AMAKYIE vs. ABABIO AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 933
8 June 1983 · MENSA BOISON JA · ≈ 11 min read
[1983] SLR (CA) 3Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Ashanti (Government of) v. Korkor (1937) D.Ct. ‘31-’37, 195.
(2) Baiden v. Ansah [1973] 1 G.L.R. 33.
(3) Banson v. Abbey [1962] 1 G.L.R. 213, S.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION to the Court of Appeal for, inter alia, an order setting aside an execution of an order of the High Court, Sunyani. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling of Mensa Boison J.A.
COUNSEL
Kofi Sackey for the applicant.
Kaba for the respondents.
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JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A.
Mensa Boison J.A. The defendant-applicant (hereinafter referred to as the defendant), by counsel moves this court for the following reliefs:
(a) an order setting aside the execution carried out by the deputy sheriff of the High Court, Sunyani, on 23 March 1982;
(b) an order of stay of execution of the writ of delivery in the above-mentioned matter; and
(c) any other order or orders which this court sees fit to make.”
About 20 October 1980, the plaintiffs-respondents (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs) applied to the Brong-Ahafo Regional House of Chiefs (henceforth referred to simply as the regional house) requesting it to take delivery and custody of the stool properties of Ntrotroso. The two plaintiffs were alleged respectively, to be the Gyasehene and the new chief of Ntrotroso. The ground for their application was that there was a pending dispute over the status of the defendant as the Ntrotrosohene.
For what apparently appears as a challenge to the jurisdiction of the regional house, the defendant stayed away from the hearing of 20 October 1980, although he opposed the said application on an affidavit filed by him. The regional house, nonetheless, acceded to the plaintiffs’ application, and by its order, dated 22 October 1980, the regional house was to take delivery and custody of the stool properties of the Ntrotroso stool as specified in a list attached to the said application.
Against this order, the defendant filed a notice of intention to appeal to the National House of Chiefs on 30 October 1980. The said appeal has, however, not proceeded any further even at the hearing of this motion on 9 May 1983. The cause of this inaction apparently seems to be lack of cordiality or a misunderstanding in getting the conditions of appeal fulfilled.
In the meantime, on 28 May 1981, the plaintiffs applied for a writ of delivery for the said stool properties. The writ was granted by the High Court, Sunyani, on 25 June 1981. An initial attempt to execute the writ was restricted by the defendant’s refusal to hand over to the bailiffs the said properties. Needless to say, the refusal laid the defendant open to contempt proceeding (which is not material here) before the High Court, Sunyani. What is important is that simultaneously with that proceeding, that is on 15 October 1981, the defendant applied to that court to have the writ of delivery set aside and to stay execution thereof. For various reasons, the two proceedings dragged on until 12 February 1982, when the court dismissed the defendant’s
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application to set aside the writ of delivery. The court (Hayfron J.) thereupon ordered execution of the writ to proceed.
The defendant was aggrieved by the dismissal and filed a notice of appeal against the decision of 12 February 1982. At the same time the defendant moved the High Court, Sunyani, for a stay of execution of its order of 12 February 1982. This last application for stay was dismissed on 22 March 1982 by the High Court, Sunyani, presided over by Sapong J. No notice of appeal was filed against the ruling of Sapong J.
Perhaps there could hardly have been time for that; for, promptly on 23 March 1982, the deputy sheriff of the High Court, Sunyani, proceeded to levy execution of the writ of delivery, and succeeded, by his bailiffs, to collect from Ntrotroso and hand over to the regional house, some of the specified properties. Further levies were yet to be made.
The position at this stage then was that the dismissal by Hayfron J. on 12 February 1982, of the application to set aside any stay of execution of the writ of delivery was the subject of a notice of appeal to this court. Although the present reliefs asked for are couched to be in respect of the execution of the writ on 23 March 1982, following the order of Sarpong J., in my opinion the present reliefs are in reality the very substance of the appeal contemplated against the ruling of Hayfron J. on 12 February 1982. Assuming then the present reliefs were favourably acceded to by this court there would be no point in the defendant pursuing the contemplated appeal against the ruling of Hayfron J.
