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[1981] SLR (CA) 4Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

ATADI vs. LADZEKPO [1981] GLR 218

29 January 1981 · EDWARD WIREDU JA · ≈ 15 min read

Cite as[1981] SLR (CA) 4
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OSCOLAATADI v LADZEKPO [1981] GLR 218 [1981] SLR (CA) 4
APAATADI v LADZEKPO [1981] GLR 218, [1981] SLR (CA) 4 (Ghana).
BluebookATADI v LADZEKPO [1981] GLR 218, [1981] SLR (CA) 4 (Ghana Ct. App. 1981).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Danquah v. Timber & Transport Co., Ltd. [1971] 2 G.L.R. 383, C.A.

(2) West African Bakery v. Miezah [1972] 1 G.L.R. 78, C.A.

(3) Yeboah v. Kwakye [1972] 2 G.L.R. 39, C.A.

(4) Tormekpey v. Ahiable [1975] 2 G.L.R. 432, C.A.

(5) Nkaeguo v. Kunadu [1974] 2 G.L.R. 150.

(6) Wakelin v. London and South Western Railway Co. (1886) 12 App.Cas. 41; 56 L.J.Q.B. 229; 55 L.T. 709; 51 J.P. 404; 35 W.R. 141; 3 T.L.R. 233, H.L.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL against the judgment of the trial circuit court finding in favour of the respondent and rejecting the evidence of the appellant’s witness, a relation, in an action for damages for unlawful seizure

[p.220] of [1981] GLR 218 of a vehicle. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of Edward Wiredu J.A.

COUNSEL

E. D. Kom for the appellant.

Gikunoo for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF EDWARD WIREDU J.A.

The facts of this case which have provoked the present appeal may be briefly stated as follows: The defendant-appellant, hereafter referred to as the appellant, was prior to the events giving rise to this action the owner of vehicle No. WE 6604. The evidence shows that he originally employed the plaintiff-respondent, also hereafter referred to simply as the respondent, as the driver of the said vehicle. In the course of his relationship, the appellant agreed with the respondent for the sale of the vehicle to him (the respondent) under what has come to be called “work and pay” basis in local parlance. A written agreement to this effect was executed between them. This agreement was tendered in evidence as exhibit 1.

Under exhibit 1 two conditions were set down which entitled the seizure of the vehicle. These were contained in clauses 5 and 6 which respectively read:

“5. The vendee has agreed that if he fails to pay the said monthly instalment of ¢83.69 (Eighty-three cedis sixty-nine pesewas) for any two consecutive months the vendor has the right, to seize the said Land Rover vehicle or can cause the vehicle to be seized by any person upon the vendor’s written authority.

6. The vendee agreed that any balance due unpaid by the end of December 1971 will be paid in block; at the same time failure which the vendor should seize the said vehicle or cause the vehicle to be seized by any person upon a written authority by the vendor till such time that the amount is paid in full.”

The event which immediately sparked off the present action was the seizure of the vehicle by the appellant. The date of the seizure became the bone of contention between the parties. The respondent claiming that the seizure was on 20 May 1971 whilst the appellant contended that the seizure was on 26 July 1971 when the respondent had been in arrears of instalments for two months in breach of clause 5 of exhibit 1.

The simple issue of fact raised for determination was on which of the two rival dates the vehicle was seized ? If it was seized on 20 May 1971 as was contended by the respondent then his case is made

[p.221] of [1981] GLR 218 out and he will be entitled to succeed against the appellant otherwise his action fails.

The learned trial circuit judge after reviewing the case for parties found in favour of the respondent and rejected the appellant’s claim that the seizure was on 26 July 1971 and proceeded to enter judgment in his favour and granted him the following reliefs:

“In the result the court finds that the special damages proved are as follows:

(i) ¢378 (as evidenced by exhibit A);

(ii) ¢142.55 (being expenses proved to have been incurred on repairs on the vehicle);

(iii) ¢360 (being total amount paid as insurance premiums as per exhibits 1, 1A, 1B, 1C and 1D); and (iv) ¢2,400 (being loss of earnings from 20 May 1971 to date of judgment, i.e. 10 July 1975 a total of approximately two years or 24 months at ¢100 per month).

These give a grand total of ¢3,280.55. Judgment is accordingly entered for the plaintiff in the sum of ¢3,280.55 it being special damages.

