BOTCHWAY vs. OKINE [1987-88] 2 GLR 1
20 March 1986 · OSEI-HWERE JA · ≈ 45 min read
[1986] SLR (CA) 26Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Amefinu v. Odametey [1977] 2 G.L.R. 135, C.A.
(2) Asare v. Brobbey [1971] 2 G.L.R. 331, C.A.
(3) Crayem v. Consolidated African Selection Trust Ltd. (1949) 12 W.A.C.A. 443. (4) Boateng v. Dwinfuor [1979] G.L.R. 360, C.A.
(5) Anyidoho v. Markham (1905) Ren. 318, F.C.
(6) Hockman v. Arkhurst (1921) F.C. ‘20-’21, 101.
(7) Jacques v. Harrison (1884) 12 Q.B. 165; 50 L.T. 246, C.A.
(8) Akwei v. Awuletey [1960] G.L.R. 231, S.C.
(9) Sharman and Meade’s Contract (Re) [1936] Ch.D. 755; [1936] 2 All E.R. 1547. (10) Eastwood v. Ashton [1915] A.C. 900, 113 L.T. 562, H.L.
(11) Norquaye-Tetteh (Emmanuel) v. Malm; Norquaye-Tetteh (David Quao) v. Malm (Consolidated)
[1959] G.L.R. 368, S.C.
(12) Kwofie v. Kakraba [1966] G.L.R. 229, S.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the decision of the High Court giving judgment for the co-defendant in an action for declaration of title, recovery of arrears of [p.5] of [1987-88] 2 GLR 1 rent and perpetual injunction. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Osei-Hwere and Abban JJ.A.
COUNSEL
Kwame Tetteh for the appellant.
Ayisi for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.A.
Osei-Hwere J.A. delivered the first judgment at the invitation of Abban J.A. The legal battle which was fought in the court below was essentially between the plaintiff-appellant (hereinafter to be designated as the plaintiff). And the co-defendant-respondent (also to be designated as the co-defendant). Although the defendant-respondent (to be referred to as the defendant) was initially drawn into the contest he faded out after he had filed his defence.
By his writ of summons the plaintiff sued the defendant and claimed against him certain reliefs ranging from a declaration of title, through recovery of ¢449 as arrears of rent and up to perpetual injunction. It was averred by the plaintiff in his statement of claim that he acquired a parcel of land by customary grant in 1963 for the Osu stool then occupied by Nii Dowuona V and that in 1967 he obtained a formal deed of conveyance evidencing the coustomary grants from the said stool. The conveyance was duly stamped and registered in the Deeds Registry as No. 147/1974 on 23 January 1974. In 1964 he let the said land to the defendant who later fell into arrears of rent. His complaint was also that the defendant had refused to vacate his land in spite of repeated notices to him to do so. He identified the land in the schedule of his statement of claim.
Although the defendant essayed to resist the claims those matters he pleaded in traverse were necessarily consigned to the lumber room when he failed to appear in court to defend them. Be that as it may, the co-defendant joined the suit and threw down the gauntlet at the plaintiff. The defence which he filed specifically denied paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) of the statement of claim and put the plaintiff to strict proof of the allegations contained in those paragraphs. Paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) of his defence were pertinent, and I quote them hereunder:
“(2) In further answer to paragraph (2), the co-defendant says that he derives his title from Nii Dowuona IV, the land having been granted to the co-defendant by deed of conveyance dated 13 April 1961, and registered as No. 1827/1975. The co-defendant further derives title from one Owusu Ansah by deed of conveyance dated 31 December 1962. The plaintiff’s alleged grant by Nii Dowuona V to him is therefore invalid and cannot confer any valid title to the land on the plaintiff.
[p.6] of [1987-88] 2 GLR 1
(3) In answer to paragraphs (5) of the statement of claim the co-defendant says that the plaintiff had no title to the land and could therefore not let same out to the defendant.
(4) Paragraphs (6), (7), (8) and (9) of the statement of claim are denied. In further answer to the said paragraphs the co-defendant sued the defendant at the Circuit Court, Accra for declaration of title, recovery of possession, damages for trespass and perpetual injunction. The plaintiff knew of this suit whilst it was pending but did nothing and judgment was entered against the defendant on 6 June 1972.
The suit No. is L 36/69. After the said judgment, the defendant pleaded with the co-defendant to be allowed to operate his workshop on the land at a monthly rent of twelve cedis and to attorn tenancy to the co-defendant. The plaintiff is therefore estopped by his conduct from denying the co-defendant’s title to the land in dispute.”
He claimed for title in respect of the land claimed by the plaintiff and, in addition, pleaded estoppel against the plaintiff by reason of the judgment in the case of Appiah v. Ayitey, suit No. 136/69.
The plaintiff reacted by a bitter reply which I quote:
“(1) The plaintiff joins issue with the co-defendant on his defence.
(2) In reply to paragraph (2) of the statement of defence, the plaintiff says that the co-defendant’s so-called title is based on forged documents which, in law, confer no title in the land in question on the co-defendant; the spurious claim the co-defendant makes to the land is denied.
(3) Paragraph (3) of the statement of defence is denied.
