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[1979] SLR (HC) 15High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

ARKORFUL vs. SEY [1980] GLR 752

2 November 1979 · OSEI-HWERE J · ≈ 9 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (HC) 15
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OSCOLAARKORFUL v SEY [1980] GLR 752 [1979] SLR (HC) 15
APAARKORFUL v SEY [1980] GLR 752, [1979] SLR (HC) 15 (Ghana).
BluebookARKORFUL v SEY [1980] GLR 752, [1979] SLR (HC) 15 (Ghana High Ct. 1979).

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CASE REFERRED TO

Dove v. Wuta-Ofei [1966] G.L.R. 299.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION for declaration of title to land, and for ancillary reliefs.

The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

A. Q. A. Archampong for the plaintiff.

A. H. Sackeyfio for the defendant.

[p.753] of [1980] GLR 752

JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.

By a deed of conveyance, exhibit A, the piece of land described in the plaintiff’s writ was sold and conveyed by one Ebenezer Buabin Quansah to the plaintiff’s uncle, Kojo Etsiwa Sarsah, on 15 November 1948. On the death of Kojo Etsiwa Sarsah he was succeeded by his younger brother, Joseph Kojo Ahinesi, who was subsequently succeeded by the plaintiff. As the ultimate successor of Sarsah the disputed land came to the plaintiff’s possession. It is the plaintiff’s case that some time ago he saw that gravel had been heaped on the plot of land. He went to meet the defendant on the land and when he challenged him he said that he had bought the plot from the elders of Apam. The plaintiff indicated to the defendant his existing pillar on the land and asked him why he should buy land on which there was a pillar but he did not reply. The plaintiff went to complain to the Tufuhene and the acting regent, Nana Ekuma. The plaintiff subsequently appeared with the defendant before the Tufuhene who asked for the defendant’s documents on the land. The defendant only produced a hand-written receipt. The Tufuhene advised that the plaintiff could take any action he liked for the land. In October 1975 the plaintiff wrote to warn the defendant to stop developing the land. The defendant, who is a building contractor, paid no heed to his warning but rather brought more workers on the land. The plaintiff said that he tried to restrain him by a motion for an interim injunction but that for five months his motion was adjourned by the court. By the end of this period the defendant had built up to about window level on the land. The plaintiff brought this action for a declaration of title, damages for trespass and perpetual injunction. The defendant’s case was simply that some time in 1963 he gave money to his uncle, Kofi Arhin, to buy him land at Apam and in April of that year his uncle bought for him the land in dispute from the Oman of Apam. The relevant document of title, exhibit 1, was subsequently prepared.

The plaintiff, who seeks a declaration of title, must prove not only his root of title but also the identity of the land. Apart from exhibit A which conveyed the land described therein to his uncle, Kojo Etsiwa Sarsah, the plaintiff called his first witness, the successor of Ebenezer Buabin Quansah, to trace his root of title further in point of time to a deed of conveyance dated 28 November 1916 which was admitted in evidence as exhibit D. Although this document is not complete, as part is torn off, it cannot be controverted that by it, one John Andrew Dadson, purported to convey to one Chief Henry Ebenezer Thompson of Ekumpuano, a parcel of land at Apam. The first plaintiff witness told the court that this land which is covered by exhibit D was sold or transferred to his uncle Quansah

[p.754] of [1980] GLR 752

by Chief Korsah IV, Ohene of Ekumpuano. The first plaintiff witness tendered exhibit C as well as the indorsement on exhibit D about the transfer to prove this transaction. It is the plaintiff’s case that it is part of this land transferred to Ebenezer Buabin Quansah which was sold to his uncle in exhibit A. The defendant’s counsel has challenged the identity of the land conveyed by exhibit A with that in exhibit D. Although the description of the lands in these documents does not appear to be identical, I am satisfied from the evidence of the first plaintiff witness that it is but part of this land in exhibit D which subsequently came to be sold to Kojo Etsiwa Sarsah in exhibit A. Indeed, it was admitted by the Omankyeame Kweku Mensah, the second defendant witness, that Ebenezer Buabin Quansah sold a portion of the adjacent land to one Okoso who subsequently, and without doubt, became the boundary owner of the land in dispute: see exhibit C.E. 1. He however, went on to say that they re-sold Okoso’s land to him upon their explanation that Ebenezer Buabin Quansah had no power to sell the land. The identity of the land sold to the plaintiff’s uncle can again not be disputed because the plaintiff said that he had his existing pillar on the land when the defendant entered to develop it.

