BOATENG vs. DWINFUOR [1979] GLR 360
27 July 1978 · ANIN JA · ≈ 21 min read
[1978] SLR (CA) 11Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Harre v. Frampton [1948] 1 K.B. 73; [1947] 2 All E.R. 604; [1948] L.J.R. 1125; 63 T.L.R. 554; 91 S.J. 625, C.A.
(2) Dofah v. Awoonor Williams (1922) F.C. ‘22, 99.
(3) Kugbe v. Union Trading Co., Ltd. (1926) D.Ct. ‘26-’29, 202.
(4) Crayem v. Consolidated African Selection Trust Ltd. (1949) 12 W.A.C.A. 443.
(5) Dzaba III v. Tumfuor [1978] G.L.R. 18, C.A.
(6) Ibeneweka v. Egbuna [1964] 1 W.L.R. 219; 108 S.J. 114, P.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the decision of the trial judge granting an order for recovery of possession against the appellant. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Anin J.A.
COUNSEL
Appellant in person.
No appearance by or for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF ANIN J.A.
The plaintiff’s case was simple and straightforward. She claimed to have bought house No. ZR 75, Bekwai, from its owner, Mr. George Kwasi Awuah of Essumangya for the sum of ¢1,660 for her personal occupation; and that she was accordingly entitled to an order of possession and ejectment against the defendant whom she described in her specially endorsed writ of summons as a statutory tenant. There was no accompanying statement of claim: but in her evidence-in-chief she made the important revelation that “the defendant was living in the house as a tenant at the time I bought the house. The defendant, I know was paying ¢14 to Awuah as rent for his occupation of the house.”
After purchasing the house, the plaintiff invited the defendant as sitting tenant to see her to discuss arrangements for his vacation of the premises; but he declined her invitation. She therefore had to resort to this action to recover possession, arrears of rent and mesne profits.
Under cross-examination, the plaintiff admitted knowledge that the defendant runs a clinic in the disputed house; but she disclosed that it was
[p.363] of [1979] GLR 360 after purchasing the house that the owner told her the amount of monthly rent being paid by the tenant. She herself never interviewed him about his tenancy; neither did the sitting tenant present her with any bill for structural repairs allegedly carried out by him on the house at his own expense. To her knowledge, the 40 year-old house had been always habitable; as matter of fact, there were previous tenants living there before the defendant moved in.
In support of her case, the plaintiff tendered in evidence, firstly, a stamped receipt for ¢1,660 dated 9 February 1974 issued to her by the vendor (exhibit A); secondly, a deed of sale (No. 2561/75) executed on 8 January 1974 but registered on 9 December 1975 (exhibit B); and thirdly, a six-months’ notice to quite dated 22 July 1974 issued upon her instructions by her solicitor and addressed to the defendant at “Zongo Hill Clinic, Bekwai.”
The defendant resisted the action on the ground that in 1970, that is, four years before the plaintiff’s alleged purchase, he concluded a verbal tenancy agreement with the owner (Mr. G. K. Awuah) through his agent in Bekwai, Mr. Agyepong. Under this agreement, he was obliged to repair, at his own initial expense, the then delapidated house and to convert it into a good tenantable house suitable for use as a clinic. The monthly rent payable was fixed at ¢14; and the tenancy was of an indefinite duration, terminable at his option. It was further agreed that the owner and the tenant should later go into accounts to ascertain the tenant’s expenditure on repairs; and that upon the taking of accounts, the defendant was to recoup himself for his initial outlay on repairs from accruing rent. The defendant revealed in evidence that the verbal tenancy agreement was sealed with a bottle of schnapps presented to the landlord; and that Mr. Awuah used it in pouring libation for the success of the business venture in the house. The defendant alleged having completed his part of the contract and carried out extensive repairs costing him ¢1,474.20. He had entered into possession of the demised premises on 5 May 1970, after they had been certified fit and suitable for a clinic by the health authorities. At the time of the action he had been in continuous possession for 60 months; and Mr. Awuah, his landlord, owed him a net balance of ¢662.29, after taking into account his said repair bill and allowing for accrued rent of ¢840, and water rate of ¢28. He had not paid any rent to the plaintiff simply because he did not recognise her as his landlord.
The pith and substance of the statement of defence was contained in paragraph (6) which reads:
“The defendant says that the plaintiff has express implied or imputed notice of the defendant’s tenancy and the said developments on the said house and therefore, if she is the new owner thereof, which is not admitted, then she should be bound by the said contract which vested an equitable interest in the defendant.”
Additionally, the defendant counterclaimed for a declaration that the tenancy contract between Awuah and himself is binding on Awuah and his assignees, alienees or successor in title.
