HIGH COURT, CAPE COAST
DATE: 2 OCTOBER 1967
BEFORE: ARCHER J
CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Ayeh v. The Republic, Supreme Court, 11 December 1964, unreported.
(2) R. v. Shipley (1784) 4 Doug. K.B. 73; 21 State Tr. 847; 99 E.R. 774.
(3) Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty (1880) 5 C.P.D. 514, C.A’.; affirmed (1882) 7 App.Cas. 741;
52 L.J.Q.B. 232; 47 L.T. 662; 47 J.P. 214; 31 W.R. 157, H.L.
(4) Nevill v. Fine Art and General Insurance Co. [1897] A.C. 68; 66 L.J.Q.B. 195; 75 L.T. 606; 61 J.P. 500; 13 T.L.R. 97, H.L.
(5) Sim v. Stretch [1936] 2 All E.R. 1237; 52 T.L.R. 669; 80 S.J. 703, H.L.
(6) Giles v. The State (1849) 6 Cobb. 284.
(7) R. v. Kelly [1967] Crim.L.R. 115, C.A.
(8) R. v. Wicks (1936) 25 Cr.App.R. 168, C.C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against convictions for defaming the National Liberation Council (the N.L.C.) under section 183A of the Criminal Code, 1960 Act 29), as amended. The facts are fully set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
K. A. Sarpong for the appellant.
Adjetey (with him Amui) for the Republic.
JUDGMENT OF ARCHER J.
The appellant was convicted by the Circuit Court, Cape Coast, on two counts of defaming the National Liberation Council contrary to section 183A of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), and was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment with hard labour on each count. He has appealed against both the conviction and the sentence and his learned counsel Mr. Sarpong, with leave of court
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argued the additional grounds of appeal in conjunction with the ground of appeal relating to sentence. Mr. Sarpong’s first ground was that the trial circuit judge wrongly overruled the submission of no case made at the close of the case for the prosecution. His main quarrel under this ground was with the construction of section 183A of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), (inserted by section 1 of the Criminal Code (Amendment) Act, 1961 (Act 82), and as amended by the National Liberation Council (Proclamation) (Amendment) (No. 2) Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 104)), which reads: “Any person who with intent to bring the National Liberation Council into hatred, ridicule or contempt publishes any defamatory or insulting matter whether by writing, print, word of mouth or in any other manner whatsoever concerning the National Liberation Council commits an offence and shall be liable onsummary conviction to a fine not exceeding five hundred pounds or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to both such fine and imprisonment.” Mr. Sarpong’s argument is that section 183A is out of context with the whole Criminal Code and that with the suspension of the 1960 Republican Constitution, there is no President in Ghana and as section 183A was passed to protect the President in person, no offence was committed by the appellant. This argument at first sounds plausible but when one considers the present words of section 183A as amended the argument loses its glamour and enchantment. Section 19 (1) of the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4), provides: “For the purpose of ascertaining the mischief and defect which an enactment was made to cure and as an aid to the construction of the enactment a court may have regard to any text-book or other work of reference, to the report of any commission of inquiry into the state of the law, to any memorandum published by authority in reference to the enactment or to the Bill for the enactment and to any papers laid before the National Assembly in reference to it, but not to the debates in the Assembly.”
I shall invoke the provisions of this section to discover what mischief section 183A was meant to cure. The memorandum to the Criminal Code (Amendment) Bill published on 17 August 1961 reads: “Provision has been made in the Criminal Code to deal with cases where any person does an act which is intended to insult or bring into contempt the National Flag and the National Emblem of Ghana and with any matter of a seditious and treasonable character. It is considered nonetheless that the
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person and dignity of the President should also be covered and this Bill provides accordingly. It is therefore clear that section 183A was originally passed to protect the person and dignity of any individual who held the office of President under the former Republican Constitution, 1960, now suspended. It is also of historical importance to note that the section created for the first time the offence of criminal slander against a specified human being in addition to the hitherto well known offence of criminal libel generally. I have not been able to trace any previous case prosecuted in a court of law under this section since the Criminal Code (Amendment) Act, 1961 (Act 82), came into force on 1 November 1961. Presumably none came to court as the former Nkrumah regime no doubt had a more effective machinery for dealing with transgressors under section 183A. What were the characteristics or features of the office of President? Article 8 of the Republican Constitution, 1960, provided that: “8. (1) There shall be a President of Ghana, who shall be the Head of the State and responsible to the people
(2) Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the executive power of the State is conferred upon the President.
(3) The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the Fount of Honour.
(4) Except as may be otherwise provided by law, in the exercise of his functions the President shall act in his own discretion and shall not be obliged to follow advice tendered by any other person “ Then article 15 (1) provided that:
“The President shall from time to time appoint by instrument under the Presidential Seal persons from among the Members of Parliament, who shall be styled Ministers of Ghana, to assist him in the exercise of the executive power and to take charge under his direction of such departments of State as he may assign to them.” A further provision in article 16 (1) and (2) reads: “16. (1) There shall be a Cabinet consisting of the President and not less than eight Ministers of Ghanaappointed as members of the Cabinet by the President. (2) Subject to the powers of the President, the Cabinet is charged with the general direction and control of the Government of Ghana.” Briefly therefore the Republican constitutional President was Head
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of State, Fount of Honour, Commander-in-Chief of the Ghana Armed Forces and the chief executive of the state. The President as the chief executive together with a cabinet of ministers formed the Government of Ghana.
By a Proclamation made on the 26 February 1966, there was established a National Liberation Council consisting of named persons and the Republican Constitution was suspended. Paragraph 3 of the Proclamation gave power to the National Liberation Council, (hereinafter to be referred to as the N.L.C. for brevity) to make and issue Decrees which shall have the force of law in Ghana. Paragraph 3 (2) preserved all existing laws subject to any revocation, repeal or amendment which may be made by the N.L.C. and paragraph 3 (3) of the same Proclamation provided: “Where any enactment or rule of law in force immediately before the 24th day of February, 1966 is in conflict with any provision of a decree made by the National Liberation Council the said provision shall prevail over that enactment and to the extent to which the enactment conflicts with the provision of the decree, that enactment shall be deemed to be amended by the decree.” Paragraph 7 of the same Proclamation also provided: “Subject to any decree that may be made by the National Liberation Council any reference to President Minister or Cabinet in any enactment continued in existence by virtue of this Proclamation shall, on and after the 24th day of February, 1966 be construed as a reference to the National Liberation Council or to such person as the Council may by writing appoint.”