It was further contended against the plaintiff that his exhibits A and D upon which he rooted his title are registrable instruments and that they are of no effect as they have not been registered. Counsel buttressed his argument by referring the court to section 24 (1) of the Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122). The effect of sections 24 (1) and 36 of Act 122 is truly to render ineffective to pass any estate or interest in land any unregistered instrument, other than a will or a judge’s certificate, which is first executed after the commencement of the Act. But as exhibits A and D were executed long before the commencement of Act 122, counsel argued under a misconception that their non-registration rendered them invalid. The relevant Ordinance applicable to them when they were first executed was the Land Registry Ordinance, Cap. 133 (1951 Rev.), which, under its section 5, made the registration of “instruments” permissible and not compulsory and, by section 21, only gave priority to registered instruments. The question of invalidity of unregistered instruments, although long existing in common law jurisdictions, is an innovation introduced by Act 122. But just as in the old enactment on the subject, i.e. section 21 (1) of Cap. 133, so in section 26 of Act 122 registration affects priority of instruments. The priority of the registered title over unregistered rights or interests is secured in both statutes by making unregistered interests inferior when in competition with registered interests. In my view, this contemplates that the two competing interests must have been

[p.755] of [1980] GLR 752

either created by the same person or traced to the same root of title. If the defendant’s vendors had no title to the land then the fact that the defendant subsequently registered his instrument would neither validate his title nor confer any priority over the plaintiff’s document which was alleged to be unregistered.

In paragraph 2 of his amended defence the defendant pleaded that the whole of the Apam land is attached to the stool of Apam and is, therefore, stool land. Consequently, it is only the chief of Apam and his elders who have the capacity to sell land at Apam and unless, therefore, Ebenezer Buabin Quansah owned the said land as his own self-acquired property, he did not have capacity to sell when he sold it as alleged. Both the plaintiff and the first plaintiff witness testified that the Apam lands were declared oman lands only after the “Apam Riot” of which they gave the dates variously as 1932 and 1926. The defendant’s contention in the above defence that the Apam lands were stool lands was stoutly rebuffed by his own witness, the second defendant witness, who said that the lands at Apam belong to no stool but the oman. Exhibit D from which the plaintiff derives his ultimate title shows one of the witnesses as Joseph Quaye who was acknowledged by the second defendant witness to be not only a Tufuhene of Apam in his day but also an acting regent. He would surely not have witnessed this deed of conveyance if the vendor had no title to the land. Indeed, exhibit D was also witnessed by one C. W. Amos and one Thompson Brown, of whom the former was acknowledged to be a mere clerk to Joseph Jeremy Quaye. A look at the signature of Joseph Jeremy Quaye in exhibit D would dispel any notion that he was an illiterate Tufuhene who needed the services of a clerk. In my view, C. W. Amos must have been somebody more than a clerk in the Tufuhene’s outfit. The signatures of these witnesses, in my view, give authenticity to the title of John Andrew Dadson in exhibit D.

I have no doubt that the defendant only rushed, after the commencement of this action, to get a deed of conveyance executed in a poor attempt to support his title. The deed of conveyance tendered by the defendant, exhibit 1, exposed so many irregularities as to belie its authenticity. The defendant and his witnesses were widely at variance (and sometimes with exhibit 1 itself) as to the year the grant of the land was made to his uncle, the date of the execution of the conveyance, the date the price for the land was paid, etc. The site plan in exhibit 1 itself is shown to have been prepared on 18 December 1975, just over one month after he had been served with the writ. His self-serving site plan was, of course, prepared to conform with the land which he had occupied and upon which he commenced his building operation, quite unmindful

[p.756] of [1980] GLR 752

of the land which is fully described in the deed of conveyance as the subject-matter of the grant. But, alas, the evidence of the surveyor appointed by consent of both counsel to find out whether the defendant’s existing building is located on the land described in exhibit 1 dealt a coup de grace to the defence and exposed the hollowness of the defendant’s claim. The surveyor’s evidence as well as the plan he tendered (exhibit C.E. 1) left no one in doubt that the land which was granted to the defendant’s uncle in exhibit 1 is far removed from the plot on which his building stands. Plainly put, and to use a plebeian expression, the defendant just “pinched” the plot on which he erected his building and this plot, indubitably, is the plot on which the plaintiff’s pillars had been affixed. The defendant has not pleaded any protection under the Land Development (Protection of Purchasers) Act, 1960 (Act 2). Even if he had done so the statute would have turned its tail to him, firstly, because there has been no conveyance of this particular plot in dispute to him at all and, secondly, because his reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s warning is such a conduct as would disentitle him to the protection of the Act: see Dove v. Wuta-Ofei [1966] G.L.R. 299 — and, thirdly, the defendant had shown no bona fides in the highly irregular and dubious manner in which he sought to give some legality to his conduct in occupying the plaintiff’s land. It is for all the above reasons that I give judgment for the plaintiff as per the indorsements on his writ. On the question of damages for trespass, I have to take into consideration that the plaintiff has to break down the structure the defendant has erected on his land and restore it to its status quo ante and, having regard to this extra expense the plaintiff would incur, I award to him ¢15,000 by way of damages. The plaintiff will also be entitled to ¢800 costs to cover his outlays.

DECISION

Judgment for the plaintiff.

S. O. K. O.

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