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[1982] SLR (CA) 4Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

APPIAH vs. TAKYI [1982-83] GLR 1

18 February 1982 · MENSA BOISON JA · ≈ 15 min read

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OSCOLAAPPIAH v TAKYI [1982-83] GLR 1 [1982] SLR (CA) 4
APAAPPIAH v TAKYI [1982-83] GLR 1, [1982] SLR (CA) 4 (Ghana).
BluebookAPPIAH v TAKYI [1982-83] GLR 1, [1982] SLR (CA) 4 (Ghana Ct. App. 1982).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Mattouk v. Massad (1 941) 7 W.A.C.A. 9 1.

(2) Ussher v. Darko [1977] 1 G.L.R. 476, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the decision of the Circuit Court, Kumasi giving judgment for the plaintiff in an action for, inter alia, declaration of title and recovery of possession of an estate house. The facts are fully set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Adu-Gyamfi for the appellant.

Addai for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A.

Mensa Boison J.A. This is an appeal from the judgment of a Kumasi Circuit Court dated 20 August 1979, and presided over by P. K. Twumasi, Esq. (then a circuit court judge) whereby he found for the plaintiff for declaration of title and recovery of possession of a built-up estate plot in addition to the ancillary reliefs of perpetual injunction and damages for trespass.

Briefly the plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) was at all material times the lessee of estate plot NO.15, North Suntresu in Kumasi from the principal lessors, the State Housing Corporation (the corporation for short). For all practical purposes the plaintiff had become owner in possession of the said property by having exercised the option of purchase of the residuary unexpired term of the head lease in 1972, by payment in full of the capital sum for development. It is not clear whether this was done entirely by way of rents.

He thus became entitled to sell the residuary tenn of years, and which he appeared to have so expressed his desire to do to some officers of the corporation in Kumasi. On the introduction of one such officer, a Mr. Quansah, the defendant-appellant (hereinafter referred to as the defendant) as a prospective Purchaser met the plaintiff in January 1973.

[p.4] of [1982-83] GLR 1

He thus became entitled to sell the residuary term of years, and which he appeared to have so expressed his desire to do to some officers of the corporation in Kumasi. On the introduction of one such officer, a Mr. Quansah, the defendant-appellant (hereinafter referred to as the defendant) as a prospective purchaser met the plaintiff in January 1973.

There is disagreement on the bargain price reached. According to the plaintiff it was ¢5,000 of which the defendant paid ¢3,200 the next day, with the balance of ¢1,800 to be paid within two weeks. The learned trial judge preferred this version to the defendant’s that the sale price asked for and agreed upon was ¢3,200, which the defendant paid three days after the bargain against a receipt dated 12 January 1973. Be that as it may, the plaintiff in the meantime, by the form of an affidavit dated 11 January 1973, did inform the corporation of his transaction with the defendant, and asked for the corporation’s consent to assign the unexpired term of the leasehold to the defendant.

This was followed by a personal interview of the plaintiff and the defendant together, by the corporation at their office, at which the two answered an interrogatory, exhibit E, – their answers being taken down, a step apparently designed to ensure and verify that the parties fully understand the import of the transaction as assignor and assignee; and further to introduce the new assignee to the corporation. The two having, it seems, successfully passed the gauntlet, the officer concerned recommended the consent – which was given on 31 January 1973. However, by an affidavit dated 31 January 1973, the plaintiff informed the corporation of having now rescinded his decision of leaving Kumasi for good and consequently withdrawing his request for consent to assign to the defendant. The plaintiff therefore would neither execute the lease nor give possession to the defendant.

The defendant as a result first sought the assistance of the rent control office to vindicate his rights. During the protracted proceedings, the defendant thought it safer to ask for his ready money, rather than to await the uncertainties of the outcome of the litigation. When, however, the defendant’s solicitors wrote to the plaintiff, the money was not forthcoming either.

It seems it was in that predicament that the defendant sought for extra-judicial intervention, by reporting the matter to the then military Regional Commissioner for Ashanti. In true military fashion, the commissioner caused the plaintiff to be thrown out (goods and all) from the house by brute force, and possession given to the defendant.