I award ¢500 being general damages for wrongful seizure, detention and conversion of Land Rover No. WE 6604 with ¢300 costs.”

It is the judgment in favour of the respondent that the appellant, complaining to be aggrieved, has appealed against to this court originally on three main grounds as follows:

“GROUNDS OF APPEAL (1) The learned judge was wrong in holding as he did that the vehicle was seized by the defendant on 20 May 1971.

(2) The learned judge erred in law by relying on speculations and presumptions not supported by the evidence in coming to the conclusion that:

(a) special damages have been proved;

(b) the plaintiff paid insurance premiums totalling ¢360 during the currency of the agreement and after seizure of the vehicle; and (c) the damages and costs awarded are excessive.

Additional grounds of appeal will be filed upon the receipt of the copy of the proceedings.”

On 17 December the following additional grounds of appeal were filed on behalf of the appellant:

[p.222] of [1981] GLR 218 “(4) The trial judge erred in disbelieving the first defendant witness, Ramsay Kwabla Fiadwo, because he gave evidence with precision, if he did not the judgment would have been otherwise.

(5) The trial judge erred in holding contrary to clause 7 of the agreement that the defendant was liable for the cost of repairs.

(6) The trial judge erred in awarding ¢378 paid for the hire of the vehicle from January-May 1971 when the plaintiff-respondent had in fact, used the vehicle for that period, and in any case the refund of this amount was not claimed as special damages in the writ or the statement of claim.

(7) The trial judge erred in awarding ¢360 being total amount paid as insurance premium when the agreement is silent on it and the refund of this payment was not claimed as special damages neither in the endorsement to the writ of summons nor the statement of claim.

(8) The award of loss of earnings at the rate of ¢100 per mensem for two solid years was unreasonable, unproved and contrary to the authorities.

(9) The award of ¢500 being general damages for wrongful seizure, detention and conversion is without legal basis or justification.”

Mr. Kom, counsel for the appellant, argued ground (1) of the original and ground (4) of the additional grounds of appeal together. Both grounds in effect attacked the learned judge’s reason for rejecting the evidence of the first witness for the defendant.

The relevant portion of the judgment which became the subject of attack on the above two grounds read:

“It would appear that there was a controversy about the date of the said seizure, for, the defendant says that it took place on 26 July 1971, and the first witness he called endeavoured to add measure to that contention.

But it is to be appreciated that this witness in his evidence-in-chief gave particular details regarding the sale transaction between the parties. He said that because the plaintiff failed to render proper accounts to the defendant the latter decided to sell the vehicle to him. He went on to give the agreed purchase price which, according to him, included a loan of ¢234 which was obtained from one Kpagle for the payment of insurance premium; an amount of ¢229 it being an outstanding insurance premium; ¢40 representing the cost of a tarpaulin; an amount of ¢201.23 being repair costs incurred by the defendant, and ¢300 being the

[p.223] of [1981] GLR 218 estimated value of the Land Rover. The precision by which he gave his evidence on these matters inclines the court to hold that he is an interested person whose evidence should of necessity be regarded as suspect.

Accordingly this court accords more weight to the evidence of the plaintiff and his witnesses as to the date of seizure than that of the defendant.”

In his submission, learned counsel for the appellant, argued that the first witness for the defendant on the undisputed facts was a material witness who had a first-hand knowledge about the events leading to the sale agreement resulting in the execution of exhibit 1 between the parties. Continuing, counsel submitted that unchallenged evidence of the witness showed that he interpreted exhibit 1 before execution and he was also the intermediary between the parties in respect of accounts between the parties prior to the execution of exhibit 1. Counsel argued that merely giving a precise account of events of which a witness had a first-hand knowledge did not necessarily make the witness an interested person. He argued that no specific reason was given for the trial judge styling the witness an interested person. He argued that had the learned judge directed his mind to other available evidence oral and documentary provided by the respondent, especially some of the receipts covering the insurance premium paid by the respondent some time well after the 20 May 1971 when be claimed to have lost possession of the vehicle, he would have had no choice than to hold against the respondent. He therefore submitted that where an oral testimony of a witness came into conflict with documentary evidence on the same issue it was not open to a court to prefer the oral testimony in the absence of any apparent defect on the face of the document.