The said Proclamation, para.1, was amended by the National Liberation Council (Proclamation) (Amendment) Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D.1), para. 2 (1) by the insertion of a new sub-paragraph which reads: “(3) Until such time as a new Constitution is promulgated by the People of Ghana and a new Government is formed under such Constitution, the National Liberation Council shall be the Government of Ghana and shall have and exercise the executive powers of the State.” By the National Liberation Council (Consequential and Transitory Provisions) Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 73), para. 4, the National Liberation Council was declared to be the Fount of Honour and paragraph 13 (1) of the same Decree conferred the powers of mercy, namely, pardon, respite and remission on the National Liberation Council.
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But there is this conspicuous departure from the Republican Constitution. Paragraph 15 (1) provides: “There shall be a Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces who shall be appointed by the National Liberation Council and shall be paid such remuneration as the National Liberation Council may determine.” As a further amendment, the National Liberation Council (Proclamation) (Amendment) (No. 2) Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D.104), para. 1 (b) was passed to substitute paragraph 7 (1) (a) of the Proclamation which now provides in part that: “any reference to President, Cabinet or Minister in any enactment continued in existence by virtue of this Proclamation shall,— (a) in the case of a reference to President or Cabinet, be construed as a reference to the NationalLiberation Council. For purposes of clarity and completeness, I shall also refer to the National Liberation Council (Proclamation) (Amendment) Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D.183), which repealed N.L.C.D.104. By paragraph 4 (1) of N.L.C.D.183 the Proclamation, para. 6A was again amended to provide that any reference to the President shall be construed as a reference to the National Liberation Council and in the case of a reference to the cabinet, be construed as a reference to the executive council. Paragraph 2 of the N.L.C.D. 183 inserted a new paragraph 1A into the Proclamation which also made it clear that subject to the powers of the National Liberation Council, the executive power of the State shall be vested in the executive council and subject to the said powers, the executive council shall be charged with the general direction and control of the Government of Ghana. It seems to me therefore that as from 29 June 1967 when the new paragraphs 1A and 6A of the Proclamation came into force the executive council became the Government of Ghana whereas previous to that date the National Liberation Council was the Government. I have however failed to trace any N.L.C. Decree which declares that a member of the National Liberation Council shall be the Head of State. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the following attributes can be discerned from the various Decrees I have quoted, that is to say, before 29 June 1967, the N.L.C. was the Government of Ghana, by exercising the executive powers of the State; the Council was and still is the Fount of Honour and still exercises the powers of mercy including pardon, respite and remission. The Council was established by the Proclamation on 26 February 1966 and consisted of seven named persons
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but was later increased to eight by the National Liberation Council (Proclamation) (Amendment) Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D.1). This chronological account of legislation by Decree shows clearly that the word “President” appearing in section 183A of the Criminal Code has been amended to read “the National Liberation Council” not only by the Proclamation but also by N.L.C.D. 104 and 183. No bills were published for these amendments and the purpose of the amendment is therefore in the air. It seems to me therefore that although the memorandum to the bill which became law as Act 82 disclosed that the purpose of section 183A was to protect the person and dignity of the President, yet it is impossible to say with confidence what attributes of the National Liberation Council, which is not an individual but a council of men, are supposed to be protected. The emphasis in the amendment is not on an individual as the President but on a council of men-an entity. Any defamatory allegation must refer to the council as a whole and not to any individual member of it. It seems to me therefore that the original purposes of section 183A as indicated in the earlier Bill have been defeated and the memorandum to the Bill cannot be of any use in construing section 183A of the Criminal Code. In any case, as paragraph 3 (3) of the Proclamation provides that in the event of any enactment in force before 24 February 1966 conflicting with any provisions of any Decree, the Decree shall prevail, I am of the view that section 183A as amended by the Proclamation and subsequent Decrees prevails. For the above reasons, I cannot subscribe to the argument of learned counsel for the appellant that because there is no President, no offence can be committed under section 183A.
Nevertheless, it is clear as was advocated by Mr. Adjetey, learned state attorney, that N.L.C.D.104 was a consequential Decree analogous to the Constitution (Consequential Provisions) Act, 1960 (C.A. 8). But I am convinced that the amendment to section 183A of the Criminal Code as it now stands is fraught not only with difficulties but bristles with ambiguities which come to the surface after they have been released from their submerged crevices. Section 183A as amended does not say “any person who with intent to bring the National Liberation Council or any member thereof into hatred, ridicule or contempt.” It refers to the National Liberation Council as a whole meaning the Government of Ghana. Myconstruction of section 183A as it now stands is that any defamatory matter written or spoken of one or more members of the N.L.C. will not constitute an offence under section 183A unless the defamatory matter is referable to the council as a whole. A section which was originally enacted to protect the person and dignity of an individual, has, by consequential amendment, been transformed into legislation for
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the protection of the official reputation of a council created by Decree and which cannot have any social reputation. Whereas it would have been defamatory under section 183A to charge a holder of the office of the President that he was notorious for promiscuous concupiscence and debauchery yet it would not be defamatory under that section as amended if one or more members of the N.L.C. were so described unless the allegation were made against all members of the council as a whole. This is so because the social and moral reputation of one member of the N.L.C. cannot invariably be the reputation of the council as a whole or that of the remaining members of the council. I cannot subscribe to the view submitted by Mr. Adjetey that section 183A was originally enacted to protect the office of the President and not his person because the memorandum to the bill does not support such a view. If section 183A is now intended to protect the person and dignity of each member of the council, then I think that section should be further amended expressly to afford such singular protection.
