AYEKPA vs. SACKEY-MENSAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 172
27 November 1984 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 12 min read
[1984] SLR (CA) 7Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Beddoes v. Shaw [1937] Ch. 81; [1936] 2 All E.R. 1108.
(2) Ussher v. Darko [1977] 1 G.L.R. 476, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the decision of a circuit court in favour of the plaintiff in an action for, inter alia, a declaration of title to a plot of land and an uncompleted budding. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Nyanor for the appellant.
No appearance for or by the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.
The main facts of this case are not in dispute. One Emmanuel Awuley Lartey owned a plot of building land at Accra. It is plot No. 96, Dzorwulu. The evidence is imprecise as to what his real interest was in this land. He developed it up to a point but ran into financial difficulties and was desirous of disposing of it. He therefore offered it for sale to the defendant, Ayekpa.
The evidence suggests that he took Ayekpa to the land and showed him the uncompleted building. The latter clearly fell for it and was willing to buy it. Lartey offered it to him for ¢8,500 and the defendant agreed to buy it at that price. According to the evidence, it was agreed that the defendant should make a down payment of ¢1,700 against the purchase price, the balance was to be paid on the delivery to the purchaser of the title deed of the land and other muniments of title. The defendant duly made the down payment and Lartey acknowledged this in writing in these terms:
“This agreement made on 9 October 1974 between my client the vendor Emmanuel Awuley Lartey of Accra and me S. I. T. Ayekpa also of Accra for the sale of his uncompleted concrete block house at Dzorwulu near Achimota at an agreed price of ¢8,500 (Eight Thousand Five Hundred Cedis).
Dated at Accra 9 October 1994.”
[p.174] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 172 Upon receipt of this deposit, Lartey took the defendant back to the land and installed him in possession. He not only handed him the keys of the building, but also introduced him to a watchman whom he employed to secure the building. There is evidence that subsequent to October 1974, the defendant paid to Lartey various moneys in further part payment of the purchase price.
On the evidence, if Lartey is not an out and out knave, he is something close to it. Notwithstanding his offer of this plot to Ayekpa and his acceptance of payment of deposit by him, he again offered it to the plaintiff, Victoria Sackey-Mensah. Ayekpa has not renounced his interest in the plot. Lartey gave him to understand that he was processing his documents of title and would make all these over to him in return for the unpaid balance of the purchase price.
Unbeknown to the plaintiff, Lartey had already alienated this plot to the defendant and put him in possession. In her state of ignorance, the plaintiff also agreed to purchase this self-same plot. This time, Lartey raised the selling price. He asked the plaintiff to pay ¢9,300 for it. The latter agreed and like Ayekpa, also made a down payment of ¢5,000. This payment was made on 21 December 1974, and Lartey gave a receipt to acknowledge this payment.
Sometime in 1975, the evidence is unclear when exactly this was, the plaintiff paid the outstanding balance of ¢4,300 to Lartey. He then gave her a receipt not for this particular payment, but a comprehensive one for the total purchase price. Although this payment was actually made on a date in 1975, it was back-dated to coincide with the date of the first payment, namely 21 December 1974.
Since the learned judge seems to have placed some value on this receipt, exhibit B, as well as another document to be presently mentioned as a conveying good title in the plot to the plaintiff, it is necessary to set out its actual terms in full, namely:
“I, the undersigned Awuley Lartey, storekeeper of Awuley Villa … have hereby received an amount of ¢9,300 from Mrs. Victoria Sackey-Mensah an Accra trader … being full payment of land and building situated at Dzorwulu near Achimota Forest in the Greater Accra Region, sold to Mrs. Victoria Sackey-Mensah on 21 December 1974.”
As he did to the defendant, Lartey also promised to hand the plaintiff the documents of title to the house but as he was apparently in breach of various promises to the plaintiff to do this, the latter appears to have reported him to the police. It seems as a result of the police intervention in the matter, Lartey gave the plaintiff another document which seems to have weighed very much with the judge. It was a
[p.175] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 172
statutory declaration (exhibit C) whose terms more or less conformed with the receipt of 21 December 1974. It was sworn on 8 September 1975, and reads as follows:
“STATUTORY DECLARATIONS ACT OF 1971 (ACT 389)
I, Awuley Lartey, storekeeper of Awuley Lartey Villa … do solemnly and sincerely declare as follows:
1 That I am the declarant herein.
2 That I have received an amount of ¢9,300 from Mrs Victoria Sackey-Mensah an Accra trader 3 That the said amount of ¢9,300 being full payment of the cost of land and building at Dzorwulu, was sold by me to the said Victoria Sackey-Mensah on 21 December 1974.