(4) In answer to paragraph (4) of the defence the plaintiff says that he had no knowledge of the suit referred to by the defendant; the plaintiff is not aware that any judgment had been awarded against the defendant in respect of the land on 6 June 1972. The plaintiff denies that he is estopped by conduct or in any other way from claiming the land in question.
(5) In further answer to paragraph (4) of the statement of defence, the plaintiff says that if ever the defendant came to any terms with the co-defendant in respect of the land in question which is denied, the arrangement was without the plaintiff’s knowledge and it is fraudulent.
(6) The plaintiff says that his late father Festus Botchway acting for and on behalf of the plaintiff sued one Mama Moshie and others for declaration of title, perpetual injunction
[p.7] of [1987-88] 2 GLR 1 and damages for trespass in respect of the land in suit No. L 68/57 and judgment was given in favour of the plaintiff’s father on 17 September 1958 and the defendant was ordered to pay damages and costs to the tune of £5,084; the plaintiff will contend at the appropriate time that the co-defendant is estopped by the said judgment from claiming title to the land.
(7) The plaintiff says that a large portion of the land in dispute was conveyed to Bishop Oliver Bowers for and on behalf of the Catholic Mission by a deed of conveyance dated 30 November 1961 by Nii Dowuona IV then Osu Mantse.
(8) The plaintiff says that he objected to the said grant to Bishop Oliver Bowers who surrendered the portion of land claimed by the plaintiff to the Osu stool by a deed of surrender dated 18 August 1967 and stamped as AC 8835/67; at the time of the surrender the occupant of the Osu stool was Nii Dowuona V who restored the land to the plaintiff.
(9) The plaintiff says that the co-defendant’s so-called title deed viz deed of conveyance dated 13 April 1961, stamped as AC 1097/62 and registered as No. 1827/1975 on 26 June 1975 is forged. The co-defendant is at present facing criminal charges of possessing and uttering forged documents; fraud by false pretences in respect of the said document before the Circuit Court, Accra (court case No.
48/74). The co-defendant has since 1975 jumped bail and is wanted on bench warrant.
(10) The plaintiff says each and every document the co-defendant has produced in respect of the land in dispute has turned out to be a forged document; criminal proceedings (part-heard) pending against the co-defendant have been halted because the co-defendant has jumped bail and is presently on the run.”
It was against the background of these pleading that the plaintiff and the co-defendant contested and, at the end of the day, the co-defendant emerged the victor and the plaintiff, the vanquished. Aggrieved by the decision of the trial judge the plaintiff appealed to this court. His additional grounds of appeal, on which his counsel rooted his dissatisfaction before us, were quite expansive. The first five grounds faulted (or tried to find fault) with the trial judge’s holding of estoppel against the plaintiff. The next five grounds attacked the other aspects of the judgment as follows
[p.8] of [1987-88] 2 GLR 1
“(f) The trial judge erred in raising suo motu the point of registration of the plaintiff’s title deed, exhibit A (which ex facie appeared to have been registered) without giving the plaintiff the opportunity to be heard on that point.
(g) The holding of the learned trial judge that there was no evidence that exhibit A was submitted for registration or was registered is per incuriam of the provision in section 27 of Act 122 under which the said exhibit A was admissible without further proof.
(h) The trial judge erred in not adverting his mind to section 26 (5) of Act 122 by which the plaintiff’s title deed, exhibit A, superseded the co-defendant’s title deed, exhibit B, by prior registration, both titles having emanated from the Osu stool.
(i) The trial judge erred in upholding the co-defendant’s title in exhibit B or 2 which was self-contradictory, inconsistent, spurious and irregular in all material respects.
(j) The trial judge gave inadequate consideration of the evidence of prior ownership and occupation by the plaintiff’s father of the land in dispute.”
And the last ground set down the convenient ground that the judgment was against the weight of the evidence.
When this appeal came before this court (with a differently constituted panel) on 22 October 1984 it was found necessary to identify the area in dispute. Accordingly it was ordered that the Chief Lands Officer should appoint a surveyor to superimpose the two plots claimed in the original documents of title on the master plan of the area. The result is the plan which was tendered before us and marked exhibit C.A.1, of which the legends speak for themselves.
As noted, paragraph (4) of the co-defendant’s defence pleaded the action which he took against the defendant in the circuit court and had judgment. He further pleaded estoppel by conduct. It became clear from his evidence in the witness-box that the defendant never entered any appearance to the writ and this enabled him to obtain judgment by default on 6 June 1972. Thus his action against the defendant was denied the benefit of publicity which normally attends land suits. When the defendant had notice of the default judgment he tried to set it aside but it is said that he later withdrew his action which, from exhibit K, was fixed for hearing on 30 June 1972. The plaintiff said that he became aware of the judgment in June 1972 when bailiffs came to attach the land.
By a bold sweep of the pen the trial judge held, rather sententiously, that the plaintiff was estopped by the judgment of the circuit court against the defendant. This holding was easily rendered
[p.9] of [1987-88] 2 GLR 1 vulnerable by the plaintiff’s counsel mainly because the plaintiff was neither a party to the proceedings nor was there any privity of interest between him and the defendant. The plaintiff could not have known of the action because by his affidavit in exhibit K the defendant deposed that he was never served with a writ of summons or with any other court process. The co-defendant’s counsel argued half-heartedly in his search for an answer and ended in finding none.