Mr. Sarpong also pointed out that the charge sheet was defective because paragraph 7 of N.L.C.D.104 was not referred to in the charge sheet.. I think the answer to this point lies in section 112 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1,960 (Act 30), as amended by the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1965 (Act 261). That subsection reads: “The statement of the offence shall describe the offence shortly in ordinary language, avoiding as far as possible the use of technical terms, and without necessarily stating all the essential elements of the offence and if the offence is one created by an enactment, may contain a reference to the enactment.” This section governs the framing of the statement of offence in summary trials. On the other hand in trials on indictment, section 202 (4) (c) of Act 30 also provides that: “The statement of offence shall describe the offence shortly in ordinary language, avoiding as far as possible the use of technical terms, and without necessarily stating all the essential elements of the offence, and if the offence charged is one created by enactment shall contain a reference to the section of the enactment creating the offence.” It is obvious therefore that in bills of indictment the statement of offence must contain a reference to the section of the enactment creating the offence whereas in the case of summary trials, the charge sheet may contain a reference to the enactment. Moreover section 27 of the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4), provides that: “In an enactment made after the passing of this Act, ‘shall’ shall be
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construed as imperative and ‘may’ as permissive and empowering.” The Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), was passed and came into force after the Interpretation Act was passed and accordingly the word “may” in section 112 (2) relating to charge sheets in summary trials is only permissive and empowering. If therefore the charge sheet in the present appeal need not have referred to section 183A of the Criminal Code then it follows that it was not necessary also to refer to N.L.C.D. 104, para. 7 which amended that section in the charge sheet. It is therefore not legally possible to agree with learned counsel for the appellant that the charge sheet was defective.
Before I deal with the remaining grounds of appeal, it is necessary that I should refer to the documents which contain the alleged defamatory matter. Exhibit A which is the subject-matter of the first count isheaded “Dr. Nkrumah and the negative revolutionaries” and exhibit A1 which is the subject-matter of count two has the same heading. Mr. Sarpong’s fourth ground of appeal was that the trial judge erred in finding that there was publication on the evidence before him whereas section 183A does not define publication. As I have already pointed out section 183A does not only contain the offence of criminal libel but also criminal slander. As I understand the law, libel and slander are offences grouped under the generic term of defamation. So that when one speaks of Mr. A. having defamed Mr. B. one means that Mr. A. has either libelled or slandered Mr. B. Ordinary criminal libel is contained in sections 112 and 113 of the Criminal Code. Section 114 (1) reads: “Matter is defamatory which imputes to a person any crime or misconduct in any public office, or which is likely to injure him in his occupation, calling, or office, or to expose him to general hatred, contempt, or ridicule.” And section 115 (1) and (2) provides: “(1) A person publishes a libel if he causes the print, writing, painting, effigy, or other means by which the defamatory matter is conveyed, to be so dealt with, either by exhibition, reading, recitation, description, delivery, or otherwise, as that the defamatory meaning thereof becomes known or is likely to become known, to either the person defamed or any other person 2) It is not necessary for libel that a defamatory meaning should be directly or completely expressed; and it suffices if such meaning and its application to the person alleged to be defamed, can be collected either from the alleged libel itself or from any extrinsic circumstances, or partly by the one and partly by the other means.”
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I cannot find anything in sections 114 and 115 of the Criminal Code which stipulates that the definition of the words “defamatory” and “publication” relate only to the offence of ordinary criminal libels contained in sections 112 and 113. The definitions have general application to all criminal libels and their publication wherever they may be found in the Criminal Code. I am therefore of the view that although section 183A does not expressly define publication for offences under that section yet section 115 provides the general definition and therefore sections 115 and 183A must be read together so far as publication of a libel is concerned, that is, written defamatory matter. I do not wish to express any views as to what the definition of publication would be if the defamatory matter were not written but spoken so as to constitute an offence under section 183A. In the present appeal therefore if there is publication then it must have been either to the N.L.C. or to any other person. The evidence shows that exhibit A and A1 were published to only one person to whom the appellant gave the documents to type. Mr. Sarpong has argued that publication to one person is not enough and he relied on the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Ayeh v. The Republic, 11 December 1964, unreported. I think that judgment relates to section 208 of the Criminal Code which deals with publication of false news with intent to cause fear and alarm to the public generally and the definition laid down by that judgment cannot oust the statutory definition of publication of libel as laid down in section 115 of the Criminal Code. Under section 115, publication to the person defamed or any other person is enough. Mr. Sarpong has further urged that there was no publication to any other person not even R. R. Mensah in whose possession the documents were found after a search by the Special Branch of the Ghana Police. I do not know why Mr. Sarpong thought it fit to make this submission when he could discern from the evidence that R. R. Mensah was not the author and not even a co-author of the documents exhibits A and Al. There is no evidence that R. R. Mensah, nec vi nec clam nec precario, that is by force or stealth gained possession of these documents. There is however evidence that it was the appellant himself whovoluntarily gave these documents to R. R. Mensah to type. R. R. Mensah read these documents and as soon as the contents became known to him, publication as required by law was complete. I cannot therefore find any substance in the fourth ground of appeal.
The third ground of appeal is that the trial judge erred in admitting two police statements made by the appellant since the prosecution failed to discharge the burden of the voluntary nature of the statements. Exhibits G and H are the two statements made by the appellant. Exhibit G was taken in the presence of an independent witness —
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Lawrence Kudadje who is a police officer. In his evidence, Kudadje at page 12 of the record of proceedings, line 7, stated that “the first prosecution witness advised the accused that he was going to take a statement from him which might be tendered in evidence one day so he should be careful of what he said.” The same witness said that several questions were put by the first prosecution witness to the accused and in re-examination explained that the questions put to the accused by the first prosecution witness were intended to find out the former’s intent in writing the articles. Some were directed to find the age and address of the accused and others concerned the accused’s hometown. When the appellant himself gave evidence on the question of the admissibility of exhibit G he told the trial court that the first prosecution witness told him that anything he said might be given in evidence against him or might not be given in evidence against him. Then in cross-examination, the appellant confirmed that the first prosecution witness read over his statement and he found the contents to be correct. He also agreed that he was not forced to make the statement. But earlier the appellant had said that the leader of the Special Branch officers who came to arrest him told him that if he spoke the truth, he would be freed but if he, did not tell the truth, he would be taken to a place he did not know. The learned trial circuit judge after hearing the evidence and submissions by counsel for both parties, delivered his ruling and overruled the objections. I have read the ruling very carefully and I cannot find anything which detracts from the fairness or correctness of the ruling. The learned trial judge heard oral evidence and after satisfying himself that the prosecution had discharged the burden on them to prove that the appellant made the statement exhibit G voluntarily, exercised his discretion and admitted the statement. Another storm was also created over the admissibility of exhibit H which the learned trial judge admitted after hearing oral evidence. There is no evidence that the police officers assaulted the appellant before he made exhibit H on 21 December 1966. The trial judge found that the appellant and R. R. Mensah were maltreated as far back as 30 September 1966 at the Regional Office, Cape Coast by military personnel and held that that incident could not affect the voluntary nature of exhibit H. The trial judge had evidence before him and I think the admissibility of exhibit H was not open to objection.