In respect of reliefs (i) and (ii) granted to the respondents, learned counsel submitted under ground (5) of the addition grounds that the award of a total sum of ¢442 being expenses allegedly made by the respondent on repairs offended the clear language of clause 7 of exhibit 1 which made the vendee responsible for such expenditure. Counsel argued further that there was no legal justification for the award of the ¢378 which was not even claimed as a special damage. The same criticism was made under ground (7) of the additional grounds of appeal against the award of ¢360 under relief (iii) in the judgment that there was no legal basis for that award which was also not claimed as a special damage. Finally, reliefs (iv) and (v) invloving the award of ¢2,400 being loss of earnings at the rate of ¢100 per month for two years and ¢1,500 general damages for wrongful seizure, detention and conversion were attacked as being

[p.224] of [1981] GLR 218 without legal basis. Authorities cited by Mr. Kom to support his submission were: McGregor on Damages (13th ed.), paras. 171-173, 945-979, 986-987 and 1032-1035; Danquah v. Timber & Transport Co., Ltd. [1971] 2 G.L.R. 383 at p. 390, C.A.; West African Bakery v. Miezah [1972] 1 G.L.R. 78, C.A.; Yeboah v. Kwakye [1972] 2 G.L.R. 39, C.A. and Tormekpey v. Ahiable [1975] 2 G.L.R. 432, C.A.

In a short reply on the issue of when the vehicle was seized, Mr. Gikunoo, counsel for the respondent, submitted that two rival dates were put up by the parties and in resolving the issue, the trial learned circuit judge who saw the witnesses preferred the case put up by the respondent. According to counsel the issue was one of fact within the exclusive competence of the trial court. He submitted that no substantial case had been made to upset the finding in favour of the respondent which was supported by the evidence on record. In seeking to support the rejection of the case for the defence, counsel argued that the witnesses for the respondent were independent witnesses whereas the first witness of the appellant who alone testified to support his case was a relation who was described as an interested party. He therefore invited the court to confirm the finding in favour of the respondent and to dismiss the appeal as being without any merit.

There is no doubt that the primary issue for determination in this case was the issue as to which of the dates as put up by the parties was the correct date on which the vehicle in question was seized. There is also no doubt that the issue is one of fact depending on the available evidence as put up by the parties. The duty of an appellate court in relation to findings of fact made by trial courts which are supported by evidence on record is now well settled to admit of any dispute. Where, however, oral testimony in respect of an issue as to date by one party comes into conflict with documentary evidence which bears some relevance to the date at issue, and where such documentary evidence tends to make the oral testimony as to the date in issue improbable then unless for good cause shown to justify the rejection of the documentary evidence, it would be wrong for a trial court to rely on demeanour of a host of witnesses to determine the issue at stake. Also whenever the testimony of a party on a crucial issue is in conflict with the testimony of his own witness on that same issue it is not open to a trial court to gloss over such a conflict and make a specific finding on that issue in favour of the party whose case contains the conflicting evidence on the issue. A trial judge, however, will be entitled to accept one of such conflicting evidence if he directs his mind to such a conflict in a party’s case and nevertheless, finds it justifiable to make a

[p.25] of [1981] GLR 218 finding in favour of the party on whose behalf a conflict exists having regard to the particular fact in issue and the circumstances surrounding the case.

In the instant case, the date, 20 May 1971 as the date of seizure testified to by the respondent and his witness were not tested against the receipts covering the insurance premium paid by the respondent (see exhibits 1A-1D) which bore dates well after 20 May 1971. Had the trial learned circuit judge directed his mind to three payments which the respondent was enjoined to pay to enable him ply the vehicle on the road, a conduct consistent with possession, it could not be said that he would have come to the same conclusion as he did; and in this regard his finding on that issue in favour of the respondent was faulty. Moreover, there was a direct conflict between the respondent and his second witness, Kwadwo Mensah, on the date they both claim to have visited the defendant which according to them was relevant to deciding when the vehicle was seized. Whilst the witness said they visited the appellant on a Sunday, 30 May 1971 the respondent himself had this to say:

“I approached some one from the State Insurance Corporation to help me in going into my accounts with the defendant. His name was or is Martin Mensah. We met the defendant on 26 June 1971. He requested the defendant to go into my accounts after I had produced the receipts. Mensah found out that I had overpaid the defendant and so he urged him to release the vehicle to me. The defendant wanted to know from Mensah what relationship existed between him and me. He explained that we were friends.”