The plaintiff’s case is that the defendant, in spite of repeated demands, failed to make up the balance of ¢1,800 event after the scheduled two weeks, and consequently he broke off the negotiations for sale to the defendant and although he tendered the ¢3,200 back to the defendant, he refused to accept it, and instead launched out a proceeding at the rent control office.

The defendant’s stand is that there was a concluded contract for sale; and besides denying the claim of the plaintiff, counterclaims “for a declaration that house No. N.15, North Suntresu, Kumasi, lawfully belongs to the defendant by purchase.”

[p.5] of [1982-83] GLR 1

At the end of the day the learned trial judge found for the plaintiff and granted him all the reliefs prayed for. In arriving at his decision, the learned judge, inter alia, made this crucial finding: “That there was a valid contract of sale of land (i.e., No. 15) at the price of ¢5,000 of which the defendant paid ¢3,200.” Following from that finding the trial judge stated the law thus:

“In my judgment where property is clearly identified as in this case, and the parties are ad idem as to the purchase price there is in law a binding agreement to sell the property; in such a case, if the purchaser pays the whole or even part of the agreed purchase price, as the defendant did in this case, the transaction is a valid contract of sale of land.”

However, the learned judge was unable to uphold the defendant’s counterclaim by reason of his later findings that:

(a) the defendant failed to pay the balance of ¢1,800 within the two weeks specified (a fact pleaded in the reply), and

(b) that by forcibly taking possession of the property the defendant was disentitled from seeking the protection of the court for, what the judge considered to be, a “declaration for title” since no assignment was executed in his favour.

Besides the omnibus ground, the following grounds were filed on behalf of the defendant:

(1) The learned trial judge’s finding that the purchase price for the sale of the house was ¢5,000 and not ¢3,200 is erroneous and cannot be justified having regard to the evidence on record.

(2) The learned trial judge erred in law when he held that without a valid deed of assignment by the respondent to the appellant, the contract of sale of the house by the respondent to the appellant was invalidated.

(3) The learned trial judge erred in law when he held that the appellant’s alleged conduct amounted to an abuse of the process of the court and therefore the appellant was not in law entitled to a declaration that the appellant was the equitable owner of the said property.

We considered those grounds weighty enough and we were obliged first to call upon Mr. Addai, counsel for the plaintiff, to support the judgment.

Learned counsel first contended that on the assumption that there was a concluded valid contract, the remedies open to the defendant were either an action for damages for the breach or specific performance. Instead, the defendant claimed for declaration of title, which never passed to the defendant, since the plaintiff failed to execute

[p.6] of [1982-83] GLR 1

an assignment of the leasehold. In any case, the receipt, exhibit B, in failing to state that the ¢3,200 paid was the “sale price”, did not embody all the terms to support the payment as part performance on the part of the defendant, to found an action for specific performance. Moreover, by the court’s finding, the defendant failed to pay the balance within the due date. Finally, it was contended that the defendant having forcibly taken possession was debarred from seeking the aid of equity.

I find no merit in these submissions, Firstly, as to the agreed purchase price, the receipt, exhibit B, put in by the plaintiff, on second thought, states:

“Receipt of ¢3,200 Re House No. N.15 – North Suntresu Kumasi This is to certify that, I the undersigned, Kwame Takyi of house No. N.15, North Suntresu, Kumasi City, Ashanti have on this 12 January 1973, received the sum an amount of ¢3,200 (three thousand two hundred cedis) from Mr. John Opoku-Appiah of Kumasi City, Ashanti, for being the cost price of the said house No.

N.15, North Suntresu Housing Estate, Kumasi, Ashanti, which I have paid to the State Housing Corporation.

Dated … 12 January 1973.”

(The emphasis is mine.) The defendant relied on this as the whole of the sale price of the house.

The learned trial judge, however, preferred the plaintiff’s evidence of ¢5,000 instead. It may be noted that the case of the plaintiff on his pleading was that the transaction was in the negotiation stage when the plaintiff had a change of mind, to wit: statement of claim paragraphs 4, 5 and 8 which state:

“4. In or around 1973, there were negotiations between the plaintiff and the defendant to sell the said house to the defendant and in the said negotiations for sale the plaintiff received the sum of ¢3,200 from the defendant.