I shall now deal with the second and sixth grounds of appeal which related respectively to the admission of irrelevant matter and proof of intent. The prosecution tendered in evidence various exhibits, according to Mr. Adjetey, to show the state of mind of the appellant. There is no doubt that exhibits A, A1 and A2 were
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found with R. R. Mensah and therefore on the appellant’s own admission, he published these three documents to R. R. Mensah. He was however acquitted and discharged on a third count involving exhibit A2. When the Special Branch searched the premises of the appellant, they came across and took possession of other documents. These were exhibit C — a photograph featuring the appellant standing near the ex-President under a state umbrella together with others.What relevance this photograph can have to the defamatory matter contained in exhibit A and A1 baffles my imagination. The learned circuit judge in his judgment opined that that photograph was “evidence of the accused’s nearness to Kwame Nkrumah.” The question, is not nearness at all. The question is whether that photograph had any relevance to the charges before the court? There was also another exhibit D written in the appellant’s own hand-writing which was not published to anybody. Then of course exhibit D1 – a copy of a cyclostyled speech made by the deposed President on 24 February 1966 which presumably was circulated in Ghana to supporters of the ex-President. Exhibit E was a printed extract from the Daily Express of 26 February 1966 narrating how Mrs. Nkrumah and her children were escorted to leave the country. These exhibits were all irrelevant and should not have been tendered. It seems that apart from the photograph, the learned circuit judge did not rely on exhibits D and E in his judgment. The intent which was required to be proved under section 183A could have been proved by looking at exhibits A and A1 alone. And in this respect I wish to quote the words of Ashurst J. in R. v. Shipley (1784) 4 Doug. K.B. 73 at p. 177: “What passes in the mind of man is not scrutable by any human tribunal; it is only to be collected from his acts. Every man (who is of sufficient understanding to be responsible for his actions) is supposed to be cognisant of the law, as it is the rule by which every subject of the kingdom is to be governed, and therefore, it is his business to know it. If, therefore, a man publishes that which the law says is treasonable, seditious, or rebellious, the alleging in the indictment or information that the party did it with a libellous or seditious intent is a mere matter of legal inference from the fact of publication and not the object of proof either on one side or the other.” The words I have quoted were expressed in 1784 and their forensic forcefulness has not been weakened by the passage of time. Moreover section 115 (2) of the Criminal Code to which I have earlier referred provides that the meaning of a libel and its application to the person alleged to be defamed can be collected either from the libel itself or
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from any extrinsic circumstances. This in my view can only be construed to mean that extrinsic circumstances or evidence can be adduced to assist the court to appreciate the meaning of a defamatory statement and its referability to the person alleged to be defamed. If there is one extrinsic circumstance which can be relied on, it is, as the learned circuit judge mentioned in his judgment, that the appellant belonged to the disbanded Convention People’s Party and was the acting district organiser of the dissolved Young Pioneer Movement. What was the result of the dissolution? The appellant lost his job because the negative revolutionaries whom he condemns in exhibits A and AI were responsible for the dissolution, which resulted in his becoming unemployed thus depriving him of his monthly salary. This is a piece of extrinsic evidence which could have been relied on to prove that the appellant intended to defame the negative revolutionaries. Exhibits C, D and E were useless pieces of extrinsic evidence from which no intention to defame could have been collected. As exhibits A and AI by themselves proved intent by legal inference, I do not think the futile reception of irrelevant evidence should vitiate the proceedings and I do not think therefore grounds (2) and (6) although sound should be regarded as devastating. I now come to what I consider the most important ground of the appeal namely that the trial judge erred in holding that the alleged “tract” was defamatory and that it was defamatory of the N.L.C. Mr. Sarpong’s submission under this ground was that the prosecution failed to substantiate the meaning they attached to exhibits A and A1. Furthermore no mention is made of the N.L.C. in these documents. Section 183A under which the appellant was prosecuted refers to “any person who with intent to bring the National Liberation Council into hatred, ridicule or contempt publishes any defamatory or insultingmatter whether by writing, print, word of mouth or in any other manner whatsoever concerning, the National Liberation Council. . .” The prosecution under this section must prove (1) that the matter was published by the appellant (2) that it concerned the N.L.C., and (3) that it was published with intent to bring the N.L.C. into hatred, ridicule or contempt. There can be no doubt that the exhibits A and AI were published by the appellant and therefore the prosecution were able to jump the first of the three hurdles. Now what about the second hurdle? Did the documents concern the N.L.C.? I shall deal with the two counts separately. Count (1) relates to exhibit A. The learned trial judge in his judgment found that the contents of the two exhibits were defamatory of the N.L.C. – particularly paragraphs (4), (6) and (7) of exhibit A and paragraph (5) of exhibit A1 tended to bring the N.L.C. into
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hatred in the minds of Ghanaians and furthermore to seek the overthrow of the N. L. C. Section 183A provides that offences under it should be summarily tried. It therefore follows that the trial judge is not only judge of the law but also judge of the facts and therefore the principles of ad questiones juris respondent judices, and questiones facti respondeat juratores cannot apply in its pristine purity and sanctity.
I shall attempt to consider paragraph by paragraph exhibit A to find out whether the document concerns the N.L.C. The first three paragraphs read: “To talk of revolution is to hit a note which has two sides. Namely: A positive revolution and a negative revolution. In a negative revolution the force in it is prepared to succumb to a more radical force which by a simple onslaught of positive action could thwart its pivot under time.
A negative revolution rules with the help of the erstwhile colonial power whose protracted economic and political tricks are always admired and considered as best by those who are the elements of a negative revolution.
