AMOAKO vs. TAKORADI TIMBERS LIMITED [1982-83] GLR 69
28 June 1982 · TWUMASI J · ≈ 7 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Watt v. Longsdon [1930] 1 K.B. 130; 98 L.J.K.B. 711; 142 L.T. 4; 45 T.L.R. 619; 73 S.J. 544, C.A.
(2) White v. J. and F. Stone (Lighting and Radio), Ltd. [1939]2 K.B. 827; [1939] 3 All E.R. 507; 161 L.T. 107; 55 T.L.R. 949; 83 S.J. 603, C.A.
(3) Adam v. Ward [1917] A.C. 309; 86 L.J.K.B. 849; 117 L.T. 34; 33 T.L.R. 277, H.L.
(4) Hunt v. Great Northern Railway Co. [1891] 2 Q.B. 189; 60 L.J.Q.B. 498; 55 J.P. 648; 7 T.L.R.
493, C.A.
(5) Longdon-Griffiths v. Smith [1951] 1 K.B. 295; [1950] 2 All E.R. 662; 66 (Pt. 2) T.L.R. 627; 94 S.J. 580.
(6) Hebditch v. MacHwaine [1894] 2 Q.B. 54; 63 L.J.Q.B. 587; 70 L.T. 826; 58 J.P. 620; 42 W.R. 422;
10 T.L.R.387; 9 R. 452, C.A.
(7) Powell v. Gelston [1916] 2 K.B. 615; 85 L.J.K.B. 1783; 115 L.T. 379; 32 T.L.R. 703; 60 S.J. 696. [p.71] of [1982-83] GLR 69 (8) Knupffer v. London Express Newspaper, Ltd. [1944] A.C. 116; [1944] 1 All E.R. 495; 113 L.J.K.B. 251; 170 L.T. 362; 6 T.L.R. 310; 88 S.J. 143, H.L.
(9) Sheffil v. Van Deusen (1859) 79 Mass.R. 305.
(10) Haire v. Wilson (1829) 9 B. & C. 643; 4 Man. & Ry. 605; 7 L.J. (o.s.) K.B. 302; 33 R.R. 284; 109 E.R. 239.
(11) Fisher v. Clement (1830) 10 B.& C. 472; 5 Man. & Ry. K.B. 730; 8 L.J. (o.s.) K.B. 176. (12) Read v. Ambridge (1834) 6 C. & P. 308.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Claim by the plaintiff against the defendants for damages for defamation. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Forson, Sarpon & Co. for the plaintiff.
Atta-Erskine for the defendants.
JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.
The plaintiff is a timber merchant trading under the name and style of Temaco Supply Co., Ltd., and under a trade mark TSC. The defendants are also a timber merchant company trading under the name and style of Takoradi Timbers Co., Ltd. Both companies buy and export timber.
On or about 21 February 1980, the plaintiff consigned to Takoradi Harbour six wawa logs. Before shipment of the logs could commence the defendants wrote a letter to the principal technical officer of the Forestry Department, Takoradi, requesting the latter not to issue his authority for the shipment of the logs until investigations had been made to find out the source of the logs.
The defendants alleged in that letter that they had reason to believe that the logs could not have come from the plaintiff’s concession. The defendants’ contention was that they had reason to believe that the logs had come from one J.S. Bansah’s concession but had been diverted to the plaintiff’s company. The defendants in their letter requested the principal technical officer to inspect the stumps of the logs in the bush to determine their sources.
The principal technical officer of the timber inspection section of the Forestry Department had a duty to investigate complaints of the nature made by the defendants. The reasons given by the defendants for their belief could be briefly stated. According to them on or about 22 February 1980 the defendants’ harbour clerks received a waybill covering six wawa logs loaded on vehicles numbers ER 413 and GJ 7635 prepared by one J.S. Bansah with property marks MBAG.
The driver who submitted the said waybills later withdrew them saying it was a mistake and that the logs, although covered by waybills belonging to the said J.S. Bansah, were not meant for the defendants. When the clerks inspected the logs they found to their dismay
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that the logs bore the property marks of the plaintiff. The defendants were therefore put on their inquiry as to the ownership of the six wawa logs. Under their agreement with the defendants, J.S. Bansah was under an obligation to supply all logs from his concession to the defendants to the exclusion of all other timber merchants.
