ATTORNEY-GENERAL vs. TAGOE [1984-86] 1 GLR 673
29 July 1985 · ADADE JSC · ≈ 14 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Darkwa v. The Republic [1981] G.L.R. 241. C.A.
(2) Adusah v. Attorney-General [1981] G.L.R. 228, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for a declaration that by the provisions of the Constitution, 1979, transitional provisions, s 17, the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to hear appeals from adverse findings of a committee of inquiry set up by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of the court.
COUNSEL
C.H.A. Tettey, Solicitor-General (with him Mrs Adusa Amankwa and Avah) for the applicant.
E. D. Kom for the respondent
JUDGMENT OF ADADE J.S.C.
Adade J.S.C. delivered the judgment of the court. By article 217 of the Constitution, 1979, “The transitional provisions specified in the First Schedule to [the] Constitution shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in [the] Constitution” Which implies that the said transitional provisions are superior to the body of the Constitution and take precedence over the Constitution. For the
[p.675] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 673 purposes of this opinion the relevant provision of the said transitional provisions are in section 17 (2)-(5) and (7) which reads:
“(2) The Special Tribunal shall also have exclusive jurisdiction to try all criminal offences disclosed by or arising out of the reports submitted by the committees of inquiry referred to in the said Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Tribunal and Other Matters) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 23).
(3) The Special Tribunal shall also have exclusive jurisdiction to review the adverse findings of the said committees of inquiry on the application of any person aggrieved by any such finding.
(4) Any such committee of inquiry which at the coming into force of this Constitution has not submitted its report to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council shall, subject to the provisions of the said Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Tribunal and Other Matters) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D.
23) continue in existence until the submission of its reports.
(5) Sections 10 and 11 of this Schedule shall not apply to any such committee of inquiry …
(7) The provisions of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Tribunal and Other Matters)
Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 23) shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution to the contrary.”
The Huppenbauer Committee of Inquiry was appointed by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council in 1979 by E.I. 38, whose full title is the Committee of Inquiry (Recent Disturbances in the Police Force) Instrument, 1979 (E.I. 38). This instrument went through a series of amendments. The committee submitted three interim reports in August, 23 September and 29 November 1979, and a last and final report on 8 January 1980. The Constitution of the Third Republic came into force on 24 September 1979. As will be noticed, the first two interim reports were submitted during the Government of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council; the third interim report and the final report were submitted after the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council Government, to the Limann Administration.
In the second interim report, submitted on 23 September 1979, adverse findings were made against Mr R. A. Tagoe, the respondent herein. The final report obviously putting together the conclusions in the earlier reports, repeated at page 41 the adverse findings in the second interim report.
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Mr Tagoe has appealed to the Court of Appeal against the adverse findings against him. He has taken this course under article 198 (2) of the Constitution, 1979 which provides that:
“(2) Where a commission of inquiry makes an adverse finding against any person, the report of the commission of inquiry shall, for the purposes of this Constitution, be deemed to be a judgment of the High Court of Justice and accordingly an appeal shall lie as of right from the commission to the Court of Appeal.”
The Attorney-General says that Mr Tagoe has no such right of appeal and accordingly the Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. He founds himself on article 217 and section 17 of the transitional provisions, particularly subsections (2)-(3) and (5), thereof.
In two earlier cases arising out of the proceedings of the same Huppenbauer Committee, viz Darkwa v. The Republic [1981] G.L.R. 241, C.A and Adusah v. Attorney-General [1981] G.L.R. 228, C.A., the Court of Appeal had held that it had jurisdiction to entertain appeals from the findings of the committee. The Attorney-General has come to this court under article 118 for an interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Constitution, as upon such interpretation will depend whether or not appeals can go from the committee to the Court of Appeal.
On 22 September by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Tribunal and Other Matters) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 23), the A.F.R.C.D. set up a special tribunal endowed with certain powers. The transitional provisions which, we must remember, take precedence over the main body of the Constitution, not only gave due recognition to the special tribunal as an adjudicating body notwithstanding the courts established under chapter 12 of the Constitution, but proceeded by section 17 (2) to expressly vest it with jurisdiction to “try all criminal offences disclosed by or arising out of the reports submitted by the committee of inquiry referred to in the said Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Tribunal and Other Matters) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 23).”
(The emphasis is ours.)
It is necessary in order to determine the quantum of the jurisdiction conferred by this subsection, to identify the said “Committee of inquiry” referred to in A.F.R.C.D. 23. For this exercise, the obvious and only source is A.F.R.C.D. 23 itself, which in section 3 (2) defines the committees as:
“(a) all committees of inquiry established by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council; [and]
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(b) all committees of inquiry established at any time whose reports were submitted by such committees to the Government of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.”