In such a revolution the composition of which are quisling tools, lackeys and reliable neo-colonialist agents could be averted through systematic and sustained upheaval by the working people.” These are the words of the appellant. I have read and re-read these three paragraphs and my conclusion is that they constitute arrant nonsense. Then there is paragraph (4): “For years Dr. Nkrumah has been preaching, teaching and writing about imperialism and neo-colonialism, all in order to create an awareness in us as to their machinations. It is a regret therefore to recognise in the midst of all these teachings a bloody rebellion in which Ghanaians have been subjected to all forms of brutalities and have been forcefully, made to accept as a revolt based on the will of the Ghanaian people.” There is no doubt that this paragraph contains an adulation of Dr. Nkrumah and also the appellant’s sense of regret that a bloody revolution has taken place and Ghanaians have been subjected to all forms of brutalities. However the paragraph does not say who inflicted the brutalities. In the fifth paragraph of exhibit A, there is a continuation of the arrant nonsense: “A negative revolution is always a stick which the forces who embellish collective imperialism employ to thwart the advance of a more dynamic nation which is on the move to political consciousness and especially SOCIALISM in order to make the
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particular nation subservient to neo-colonialism, a loyal son who speaks his almighty dollars voice.”
I need not spend mental energy to comment on this. The sixth paragraph begins:“A revolution such as this which culminates classes and breeds antagonism is bound to fail. Picturing the Ghanaian Army rebellion which they mistakingly call a revolution one can glaringly see self interest at work and this is so because one can’t observe a single officer who took part in the rebellion and has not been promoted and paid two months in salaries. This is the sort of thing which every true nationalist has rightly condemned.” In this paragraph the appellant betrays himself as a hungry, ravenous wolf who could also do with a promotion and two months’ salaries paid to him as a bonus. But the trend of his feelings echoes the biblical maxim that “to him that hath shall be given and from him that hath not shall be taken away that even he hath.” Here is a case in which the appellant has been given no promotion or two months’ salary but the only job which he had in this world which provided him with his daily bread had been taken away. Is he not entitled to express his petulance? Finally in exhibit A we have the following: “Ghana the once virile country is now a neo-colonialist sell-out. Political circles in western Europe and America not only control Ghana economically but also direct its political actions. The military cum political renegade Ankrah has made numerous statements trying to picture the rebellion as a sort of humane upheaval which meets the sentiments and aspirations of the Ghanaian people which only inveterate trouble makers and irresponsible people could undermine and tries to give a picture of the present situation as the only way through which we can preserve our culture. He himself has taken over by force of arms yet he talks of morality. How? SAWABA No. 1” This last paragraph laments that Ghana is no longer virile and political circles abroad control Ghana economically and politically. The question I would like to ask is, whether it is defamatory to say that the economy of one’s fatherland is controlled from abroad? I think not. Political behaviour and economic policies are so interwoven these days that it is impossible to determine the path of one without at the same time foreseeing which path the other would take. What nation in the world today is economically or politically
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independent of other nations? Was devaluation of the Ghana cedi not dictated from abroad? Was the release by Ghana of the diplomats from Guinea—a political action-not compelled by pressure from without?
When one reads the whole exhibit A it is impossible to say with confidence whether the appellant was attacking the idea of the 24th February coup d’etat or officers who had earned promotion with immediate payment of bonuses or attacking the administration of the country. Nowhere in this exhibit A is the National Liberation Council mentioned expressly or by implication. Mr. Adjetey has urged that count (1) is referable to the people who organised the coup and that the court should take judicial notice of the fact that the N.L.C. organised the coup. I am most unwilling to accept Mr. Adjetey’s invitation to take judicial notice of his suggestion because that suggestion has no support from the Preamble to the Proclamation which was issued on 26 February 1966. The Preamble to the Proclamation reads: “WHEREAS on Thursday the 24th day of February, 1966 the Armed Forces of Ghana in the interest of the People of Ghana and with the co-operation of the Police Service of Ghana and the support of the People of Ghana assumed the Government of the State of Ghana: AND WHEREAS it is expedient that due provision should be made by law for the proper administration of the country and for the maintenance of law and order therein: NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the said assumption of the Government of Ghana this Proclamation is hereby made with effect from the 24th day of February, 1966:- 1 (1) There is hereby established a council to be known as ‘the National Liberation Council’.”It is clear from the Preamble that the N.L.C. did not organise the coup. The N.L.C. came into being, after the coup, as a necessary institutional provision for the proper administration of the country and for the maintenance of law and order. Mr. Adjetey further suggested that exhibit A attacked the N.L.C. because it referred to promotions. This cannot be the basis for attaching criminality to the exhibit. Promotions were abundant after the coup not only in the Ghana Armed Forces but m also in the Ghana Police Service. Promotions were not restricted to members of the N.L.C. In any case not all of them were promoted. At least there is one police senior officer in the N.L.C. who still holds the rank he held before the coup and, as Brigadier Afrifa revealed in his book on the coup, not all members of the N.L.C. knew about the coup. Indeed the
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majority of the members had no hand in it until after they had been invited and in fact after some had accepted the invitation with reluctance and probably with trepidation. Mr. Adjetey further suggested that the publication in exhibit A attacked General Ankrah in his capacity as Chairman of the N.L.C. If one reads the last paragraph of exhibit A one becomes convinced that it is an attack on General Ankrah. The appellant described General Ankrah as a military cum political renegade. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines a renegade as an “apostate especially from Christianity to Mohammedanism; deserter of party or principles, turncoat.” In the modern world when man can win the respect and admiration of his fellow men because of his consistency, faith in the principles he professes and his tenacity of purpose, it is clearly defamatory to describe a man especially one holding very high office as a military cum political renegade and it is criminal to publish such a libel. Then there is the remaining sentence: “He himself has taken over by force of arms yet he talks of morality. How?” If there is any express attack against any person specifically and unequivocally then it is General Ankrah. But does the mere fact that he is Chairman of the N.L.C. necessarily transfer the libel against him to the N.L.C.? I think not. As I said earlier in this judgment, section 183A refers to the National Liberation Council as a whole. So that an attack on the council can only relate to its official reputation and not its social reputation because as a council set up for the administration of this country, it cannot have a social reputation although the individual members of the council have both an official and a social reputation. Section 183A does not cover defamation matter concerning a member of the Council. It refers to the N.L.C. as an institution of government. In the course of his evidence, R. R. Mensah said that when he read the documents he understood them to refer to the government that is the N.L.C. That is exhibit A, A1 and A2. I am convinced that R. R. Mensah formed this opinion because he read through all the three documents. But unfortunately, the three documents were not the subject-matter of one count. Each document was the subject-matter of a separate count and it was the duty of the prosecution to prove their case on each count separately.