One of the pillars on which the trial judge rested his judgment was that the plaintiff had failed to prove that his deed of title had been registered. The question of registration loomed ominously at the trial because of the telling effect of non-registration provided by section 24 (1) of the Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122). At the trial the plaintiff tendered his title deed as exhibit A and, in his attempt to impugn the co-defendant’s title deed, he tendered it as exhibit B.
According to him he came by exhibit B as the result of his search at the Lands Department. The co-defendant tendered his original title deed as exhibit 2. Again the plaintiff rallied to his support the third plaintiff witness, the stamping officer attached to the Land Department. He identified in court the stamp duty register (exhibit G) in which are recorded conveyances. He said that exhibit B was duly recorded in his register and he went on to testify about certain initialled cancellations relative to the recording of exhibit B.
Finally, he called the fifth plaintiff witness who was once a principal technical officer in charge of the valuation drawing office of the Lands Department. This office is concerned with the recording and plotting of documents. He explained that when a document is brought to his office it is recorded in the property register and the site plan attached to the document is transferred to the record sheet. His office also prepares composite plans to show various plottings of transactions from various owners. He produced in court a certified copy of the composite plan showing the various transactions of a parcel of land at Kotobabi. This was marked exhibit H. He sought to show that as the grant to the co-defendant was not reflected in any of the transactions recorded in exhibit H then it meant that transaction did not exist (or was unknown to the Lands Department) at the time the plan was prepared.
The fifth plaintiff witness did admit under cross-examination that the plaintiff ‘s title deed (exhibit A) did not also reflect in exhibit H. He then went on to make the following significant admissions:
“The plotting of exhibit H was made more than four years ago—made between four and five years ago. And in fact any disposition of land in the area if made between five and six years ago would be reflected in exhibit H. If a disposition of land there has been made five years ago and after that period is not reflected in
[p.10] of [1987-88] 2 GLR 1 exhibit H, then it means that disposition not so reflected was not sent to the Land Department for processing.
Looking at exhibit H, and at legend Nos. 4, 5 and 7, I see that they relate to grants of land made to Kwamina Appiah and Vithoba Appiah.”
In re-examination, the fifth plaintiff witness explained the stages a document goes through for processing at the Lands Department. First it goes to the Stamp Commission for the government number to be given on the document. It then comes back to the Lands Department and because of the provisions of the Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123) the plan covering the land granted is examined to find whether it is accurate with regard to the land it portrays. That done it went (formerly) to the legal section for the contents to be scrutinised. It is then taken to the control record room to be checked if the land covered is government land. From this record room, it goes to the valuation and drawing office for the plotting to be made. He also explained that the data for preparing exhibit H appears in the record sheet, the compilation of which commenced from 1947. In another flush of enthusiasm the plaintiff’s counsel tendered through the fifth plaintiff witness exhibit J, a letter from the Lands Secretariat dated 9 April 1968 and addressed to the plaintiff. The plaintiff had submitted his document for concurrence in terms of Act 123 and exhibit J requested the plaintiff to have his plot tied to a known survey pillar to help identify the plot. He was also asked to show the purpose for which he acquired the land.
To counteract exhibit H the co-defendant called the first defendant witness to tender exhibit 3, the duplicate copy of composite plan No. L.D. 9526/56375 which he prepared in 1980. At the time he testified the first defendant witness was a senior technical officer of the Lands Department and his duties included plotting land transactions and preparing composite plans for the public and for the courts. He told the court that he was not concerned with the registration of documents but with plotting on record sheets. This plotting he said, is effected before registration. It would seem that this process of plotting before registration gives validity to what is implied in the statement of the fifth plaintiff witness that if the disposition in a document is not reflected in the relevant composite plan then that document was not forwarded to the Lands Department for processing. Exhibit 3 is in respect of land at Kotobabi and it shows, as legend No. 1, document PD No. A.C. 1097/62 and property No. D 9015, conveyance dated 13 April 1961 of which the parties are Nii Noi Dowuona IV and Kwamina Appiah. Within the larger area of land plotted as the co-defendant’s grant, there are shown in exhibit 3 twelve other land transactions. None of these transactions relates to the plaintiff ‘s document, exhibit A, just the same way as exhibit H does not portray any plotting in respect of the plaintiff’s grant.
[p.11] of [1987-88] 2 GLR 1
The cumulative result of the evidence of the third and fifth plaintiff witnesses and the first defendant witness, together with the documents they tendered, led the trial judge to the following robust conclusion:
“In conclusion I hold that the plaintiff has failed to prove that he ever lodged with the Lands Department his conveyance, exhibit A, dated 15 November 1967 for processing as there is no evidence of any entry in the register of the Lands Department under section 11 of Act 122 to evidence such processing. The composite plan exhibit 3 made in 1980 does not portray a legend of his conveyance nor does the composite plan exhibit H tendered by him in evidence. The evidence establishes that the entire area in dispute was within the larger area granted to the co-defendant in the name of Kwamina Appiah by the conveyance exhibit 2 dated 13 January 1961 and registered as No. 1827/1975.