[p.364] of [1979] GLR 360
The defendant’s testimony received support from his only witness, Mr. Agyepong, the landlord’s agent and brother-in-law, who confirmed having been authorised by the owner to negotiate the defendant’s tenancy agreement with him and to hand over the keys of the house to him on 5 May 1970. On 10 September 1970, the owner himself had paid a visit to Bekwai and ratified the parol tenancy agreement.
In his judgment the learned circuit judge found as a fact that the plaintiff bought the house as alleged for valuable consideration for her personal occupation. “The evidence indicated that the premises in question are a dwelling-house which the defendant required and used as a clinic,” he held:
“and the plaintiff bought same and wanted it for her personal occupation. It is clear therefore that the plaintiff could come under section 17 (1) (g) of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), for an order of possession . . . I hold that the plaintiff has established her claim against the defendant herein and that she is therefore entitled to judgment.”
Being aggrieved by the judgment of the court below upholding the plaintiff’s claim and dismissing his counterclaim, the defendant has appealed to this court on a number of grounds, including the grounds that “the learned trial judge erred in law by failing to consider whether or not the plaintiff fulfilled all the necessary requirements under Act 220 in her request for possession;” and that “the judgment is against the weight of the evidence.”
With respect, the learned trial circuit judge erred in law in assuming throughout his judgment that the defendant was a statutory tenant. In the first place, a statutory tenant is by definition “a tenant who remains in possession of premises after the determination by any means of his tenancy and cannot by reason of the provisions of the Rent Act be deprived of such possession by his landlord”: see section 36 of Act 220, omitting categories (b) and (c) as being irrelevant to this case. The words emphasised in the definition indicate that before a statutory tenancy can come into existence, the prior contractual tenancy should first have been terminated; the mode of termination is immaterial. It is sufficient if any one of the recognised legal modes of terminating a tenancy is employed, e.g. forfeiture, merger, surrender, effluxion of time, or where an agreement to that effect has been made, by a notice to quit given by either party or by abandonment (atuogya). In the instant case, at the time the vendor purported to sell his house outright to the plaintiff, the property was encumbered by the defendant’s tenancy and equitable interest in possession. The defendant’s contractual I tenancy not having been first terminated, he cannot in my opinion be deemed a “statutory tenant;” i.e. a person without an estate or interest in the land but enjoying only a personal right of occupation or a status of irremoveability under the Rent Act. In my respectful view, the learned trial judge erred in holding otherwise and assuming throughout his judgment that the defendant is a statutory tenant.
Under the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), the term “landlord” includes, not only the original lessor, but also a derivative landlord, that is, “any
[p.365] of [1979] GLR 360 person deriving title under the original landlord”—see the definition in section 36 of the Act. It would therefore appear that the plaintiff, having succeeded to the title and interest of the original landlord by purchase, becomes in the contemplation of the law the defendant’s “landlord” and the defendant in turn becomes her “tenant.”
The learned trial judge invoked section 17 (1) (g) of Act 220 in granting the order of possession and ejectment sought. However, that subsection does not mention a statutory tenant; it simply provides for the ejectment of a tenant by his landlord when he reasonably requires the premises for personal occupation as a dwelling-house by himself or a member of his family or an employee upon the fulfillment of certain prescribed conditions. By contrast, section 17 (1) (i) deals with the situation where a statutory tenant has come into being upon the expiry of the lease and the landlord requires the premises for a new construction or remodelling or redevelopment. In the instant case, the plaintiff as landlord by purchase required the premises for her personal occupation and not for a scheme of redevelopment. The confusion in nomenclature was occasioned by the description of the defendant as statutory tenant in the writ whereas the plaintiff’s case and the judgment of the court below proceeded upon the basis of an application made under paragraph (g) for the landlord’s recovery of possession from a tenant on the ground that the premises are required for the landlord’s personal occupation.
Whether the defendant was correctly described as a statutory tenant or not, I would hold that the learned trial judge erred in making an order of recovery of possession and ejectment against the defendant under section 17 (1) (g) of Act 220 without considering the statutory conditions precedent, viz. (a) whether the premises were reasonably required by the landlord for her personal occupation as a dwelling-house and (b) whether greater hardships would be caused by granting the order sought than by refusing it.
The relevant section 17 (1) (g) reads:
“17. (1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of section 25 and of section 28, no order against a tenant for the recovery of the possession of, or for the ejectment from, any premises shall be made or given by the appropriate Rent Magistrate, or any other Judge of a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of any other enactment for the time being in force, except in any of the following circumstances,—. . .