In his evidence the principal technical officer said that it was his official duty to investigate such complaints as the one made to him by the defendants but that when he investigated the defendants’ complaint he found that the logs in fact came from the plaintiff’s concession. He therefore wrote to the defendants to withdraw their complaints which the latter did.
The plaintiff brought this action against the defendants claiming damages for defamation alleging that the letter written by the defendants imputed to him theft of the six wawa logs from J.S. Bansah’s concession. From the facts as narrated it is quite clear that the business interest of the defendants was at stake at the time the letter was written and that the letter was addressed to a person who had a duty to investigate the allegation. Therefore even assuming that the contents of the letter were defamatory of the plaintiff it is clear that the occasion was privileged.
A communication between two persons defamatory of another is not actionable if the person making the communication has an interest in the matter so communicated or has a duty, legal, moral or social to make the communication and the person receiving it has a corresponding interest or duty to receive it: see Watt v. Longsdon [1930] 1 K.B. 130, C.A.; White v. J. and F. Stone (Lighting and Radio) Ltd. [1939] 2 K.B. 827; Adam v. Ward [1917] A.C. 309, H.L. and Hunt v. Great Northern Railway Co. [1891] 2 Q.B. 189, C.A. In order to succeed the onus rested on the plaintiff to prove that the defendants were actuated by malice. Inasmuch as the plaintiff adduced no evidence of actual malice his action fails and ought to be dismissed: see Longdon-Griffiths v. Smith [1951] 1 K.B. 295.
As to whether the contents of the defendants’ letter were actionable it is necessary to ask the question whether the words exposed the plaintiff to public hatred, ridicule or contempt or in any way injured him in his trade. The principal technical officer of the Forestry Department alone could not constitute the public or a section of the public. There is no evidence that the matter was published to other timbermen or members of the public or a section of it. In an action for damages for defamation it is not sufficient for the plaintiff to say that in his self-estimation the words alleged convey some obnoxious meaning to him. He must go further to prove that the obnoxious meaning was conveyed to persons other than himself and the words have lowered him in the estimation of those; in other words no civil
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action for libel or slander can be maintained unless the plaintiff has established that the words complained of have been published to persons other than himself and those persons have understood the words in the defamatory sense attributed to them by the plaintiff: see Hebditch v. MacHwaine [1894] 2 Q.B. 54, C.A.; Powell v. Gelston [1916] 2 K.B. 615 at p. 619; Knupffer v. London Express Newspaper Ltd. [1944] A.C. 116, H.L. and Sheffil v. Van Deusen (1859) 79 Mass. R. 305.
The principal technical officer who was called by the defendants volunteered evidence which in fact should have come from the plaintiff to augment his case. He said that upon receipt of the letter he got in touch with J.S. Bansah. But he never communicated the contents of the defendants’ letter to him. He asked J.S. Bansah whether the property mark MBAG had been altered to TSC. The answer was no! That was the end of the investigation. There was no publication of anything to J.S. Bansah or to any other person, of the contents of the letter. It is conceded that the statement made in the defendants’ letter turned out to be false and the fact that the defendants honestly believed in the truth of the statement afforded them no defence because he who attacks the reputation of another does so at his own risk. By paragraph 9 of their statement of defence the defendants contended that they did not intend to defame the plaintiff by their letter of 22 February 1980.
They said they were meant to be understood that the said J.S. Bansah was trying to evade his responsibilities towards the defendants. The law is that the meaning in which the defendant intended his statement to be understood, though material on the question of damages is immaterial in determining whether the words are defamatory or not: see Haire v. Wilson (1829) 9 B. & C. 643; Fisher v. Clement (1830) 10 B. & C. 472 and Read v. Ambridge (1834) 6 C. & P. 308. Words or statements are defamatory and actionable if reasonable men understood them in a defamatory sense. The contents of the letter written by the defendants were clearly capable of bearing a defamatory meaning in the sense that they imputed dishonesty to the plaintiff but as I have already concluded it was made on a privileged occasion. For these reasons the plaintiff’s action is dismissed with ¢3,000 costs to the defendants.
DECISION
Action dismissed.
M. C. N.-N.