Subject to what follows shortly, the language of section 3 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23 is plain beyond any shadow of controversy. Section 3 (2) (a) refers to all committees established by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. It does not talk of reports of these committees. Therefore the issues of when such committees submit their reports and to whom are irrelevant. In construing section 3 (2) (a) the only relevant consideration is whether the particular committee whose work has fallen for scrutiny was established by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. If it was so established then it is one of those committees of inquiry contemplated by section 17 (2) of the transitional provisions.
The other category of committees established under section 3 (2) (b) of A.F.R.C.D. 23 is obviously those committees which were established before the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council came on the scene, but which continued to work during the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council era and submitted their reports to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. If such committees could not submit their reports to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, it is clear they will fall outside the definition in section 3 (2) (b) of A.F.R.C.D. 23, and therefore will not be covered by section 17 (2) of the transitional provisions.
In the Adusah case (supra) the Court of Appeal, interpreting section 3 (2) (a) and (b) of A.F.R.C.D. 23, held that (a) is part of (b) and is comprised in it, and that the whole of section 3 (2) defines just one class of committees. We think the court was in error. We need not examine this issue further, since Mr Kom, counsel for the respondent, has courageously conceded that the court was wrong in the view it took of section 3 (2) (a) and (b). In his “reply to the case of the Attorney-General”, filed on 27 January 1984, Mr Kom, in the best traditions of the profession, announced:
“I regret I do not support the interpretation of the Court of Appeal in the Darkwa and Adusah cases that under section 3 (2) defining committees from which review lies, both subsections (a) and (b) mean the same thing.”
Of course, they do not.
The Huppenbauer Committee of Inquiry was established by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. It falls within section 3 (2) (a) of A.F.R.C.D. 23, and being one of the committees referred to in the said A.F.R.C.D. 23, it is covered by section 17 (2) of the transitional provisions. As the committees covered by section 17 (2) are the same committees contemplated by section 17 (3) and (4), it stands to reason
[p.678] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 673 that the Huppenbauer Committee is within the ambit of section 17 (3) and (4). Thus far the position is plain enough.
However, complications were dragged into the fray in the Darkwa and Adusah cases (supra) and by the respondent in this case, by introducing the time of submission of the reports. This is relevant only in relation to committees set up under section 3 (2) (b) of A.F.R.C.D. 23—they must have submitted their reports to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council Government, not after. As regards committees established under section 3 (2) (a) of A.F.R.C.D. 23, time is irrelevant. This is re-enforced by section 17 of the transitional provisions which authorises “Any such committee which … has not submitted its report to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council . . . [to] continue in existence until the submission of its report.”
This clause, although couched in terms to cover both committees established under section 3 (2) (a) and (b) of A.F.R.C.D. 23 is intended specifically for committees established under section 3 (2) (a) since reports of committees established before the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council came into being but submitted after the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council era will not be covered by section 3 (2) (b) anyway, and will therefore be outside section 17 of the transitional provisions. Such committees will be covered more by section 10 of the transitional provisions, and their reports will fall within article 198 (2).
Even if we take the view that committees set up under section (3) (2) (a) of A.F.R.C.D. 23 which presented their reports to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council fall within section 3 (2) (b) and are outside section 3 (2) (a) we shall still arrive at the same position that the Huppenbauer Committee is within section 3 of A.F.R.C.D. 23 as a whole, for in that event the first two “interim” reports will be within section 3 (2) (b), having been submitted to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, whilst the last two reports fall under section 3 (2) (a), as reports of a committee appointed by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. Any interpretation, such as the one advanced by the Court of Appeal, which suggests that section 3 (2) (a) represents nothing and means nothing in view of section 3 (2) (b) is simply unacceptable, since in interpreting the section as a whole, it must be assumed that the law makers intended the two different sets of provisions to represent different classes of committees, unless such an interpretation will lead to an absurdity. In this case, this latter contention cannot be seriously put forward.
It follows that in relation to the Huppenbauer Reports it is a pointless exercise to split hairs over whether a particular report was final or interim; or whether one was adopted by reference or not; nor
[p.679] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 673 whether there was a merger of reports or they exist separately and as discrete units. In the result, we are of the opinion that the special tribunal having been expressly acknowledged as an adjudicating tribunal and continued in existence by the transitional provisions is the authority vested with jurisdiction under section 17 (3) of the said transitional provisions to review any adverse finding of the committees which fall within section 3 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23. The Huppenbauer Committee is one such committee. Accordingly, we hold that the Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction to entertain “appeals” from the said Huppenbauer Committee.
We have serious reservations about the view expressed by the Court of Appeal in the Adusah case (supra) at 237 that:
“Where the report of such a committee is submitted not to the . . . Armed Forces Revolutionary Council but to some other government—in this context, the government in being after that council had left the scene—that government of the day would have full powers to take its own decisions.”