(g) where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord for personal occupation as a dwelling house by himself a member of his family or any person in his whole time employment, such premises being constructed to be used as a dwelling house, so, however, that—. . .
(ii) no such order shall be made if the Magistrate or Judge is satisfied having regard to all the circumstances of the case including any alternative accommodation available for the person for whose occupation the premises are so
[p.366] of [1979] GLR 360 required or for the tenant, that greater hardship would be caused by granting the order than by refusing it.”
It would be seen from the above quoted paragraph that apart from the condition that the premises should have been constructed for use as a dwelling-house (which was not in issue in this case), the two most indispensable conditions precedent for the grant of an order of possession and ejectment under the paragraph are that the promises are reasonably required by the landlord for his personal occupation as a dwelling-house and the test of greater hardship that would ensue the grant or refusal of the order sought, having regard to all the circumstances of the case. In my opinion, the judicial discretion was not properly exercised under paragraph (g) since these two crucial issues were not considered at all by the trial judge. He was in duty bound to consider them, assuming for this purpose that the case fell within the Rent Act.
In my opinion, had the learned trial judge considered the relative hardship, for instance, he would inevitably have concluded that the defendant would suffer greater hardship by the grant of the order sought; since not only would he have lost his only residential accommodation, but also the inmates and staff of the clinic who were dependent on him for accommodation would have been thrown out into the street. It should be mentioned in this connection that, in considering the relative hardships, the court is not confined to weighing, the effects upon the landlord and statutory tenant alone; but it should consider also all relatives, dependants, lodgers, guests and strangers within the gates likely to be affected, though with due regard to their status and proximity to the landlord and tenant, and the court should consider the extent to which hardship to them would be hardship to the party concerned see Harte v. Frampton [1947] 2 All E.R. 604 at p. 606, C.A. per Jenkins L.J. (as he then was).
Unfortunately, the learned trial judge granted the order of possession sought without ensuring that the plaintiff fulfilled the necessary conditions precedent under Act 220, assuming its applicability. He seemed to hold that once a purchaser had bought a house expressly for her personal occupation, then the grant of the order of recovery of possession under the relevant subsection of the Rent Act must be automatic. In so holding, he fell into serious error.
The Rent Act apart, the judgment was indeed against the weight of evidence. It would be recalled that the kernel of the defence was that the plaintiff is affected with constructive notice of, and is bound by, the defendant’s prior contractual tenancy with the vendor. The general principle of equity is that a purchaser is deemed to have notice of all that a reasonably prudent purchaser would have discovered. Thus where the purchaser, like the plaintiff in this case, had actual notice that the property was in some way encumbered, she will be held to have constructive notice of all that she would have discovered if she had investigated the encumbrance.
Again, if the purchaser has whether deliberately or carelessly, abstained from making those inquiries into the title of his vendor that a prudent
[p.367] of [1979] GLR 360 purchaser would have made, he will be affected with constructive notice of what appears upon the title.
“Apart from investigating the deeds, a prudent purchaser will inspect the land itself. If any of the land is occupied by any person other than the vendor, this occupation is constructive notice of the estate or interest of the occupier, the terms of his lease, tenancy or other right of occupation, and of any other rights of his, except . . . a mere equity.”
See Snell’s Principles of Equity (26th ed.) at p. 59 and the cases cited. Reference may also be made to Maitland’s Equity (2nded.) (1969 reprint), pp.117-119.
Of the many local cases on constructive notice, it would be sufficient to cite three which are instructive and have a direct bearing on the facts of this case. The first is Dofah v. Awoonor Williams (1922) F.C. ‘22, 99 at p. 103, where the plaintiff acquired a customary parcel grant of land from the stool of Dutch Sekondi in 1902. He exercised acts of ownership over it and paid all accruing rates for a period of eighteen years. On 18 February 1920, the same stool conveyed the very plot of land by deed to the defendant, a legal practitioner, who registered his instrument within a fortnight and fenced the land in June 1920. In an action for trespass and injunction, the plaintiff recovered judgment; and the defendant’s appeal to the full court based principally on the ground that he was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the plaintiff’s claim with a registered instrument, was unanimously dismissed. Smyly C.J. held at p. 106 that:
“. . . while registration under the Ordinance gives priority to instruments registered, over instruments unregistered or subsequently registered, the Registration Ordinance gives no priority to a registered conveyance over a prior verbal sale made according to native custom; in other words that the Registration Ordinance does not abolish the native custom as to sale of land.”
