ASANTE vs. AGYEI AND ANOTHER [1984-86] 2 GLR 475
24 July 1986 · AMMAH J · ≈ 5 min read
[1986] SLR (HC) 7Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Battersby v. Anglo-American Oil Co. Ltd. [1945] 1 K.B. 23; [1944] 2 All E.R. 387, C.A.
(2) Sheldon v. Brown Bayley’s Steel Works Ltd. and Dawnays Ltd. [1953] 2 Q.B. 393; [1953] 3 W.L.R. 542; [1953] 2 All E.R. 894, C.A.
(3) E. Ltd. v. C [1959] 1 W.L.R. 692; [1959] 2 All E.R. 468.
(4) Ofori v. Lartey [1978] G.L.R. 490, C.A.
(5) Trent Cycle Co. v. Beattie (1899) 15 T.L.R. 176, C.A.
(6) Kombat v. Bediako [1971] 1 G.L.R. 196.
(7) R.B. Policies At Lloyds v. Butler [1950] 1 K.B. 76; [1949] 2 All E.R. 226.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION ex parte for extension of time for the renewal of a writ made more than twelve months after the issue of the writ. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.
COUNSEL
E. K. Mensah for the plaintiff-applicant.
JUDGMENT OF AMMAH J.
This is an application ex parte by the plaintiff per his counsel for an extension of time to renew the writ of summons under Order 64, r. 6 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). It is accompanied by an affidavit setting out the facts relied upon. The renewal of a writ is dealt with under Order 8, r. 1 of L.N. 140A. By that rule “ . . . the plaintiff may, before the expiration of the twelve months, apply to the Court or a Judge, for leave to renew the writ; . . .”
[p.477] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 475
In this case the writ was filed on 18 August 1983. It is clear that the present application filed on 16 July 1986 is long after the expiration of the twelve months’ period allowed by Order 8, r. 1, hence the application for an extension of time to renew the writ.
In support of the present application filed on 16 July 1986 it is deposed as follows in paragraph 3 and 4 of the affidavit by the plaintiff-applicant.
“3. That the third defendant was out of the country. I could not serve him with the writ of summons although his driver was served.
4. That I did not apply for service by substitution because I was seriously sick and could not travel to Accra to see my lawyer. But I have been informed that the third defendant has now returned to Kumasi and can now be served.”
The general principle under the English rules with regard to renewal of writs is that if it is made after the expiration of twelve months as in the instant case, renewal will not ordinarily be granted if the effect thereof would be to deprive the defendant of a defence of a statute of limitation which has accrued to him by reason of the plaintiff’s delay: see Battersby v. Anglo-American Oil Co. Ltd. [1945] 1 K.B. 23, C.A.: Sheldon v. Brown Bayley’s Steel Works Ltd. and Dawnays Ltd. [1953] 2 Q.B. 393, C.A. and E. Ltd. v. C. [1959] 1 W.L.R. 692.
But it is significant to note that in the case of Ofori v. Lartey [1978] G.L.R. 490 at 494, C.A the Court of Appeal pointed out as follows:
“Order 8, r. 1 now differs from the English equivalent, Order 6. r. 8. Our rule expressly preserves the requirement that the applications must be made before the expiry of twelve months.”
From the docket in this case there was an attempt made to serve the third defendant. The affidavit of service and non-service filed shows that the bailiff was told that the third defendant had travelled to a village to heal himself. This was on 2 November 1983. It could reasonably be inferred that at that time the plaintiff was in Ghana and not abroad.
I think in the wisdom of the framers of the rules of court, provision was made for service by substitution to overcome difficulties by way of personal service. The third defendant’s address on the writ is “Transport Services, Kumasi.” It is my view that at the time the writ of summons was issued, the third defendant was in Kumasi or at least in Ghana, and the proper thing for the plaintiff’s solicitor to do was to have applied to serve the third defendant by substitution. This was not
[p.478] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 475
done. Although it is averred that the plaintiff travelled abroad it is not shown at what time he left. It is difficult to accept the fact that because the plaintiff was sick and could not travel to Accra to see his lawyer, the application for substituted service could not be made. This is a case where I think the plaintiff’s solicitor could have applied for service by substitution on the third defendant and his managing clerk could swear to the supporting affidavit that efforts at personal service were not successful.
The principle of law is that if at the time of the issue of the writ for service within the jurisdiction, there could at law have been personal service of it upon the defendant sought to be served, but circumstances prevented such service being made, then substituted service of such writ may be allowed: see Trent Cycle Co. v. Beattie (1899) 15 T.L.R. 176, C.A. This was referred to with approval in Kombat v. Bediako [1971] 1 G.L.R. 196 at 200. See also R. B. Policies At Lloyd’s v. Butler [1950] 1 K.B. 76 at 80-81. In Ofori v. Lartey (supra) the Court of Appeal held (as stated in the headnote holding (2) at 491) that:
“As Order 8, r. 1 restricted applications for renewal of a writ to a period before the end of twelve months, time could not be enlarged to overreach vested or accrued rights. Unlike in England, in Ghana the old principle prohibiting enlargement of time to effect renewal of a writ to defeat vested rights’ remained in full force, notwithstanding the court’s discretionary intercession contained in Order 64, r. 6. The power to enlarge time could not apply to the renewal of a writ when by virtue of a statute the cause of action was gone. Dictum of Cockburn C.J. in Doyle v. Kaufman (1877) 3 Q. B. D. 7 at p. 8, C.A. applied. . . .
I feel fettered by this decision.
The failure by the plaintiff’s solicitor to serve the third defendant by substitution within a year of the issue of the writ of summons has created a hurdle in his path.
The writ in this case was issued on 18 August 1983. The cause of action occurred on 27 August 1980. Although the writ was filed within the time limitation period of three years it became dead or ineffective as to service when it was not served within twelve months. A renewal of it would deprive the defendant of his accrued right of a defence of a statute of limitation.
For the reasons I have given, the application is refused.
DECISION
Application dismissed.
M.C.N.-N.