Even though the plaintiff’s conveyance bears the number 1471/1974 there is no evidence of the necessary lodging and processing by relevant entries in a register of the Lands Department in accordance with section 11 of Act 122. No register was in evidence in the case of his document. There must be evidence from him that he lodged his document, and that the necessary recordings were effected as in the case of the co-defendant by exhibit C.”
The above conclusion gave rise to grounds (f) and (g) of the additional grounds of appeal which, predictably, were argued by both counsel with much animation.
It was certainly a misconception to argue that the trial judge raised suo motu the point of registration of the plaintiff’s document. The co-defendant’s defence specifically denied the said registration and put the plaintiff to strict proof thereof. The summons for directions taken out by the co-defendant included this omnibus issue: “Any other issues raised on the pleadings.” In his attempt to destroy the co-defendant’s deed of title the plaintiff rendered his own document vulnerable. The co-defendant’s counsel capitalised on this in his address. There was enough material upon which the trial judge could draw the conclusion he did. Whether it is valid or not is another matter.
The plaintiff ‘s document did not reflect in exhibit H because it may well be that at the date of its preparation he had not submitted it for registration. This may purely be conjectural. However, the expose supplied by exhibit H and the answers elicited from the fifth plaintiff witness in cross-examination should have put the plaintiff on the alert to remove the doubt that his document evoked about its registration. But what answer can be given to the query raised by exhibit 3 which was compiled in 1980? If, as on the face of exhibit A, it had been
[p.12] of [1987-88] 2 GLR 1 registered in 1974, why was it that it did not reflect in any of the legends in exhibit 3, especially as records are kept of documents from which a composite plan is compiled?
The issue about processing taken up by the learned trial judge was not mere arid pedantry but a proper question which in the doubtful circumstance the plaintiff ‘s document was placed, called for satisfactory proof. This court once lent the force of its voice to it. In Amefinu v. Odametey [1977] 2 G.L.R. 135 at 143, C.A. Annan J.A. (who delivered the judgment of the court) in answer to the argument that the plaintiff having presented her conveyance, and in the absence of any default on her part to account for non-registration, the rigours of the Act ought not in fairness be applied to her case said:
“… [T]he language of Act 122 makes it clear that an attempt to register or presentation for registration cannot be equated to registration. Either a document is registered or it is not registered and the Act does not take cognisance of an incomplete process for registration.
Section 10 of the Act draws a clear distinction between the presentation of a document for registration and its ultimate registration. Section 11 provides for the keeping of a register in which instruments presented for registration shall be entered and section 12 provides:
‘12. (1) Registration shall consist in filing a duplicate or copy (to be provided by the person presenting the instrument for registration) of the instrument brought for registration.
(2) Every duplicate or copy shall bear the certificate required by section 10 of this Act to be placed on the original instrument, and also a certificate signed by the registrar that such a duplicate has been compared and verified with the original.’
It seems to be clear from the very language of the Act that where the processes set out in sections 10, 11 and 12 have not been performed an instrument cannot be said to have been registered.”
It is clear from the above sections that the fact of registration must be ascertained from the copy or duplicate of the instrument filed.
The plaintiff’s counsel thinks otherwise and seems to be saying that the production in court of the plaintiff’s original title deed which shows on its face the land registry number is sufficient evidence of registration. He backs this view by placing reliance on section 27 (1) of Act 122. But the co-defendant’s counsel countered this by observing that section 27 (1) could not be read in isolation but alongside section 27 (2). The argument of the plaintiff’s counsel at first blush seemed
[p.13] of [1987-88] 2 GLR 1 attractive if only because the trial courts are not unaccustomed to accepting as proof of registration, without raising any eye-brow, the original title deed of a party with its registration mark. But, in my opinion, the true view of the matter (i.e. proof of registration) is to read as an integral whole sections 19, 27 (1) and (2) of Act 122.
To get a clearer picture of those sections they are quoted hereunder:
“19. A registrar shall, upon application, allow searches to be made at all reasonable times in any book, register or list in his custody, and shall upon request give certified copies of, or extracts from, any entry in any such book, register or list or of any duplicate or copy of a registered instrument filed in his register …
27. (1) Every copy or extract or certificate of registry purporting to be signed by a registrar shall be receivable in evidence in any Court without further or other proof thereof, unless it is proved to be a forgery.
(2) The party proposing to use it in evidence in a civil case shall give notice of his intention in writing to the opposite party, and at the same time shall deliver to him a copy of the copy or extract and of the certificate thereon; and on proof of the service or on admission of the receipt of such notice and copy, the certified copy or extract shall be received in evidence if the Court is of opinion that the service has been made in sufficient time before the hearing to enable the opposite party to apply for a search of the original book or the register from which the copy or extract has been taken.”
The sections outline, in brief, two procedural stages, viz (a) an application to the registrar for the relevant copy or extract or certificate of registry; and (b) the service on the other party of notice of intention together with delivery to him of the relevant document. When the document presented in court has, on its face, emanated from the registrar and there is proof of such notice then it is receivable in evidence without further proof. The sections do not certainly advocate that free and easy mode of proof of registration which seems to have earned forensic fiat.