Hall J. concurred and held at pp. 106-107 that:
“. . . Section 17 of the Land Registry Ordinance [which enacted that] every Instrument executed on or after 29th March, 1883 . . . shall, so far as regards any land affected thereby, take effect as against other instruments affecting the same land from the date of its registration . . . does not affect unregistered grants of land made.”
The third member of I the court was Logan J., the trial judge himself, whose judgment was being upheld on appeal. He modestly expressed his concurrence with the rest of the court. In the court below he had unburdened himself with clarity on the issue at p. 103:
“In my opinion the Land Registry Ordinance does not affect unregistered grants of land made verbally in accordance with native custom. Were the courts to hold otherwise native grants of land would give no security whatever to the grantee. He could always be
[p.368] of [1979] GLR 360 defeated by a subsequent conveyance of the same land by the same, grantor to some other person, completed by registration, although the grantor had no title whatever. I think it is clear that registration only gives priority and is only intended to give priority when there are two or more documents relating to the land affected by them.”
The second relevant case is Kugbe v. Union Trading Co., Ltd. (1926) D.Ct. ‘26-’29, 202, where the plaintiff bought land at an auction sale in execution. The defendants were in occupation of this land under an agreement in writing, not under seal, for a certain unexpired portion of a term of five years. The plaintiff then sent to the defendants two notices to quit; but they refused to quit. On the plaintiff suing them for possession, Michelin J. held, inter alia, that (1) although the agreement was not under seal, it created a tenancy from year to year; and (2) that, on the facts, the plaintiff had constructive notice of the agreement and was bound by its terms. The court found as a fact that at the time the plaintiff bought the property at the auction sale, the tenancy demised by the execution debtor in favour of the defendants still subsisted. In his evidence, the plaintiff admitted that prior to the auction sale he used to see the defendants’ signboard on the store occupied by them which formed a portion of the lots sold to him; and that even on the day of the sale he had seen the signboard in question. After referring to the relevant English authorities on constructive notice, the court held that the plaintiff’s duty was to have made full investigation as to the title of the judgment debtor, and as to the terms on which the defendants hold the store from the judgment debtor. Not having made any such investigation prior to his purchase of the property, he must in law be held to have had constructive notice of the tenancy held by the defendants and was bound by the terms of such tenancy.
In the third case, Crayem v. Consolidated African Selection Trust (1949) 12 W.A.C.A. 443, where the relevant authorities were reviewed, it was held as reported in the headnote that:
“(i) the language of the Gold Coast Land Registry Ordinance [s. 70 quoted supra] cannot be construed as giving absolute priority to an instrument by reason only of its registration;
(ii) section 20 of that Ordinance is confined to determining priority only as between written instruments;
(iii) a later instrument can by registration obtain priority over an earlier one only if it was obtained without fraud and without notice of the earlier unregistered instrument;
(iv) a tenant’s occupation or possession is constructive notice of that tenant’s rights to a purchaser, mortgagee or lessee of the property;
(v) where a tenant in possession holds under a lease, a party who proposes to take a lease of the same land is bound to enquire on what terms the lessee is in possession, send the fact that the landlord misinforms him of the contents of the lease does not relieve him of that onus.”
[p.369] of [1979] GLR 360
Applying the above principles to the facts of this case summarised above, I hold firstly, that plaintiff’s registration of her deed of sale (exhibit B) on 9 December 1975 under sections 24-26 of the Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122), did not confer on the instrument priority over the defendant’s subsisting parol contractual tenancy granted by the vendor to him in 1970, for section 26 of Act 122, which is in pari materia with the above-quoted provision of the repealed Land Registry Ordinance, confers priority on a registered instrument only as against other instruments affecting the same land; and “instrument” is defined in section 36 of the Act to mean “any writing affecting land situate in Ghana . . .” Hence, the defendant’s parol agreement is excluded from the ambit of section 26 of Act 122; and exhibit B enjoys no priority over the defendant’s earlier parol customary tenancy agreement.
In the second place, since the plaintiff admitted in evidence knowledge that the defendant was living in the disputed house as tenant; and was paying monthly rent of ¢14 and was running a clinic in the house at the time she bought it, she must be deemed to have had constructive notice of and to have been bound by, the defendant’s tenancy and its terms including equities which, as a tenant, he had against his landlord, and the collateral agreement entered into about the mode of defraying the tenant’s initial expenditure on structural repairs and his lien on future accruing rents to the value of those repairs.
In the third place, the vendor not having terminated the defendant’s subsisting contractual tenancy, could not convey vacant possession to the plaintiff; and the latter was in turn fixed with constructive notice of defendant’s tenancy, terms and interests arising thereunder. She cannot now be heard in equity to say that she bought the house without notice of the defendant’s prior estate or interest in possession.
