AMLALO vs. MARFO [1984-86] 2 GLR 619
18 November 1986 · BROBBEY J · ≈ 5 min read
[1986] SLR (HC) 4Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Heward-Mills v. Barclays Bank (D.C.O.) [1966] G.L.R. 618.
(2) Farden v. Richter (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 124; 60 L.T. 304.
(3) Djorbua v. Poku [1971] 1 G.L.R. 93.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION to set aside the judgment of the High Court given against the defendant in default. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Lamptey for the defendant-applicant.
The plaintiff-respondent in person.
JUDGMENT OF BROBBEY J.
In this application, the defendant-applicant, hereafter referred to as the defendant, has applied for stay of execution of a
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default judgment delivered by this court; an order setting aside that judgment and leave to file a defence to the plaintiff’s claim.
On the face of the defendant’s supporting affidavit, the sole ground of the application was put this way. “That I have a good defence or set-off or both against the plaintiff’s action with very high chance of success.” The plaintiff in his affidavit in opposition averred that the affidavit did not disclose any triable issue. When the application came up for hearing for the first time I pointed out to counsel for the applicant that his affidavit had to state facts disclosing some triable issue or some grounds of defence and so he had to advise his client to file a supplementary affidavit or file whatever defence he will eventually send to court if leave were granted. The latter advice was given in the alternative because it is now well established that even when leave is required, and the leave has not yet been given, once a defence is filed, it cannot be ignored: see Heward-Mills v. Barclays Bank (D.C.O.) [1966] G.L.R. 618 at 620.
In spite of the advice from the bench, counsel came back to court on the next return date without any supplementary affidavit or defence.
Counsel has rather been preoccupied with explaining to the court that he filed his appearance on 12 August 1986 instead of 21 August 1986. The plaintiff’s writ and statement of claim were filed on 15 July 1986 and served on the defendant on 21 July 1986. Even if the arguments of counsel and the applicant are accepted, the position would be that only appearance was filed on 12 August 1986. That did not answer the point at issue because the plaintiff had by 12 August 1986 applied for judgment in default of appearance and defence. Since no defence had been filed by 12 August the default judgment was regularly entered against the defendant.
No explanation has been offered by the defendant as to why he failed to file appearance within the period of eight days. As stated already, he filed appearance on 12 August 1986 under dubious circumstances but those circumstances are not relevant and the case will proceed on the assumption that appearance has been filed.
Further, no explanation has also been given as to why the defence has not been filed. That apart, an applicant seeking to set aside a judgment must support his application with “an affidavit of merits, i.e. an affidavit stating facts showing a defence on the merits”: see the White Book (1970 ed.), Vol. 1, p 117, para 13/9/4. See also Farden v. Richter (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 124 cited on the same page of the White Book in which it was held that in the absence of an affidavit showing that the defendant had a defence or raised a triable issue he would not be entitled to have a regular judgment set aside.
In the alternative the defendant has applied for leave to defend the plaintiff’s action. As a rule, leave to defend will be granted if the
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applicant shows that he has a bona fide defence or probable defence or reasonable or fair grounds for setting up a defence or raises triable issues. These or any of them can be shown by facts deposed to in an affidavit or even a complete defence filed on record, though the latter course can be dispensed with if the affidavit contains adequate facts on the proposed defence.
This is precisely what the defendant has failed to do in this case. His supporting affidavit discloses no triable issue. It does not disclose any defence whatsoever. All it does is a bare assertion, without more, that he has “a good defence or set off or both against the plaintiff’s action with very high chance of success.”
That bare assertion is not enough to ground an application for leave to defend the action. On a similar issue arising in the case of Heward-Mills v. Barclays Bank (D.C.O.) (supra) when an applicant against whom interlocutory judgment had been given applied for leave to defend a counterclaim, it was held that some defence had to be disclosed before leave could be granted and the bare assertion that “the bank denies liability to that counterclaim” was no defence.
The whole application has been pursued in this court as if merely filing an application with any affidavit will suffice for the grant of leave to defend an action. That unfortunately is the wrong approach altogether. Even if facts were disclosed or a defence filed, it must raise a triable issue before leave will be granted. In Djorbua v. Poku [1971] 1 G.L.R. 93 where facts were set out in extenso and a defence filed with exhibits, the court as stated in holding (3) of the headnote at 94 refused to reopen the case on the ground that “from the exhibits and statement of defence and other affidavits filed by the defendant, it was clear that he had very little chance of resisting the plaintiff’s claim.”
For the simple reason that no defence or triable issue has been disclosed on the face of the defendant’s affidavit, the application for leave to defend the action fails and is dismissed accordingly. The determination of this issue disposes of the remaining reliefs for stay of execution and an order to set the judgment aside. The defendant cannot file any defence without leave and if there is no defence, there is no basis for setting aside the default judgment.
There is similarly no basis for staying execution of that judgment. The application for stay of execution and an order to set aside the default judgment are also dismissed accordingly.
There will be costs of ¢2,000 for the plaintiff against the defendant.
DECISION
Application dismissed.
M.C.N-N