It was further argued that the plaintiff’s exhibit A was admitted in evidence without objection and for that reason the plaintiff could enjoy relief from further proof under section 27 (1). Again it was the contention of the plaintiff’s counsel that as it appears on the face of exhibit A that the document was registered, the court below should have applied to it the presumption of regularity. In the first place, the mere admission in evidence of a document does not prove the truth of its
[p.14] of [1987-88] 2 GLR 1 contents against a person who is not a party to it. Secondly, the omnia praesumuntur rule, although lifted from the common law and now made a statutory rule—vide section section 35 of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (N.R.C.D. 323), still remains a presumption and the general provision of section 37 of the Decree cannot derogate from the special provisions of Act 122 as to the fact and proof of registration.
The trial judge’s conclusion, accordingly, stands vindicated. Furthermore, there was no proper proof of registration. The result is that exhibit A could not be held as a registered document which was effective to pass any title to the plaintiff—see section 24 (1) of Act 122. What then is the position of the co-defendant’s title deed which did not similarly pass the rigorous test in proof of registration? The short answer is that exhibit 2 (or B) is a pre-1962 instrument which did not require compulsory registration to render it effective.
Upon the pure assumption that the documents of both the plaintiff and the co-defendant were duly registered, then ground (h) of the additional grounds obtrudes for consideration. According to the plaintiff’s counsel the trial judge determined priority between the two competing documents by the date of execution whilst it should have been by the date of registration. Counsel for the co-defendant replied that the plaintiff can have no truck with section 26 of Act 122 because at the date of the execution of exhibit A the Osu stool had already divested itself of its title to the land and it had nothing to convey thereby to the plaintiff. The co-defendant’s document was executed on 13 April 1961 whilst the plaintiff’s was on 15 November 1967.
It will be useful, before considering the point of law involved, to peep at the events antecedent to the alleged registration of the two documents. Following the execution of his document the plaintiff said that he made the defendant his caretaker of the land granted to him. The defendant operated a fitter’s workshop on the land and paid rent of eight cedis per month. According to the co-defendant after the land had been conveyed to him he went into possession and started to develop it. One Owusu Ansah came to claim ownership and he repurchased the land from him. In 1967 or 1968 he was released from protective custody and he saw the defendant on the land. He took action against him for trespass and he obtained judgment against him. He came to terms with the defendant and permitted him to stay on the land on the payment of monthly rent of twelve cedis. The defendant paid this rent to him but stopped when the plaintiff commenced this action against him on 18 February 1974.
As noted earlier, the plaintiff became aware of the judgment the co-defendant had obtained against the defendant in June 1972 when the plaintiff took the two bailiffs who had come in connection with the land
[p.15] of [1987-88] 2 GLR 1 in issue to the police station. According to the plaintiff they had come to attach the land with a writ of fi.fa., but ostensibly they came to put the co-defendant in possession and also to attach one of the vehicles of the defendant—vide exhibit K. The co-defendant put it accurately that he went into execution by a writ of possession. In spite of exhibit K which the defendant filed, the judgment was never set aside either by the trial court or on appeal. It must be mentioned in passing that the admission by the plaintiff in court and also by his exhibit K (the affidavit of the defendant upon which he relied) to the effect that bailiffs came to levy execution on the land raised the presumption of a regularly obtained judgment against the defendant. The rents which the plaintiff sued for against the defendant covered a period of four years prior to his action. He admitted in cross-examination that the defendant had told him he would not pay the rents because of the judgment the co-defendant had obtained against him.
It was sought by the plaintiff’s counsel to avoid this judgment in favour of the co-defendant. His reason was that at the time the co-defendant brought his action he was possessed of an unregistered document which was ineffective to confer any title on him and thus give him the right to sue. The point has been answered before. It must be remembered that section 24 (1) of Act 122 is innovative in its provisions. I can do no better than to let this court re-echo what it said in Asare v. Brobbey [1971] 2 G.L.R. 331 at 339, C.A.:
“It must be pointed out that before Act 122 came into force, the Land Registry Ordinance, Cap. 133 (1951 Rev.), did not contain provisions similar to those in section 24 of the Land Registry Act. Before 2 November 1962, there was nothing like compulsory registration of documents relating to land. Such documents if they remained unregistered lost only their priority . . .”
Because it was valid and effective the co-defendant was entitled to sue on his document.
In obvious anticipation of his action the plaintiff presented exhibit A for registration on 23 January 1974. The co-defendant also presented exhibit 2 for registration on 26 June 1975. From the foregoing it is quite plain that before he mounted his action the plaintiff was aware not only of the co-defendant’s possession but also of the judgment in his favour. In those circumstances what became of the plaintiff ‘s document of title which, as alleged, was registered before the defendant’s? Did it gain priority over the co-defendant’s document by reason of section 26 of Act 122? It has been affirmed time and again that registration under Act 122 does not constitute a state guaranteed title. At the time the plaintiff had notice of the co-defendant’s judgment against the defendant (whom he described as his caretaker) he held an invalid title
[p.16] of [1987-88] 2 GLR 1 deed because it had not then been registered. Did he by his subsequent registration gain priority which could also avoid the judgment? In my opinion the answer should be, No. The invalidity of the plaintiff’s title deed at the time he had notice of the judgment was crucial and it drove a coach-and-four through the registration of his instrument.