I shall now deal with exhibit A1 which is the libel charged in count two. As usual it commences with indigestible generalisations: “A positive revolution as we saw in the look forward conditions of the Nkrumah regime, is a historical process within which various revolutionary and democratic movements unite and interact with the working class exerting the determining influence. A positive revolution is not confined to some small section
[p.580] of [1967] GLR 562
of the populace, it is the sole preserve of all and sundry. A positive revolution organises the aims, sentiments and feelings of millions towards specific goals.” Then the appellant, who thought he could bisect and dissect the anatomy of revolutions, continued:“The main revolutionary mandate of a positive revolt is first to speed up the rate of economic and social progress of the population as well as their political consciousness so as to create in them an awareness of the force that could easily militate against them. In order to avoid the sordid story of nationalistic economic competitions haphazard boom and slump, poverty in the midst of plenty and the waste of all human potentialities a positive revolt does not come in to negate the negation but comes as a saviour to infuse positive action into the already sorry plight of the masses.” I must say now that in this passage we are discerning glimpses of Hegelian philosophy which I may sum up succinctly as every condition of thought or of things — every idea and every situation in the world – leads irresistibly to its opposite, and then unites with it to form a higher or more complex whole – thesis, antithesis, and synthesis constitute the formular and secret of all development and all realty. This was what Hegel, Schelling and Fitche, all German philosophers preached and the first lecture which Nkrumah delivered at the Accra Palladium on his return to the Gold Coast was on thesis, antithesis and synthesis. I was present at the Accra Palladium to hear him while the late Dr. Danquah was in the chair. Perhaps, ironically, Nkrumah had his thesis, the N.L.C. are now having their antithesis and a civilian government will have the synthesis. If the appellant ever read Hegel’s philosophy, it is obvious that he did not understand it. If he had, he would not have used expressions like “to negate the negation.” But this is not the end of exhibit Al. The appellant now treads on dangerous and hallowed ground when he states: “Looking at the Ghanaian scene as a citizen, one can do nothing than arrive at a positive conclusion that, there is much to be desired. The pace of our development as was vigilantly tackled by Dr. Nkrumah and his socialist planning has been slowed and even better ones malignantly cancelled. As self-interest is the code of ethics predominant in a negative revolution it’s not so with a positive revolution. In Ghana today self-interest is at its peak, the few who illegally compose the ruling class in Ghana are enriching themselves at the expense of the
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many, economic plans have been confused with tribalism and a so-called intelligentsia have monopolized all discussions at social economic and political levels.
Ghana is now a crooked oligarchy and a well baked American satellite nation.”
This passage has exposed the appellant. He attacks the administration of the country by alleging that the pace of development has been slowed and planning has been malignantly cancelled. The few who illegally compose the ruling class in Ghana are enriching themselves at the expense of the many. Who are the few who compose the ruling class, and according to the appellant, illegally? The few no doubt refers to the N.L.C. It is defamatory to say that the N.L.C. is enriching itself at the expense of the many. What is an oligarchy? – it means a government or a state governed by the few or the members of such a government. The word oligarchy aptly describes the N.L.C.: but what about the adjective “crooked”? The word crooked means “not straight, bent, twisted, deformed, bent with age; and in the figurative sense it means not straightforward or dishonest.” Well if that is what the English word “crooked” means then it is libellous to describe one’s government as crooked. Here I may borrow a rule of evidence in the law of negligence “res ipsa loquitur” – the thing speaks for itself and I do not think the appellant who is not an Englishman and whose native tongue is not English can tell this court that the word “crooked’ has a harmless meaning when used to describe a government. Mr. Sarpong has relied on the principle laid down by Brett L.J. (as he then was) in the Court of Appeal in the case of Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty (1880) 5 C.P.D. 514 at p. 541, C.A. and cited with approval in Nevill v. Fine Art and General Insurance Co. [1897] A.C. 68 at p. 73, H.L. by Lord Halsbury L.C. as follows: ‘It seems to me unreasonable that, when there are a number of good interpretations, theonly bad one should be seized upon to give a defamatory sense to the document.” It seems to me that I can best apply this principle to the two counts. In Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty (1882) 7 App.Cas. 741 at p. 776, H.L. Lord Blackburn said: “Now it seems to me that when the Court come to decide whether a particular set of words published under particular circumstances are or are not libellous, they have to decide a very different question from that which they have to decide when determining whether another tribunal, whether a jury or another set of judges might, not unreasonably, hold such words to be libellous. In fact whenever a verdict has passed against a defendant in a case of libel, and judgment has been given in
[p.582] of [1967] GLR 562
the Court below, those who bring their writ of error on the ground that there was no libel, assert that both the jury and the Court below have gone wrong; but they are not called upon to say that the words were incapable of conveying the libellous imputation; it is enough if they can make out, to the satisfaction of the Court in error, that the onus of shewing that they do convey such an imputation is not satisfied; and there are numerous cases in which, after a verdict for the plaintiff and judgment for him, that judgment has been set aside in error.” Bearing this principle in mind I hold that the prosecution failed to discharge their burden of proof in the case of count (1). If there was any defamatory matter at all it was against Lieutenant-General Ankrah as an individual and he alone does not constitute the N.L.C. Section 183A demands that the defamatory matter must concern the National Liberation Council but it does not follow that because he is Chairman of the N.L.C., any defamatory matter published concerning him must necessarily also be attached to the council. Moreover the N.L.C. did not organise the coup because the Preamble to the Proclamation states clearly who organised the coup and who assumed the government of Ghana on 24 February 1966. The N.L.C. was established after the coup and if therefore exhibit A attacked the organisers of the coup and the idea of