Division: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, ACCRA
Date: 3 OCTOBER, 1964
Before: JUDGE D. F. ANNAN
JUDGMENT OF JUDGE D. F. ANNAN
The plaintiff’s claim is for damages for breach of promise of marriage. In her statement of claim she averred as follows:
“(2) On a date in 1951 the plaintiff and defendant orally agreed to marry one another under the Ordinance.
(3) The defendant fixed the date of the said marriage within two months after the formal engagement performed by the defendant.
(4) For the purpose of the engagement the defendant sent to the parents of the plaintiff an engagement ring, a Bible and several bottles of drinks and also confirmed his promise to celebrate a wedding in the Registrar’s office.
(5) The two months have elapsed and a reasonable time has also elapsed. The said appointed time was past before the commencement of this action but the defendant has not married the plaintiff.
(6) The defendant has since married another woman under customary law and the said woman is staying together with the defendant as his wife.
(7) The plaintiff however relying on the defendant’s promise allowed the defendant to co-habit with her on several occasions but the defendant has refused to marry her.”
The defendant in his defence has denied any such promise to marry the plaintiff under the Marriage Ordinance1 and alleged that he had in fact lived with the plaintiff for several years as husband and wife, and has pleaded that the plaintiff’s claim is statute-barred.
In his additional issues for the summons for directions, counsel for the defendant set down the following issues: “whether or not the plaintiff’s cause of action is not statute-barred.” At the hearing of the summons counsel agreed to argue this additional issue as a preliminary point of law and the point was accordingly argued.
In his submissions, counsel for the defendant argued that on the pleadings the contract which the plaintiff relies on is alleged to be one which by its nature is governed by English law, it being a contract to marry under the Marriage Ordinance. He submitted therefore that it was subject to the law of limitation. The relevant legislation applicable to Ghana in relation to contracts is the Limitation Act, 1623,2 which applies here because it is a statute of general application which was in force in England on 24 July 1874. All such statutes have been continued in force in Ghana by virtue of section 154 (4) of the Courts Act, 1960.3 He referred to the case of Koney v. Union Trading Co., Ltd.4 to support his contention that statutes of limitation do apply to contracts entered into by Ghanaians where the law applicable was exclusively English law. This case also established the proposition that the relevant statute of limitation is the Limitation Act, 1623. That Act prescribes in section 3 thereof a limitation period of six years for causes of action based in simple contract. Counsel submitted further that the contract alleged by the plaintiff on the pleadings is a simple contract to be governed exclusively by English law and accordingly was caught by section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1623, and the six years’ limitation period. On the pleadings, the contract to marry was made in 1951, and the breach of that contract relied on by the plaintiff occurred that same year. The action was commenced in 1964 and it was accordingly statute-barred since the breach occurred more than six years before the action was commenced; the cause of action having accrued at the date of the breach. Counsel submitted finally that the plaintiff waited for thirteen years before commencing proceedings and that that fact disentitled her to any relief.
Counsel for the plaintiff in reply argued that the defendant had not established that on the pleadings the plaintiff’s claim was statute-barred. He submitted that the plaintiff’s action was not based on a simple contract and was not caught by section 3 of the Act of 1623. He maintained that the breach relied on by the plaintiff was a continuing breach and that accordingly time did not run in such a case. He submitted further that the defendant had deceived the plaintiff and that the plaintiff had been induced to delay her action as a result of this deceit. He argued that where there is such deceit time did not run against a plaintiff. Counsel relied on the case of Shaw v. Shaw5 to support his submissions.
In my opinion the issues for determination are: (1) whether English statutes of limitation apply in Ghana, (2) whether the contract relied on by the plaintiff is a simple contract, (3) the date when the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued and (4) whether the cause of action accrued outside any period of limitation applicable thereto.
On issues (1) and (2) I am of the opinion that the answer must be in the affirmative. There cannot be any dispute on the law that statutory periods of limitation do apply at the present time in Ghana and that the relevant statute applicable to contracts governed by English law is the Limitation Act, 1623. I accordingly accept the submission of counsel for the defendant on this point. Again there can be no doubt that the oral contract of marriage pleaded by the plaintiff is a simple contract and not a specialty. Again it is beyond dispute that a plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of a simple contract accrues at the date when the contract is broken, and in this respect there is no such concept known to law as a continuing breach. Once the contract is proved and the breach thereof, the cause of action accrues immediately and generally time begins to run from the date of the breach. It is quite clear also that the relevant period of limitation that applies to causes of action based in simple contract is that provided by section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1623, namely six years.
The next points for determination are: first, the date when the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued and secondly, whether there are any cogent reasons why time should not run from the date. Looking at the statement of claim and at paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 thereof, it is clear that the contract pleaded by the plaintiff was made in 1951. It is clearly stated therein that the contract was to be performed “within two months after the formal engagement performed by the defendant.” The important point to decide therefore, is the date when the formal engagement was performed by the defendant. From the statement of claim as a whole it seems to me clear that the formal engagement took place shortly after the oral contract was made, that is either in 1951 or shortly thereafter. In any case where there is a contract to marry and no
precise date is agreed upon for the marriage the law presumes that the parties promised to marry within a reasonable time.
I hold therefore that the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued in 1951 or shortly thereafter, and accordingly that action is caught by section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1623, and is accordingly statute-barred. In the result, I find that the claim of the plaintiff is statute-barred and cannot therefore be entertained by the court and I dismiss it accordingly. No order as to costs.
DECISION
Preliminary objection sustained.
T.G.K.