It has also been firmly settled that Act 122, like its predecessor Cap. 133, did not abolish the equitable doctrines of notice and fraud: see Crayem v. Consolidated African Selection Trust (1949) 12 W.A.C.A. 443 and Boateng v. Dwinfuor [1979] G.L.R. 360, C.A. Consequently, a later instrument can by registration obtain priority over an earlier one only if it was obtained without fraud and without notice of the earlier unregistered instrument; see Crayem v. Consolidated African Selection Trust (supra). In this regard possession by a tenant or by the unregistered owner is constructive notice of his rights. The authority for this qualification founded on equity was found in English cases interpreting English statutes which, it was argued, must have been taken into account in framing our Ordinance—see Crayem v. Consolidated African Selection Trust (supra) which fully reviewed some of the authorities on the point. It was, however, never finally settled in the above decision what should be the crucial time of the notice, i.e. was it at the time of his grant or that it must continue until the time of his registration. This question was expressly left open at 446 of the report. But in Anyidoho v. Markham (1905) Ren. 318 the majority of the Full Court held that the time of registration was crucial, because the instrument took effect from that time. This also seems to have been the view of Nettleton J. in Hockman v. Arkhurst (1921) F.C. ‘20-’21, 101 at 105. As under section 24 (1) of Act 122 the instrument shall have no effect until it is registered, I hold the view that until he registered his title deed, any notice the plaintiff had of the co-defendant’s rights over the land disqualified his priority.
Although not bound by the judgment the plaintiff could properly have espoused the defendant’s cause and applied to the court to set it aside as it adversely affected him. Order 13, r. 6 of the Civil Procedure (High Court) Rules) 1954 (L.N. 140A.) empowers the court to set aside any judgment by default upon such terms as may be just. It was said of the corresponding English rule (i.e. Order XXVII, r. 15) that it was designed to enable judgments by default to be set aside by those who have or who can acquire a locus standi; and the two modes open by which a stranger to an action, who is injuriously affected through any judgment suffered by a defendant by default, can set the judgment aside were indicated—see Jacques v. Harrison (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 165. A third party who desires to apply to set aside a judgment must show that he has a direct interest in so doing and must either do so in the name of the defendant with his leave, or he must make both the plaintiff and the [p.17] of [1987-88] 2 GLR 1 defendant parties to the application and ask for leave to intervene. But the plaintiff was contented in his own inaction and allowed the judgment to remain proof against all the world of that fact. With the notice of this judgment and with the defendant’s refusal to pay the rents coupled with his explanation, he was not entitled to close his eyes to the rights of the co-defendant. In the result exhibit A did not gain any priority over exhibit 2.
The argument was advanced that the plaintiff was entitled to rely on his father’s earlier occupation of the land in dispute by way of his defence to the co-defendant’s counterclaim—see ground (J) of the additional grounds of appeal. It should be noted that at the trial the plaintiff never adverted to paragraphs (6), (7) and (8) of his reply to the co-defendant’s defence. His evidence was simply that he acquired the area in dispute by custom from Nii Dowuona V, Paramount Chief of the Osu stool, in 1967 and that subsequently exhibit A was executed. Although there was proof that the plaintiff’s father sued and obtained judgment against one Mama Moshie and others for trespass in 1958 in respect of the land covered by a conveyance to him from one Nii Yeboah Nortey and also that this land is identified in both exhibits H and 3 the plaintiff failed to raise any issue at the trial as between his father’s grant and the co-defendant’s subsequent grant from the Osu stool. The learned trial judge gave sufficient and satisfactory reasons for rejecting exhibit F, the proceedings and judgment of the action waged by the plaintiff’s father, as having no probative value. This court cannot, therefore, submit to the meretricious flirtation with the grant to the plaintiff’s father and his status as an Osu stool subject. Indeed, at the trial in exhibit F, the plaintiffs father said that the defendant, Mama Moshie, set up his claim in the Osu stool. Nii Yeboah Nortey claimed at the trial that the land was part of his family land which he granted. I dare conjecture, having regard to the decision in Akwei v. Awuletey [1960] G.L.R. 231, S.C. recited in exhibits A and 2 that if the action in exhibit F had been waged after this decision the result might well have been different.
In spite of the different numbers given to the composite plan in exhibits H and 3 there can be no doubt, looking at them, that they relate to the same area. The two plans are heavily overloaded with different land transactions which exemplify the uncertainty or insecurity of land speculation in Accra. The co-defendant was himself involved in a number of transactions within the area. Both exhibits H and 3 identify a large area of land edged brown which, as it seems, would have swallowed up the plaintiff’s site plan almost entirely if it had been plotted in any of those composite plans. It is legend No. 5 in exhibit H and No. 7 in exhibit 3. The legend reads: “PD. No. A.C. 954/69 P. No. D. 2202 conveyance
[p.18] of [1987-88] 2 GLR 1 dated 19 February 1958 E. O. AMAMU TO VITHOBA APPIAH.” In the plaintiff ‘s exhibit H the legend continued: “. . . BY CERTIFICATE OF PURCHASE DATE 6 May 1945.” This means that Amamu who acquired this land under a certificate of purchase conveyed the land to the co-defendant on 19 February 1958.