the coup itself, it does not follow that the attack is directed against the N.L.C. If the appellant has committed any offence at all under exhibit A the subject matter of count (1), then it is the offence of intentional libel under section 112 (2) for defaming Lt. General Ankrah. As regards count (2), I have already revealed my convictions in the matter. There cannot be any innocent interpretation of exhibit A1 in count (2). Exhibit A1 praises Nkrumah, attacks the intellectuals in higher educational institutions and the Legon Observer. But when one reads “a crooked oligarchy,” a few who illegally compose the ruling class enriching themselves one is tempted irresistibly to apply the test of Lord Atkin in Sim v. Stretch [1936] 2 All E.R. 1237 at p. 1240, H.L., “would the words tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally?” I think the test is amply satisfied and the appellant cannot escape criminal responsibility for the words published against theN.L.C. in exhibit A1 although he does not mention the N.L.C. expressly. To describe General Ankrah as a military cum political renegade when he holds a high office in the government of the State is both civilly and criminally libellous. Even in the United States in Giles v The State (849) 6 Cobb. 284 it was held libellous to describe a man as a Tory and as Kenny points out in the footnote at p. 232 of his Outlines of Criminal Law (19th ed): “With emphatic rhetoric the Supreme
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Court of Georgia thus ruled the point: ‘When the name of Washington shall grow cold to the ear of the patriot, when the poles of the earth shall be swung round to a coincidence with the equator, then and not till then will it cease to be a libel’ to call a man a Tory.” This is what the Americans thought in the nineteenth century. Perhaps in Ghana in the twentieth century I may also say that when the heavenly hot tropical sun ceases to shine over this land and when theinhabitants of this blessed land of forests and verdant pastures begin to endure the frigid temperates of the north and south poles then and not till then will it cease to be a libel to call a man a “renegade.” Section 183A as amended now appears to be synonymous with the crime of sedition under section 183 of the Criminal Code because under subsection (11) “an intention shall be taken to be seditious if it is an intention – (a) to advocate the desirability of overthrowing the Government by unlawful means; or (b) to bring the Government into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against it.” There are other instances. Indeed the learned trial circuit judge in his judgment expressed himself as follows: “I have no doubt whatever that he wrote and published exhibits A and A1 with intent to bring the N.L.C. into hatred and seek its overthrow.” This is a finding which the charge sheet did not state. If the N.L.C. as the legislative organ wishes to protect the dignity and person of each member of the council then section 183A should be amended clearly to say so.
Intentional libel is a misdemeanour and therefore carries punishment of imprisonment not exceeding three years. An offence under section 183A also carries on summary conviction a fine not exceeding £G500 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or both fine and imprisonment. Since the maximum term of imprisonment is three years, it follows that an offence under section 112 (2) of Act 29 is at par with an offence under section 183A. I have considered the provisions of section 154 (1) and (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code to find out whether the appellant can be convicted of a lesser offence. But as intentional libel is not an offence lesser than an offence under section 183A, it seems, unfortunately, that I cannot exercise the powers vested in the court under section 154 (1) and (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code and convict the appellant of an offence contrary to section 112 (2) in respect of exhibit A. The appeal against conviction on count (1) is therefore allowed and the conviction is quashed and the sentence set aside. The appellant is acquitted and discharged on count (1). The appellant did not put up any statutory defences nor did he give evidence but in his address Mr. Sarpong told the learned trial judge that he relied on his previous submissions. The learned circuit
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judge in his judgment stated briefly that he had already ruled on the submissions and it was not necessary for him to repeat his ruling in his judgment. Mr. Sarpong has made this omission another ground of appeal and relied on R. v. Kelly reported in [1967] Crim.L.R. 115. The principle laid down in that casenapplies to a trial by judge and jury where the defendant has given an explanation; then it is obligatory that the trial judge should not refer to his previous ruling but should leave the matter to the jury to decide for themselves. In the present appeal, the learned trial judge was both judge and jury and in the absence of any explanation by the appellant he had no further material before him to enable him to reconsider his ruling. It would have been highly desirable if the learned circuit judge had incorporated his previous ruling in his judgment because that was the answer to Mr. Sarpong’s final address. However I do not think that the learned trial judge’s reference to his previous ruling or his omitting that ruling in his judgment should vitiate the proceedings or render his judgment impeachable. In the Kelly case (supra), the accused was prosecuted at a court-martial on a charge of murder but was convicted of manslaughter.
During the trial and at the close of the case for the prosecution, a submission of no case by the defence was rejected. The accused gave evidence in his defence but when the judge-advocate was summing up to the court, he reminded the court of its earlier rejection of the submission of no case and invited the court to decide, having heard the defence evidence, whether it was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. The Courts-Martial Appeal Court held that reference to the court’s own previous ruling was a matter fraught with risk because it meant treating the ruling as a starting point for its final determination. The Appeal Court pointed out that any reference to the court’s earlier ruling ought to be in the form of a clear and unambiguous warning that the court should start its deliberations afresh on the evidence as a whole andfree itself of any idea that its ruling had a bearing on its final conclusions. Commenting on this case, Professor J. C. Smith in [1967] Crim.L.R. 115 considers that: “The rejection of a submission of no case to answer means no more than that such evidence has been given by the prosecution that, if it were submitted to the jury at that stage, they could properly find a verdict of guilty upon it. The prosecution’s evidence may, however, look very different in the light of the case for the defence. The rejection of the submission is, to say the least, irrelevant and the reference to it might be damaging to the accused.”