4 That I make this solemn and sincere declaration conscientiously in support of the receipt issued by me to the said Victoria Sackey-Mensah on 21 December 1974 believing the same to be true in accordance with the Statutory Declarations Act, 1971.
(Sgd) A. Lartey”
Lartey also handed to the plaintiff, the building permit of the house. Believing she had good title to the property, the plaintiff contracted to put finishing touches to the house with terrazzo. The defendant then in possession, resisted this and asserted against her, his prior title. Both or either of them reported this conflict to the police. They could not assist in resolving the issue of title to land which was clearly beyond their competence. At some stage of the transaction, the defendant for his part, apparently disenchanted with Lartey, reported and gave him into custody of the military authorities. They were no more capable of resolving this complex legal issue than the police.
Accordingly, on 16 March 1976, the plaintiff issued out of the circuit court, a writ in which she sought against the defendant:
(a) declaration of title to the uncompleted building situate and lying on a piece of land known as plot No. 96 Dzorwulu;
(b) recovery of possession of all the keys to the said premises; and
(c) perpetual injunction against the defendant, his agents, privies, workmen, etc.
On 6 July 1977 the learned circuit judge, Mrs. Striggner-Scott (as she then was), determined the issue of title in favour of the plaintiff and granted her all the reliefs indorsed on the writ. The defendant invites us to say that that decision was wrong and that the conclusion should have been the other way round.
[p.176] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 172
The learned judge recited the case of the defendant as set out as well as that of the plaintiff. She used language which suggests that she was troubled by the earlier transaction between Lartey and Ayekpa, the defendant, but concluded that no effectual sale of the house was made to the defendant by it but was of opinion that such a sale was made to the plaintiff. As she put it:
“On the sale of the building therefore the court’s finding is that whereas no effectual sale was made to the defendant it has made a finding of fact that such a sale was made to the plaintiff because the plaintiff was given title by the execution of exhibit C (that is the statutory declaration) in her favour and handed exhibit D (the building permit).”
Although the judge expressed herself as making a finding of fact, she was, in fact, drawing a conclusion of law on the competing claims of the parties to the title of the house. This transaction was governed by the Conveyancing Decree, 1973 (N.R.C.D. 175), which was in force at the date of both transactions. Section 1 of N.R.C.D. 175 provides that a transfer of an interest in land shall be of no effect unless it is in writing signed by the transferor or his agent. Section 3 of N.R.C.D. 175 makes exception to the requirement of writing in cases not germane to this case.
As conceived by N.R.C.D 175, a written transfer of landed property technically known as a conveyance, is defined by section 45 (1) of the Decree as “any document in writing by which an interest in land is transferred” and this includes a lease, sublease, etc. The question is: was the title to the plot in issue transferred to the plaintiff by the statutory declaration? Clearly, that document is not a conveyance. It did not seek to transfer whatever title Lartey had in the plot to the plaintiff. Accordingly, on its proper legal analysis, it had no more potency than a contract for the sale of land. I think it can properly be said to be the type of writing that section 2 of N.R.C.D. 175 requires for an enforceable contract for the sale of land.
Both the receipt (exhibit B) and the statutory declaration (exhibit C) have the same legal value. They are both contracts for the sale of land and contain terms which satisfied section 4 of the Statute of Frauds, 1677; section 19 of the Contracts Act, 1960 (Act 25) and now, section 2 of N.R.C.D 175. The legal potential of these two documents is that they constitute enforceable contracts for the sale of the house and accordingly, convey equitable title to the plaintiff of that property.
But the earlier contract between Lartey and the defendant which was also reduced into writing, equally constitutes such contract and similarly conveys an equitable title in the self-same plot to the defendant. So the real contest between the parties was, who had the
[p.177] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 172
better title? Section 3 (2) of N.R.C.D. 175 which regulates the modes of transfers of interests in land and enforceable contracts for transfer of such interests, enacts that its provisions are subject to the rules of equity. So the question is, what rule of equity governs this matter? It is the maxim qui prior est tempore, potior est jure which means, “He who is first in time is the stronger in law.” That maxim settles the question of title definitely in the defendant’s favour. He obtained an equitable title to the house in October 1974, and was put in possession. The plaintiff obtained a like estate in December 1974.
