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[1980] SLR (HC) 4High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

ATTA AND ANOTHER vs. MOHAMADU [1980] GLR 862

26 February 1980 · ROGER KORSAH J · ≈ 7 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 4
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OSCOLAATTA AND ANOTHER v MOHAMADU [1980] GLR 862 [1980] SLR (HC) 4
APAATTA AND ANOTHER v MOHAMADU [1980] GLR 862, [1980] SLR (HC) 4 (Ghana).
BluebookATTA AND ANOTHER v MOHAMADU [1980] GLR 862, [1980] SLR (HC) 4 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Barker’s Estate, In re, Hetherington v. Longrigg (1878) 10 Ch.D. 162.

(2) Nene Dugbartey Tetteyga II v. Sappor [1973] 2 G.L.R. 277, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for leave to purge the applicant’s contempt. The facts are fully set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Mensah Bonsu for Totoe for the applicant.

Koduah for Asumadu-Sakyi for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF ROGER KORSAH J.

This is an application by the defendant-contemnor to be allowed to purge his contempt and be released from prison.

The applicant is a defendant in a case pending before the circuit court. On the application of the plaintiff, an order of interim injunction was made by the said court restraining the defendant from continuing his building operations on the land, the subject-matter of the action. The defendant was present when the order of injunction was pronounced. But in complete disregard of that order, the defendant rushed to complete the building and not only put tenants therein but also installed himself as the owner and landlord of the premises.

An application to commit the defendant for contempt of the order of the circuit court was made to this court. Although service of the application for contempt was effected on the defendant, neither he nor his counsel was present when the court was moved to make an order committing the defendant to prison for contempt. He was committed to prison for six months.

[p.864] of [1980] GLR 862 Mr. Totoe for the contemnor says the contemnor has now learnt his lesson and has come on bended knees and with a contrite heart imploring to be allowed to purge his contempt. To purge his contempt he makes the following proposals:

(a) That all rents that have accrued from the building, the subject-matter of the injunction order, will be paid into court. And all future rents should be collected by the registrar of the circuit court.

(b) That in the event of the verdict going in favour of the plaintiff, he (the plaintiff) shall take the building on the land, if he so wishes, without making any payment whatsoever therefor. Or if the plaintiff does not want the said structure, the contemnor shall bear the cost of demolition, which should be carried out within a reasonable time after judgment.

Mr. Asumadu-Sakyi for the respondents opposes this application on three main grounds. He argues that this is not the usual application for a contemnor to be allowed to purge his contempt and that it has been brought on the supposition that the court erred in committing the defendant to prison and that is why by his motion the contemnor requests the court to review the order committing him to prison. Counsel definitely has the law on his side when he argues that, in any case, a review under Order 39 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), must, in the case of an interlocutory order, be brought within fourteen days and in the case of a final judgment, if the application for review is not brought within fourteen days, there must be an application for special leave to apply for a review. Since more than fourteen days have elapsed between the order for committal and this application for review, the contemnor, even if the order for committal were regarded as a final judgment (which is not conceded), should have applied for special leave to apply for a review. No special leave having been granted to bring this application, the motion sins against Order 39 and must be dismissed.

The application to purge his contempt was not made under any particular order of our rules of court, but unfortunately the word “review” is used in the body of the motion. It is the use of this word upon which counsel’s first objection is founded.

I do not think that in asking an order from the court a party is bound to state under which rule or order he proposes to move, and it frequently happens that parties move under a particular rule, and then, when they find that it is the wrong one, turn to another, and an order is made: see In re Barker’s Estate; Hetherington v. Longrigg (1878) 10 Ch.D. 162 at pp. 165 and 166. Nor do I think that the use of particular words or word precludes the court from

[p.865] of [1980] GLR 862

doing what it has power to do, provided the relief sought is couched in sufficiently clear words to enable the court to appreciate what is required of it.

To my mind, the instant application is not one for review, but one in which the applicant seeks the leave of this court to be allowed to purge his contempt. The overtures made by the contemnor testify to the fact that he accepts that he was in contempt of the order of the circuit court. Nowhere in his affidavit in support of this application has it been suggested that there was some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record of the proceedings on which he was committed, or that there was other sufficient reason why he should not have been committed. The contemnor merely explains the absence of his counsel and himself at the committal proceedings in order to obviate any suspicion of discourtesy to this court.

Mr. Asumadu-Sakyi further urged that when the court committed the contemnor to prison, it imposed a term certain of six months’ imprisonment; that this was not a case where a person has been committed to prison until he purged his contempt; that in a case where a term certain has been imposed there is no jurisdiction in the court to review or vary it. The only remedy is for the contemnor to appeal.

Upon the hearing of any application for contempt, the court, in making an order for a writ to issue, may:

“1 Inflict a fine or sentence the offender to a definite term of imprisonment or both;

2 Sentence the offender to an indefinite term of imprisonment;

3 Order sureties to be found for good behaviour;

4 Order the offender to pay the costs of the proceedings;

5 Impose only a fine and payment of costs.”

See Nene Dugbartey Tetteyga II v. Sappor [1973] 2 G.L.R. 277 at p. 282, C.A.

An order of conviction and sentence can only be made in case of a contempt which is punishable as a misdemeanour. In such cases the court, in my view, has no power to entertain an application by the contemnor for leave to purge his contempt. The conviction and sentence sound in criminal law and are final. There is nothing more that the court can do. The contemnor’s only remedy is to appeal against either or both conviction and sentence.

In cases where the contempt is only of a civil nature, such as a disobedience to an order of court for something to be done outside the court which only occasions a private injury—such as a breach of an injunction order—an order of conviction and sentence cannot be made and passed: see Nene Dugbartey Tetteyga II v. Sappor

[p.866] of [1980] GLR 862

(supra). A committal, and not a conviction and sentence, is the proper order to make.

A committal to a term of imprisonment lacks the finality of a conviction and a sentence in respect of contempt punishable as a misdemeanour. In the former, there is power in the court, where the contemnor takes the appropriate steps to purge his contempt, to entertain an application on behalf of the contemnor for leave to purge his contempt, and should the court deem it fit, to release the contemnor from custody even before the term imposed has expired. With a conviction and imprisonment, there is no such power in the court.

The third leg of counsel for the respondents’ opposition to this application is that, nowhere in the body of the affidavit in support of his application has the contemnor assigned any reasons for disobeying the order of injunction. The contemnor has thus not exhibited any reason why he should be visited with clemency.

It is not necessary for an applicant wishing to purge his contempt to assign reasons why he disobeyed an order of the court. It is sufficient that he appreciates that he has done the wrong thing and takes the necessary steps to remedy his fault and apologise to the court.

In my view, the contemnor has by his overtures exhibited sufficient penitence. And I order the release of the applicant from prison subject to his signing or thumbprinting the proposals made by him hereunder:

“I, ALHAJI MOHAMADU, in order to purge my contempt, give the following undertaking:

(a) That all rents that have accrued from the building, the subject-matter of the injunction order will be

paid into court. And all future rents should be collected by the registrar of the circuit court.

(b) That in the event of the verdict going in favour of the plaintiff, he (the plaintiff) shall take the building on the land, if he so wishes, without making any payment whatsoever therefor. Or if the plaintiff does not want the said structure, the contemnor shall bear the cost of demolition, which should be carried out within a reasonable time after judgment.

THUMBPRINTED by me ALHAJI MOHAMADU after the contents have been read over to me in the Hausa language by JAMES AZONAH this 26th day of February 1980.”

DECISION Application granted. Applicant released. D. F. L.

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