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I may remark that Professor Smith taught me criminal law at the same university where he still holds the Chair of Law and my respect and admiration for his scholarship and erudition have remained unabated since I last sat in his lecture room. In the present appeal, the appellant gave no evidence, made no statement from the dock, his learned counsel Mr. Sarpong did not make any fresh submissions in his final address. It is therefore impossible to say that the evidence for the prosecution looked different in the lightof the case for the defence. The appeal against conviction on count (2) is therefore dismissed. The appellant has appealed against sentence. As I have already acquitted and discharged him on the first count, I am now left to deal with the sentence of three years’ imprisonment with hard labour on count (2). The appellant is a first offender and there is no doubt that he wrote this article out of sheer petulance because the Young Pioneer Movement which employed him had been dissolved and he had lost his job. His educational background covered the period 1944-1953 when he passed Middle Form Four. He went to Takoradi Claybourn Secondary School from 1954 to the middle of 1955 and studied up to Form Two. He left at this stage because of financial difficulties and was employed as a tally clerk at the Takoradi Harbour from mid -1955 to 1959. From 1959 to 1964 he was unemployed. In March 1964, he joined the National Gliding School at Afienya and qualified as a glider in December 1964. With this qualification he was appointed assistant district organiser of the Young Pioneer Movement and posted to the Central Region. He was with this movement until the 24 February coup when he lost his job and remained jobless until he was arrested. I can sum up the plight of the appellant in the words of that great revolutionary, Voltaire as quoted in Durant’s Outlines of Philosophy (1962 ed.), at p. 183: “Not to be occupied, and not to exist, amount to the same thing . . . All people are good except those who are idle. One must give one’s self all the occupation one can to make life supportable in this world . . . The further I advance in age, the more I find work necessary. It becomes in the long run the greatest of pleasures, and takes the place of the illusions of life.” Then in another serious witticism, Voltaire proclaims at the same page: “If you do not want to commit suicide always have something to do.” Mr. Sarpong has described the articles written by the appellant as an attempt at political analysis. It may be true but does it mean
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that because the 24 February revolution has restored freedom of thought and expression, one is at liberty to flout the law and engage in vituperation and give vent to one’s spleen? The National Liberation Council is the government of the country until an elected government assumes power. Recently we have heard from the lips of some Ghanaian intellectuals that military governments are unstable and the N.L.C. should hand over next year. None of these intellectuals has been prosecuted for exposing the instability of the N.L.C. as a military government thereby creating in the minds of the public either disaffection, hatred, contempt or ridicule. The pronouncements of these intellectuals are disseminated and propagatedthroughout the country. But when an unemployed semi-educated idiot writes tripe which only one person sees, then the whole machinery of justice is alerted and driven with velocity in space to mete out punishment. Where lies the rule of law? Has the doctrine “equality before the law” lost its glamour and sanctity? In the words of Du Parq J. (as he then was), in his judgment in R. v. Wicks (1936) 25 Cr.App.R.
168 at p. 172, C.C.A.:
“It is true that a criminal prosecution for libel ought not to be instituted, and, if instituted, will probably be regarded with disfavour by Judge and jury, when the libel complained of is of so trivial a character as to be unlikely either to disturb the peace of the community or seriously to affect the reputation of the person defamed. We were referred to well-known passages in Hawkins’ Pleas of the Crown and in the judgment in Labouchere (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 320, which emphasise this truth, and it may well be that cases will sometimes occur in which juries may properly refuse to convict a man accused of criminal libel where the offence is trivial.”If one considers the present appeal in the light of the above passage, one wonders whether the time, energy and expense put in the prosecution of this case were necessary. A military coup, in theory is not only unconstitutional but also illegal. In practice when it occurs and it succeeds with the support of the people, it is acclaimed and recognised by all civilized nations as the legitimate government. Nevertheless, there are bound to be a disgruntled few who will constitute an insignificant and negligible discord in the revolutionary symphony. The present appellant belongs to the discordant few. Many revolutionary governments are still recognised throughout the civilized world notwithstanding what that great Spanish-American philosopher George Santayana said as quoted in Durant, Outlines of Philosophy (1962 ed.), at p. 431:[p.587] of [1967] GLR 562
“Revolutions are ambiguous things. Their success is generally proportionate to their power of adaptation and to the reabsorption within them of what they rebelled against. A thousand reforms have left the world as corrupt as ever, for each successful reform has founded a new institution, and this institution has bred its new and congenial abuses.”
These are no mean words and I hope the next civil government will be guided by these words. Blackstone J. in his Commentaries Vol. 4, expressed the following opinion as quoted in R. v. Shipley (1784) 4 Doug.K.B. 73 at p. 111: “[The excellence of the trial by jury] ‘holds much stronger in criminal cases; since, in time of difficulty and danger, more is to be apprehended from the violence and partiality of Judges appointed by the Crown, in suits between the King and the subject, than in disputes between one individual and another,’ [in civil matters].” In present day Ghana, I am sure no danger of this sort is to be apprehended from judges because they were appointed by the National Liberation Council. The appellant strikes me as one of those unfortunate young men who through misguided enthusiasm and ill-education were compelled to swallow abstruse and nebulous doctrines of a so-called scientific socialism. I have even observed that a former exponent of scientific socialism whose rodomontade was blared during a B.B.C. interview in London is now an editor of a national paper. It seems to me that perhaps the appellant’s inchoate initiation into the intricacies of Hegelian dialectics has convinced him that the words “positive” and “negative” can always be used as charges for detonating salvoes of ratiocination and political theorization. This is a remarkable example of dangerous knowledge. I have taken into consideration the circumstances of the appellant and the fact that the articles were seen by only one person who did not publish it to anybody else because of the intervention of the Special Branch. I have therefore decided to allow the appeal against the sentence on the second count. Perhaps my decision to reduce sentence may sound unpopular on unmerciful ears. May my unpopularity wax andwane no more. But I can derive consolation from the words of Forster J. “that a popular judge is an odious and pernicious character.” The great English judge Lord Mansfield in R. v. Shipley (1784) 4 Doug. 73 at p. 170, said: “To be free is to live under a government by law. The liberty of the press consists in printing without any previous licence, subject to the consequences of law. The licentiousness of the press is Pandora’s Box, the source of every evil. Miserable is the condition of individuals, dangerous is the condition of the State, if there is no certain law, to protect individuals, or to guard the State.” I propose therefore to hold the scales of justice evenly to guard the National Liberation Council and also to ensure the freedom of speech, thought and expression of the appellant, whose infatuation with malapropisms excels the feat of Mrs. Malaprop in Sheridan’s play The Rivals. The appellant was arrested in September 1966 and remained in custody until he was convicted and sentenced in February this year to his present term of three years. I have taken into consideration the period he was in custody since September 1966 pending his trial and I am convinced that from the evidence in the court below, he has suffered some moments of anxiety and self-inflicted mental torment which constitute enough punishment. The sentence of three years’ imprisonment with hard labour is the maximum period allowed by section 183A but I think the extent of the publication of the libel warrants a far lesser sentence as only one person read exhibit A1.
Accordingly, the appeal against sentence on the second count is allowed. The sentence of three years’ imprisonment with hard labour is hereby set aside and in lieu thereof, the appellant is sentenced to six months’ imprisonment with hard labour with effect from 20 February 1967, that is the date of his conviction and sentence in the court below. As he has already served the period, he is discharged.
DECISION
Appeal against conviction of first count allowed.
Appeal against conviction on second count dismissed.
Appeal against sentence on second count allowed.
S. Y. B. -B.