Be that as it may, the court must pronounce on the instant motion. The submission is that the law required at least seven days “interval” after the refusal by Sapong J. on 22 March 1982, before execution of the writ. Consequently, the immediate levying of execution on 23 March 1982, was irregular, and so must be set aside by this court. Order 48 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), which provides for the writ does not itself mention the “seven days rule. “Learned counsel did not himself cite to us any rule either. But I presume his submission was referable to the Court of Appeal (Amendment) Rules, 1975 (LI 1002) which amended rule 27 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (LI 218). Rule 27 (1) of LI 218 now provides that:
“27. (1) An appeal shall not operate as a stay of execution of proceedings under the judgment or
decision appealed from except where the Court below or the Court otherwise orders.”
Rule 27 (1) (a) and (b) deal with mode of application and are not material here. However, rule 27 (2) and (3) states:
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“(2) During any period while any application is pending for determination under sub-rule (1) of this rule any proceedings for execution of the judgment or decision to which the application relates shall be stayed.
(3) There shall, in any case, be a stay of proceedings for execution of the judgment or decision appealed from – (a) for a period of seven days immediately following the giving of such judgment or decision; and (b) for a period of seven days immediately following the determination by the Court below of any application under sub-rule (1) (a) of this rule where the application was refused by the Court below.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
In my opinion rule 27 (3) did not operate as a stay of execution of the ruling on 22 March 1982 since there was no notice of appeal given against that decision. There was therefore no irregularity in the execution of the writ on 23 March 1982.
Assuming, however, that the rule applies, I observe that rule 27 (3) does not on the face of it provide any sanctions for its breach. An application under that rule to set aside the execution of the writ of delivery here will therefore be a matter of judicial discretion. In my opinion, such discretion may be favourably dispensed only if the defendant can show that he had sustained substantial injury by reason of the irregular execution. I take that view on looking at provisions giving similar rights to a party in a like situation in the case of sale of immovable property, that is Order 51, r. 18 of LN 140A which states:
“18. At any time within twenty-one days from the date of the sale of any immovable property, application may be made to the Court to set aside the sale on the ground of any such material irregularity in the conduct of the sale but no sale shall be set aside on the ground of such irregularity unless the applicant shall prove to the satisfaction of the Court that he has sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity.”
See also Government of Ashanti v. Korkor (1937) D.Ct. ‘31-’37, 195. I am of the opinion that on the affidavits and on the submissions of learned counsel there has been no proof to satisfy the court that the defendant had sustained any substantial injury to his cause by the premature execution.
The above might well dispose of the application. There is, however, to my mind, a fundamental point of law as to whether the application properly lies at this court. Mr. Kofi Sackey has defended his position in moving this court to set aside the execution of 23 March
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1982, by relying on rules 21 and 31 of LI 218. What he submits is that having filed a notice of appeal in respect of the ruling of Hayfron J. of 12 February 1982, it is competent for this court to entertain this motion as a related matter. Rules 21 and 31 of LI 218 provide:
“21. After an appeal has been entered and until it has been finally disposed of, the Court shall be seised of the whole of the proceedings as between the parties thereto, and every application therein shall be made to the Court and not to the Court below, but any application may be filed in the Court below for transmission to the Court.
31. The Court may from time to time make any order necessary for determining the real question in controversy in the appeal, and may amend any defect or error in the record of appeal, and may direct the Court below to enquire into and certify its finding on any question which the Court thinks fit to determine before final judgment in the appeal, and may make any interim order or grant any injunction which the Court below is authorised to make or grant, and may direct any necessary enquiries or accounts to be made or taken, and generally shall have as full jurisdiction over the whole proceedings as if the proceedings had been instituted and prosecuted in the Court as a Court of first instance, and may rehear the whole case, or may remit it to the Court below to be re-heard, or to be otherwise dealt with as the Court directs”.