The plaintiff also tendered exhibits L and H. Both are title deeds. Exhibit H is first in time. It was executed on 9 June 1965 and bears the land registry No. 1028/1965. In that document one E. E. Mensah conveys to the co-defendant a piece of land at “Kotobabi (Pig Farm) near Accra New Town” and measuring approximately 0.64 acre. The recitals indicate that by the writ of fi.fa. issued in pursuance of a decree of the then “Senior (Registrar) Magistrate” Accra dated 6 March 1958 in an action wherein S. K. Aduamah was plaintiff-judgment creditor and Nii Yaboah Nortey was defendant judgment debtor the land was bought at a public auction by E.E. Mensah and a certificate of purchase date 27 December 1958 was issued to him. Exhibit L is also a deed of conveyance bearing land registry No. 428/1969 and executed on 25 February 1969. Here the co-defendant conveyed to Madam Agnes Carboo a parcel of the land he bought from E.E. Mensah in exhibit M.
The land sold to Madam Carboo by the co-defendant is identified in exhibit 3 as legend No. 8. The land gifted to the plaintiff ‘s father is also shown in exhibit 3 as legend No. 13 and as legend No.1 in exhibit H. Both plans as well as exhibit CA1 are drawn to the same scale. The land gifted to the plaintiff’s father is shaped like a T-square and it seems to fall within the land claimed by the plaintiff. The land conveyed to Madam Carboo also seems to lie within the land conveyed to the plaintiff. The point being made here is that before the plaintiff’s instrument was registered the co-defendant held a registered conveyance from E. E. Mensah and that he sold a portion of that land, which falls within the area in dispute, to Madam Carboo. Again, he had already bought from E .O. Amamu (who derived his title from a certificate of purchase) the large tract of land edged brown which was swallowed up in exhibit 3 or was almost swallowed up in exhibit H, the conveyance to both the plaintiff and his father. I draw this conclusion, again, on the assumption that the registration numbers quoted on exhibits L and H tendered by the plaintiff and the legends in exhibits H and 3 proved themselves.
The alleged discrepancies in the title deed of the co-defendant became a ground of appeal which was also argued with some gusto. It was pointed out that in the description of the parcel of the land conveyed it is stated that the land is at Dzorwulu but that in the schedule the land is described to be situated at Kotobabi. Again, it was said that although the conveyance was executed in 1961 the plan attached was prepared on 16 April 1975. In the habendum in exhibit 2
[p.19] of [1987-88] 2 GLR 1 the land conveyed is truly described thus: “. . . all that piece of land situate lying and being at Dzorwulu, Accra and more particularly described in the schedule hereto . . .” It was argued in answer that the description in the schedule overrides the earlier description in the habendum. In regard to the plan attached which is later in date than the date of execution it was argued that the co-defendant gave an explanation which was never challenged. Counsel further argued that as the need to prepare a fresh site plan arose the co-defendant’s grantor was called upon to swear to an affidavit to confirm the land conveyed by exhibit 2 which was disclosed on the new site plan.
The duty of a vendor is to convey under a description which is a sufficient and satisfactory identification of the land sold: see Re Sharman and Meades Contract [1936] 2 All E.R. 1547. Where this can be effected without a plan, the purchaser has no right to insist upon one. But in exhibit 2 where the land conveyed is said to be bounded on all sides by the vendor’s stool land nothing could be more vague than this description in identifying it and, if there had been no previous plan, the co-defendant’s explanation that his previous plan was an air sheet which was rejected on the ground that air sheets were no longer accepted was not challenged. Indeed the stamp on his document which seems to record current deeds affecting stool lands shows that the sheet plotted is not an air sheet as in the case of the plaintiff’s. The trial judge disbelieved the co-defendant’s grantor, the first plaintiff witness, who tried to renege from his own solemn affidavit, exhibit, sworn to in confirmation of the grant he made.
The difference in nomenclature, Dzorwulu and Kotobabi, does no harm. This is because of the qualifying words “more particularly described in the schedule hereto.” In Eastwood v. Ashton [1915] A.C. 900 one of the matters in dispute was as to what parcel was conveyed by the description “all which said premises are more particularly described in the plan indorsed on the conveyance and coloured red.” Lord Wrenbury said at 920:
“The words ‘more particularly’ exclude, I conceive, that they have already been exhaustively described.
These words seem to me to mean that the previous description may be insufficient for exact delimitation, and that the plan is to cover all deficiencies, if any.”
The schedule to the conveyance in exhibit 2 must cure all deficiencies.
The Osu stool seemed to name the area in dispute indiscriminately. The second plaintiff witness himself (Nii Dowuona V) said that the land he gave to the plaintiff was at Maamobi. Some of the conveyances tendered, e.g. the conveyances to Bishop Bowers and to the plaintiff’s father, described the land as Maamobi. At the hearing of the appeal, the
[p.20] of [1987-88] 2 GLR 1 court observed that the dimensions of the plan in exhibit 2 did not conform with the dimensions of the land conveyed in the schedule. Counsel for the co-defendant was undoubtedly flustered by the observation. The land conveyed to the co-defendant is seven sided and when the sides lying at a particular direction are measured separately or added up it becomes clear that there are no discrepancies. But in any case the schedule in exhibit 2 itself indicated that the description given would be “more or less” when reduced onto a plan.