In the fourth place, the Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122), like its predecessor, the Land Registry Ordinance, Cap. 133 (1951 Rev.), did not abolish the equitable doctrines of notice and fraud; neither has it conferred on a registered instrument like exhibit B herein a state-guaranteed title. Registration does not create absolute title; and the learned trial judge erred by virtually holding that the plaintiff’s title became absolute and impregnable with registration. Notwithstanding her registered deed of sale, the plaintiff is affected with constructive notice of, and is bound by, the defendant’s earlier parol customary tenancy. Her claim for possession and ejectment and other ancillary reliefs must accordingly fail and be dismissed.
Turning to the defendant’s counterclaim for an order of declaration that “the tenancy contract between Awuah and the defendant is binding on Awuah and his assignees, alienees or successors in title,” the general rule is that the grant of a declaratory relief is discretionary and ought to be exercised with care and caution and judicially, with regard to all the circumstances of the case and except in special circumstances it should not be exercised unless all interested parties are present. But there has never been an unqualified rule of practice that forbids the making of a
[p.370] of [1979] GLR 360 declaration when some of the persons interested in the subject of the declaration are not before the court. The exercise of the discretion depends on the facts of each case and on whether it would be in the particular case unjust, inequitable, impracticable, academic, inappropriate or even an abuse of the court’s process to grant it. In a nutshell, the test is whether it is just and appropriate in all the circumstances of the case to grant it: see this court’s recent decision in Dzaba III v. Tumfuor [1978] G.L.R. 18, C.A. and Ibeneweka v. Egbuna [1964] 1 W.L.R. 219. P.C.
On the one hand, the uncontroversial facts in this case are that the plaintiff has bought outright the house in question and has had conveyed to her the title of the vendor (Mr. Awuah) by a deed of sale (exhibit B), duly registered under the Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122). The registration of this deed of sale is deemed in law to constitute actual notice of the instrument and of the fact of registration to the whole world: see section 25 (1) of Act 122.
On the other hand, the plaintiff herself admitted in evidence that at the time she bought the house the defendant was living there as a tenant and was to her knowledge paying ¢14 monthly rent to the vendor and was operating a clinic in the house. It has already been demonstrated that from these admitted facts, the plaintiff is deemed in law to have constructive notice of, and to be bound by, the defendant’s subsisting tenancy and its terms: see the fourth holding in Crayem’s case (supra) and the cases of Dofah v. Awonoor Williams (supra) and Kugbe v. Union Trading Co., Ltd. (supra). Clearly, as between the parties herein, the defendant is entitled to have his rights and interests as against the plaintiff spelled out, in an order of declaration. The only outstanding question is whether the non-joinder of the vendor to the counterclaim should disentitle him to this declaratory relief.
The vendor was indeed not joined to the suit. The defendant himself explained in evidence that upon being served with the writ he searched in vain for him but was told he had gone to his village; while his witness, Agyepong, also denied any knowledge of his whereabouts. He last saw him about six weeks prior to his testimony in court. Even though on that occasion, he Agyepong knew of the pendency of the suit yet he refrained from discussing it with him because, as he explained, he was at loggerheads with him over a different matter. In these circumstances, it was perhaps not surprising that Awuah, the vendor, was not joined to the suit. Be that as it may, the plaintiff claimed to have bought the totality of Awuah’s title and interest in the property in dispute, while the defendant counterclaimed for the preservation of his rights and interests in possession as the sitting tenant as against both Awuah the vendor and his assignees, alienees or successors in title. It is undeniable that the plaintiff was on the evidence of the deed of sale coupled with the receipt (exhibits A and B) the successor in title or alienee of the vendor. Having regard to the facts and all the circumstances of the case, it would b e just and appropriate to grant the defendant the declaratory relief sought but limited in its operation to the interested party actually before
[p.371] of [1979] GLR 360 the court, namely, the plaintiff. I would therefore declare that since the plaintiff knew at the time of her purchase of the house in question that the defendant was in occupation thereof as a tenant at a monthly rent of ¢14, she has constructive notice of, and is accordingly bound by, the defendant’s tenancy and its terms.
In the premises I would allow this appeal by the defendant from the judgment of the Kumasi Circuit Court dated 20 February 1976; set aside the said judgment and the orders made together with the order as to costs. I would grant an order of declaration against the plaintiff in the terms contained in the preceding sentence. The defendant would be entitled to his costs in the court below assessed at ¢200 and in this court fixed at ¢250.
JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.
I agree and have nothing to add.
JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A.
I also agree.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
D. R. K. S.