It is plain that LI 218, r. 31 sets out the general powers of the Court of Appeal over a case when it is seised of the appeal, within the terms of LI 218, r. 21, and the operative words in rule 21 are “after an appeal has been entered . . . “ These words have been explained in Baiden v. Ansah [1973] 1 G.L.R. 33 at p. 35 to mean in effect “after an appeal has been listed in the cause list” by the Registrar of the Court of Appeal. This in effect will mean a publication in the Gazette of the appeal, as laid down in rule 3 (1) of LI 218, namely:
“3. (1) Notice of a cause list shall be published by the Registrar in the Ghana Gazette from time to time at least two weeks before the date appointed for the hearing of the first of the causes and matters contained in such list.”
This point cannot be reached until the registrar of the court below has complied with the provisions of rule 15 of LI 218, which states:
“15. (1) The Registrar of the Court below shall transmit the record when ready together with – (a) a certificate of service of the notice of appeal;
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(b) a certificate that the conditions imposed under rules 12 (4) and 13 have been fulfilled;
(c) five or three copies as the case may be of the record for the use of the Judges;
(d) the docket or file of the case in the Court below containing all papers or documents filed by the parties in connection therewith.
(2) The Registrar of the Court below shall also cause to be served on all parties mentioned in the notice of appeal a notice that the record has been forwarded to the Registrar, who shall in due
course enter the appeal in the cause list mentioned in rule 3 (1).”
In Baiden v. Ansah (supra) at p. 39, Baidoo J. points out the appropriate court to be the court below, when he stated:
“During the transitional period from the moment the notice of appeal is lodged right up to the time the appeal is entered, the trial court can entertain interim applications especially on matters affecting execution. By virtue of its inherent jurisdiction to control the registrar, the bailiffs and the whole staff, the High Court is the appropriate forum to deal with the judgment debtor’s application, especially as the order was made on 31 July 1972 just when the Court of Appeal went on long vacation.”
In that case, Coussey J. on 14 June 1972 gave judgment in favour of the judgment creditor in an action for damages. Aggrieved by the said decision, the judgment debtor filed a notice of appeal which (under the then existing rules) operated as a stay of execution. The judgment creditor then asked for leave to go into execution, and leave was granted on 31 July 1972. The judgment debtor then filed another notice of appeal against the leave granted to the judgment creditor and brought a motion to have his property released from attachment and the execution order suspended.
Admittedly, Baidoo J. could not review or sit on appeal on the ruling of Coussey J. But as the judgment debtor’s notice of appeal had yet to be entered on the cause list within the meaning of rule 21 of LI 218 Baidoo J. was able to exercise powers that a registrar could normally use to suspend further action whenever there was an interim application filed against execution: see Banson v. Abbey [1962] 1 G.L.R. 213, S.C. I respectfully agree with the law as expressed by Baidoo J., and will rule that until the Court of Appeal is seised of the appeal, that is to say, until the appeal is entered within rule 21 of LI 218, the trial court is the appropriate forum for proceedings relating to executions under the judgment appealed from.
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In the instant motion, there was nothing to show that even the appeal against the ruling of Hayfron J. on 12 February 1982 had been entered. Therefore interim applications relating to execution from the ruling of Sapong J. cannot hang on that notice of appeal. Any interim application, especially relating to execution, ought to be brought before the trial court.
Mention may be made also of rule 28 of LI 218 as amended by the Court of Appeal (Amendment)Rules, 1969 (LI 618), r. 2, which in general, directs that whenever an application may be made either to the court or to the court below, the application must in the first instance be made to the court below. I find the rule was not observed.
Before I conclude, it may be pointed out that this ruling is strictly on the motion originating from the ruling of Sapong J. given on 22 March 1982. We notice, however, that the affidavits raise other substantial issues, for which the National House of Chiefs may be the appropriate forum for them to be ventilated. The defendant’s grievances are in essence against the plaintiffs. Notwithstanding that the regional house is to keep custody of the stool properties, it should be possible for the appropriate officers to facilitate the processing of the defendant’s appeal for hearing and determination by the National House of Chiefs. I have only to add that in my judgment the application should be dismissed.
JUDGMENT OF JIAGGE J.A.
I agree.
JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A. I also agree.
DECISION Application dismissed.
D. R. K. S.