As is well-known to any conveyancer and property lawyer, the main policy objective of the English Property Act, 1925 was to reduce equitable interests in land and thus make the acquisition of legal estates less precarious to purchasers. When in Beddoes v. Shaw [1936] 2 All E.R 1108, counsel sought to contend that section 113 of that Act did away with the equitable rule that he who is first in time is the stronger in law, Bennet J. was startled by it. In rejecting that contention, the learned judge expressed himself at 111 as follows:
“If a person acquired a legal interest he got it unaffected by notice of any trust; but if he acquired an equitable interest there is nothing in the section which gives him priority over other holders equal to himself but earlier in time. I cannot hold to be law the proposition so ably presented by Mr. Johnston, which would have the startling effect, when the equities are equal, of making the best title lurk in him who is last in point of time. “
See also the judgment of this court in Ussher v. Darko [1977] 1 G.L.R 476 at 490, C.A.
This rule is not, however, inflexible. The defendant as the prior equitable owner may have his title postponed in favour of the plaintiff if he was guilty of some act or omission which makes it inequitable for him to assert his earlier title. There is no evidence on which any such holding can be made. I think, therefore, that the learned judge was in error in thinking that the statutory declaration conferred on the plaintiff any title other than that of a second equitable owner of the land and building in dispute. The defendant’s title was earlier in time and, as against the plaintiff, he is the owner of the plot and building in dispute.
The learned judge foresaw the possibility of her erring on the main ground on which she rested her decision. But she felt that if she was wrong on that, there was a second valid ground on which the decision in favour of the plaintiff could be rested. Although she did not speak with a clear voice, she considered that the plaintiff was “a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.” That would only be a valid answer to the defendant’s prior equitable title if it could be shown that the
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plaintiff who was later in time, acquired by the sale to her, a legal title to the property and did so bona fide and had no notice, actual or constructive of the defendant’s earlier title.
As I said, the statutory declaration on which the judge founded her conclusion of title in favour of the plaintiff conferred on her, at best, an equitable title to the property. She could only have obtained legal title if Lartey had actually transferred in writing his interest in the property to her.
The Fourth Schedule to N.R.C.D 175 contains simplified model precedents for transfer of land, and section 43 of the Decree provides that a transfer of interest in land made in that simplified form is sufficient. Had Lartey sought to convey rather than merely contract to sell, he would, at least, have recited his root of title. It is unclear whether he had an absolute or leasehold interest in the property. The designation of the plot as No.96 Dzorwulu, suggests that it is government land which is usually laid out in plots and systematically numbered. If it is government land, Lartey’s title was more likely to be leasehold than freehold.
Under section 36 (1) of N.R.C.D 175, either purchaser was entitled to call upon Lartey to furnish a good root of title dating back to 30 years from the date of contract. It is clear that neither purchaser, i.e. the defendant nor the plaintiff, made any investigation into their vendor’s title. Both entered into open contracts for the transfer of land without professional advice and both must be deemed to agree to accept any title that their vendor could competently convey.
The evidence satisfied me that Lartey did not convey whatever legal title he had in the plot to either of the parties and both must rely on the equitable title each obtained by the contract of sale. In so far as the judge held that either the statutory declaration (exhibit C) alone or jointly with the receipt (exhibit B) conveyed legal title in the plot to the respondent, she was, with respect, wrong.
If that view is right, the equitable doctrine of “purchaser for value” and the considerable learning on notice, actual, imputed or constructive, can have no place in determining the rights of the parties. Inasmuch as the judge held that that plea provided additional ground on which a verdict for the respondent could be rested, she again slipped.
In my judgment, therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled, as against the defendant, to a declaration of title to the plot in dispute or to the consequential reliefs of possession and injunction. As the judge held that she was, her conclusion was wrong and ought to be reversed.
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Accordingly, I would allow the appeal and set aside the judgment appealed from. In lieu of it, I would dismiss the plaintiff’s claim and enter judgment for the defendant with costs here and below.
JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A.
I agree.
JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.
I also agree.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
M. C. N. – N.