This statement is correct only if it is spoken of committees established before the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council was established but whose reports were submitted after the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council era. The statement cannot properly apply to any committee within section 3 of A.F.R.C.D. 23. It is true that, “the Constitution did not envisage that the special tribunal was going to be a permanent feature of the administration of justice in the country.” But it is equally true that by the provisions in section 17 (1)-(4) of the transitional provisions, the constitution envisaged that the special tribunal would be around for a long time after the Constitution had come into force and by the provisions of section 17 (1) “shall take over and complete the trial of all cases pending … before the special courts…” Section 17 (2) and (3) provided that the special tribunal was empowered “to try [exclusively] all criminal offences … arising out of reports submitted by committees established under [section 3 (2) (a) of A.F.R.C.D. 23]” and in section 17 (3) “to review [again exclusively] the adverse findings of the said committees…” Section 17 (4) provided that the committees set up under section 3 of A.F.R.C.D. 23 should “continue in existence” after the coming into force of the Constitution “until the submission of their reports.”
The Constitution anticipated that the special tribunal would stay on to deal with their reports when submitted after the Constitution had come into force. Hence sections 2 (2) and 9 (3) of A.F.R.C.D. 23 provide for the filling of vacancies in the membership of the tribunal and in the office of the special prosecutor respectively “after the coming into
[p.680] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 673 force of the Constitution…” And the whole of section 17 with its six subsections, deals with matters affecting the special tribunal that may arise and may require attention after the said coming into force of the Constitution, for example the provision of staff and other support services and personnel; determining service conditions of employees; and the filling of vacancies in any of the committees whose work would be of interest to the special tribunal. A.F.R.C.D. 23 was enacted before the Constitution came into force. Section 3 (1) (a)-(c) of that Decree is in virtually identical terms with section 17 1 (3) of the transitional provisions. The implication is clear that the Constitution-makers, fully aware of the identity, role and functions of the special tribunal as it existed before the Constitution, desired it to continue after the Constitution in the same capacity, playing the same role and discharging the same functions.
In this context we consider paragraph 6 of the letter from the special tribunal dated 30 May 1980, exhibited by Mr Kom, with the greatest respect to its authors, grossly misleading. The said paragraph (6) reads:
“(6) On the face of it, one can say that section 17 (5) overrides sections 10 and 11 of the transitional provisions. But in our view the words—’Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution to the contrary’ in section 10 and which words are absent in section 17 (5) make the whole difference: for because of the absence of the said words in section 17 (5) it cannot effectively dispose of section 10. As between section 17 (5) and section 10, section 17 (5) cannot stand against section 10, and so section 17 (5) will have to give way to section 10, which must prevail. Once section 10 prevails, section 11 automatically prevails because it is a follow-up from section 10. In the circumstances the Huppenbauer Report have been submitted to the President, any officer aggrieved by any adverse findings made against him in the report and any decision taken upon those reports or findings can only appeal to the Court of Appeal and not to the special tribunal.”
In the first place, section 17 comes after section 10. Therefore by normal rules of constitution, if there is a conflict between the two sections, section 17, being the latter, will prevail over section 10 which is earlier. In this case there is no conflict. Section 17 (5) says expressly: “Sections 10 and 11 of this Schedule shall not apply to any such committee of inquiry” ie committee covered by section 3 (2) (a) and (b) of A.F.R.C.D. 23. This subsection is plain enough; the words “Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution to the contrary” in
[p.681] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 673 section 17 (1) will have been a complete surplusage and an unnecessary padding, and would have constituted bad drafting. Besides, section 11 of the transitional provisions which gives the reports and findings of committees established before the Constitution came into force the same effect as the findings and reports of committees established under the Constitution, can only refer to committees which are outside section 3 (2) (a) and (b), since these latter committees are expressly catered for in the later section 17.
In the letter referred to, the special tribunal was doubtful whether section 17 (4) and (5) of the transitional provisions overrides the Committee of Inquiry (Recent Disturbances in the Police Force) (Implementation of Findings) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 12). We cannot appreciate this doubt. A.F.R.C.D. 12 was one of the laws continued in existence by article 4 in the body of the Constitution. The transitional provisions take precedence over everything else in the Constitution by virtue of article 217, and section 17 (4) and (5) is part of the transitional provisions which means then that if there should be any conflict between A.F.R.C.D. 12 and section 17 (4) and (5) of the transitional provisions, surely the latter should prevail. We comment on this matter merely to help resolve the doubt raised in the letter referred to, without necessarily going into the question whether there is or there is no conflict between A.F.R.C.D. 12 and section 17 of the transitional provisions, as this will be an unnecessary digression, having regard to the substantive matter for determination in this case.
We hold that on a true and proper construction of section 17 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, the Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction to hear appeals from adverse findings of committees of inquiry set up by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council whether or not the reports of such committees were submitted to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.
DECISION
Application granted.
M. C. N.-N