5. Soon after the said payment by the defendant as explained in paragraph 4 above, the plaintiff contacted the defendant and informed the defendant that he, the plaintiff, was no more going to sell

the said house to the defendant and offered back to the defendant the sum of ¢3,200…

8. The defendant . . . in essence refused to accept the ¢3,200 back.”

Nowhere in the statement of claim did the plaintiff give any hint that the “bargain price was ¢5,000 which the defendant was unable to pay within two weeks as agreed after a deposit of ¢3,200.” This, however,

[p.7] of [1982-83] GLR 1 was now the case set up in the plaintiff’s reply and at the trial in evidence.

The learned trial judge was persuaded by it. He appeared to have been misled by exhibit B, that the “cost price” of the estate house as sold by the corporation was ¢3,200. Consequently, the learned trial judge thought it improbable that the agreed price was ¢3,200. He therefore preferred the plaintiff’s evidence of ¢5,000 which in the learned judge’s view allowed the plaintiff some profit.

The true state of the facts is that on exhibit E, the answers to the questionnaire at the interview by the corporation, the “selling price” of the house sold to the assignor was given as ¢1,268. The date of lease being 31 October 1966, the sum was a large amount. It is clear therefore that by the inexpert language of exhibit B, the amount of ¢3,200 as the `cost price” was really the “sale price” agreed upon between the plaintiff and the defendant.

Nor is there any substance in Mr. Addai’s submission that with the omission of some such words as the ¢3,200 “being the sale price bargained” the terms of the receipt were incomplete to support an action for specific performance if the defendant had come by that. For in a home-made receipt the intention expressed by the parties in the document must be approached with commonsense. In any case, the plaintiff was the author of the receipt and by the rule of construction he cannot be permitted to take advantage of any alleged omission in the receipt.

More importantly, however, is the point that the learned trial judge failed to guide himself by the rules of pleading. As it happened the plaintiff who launched out the action, did not plead anything about the ¢5,000 in his statement of claim. His case was that he received a deposit of ¢3,200 in the course of negotiation. When the defence raised the issue that the ¢3,200 was the agreed price for the sale, the plaintiff did not care to make the two amounts issues for trial by his summons for directions. Consequently, the introduction of the ¢5,000 in the reply as the “sale price” did not only come out of the blue, but it was inconsistent with his own pleading. Here the learned trial judge should have placed reliance on the salutary rule of practice that where there is a departure from pleadings at trial by one party whereas the other’s evidence accords with his pleadings the latter’s is, as a rule, preferable.

The shifting sands of demeanour was a poor guide here, and though an appellate court may not lightly upset findings of fact made by a trial court, it may properly do so where, especially in a non-jury trial, all the circumstances are adverse to such finding of fact: see George Mattouk v. Elie Massad (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 91 at p. 93. It follows that there was overwhelming evidence before the trial judge

[p.8] of [1982-83] GLR 1

that the agreed sum on the valid and binding contract of sale was ¢3,200.

There appears to have been some misapprehension as to the nature of the relief sought in the counterclaim. As the learned trial judge held, and rightly in my respectful opinion, it did not ask for specific performance, and consequently the trial court was not competent to grant that relief. The lengthy discourse on the nature and requirements of that remedy, in my respectful view, was not in point, and only distracted the trial court’s view of the real issue before it.

The transaction engaged in by the parties was a contract to sell or lease land. Contracts for dispositions of land, now known as “estate contracts,” have been placed in special category from other contracts because of the requirement of written evidence or part performance of the contract before their enforcement by action. To this the learned authors, Megarry and Wade in their book, The Law of Real Property (4th ed) at p. 542 add: “Another distinguishing rule, peculiar to such contract, is the rule that a purchaser, even before conveyance acquires equitable interest in the property.”

The question then was did the defendant become a “purchaser” as a result of the concluded contract for sale? That was so found by the learned trial judge. The prayer of the counterclaim for “a declaration that house No. N.15, North Suntresu Estate lawfully belongs to the defendant by purchase,” in my opinion asks the court to declare that the defendant having paid the purchase money acquired immediately the immediate equitable ownership thereof. With respect, the counterclaim did not ask for “a declaration of title”; that being in the plaintiff as he refused to execute an assignment. Nor did it ask to be put into possession; something the defendant had himself contrived to obtain by extra-judicial means.