This vital conflict was overlooked by the trial learned circuit judge who adopted an omnibus belief in the case for the plaintiff when he came to consider which of the two rival stories as to the date of seizure was the truth.

On the issue of credibility of witnesses, there is no well-defined guideline on this. The whole matter is left to the judicial discretion of the trial judge who has the advantage of seeing the witnesses and observing them. In the case of Nkaeguo v. Kunadu [1974] 2 G.L.R. 150 at p. 151 when the only witness called by the successful party to determine the boundary of the disputants who were adjoining boundary owners was her sister, a submission by counsel for the appellant that the testimony of the sister of the successful party should not have been accepted was rejected and the court held (as stated in the headnote) at p. 151:

[p.226] of [1981] GLR 218

“(1) the two rival stories put up by the parties as to what features divided their lands were primarily findings of fact based on the credibility of the witnesses and principally a matter for the trial court. It was not open to an appellate court to differ from a trial court as to the credibility of witnesses, save for good reasons to be recorded by the appellate court. The argument that the evidence of the defendant’s sister should not have been admitted in view of her relationship with the defendant was untenable because that would have made it impossible for the defendant to make out her case and in fact would have denied her justice.”

Thus where the only eye-witness account of an event is provided by a relation of the party calling such eye-witness, the guideline to credibility or otherwise of the witness is not based solely on the relationship but also on all facts surrounding the case, otherwise a great deal of injustice will be caused. In the instant case, the first witness for the appellant even though a relation, was mentioned by the respondent, also a relation, in his evidence as an eye-witness to accounts taken between the parties at a certain stage during the currency of the agreement between the parties, the appellant being an illiterate. His unchallenged testimony shows that he had personal knowledge of the events between the parties in respect of the use of the vehicle in question by the respondent as a driver and also as to the negotiations resulting in the sale of the vehicle to the respondent and the resultant execution of exhibit 1. His testimony including the date of seizure was described in the judgment as:

“The precision by which he gave his evidence on those matters inclines the court to hold that he is an interested person whose evidence should of necessity be regarded as suspect. Accordingly this court accords more weight to the evidence of the plaintiff and his witnesses as to the date of the seizure than that of the defendant.”

How he is an interested person has not been shown. If it is based on the fact that he is a relation of the appellant then the same goes for the respondent because the parties are also related. One may even ask whether being merely a relation makes one an interested person. What about the witnesses for the respondent who are all his friends? They cannot be described as independent disinterested witnesses.

Whilst there is the need for caution in accepting the corroborative evidence of a relation, especially when his evidence is being offered against a stranger to the family, it is not justifiable

[p.227] of [1981] GLR 218 to reject same without laying a foundation for such a course especially when on the evidence such a witness is the only person known to have personal knowledge of the events at issue.

The learned trial circuit judge failed to assign any justifiable reason for preferring the case put up by the respondent to that of the appellant, a defendant in the action, and any weakness in his case should not have enured to the benefit of the respondent.

Since the finding by the trial court on the crucial point at issue in this case in favour of the respondent is found to have been made on faulty grounds, that finding cannot stand, since the fate of the respondent’s action is dependent on his establishing that the vehicle was seized on 20 May 1971 which he has failed to do. The appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The judgment appealed from is hereby set aside together with all the consequential orders including the order as to costs. In substitution thereof, the case of the respondent is hereby dismissed. The appellant will have his costs in the court below and in this court.

JUDGMENT OF CHARLES CRABBE J.S.C.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A.

I have read the judgment of my brother Edward Wiredu J.A. and agree with the conclusion reached that the appeal should be allowed. In the headnote to the case of Wakelin v. London and South Western Railway Co. (1887) 12 App.Cas. 41, H.L. the following appears, “where the available evidence is so scanty as to render it impossible to reach a definite conclusion, the party to suffer for this state of affairs must be the one on whom lies the burden of proof of the issues.” In the instant appeal, the plaintiff respondent claimed that the vehicle was seized on 20 May 1971 and therefore unlawful in terms of the agreement, exhibit 1. He was unable to establish this fact in view of the conflicting evidence of his own witness. The evidence is such that a definite conclusion could not be based on it in his favour. He must therefore suffer for this state of affairs.

In short he failed to prove his case. I would also allow the appeal with costs.

DECISION

Appeal allowed.

D. F. L.

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