ANING vs. THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 2 GLR 85
18 November 1985 · AMUA-SEKYI J · ≈ 8 min read
[1985] SLR (CA) 7Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) R v. Walsh (1824) 1 Mood 14; 168 E.R. 1166.
(2) R v. Amier (1834) 6 C & P 344; 172 E.R. 1269.
(3) R v. Gruncell (1839) 9 C & P 365; 173 E.R. 870.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the decision of the General Court-Martial convicting the appellant and another of conspiring to steal and stealing. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Anyade for the appellant.
Colonel Donkor (with him Captain Sarpong) for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J.
Amua-Sekyi J. delivered the judgment of the court. This is an appeal from the decision of a General Court-Martial convicting the appellant, Major Emmanuel Aning, and one other, of the offences of conspiring to steal and stealing. The offences were alleged to have been committed on or about 9 March 1981 in the Lebanon, where the appellant was serving with the Ghana contingent to the United Nations peace-keeping force. He was officer commanding B company.
The case for the prosecution was that the appellant and Major Oduro-Gyamina, the second accused, conspired to steal and did steal a quantity of roofing sheets supplied to the Ghana contingent by the United Nations force headquarters at Nakura. To prove the charge, [p.87] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 85
reliance was placed on the manner in which the sheets were procured. Evidence was led to show that in accordance with the service operational procedure the second accused, who was the operations officer, was required to make requisitions through Major Ayisi, the logistics officer, who would, in turn, instruct Captain Opoku-Agyeman, the engineer officer, to procure them from Nakura. On this occasion, the prosecution said, the second accused made his request direct to the captain who then went to Nakura with the appellant to requisition for, and take delivery of, a quantity of roofing sheets. The consignment was in excess of what the appellant required, but Captain Opoku Agyeman explained that he added more on account of a project to be undertaken for the Ghana contingent by a Major Reynolds. As to the manner in which the roofing sheets were procured, he stated that the service operational procedure was often ignored and that the second accused had, in the past, requisitioned for stores from Nakura through him without reference to the logistics officer.
The roofing sheets were given into the custody of the appellant at Nakura. The service operational procedure required that he should take them to Kafr Dunin where the Ghanaian contingent had its headquarters. Again, in disregard of the laid down procedures, Captain Opoku-Agyeman instructed the appellant of take them to his company—the B company—at Shacra. The appellant for his part said nothing about this but claimed that he was instructed by the second accused to take them to a spot in the area of operations of C company. The second accused agreed, but also stated that the appellant took them to a different spot. It is to be noted that the appellant as officer commanding B company had no duties to perform in the C company’s area of operations.
The appellant deposited the roofing sheets within sight of a C company observation post. For unexplained reasons, he took the trouble to unload the consignment himself with the aid of Corporal Yaw Manu, his driver. It took them 40 minutes. It was commendable of him to do the work of the fatigue men whom, he told Corporal Manu, he had expected to attend him at the spot, but one may wonder why these men having failed to turn up he did not seek assistance from soldiers of C company. Again, there was evidence that he told Corporal Manu that he was going to make a report to the platoon commander about the deposit of the sheets in his area. However, his own evidence is clear that he did not do so. This is what he said of his meeting with Lieutenant Wuni, the platoon commander: “When I got to his office he said he had whisky and offered it for me to drink some. We drank the whisky. We discussed other matters without my mentioning the iron sheets to him.” From there, the appellant went to battalion headquarters. Corporal Manu said the appellant went to speak to the second
[p.88] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 85
accused. The appellant said he did not. If the appellant is right, then only did he fail to inform any officer of C company of the roofing sheets, but he also failed to notify headquarters of their whereabouts.
Word did eventually get to Major Ampaw, officer commanding C company, who had guards placed at the site which was said to be near an uncompleted building not under the control of the military. There was evidence that during the night a woman attempted to remove one of the sheets. At any rate, when they were counted the next day they were short by fifteen sheets. Lieutenant-Colonel Peedah, commanding officer of the Ghana contingent, and Major Akai-Nettey, his second-in-command, confronted the appellant. They are agreed that he denied all knowledge of the roofing sheets. A board of inquiry was set up to go into the matter. Following its report, the appellant and the second accused were charged. They were convicted and sentenced to be dismissed from the Armed Forces. At his trial, the appellant admitted knowing a very great deal about the sheets The charge did not specify the number of roofing sheets alleged to have been stolen. However, the proceedings show that the trial related to the whole consignment of 150 sheets. With this in mind, it has been argued on this appeal that the consignment never left the custody or area of operations of the Ghana contingent and therefore the appellant could not be guilty of the offence of stealing. If counsel is right, then no one can be convicted of stealing property of the Ghana contingent if he is found with the goods in its area of operations. The truth of the matter, however, is that even in those jurisdictions where a “carrying away” is an essential part of the offence of larceny it has been held that a bare removal from the place in which the thief found the goods, though he does not make off with them, is sufficient.
In R v. Walsh (1824) 1 Mood 14, the prisoner was tried on an indictment for stealing a bag. The bag was placed in the front boot of a coach. The prisoner, who was sitting on the box lifted it. A person who stood beside the wheel on the pavement took hold of the bag, and while the two were trying to draw it out of the boot with a common intent to steal it they were interrupted by the guard. They dropped the bag. It was held that even though the bag was not entirely removed from the boot, since the raising it from the bottom had completely removed each part of it from the space that specific part occupied there was complete asportation, and the conviction was right. In R v. Amier (1834) 6 C & P 344, the prisoner broke into a house and took two half-sovereigns from a bureau, but being disturbed threw them under the grate in the same room. It was held that if the half-sovereigns were taken with a felonious intent, this was a sufficient removal of them to constitute the offence. And in R v. Gruncell (1839) 9 C & P 365 a waggoner removed a quantity of hay from his master’s stable into the wagon. When the
[p.89] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 85
wagon stopped at an inn an ostler assisted in removing the hay from the wagon. It was held that the moment the hay was removed by the waggoner from the stable to the wagon animo furandi, the larceny was complete and that the ostler was properly indicted for receiving. In the light of the cases, therefore, if the appellant removed the roofing sheets from the vehicle and deposited them in C company’s area of operations animo furandi he was guilty of stealing.
The summing up of the Judge Advocate was criticised on several grounds. One was that he failed to give a proper direction as to what constitutes conspiracy; but at the end of his submission counsel agreed that a proper direction had been given: There was, however, a clear misdirection in a passage which appears in the record. It reads:
“After a very careful consideration of the case put forward by the prosecution and the explanation given by the defence, if you are satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that any of the charges have not been proved, you are enjoined in law to find each of the accused persons not guilty on that charge and acquit and discharge him on that particular charge.”
Now, since it is not for an accused person to prove his innocence, it was not a proper direction to say that he should be acquitted if the court were satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the charges had not proved. The direction ought, simply, to have been that if the court were satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the charges had been proved they should convict, and if they were not so satisfied they should acquit.
We are enjoined by section 91 of the Armed Forces Act, 1962 (Act 105) to disallow an appeal if, in our opinion, there has been no substantial miscarriage of justice. In the case before us, we find that before making the unfortunate statement quoted above the Judge Advocate had explained that the burden lay on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and shortly thereafter stated that if on a consideration of the case as a whole the court were left in doubt they should acquit. We think that the summing up as a whole was fair and that section 91 ought to be applied.
The appeal is dismissed.
DECISION Appeal dismissed. M.C.N.-N