It would seem that the learned trial judge was greatly upset by the defendant’s resort to forcible entry. That I admit, deserves no sympathy from any regular court. But it is by no means an “abuse of the process of the court,” for which the defendant must be penalised by denying him the aid of the court for the declaration he sought. For one thing, it was no such abuse; for the very reason that no court process was employed in gaining possession.

Says Megarry and Wade (supra) at p. 542 regarding contracts for disposition of land:

“But although a valid contract relating to land may be made orally, it will be unenforceable by the most important method of enforcing contracts, namely, by action, unless either the statutory requirements as to written evidence of the contract, or the requirements of equity as to part performance, have been satisfied.”

[p.9] of [1982-83] GLR 1

(The emphasis is mine.) This statement of the law sub silentio does not seem to rule out self-help.

What in all probability happened here was that the plaintiff was in need of money and thought of selling his leasehold. Almost after the contract of sale had been concluded, he must have been put wise, and resorted to the bank for a loan by mortgaging the leasehold (see exhibit C). For by exhibit F he informs the corporation that he had now rescinded his decision of leaving Kumasi for good for the Western Region, and wishes to cancel his request for consent to transfer his leasehold to the defendant – whom he had held out as full of kindness and personal assistance “rendered to me when we became friends.”

Thereafter the defendant finding the rent control proceedings to secure the house for him precarious, asked for his purchase money back. This the plaintiff would not, until the defendant was put in possession forcibly.

No matter the demerits of the jungle law of self-help resorted to, the plaintiff by the valid contract of sale of the leasehold has in my opinion raised the equity of holding the legal estate in trust of the defendant. I resist the temptation of discussing the arguments of learned counsel, which appeared to have prevailed at the court below, that there was no part performance by the defendant to ground an action for specific performance. I hold my peace because the defendant did not counterclaim for that relief. It will be for his advisers to attend to that.

But as to the declaration sought, I am of the opinion that he is entitled to it, and accordingly, I would declare the defendant to be the beneficial owner in equity of house No. N.15, North Suntresu Estate, Kumasi. It follows that the plaintiff holds the bare legal title of the leasehold in trust for the defendant. The plaintiff can only deal with the title only at the direction of the defendant. In my opinion, the appeal should be allowed, and the judgment of the court below set aside.

JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A.

I have had the opportunity of reading in advance the judgment of my brother Mensa Boison J.A., and I am in complete agreement with his reasoning and the conclusion reached.

Be that as it may, I wish to add that, if the defendant in his counterclaim had asked for specific performance of the contract of sale of the subject-matter in dispute, this court no doubt would have decreed it in terms that the plaintiff should convey the legal title in the said house by executing an assignment to him; in my view there is abundant evidence in support thereof.

I think the appellate court suo motu must be able to do justice in such deserving cases if indeed there had been a provision in the Court [p.10] of [1982-83] GLR 1 of Appeal Rules, 1962 (LI 218) and this would doubtless avoid multiplicity of suits. Such powers if ever given must, however, be exercised in very special circumstances and with circumspection. It is hoped that the Rules Committee will, at an appropriate time, have another look at the rules and make a suitable recommendation.

JUDGMENT OF WIREDU J.A.

I agree with the judgment just read by my brother Mensa Boison J.A. both in its reasoning and conclusions but will take the opportunity to make a few observations.

Having found that the beneficial interest in the disputed house resides in the defendant, the plaintiff whose name appears on the lease, holds a bare legal title to the property in trust for the defendant who is entitled to compel him (the plaintiff) to deal with that interest under his (the defendant’s) directions. It will therefore be tantamount to the court lending support to a fraud to declare title to the property in the plaintiff in terms as sought by him in his claim. His action therefore should have been dismissed: see Ussher v. Darko [1977] 1 G.L.R. 476 at p. C.A.

DECISION Appeal allowed.

D. R. K. S.

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