guilty of defrauding by false pretences if, by means of any false pretence, or by personation he obtains the consent of another person to part with or transfer the ownership of
anything.”
“133. (1) A false pretence is a representation of the existence of a state of facts made by a person, either with the knowledge that such representation is false or without the belief that it is true, and made with an intent to defraud.”
The definitions given in sections 132 and 133 (1) show that the terms “defrauding” and “false pretence” are technical terms and that for “false pretence” to constitute the offence of “fraud by false pretences” created by section 131, it must be a pretence made “with intent to defraud” or “for the purpose of defrauding.” It follows that without intent to defraud, a pretence however false, may only amount to deceit, falsehood, which is not the same thing as fraud. The two terms “to deceive” and “to defraud” are defined in Re London and Globe Finance Corporation,40 culled from Archbold, Criminal Pleading Evidence & Practice (35th ed.), paragraph 2043 and provide a useful guide. The definitions are as follows:
“To deceive is to induce a man to believe that a thing is true which is false and which the person practising the deceit knows or believes to be false. To defraud is to deprive by deceit; it is by deceit to induce a man to act to his injury. More tersely it may be put, that to deceive is by falsehood to induce a state of mind; to defraud is by deceit to induce a course of action.”
See also R. v. Bassey,41 where the definition was cited with approval. We may illustrate this with the following example: A. induced B. to pay to him an amount of £G10 by falsely representing to him that he had met his (B.’s) wife in a small shop across the road and that she had sent him to B. for the amount to enable her to purchase some goods she had by chance seen in that shop which are in short supply in the market. In fact he has not been sent by B.’s wife, he used the deceit to receive payment of a debt of £G10 which B. owed him and had failed to pay within the last two years. Thus A. deceived B. and by his deceit obtained the payment of the debt of £G10. What A. did may be very annoying to B. but that does not constitute a triable offence, because the deceit practised was not made with intent to defraud and B. has not been defrauded thereby; the deceit simply induced him to pay an honest debt which he might not otherwise have paid.
The conclusion to which these definitions lead are that deceit by itself is no offence however annoying and improper it may be; therefore the essence, the bed rock of the offence of fraud by false pretences is “intent to defraud.” In other words intent to defraud is not a particular which is necessary merely to give reasonable information as to the nature of a charge of “fraud by false pretences.” Therefore its omission from the charge is one which cannot be saved by the proviso to section 15 of the Courts Act, 1960.42 Its omission is fatal.
In view of the decision we have arrived at on the first point argued, we do not consider it necessary to deal at length with the points raised on the second ground of appeal. We will content ourselves with observing that it does not appear to us that the circuit court judge made any critical examination of the submission made by counsel for the parties before coming to his conclusion that the pretence alleged in the charge had been proved. Unfortunately the learned judge of the High Court too, misconceived what is involved in the principle that any variance in substance between the pretence as alleged in the charge and that given in evidence is fatal, therefore he held that the principle applied in England but not in Ghana, giving as his reason that in Ghana the pretence may be made in vernacular, and the charge framed in English, and therefore it would not be possible for the exact words used in making the pretence to be reproduced verbatim in the charge, as concerned with words used.
It must be pointed out that the law does not require that evidence in a case of false pretences as to the pretences made should reproduce the words alleged in the charge before the charge can be sustained; what the principle amounts to is, that representations alleged in the charge as made which induced the parting with the money or goods, should be the same in substance as the pretence of which evidence is given, and where it varies substantially from the one alleged in the charge, the variance would be fatal.
Now, the substance of the pretence alleged in the charge is, that an order for preventive detention had been made in the usual way against the first prosecution witness and he was going to be arrested in consequence of that order; that the appellant was in a position to get the arrest stopped if the first prosecution witness paid him £G200. But the substance of the pretence as given in the evidence of the first prosecution witness as the one which induced him to pay the £G200 to the appellant is, that the appellant had the power to cause people to be arrested and that in the exercise of that power, he had had many people arrested by the police and detained; that in further exercise of that power he had submitted the name of the first prosecution witness, among others, to the police for their arrest and detention and therefore he, the first prosecution witness, was going to be arrested and detained on Monday; but that he, the appellant, was prepared to recall his order for the arrest and detention of the first prosecution witness if the first prosecution witness paid him an amount of £G200. Indeed the prosecution produced evidence which, to some extent, lends support to the alleged claim of the appellant that he could, and had caused the arrest and detention of some of the persons he named.
It is too obvious that the representation alleged in the charge is materially different from the
representation which was proved. Indeed if true, the representation of which the evidence was given would support a charge for some other serious offence, but the appellant stood charged only with the offence of fraud by false pretences and with no other. The variance between the representation alleged in the charge and that of which evidence was given is so great as to make it abundantly clear that the prosecution failed to prove what they charged. Therefore on the second ground also the appeal should be allowed.
In the circumstances the appeal is allowed, the conviction of the appellant and the sentence passed upon him are each quashed. The appellant is acquitted and discharged.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
S. A. B.