On the whole there is enough material to support the judgment and the appeal accordingly ought to fail.
JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.
I had the advantage of reading in advance the learned judgment which has just been read by my brother Osei-Hwere J.A. and I agree with the reasons and the conclusions. I would, however, like to make some observations in about two areas. First, as to the contention of the plaintiff that the land sold to the co-defendant was at Dzorwulu and not at Kotobabi. The contention was based on the fact that the recital in the co-defendant’s deed of conveyance, exhibit B, said so. But the recital further indicated that the said land is “more particularly described in the schedule hereto”: and in the schedule the name of the exact location was given as Kotobabi with full description as to its dimensions. There is also a plan attached which described the land granted in detail and in clear terms. In such cases, all the authorities show that since the plan forms part of the deed of conveyance, if the description is the body of the document is ambiguous or is doubtful the description in the plan should prevail.
In this particular case, the description in the schedule and in the plan agree with the co-defendant’s evidence that the land sold to him was at Kotobabi and not at Dzorwulu. Indeed, if the plaintiff ‘s contention is accepted, it would mean that in the same token the piece of land which was supposed to have been granted to the plaintiff by Nii Dowuona V was at Maamobi and not at Kotobabi because Nii Dowuona V himself said so. In giving evidence as the second plaintiff witness said:
“I know the plaintiff—he is my nephew. It is true that while I was on the stool I granted a piece of land to the plaintiff at Maamobi near the building site owned by a lawyer whose name I have forgotten. I know the area myself”
(The emphasis is mine.)
The plaintiff’s alleged grantor was positive that the land granted to the plaintiff was at Maamobi, while the plaintiff’s deed of conveyance, exhibit A, stated that the land granted was at Kotobabi. Nii Dowuona V, the first plaintiff witness, agreed that the Osu stool owned the lands at Maamobi, Kotobabi and Dzorwulu. It appears there are no boun
[p.21] of [1987-88] 2 GLR 1 daries demarcating where each of those lands starts and ends. They are contiguous to one another, one running into the other; and the Osu stool seemed to use the three names interchangeably. This is borne out by the evidence of Nii Dowuona V, the second plaintiff witness, which I have already referred to above. This view is also confirmed by the evidence of Nii Dowuona IV, the first plaintiff witness, where he stated: “. . . when I was occupying the stool I called that area—Maamobi-Osu; by that area I mean the area adjoining Ofori Atta’s land. My people call that area Kotobabi.” (The emphasis is mine.)
From this it can be stated with confidence that in case of dispute as to the location of a portion of land granted by the Osu stool either at Dzorwulu, Maamobi or Kotobabi, the safest way of finding that location is to go by the description as given in the schedule of the conveyance and the site plan annexed thereto which normally gives graphic description of the location; and not to go by the name which has been given by the parties or in the recital of the deed of conveyance.
The learned trial judge was therefore right when he said that “the words more particularly described in the schedule” in the parcels in exhibit B (exhibit 2) and the words: “more particularly delineated on the plan attached herein” in the schedule itself cannot convey any land other than that described in the schedule and by the plan attached.
The respective portions of land claimed by the plaintiff and the co-defendant, whether one calls the area Dzorwulu, Maamobi or Kotobabi, were all found by the learned trial judge (and quite rightly too) to be at one place and they did over-lap in some respects. However, Nii Dowuona IV in his affidavit, exhibit 1, put the matter beyond doubt that the land the stool granted to the co-defendant was at Kotobabi as described in the schedule and in the site plan attached to the co-defendant’s deed of conveyance, exhibit B (or exhibit 2). This is what Nii Dowuona IV said in the said exhibit 1: “That by a deed of conveyance dated 13 April 1961, I granted a piece of land situate lying and being at Kotobabi—Accra to Kwame Appiah of Accra.” (The emphasis is mine.) Of course at the trial Nii Dowuona IV attempted to detract from this statement in exhibit 1 but the learned trial judge did not believe him and found that statement was the truth of the matter!
With the area in dispute clearly identified, the question then is which of the parties—the plaintiff or the co-defendant, had title to that disputed portion? It is clear from the evidence that the Osu stool through Nii Dowuona IV (the first plaintiff witness) granted the disputed land to the co-defendant on 13 April 1961, as evidenced by exhibit B. Nii Dowuona IV, when he was shown exhibit B in the course of his evidence-in-chief said: “My signatures in exhibit B are correct signatures … My signature in exhibit B is genuine.”
[p.22] of [1987-88] 2 GLR 1
When Nii Dowuona IV, the first plaintiff witness, was also confronted with his affidavit, exhibit 1, which I have already referred to, he said:
“The signature in exhibit 1 appears to be mine. I made this exhibit 1 in 1974. I swore this before the commissioner for oaths … I satisfied myself with regard to the documents with regard to the sale before I signed it.”
As a matter of fact, Nii Dowuona IV positively stated that he executed exhibit B on behalf of the Osu stool. Thus, on the showing of the plaintiff’s own witness—Nii Dowuona IV—the disputed land was validly and properly granted to the co-defendant on 13 April 1961 by the Osu stool, the acknowledged owner thereof, acting through its recognised Mantse Nii Dowuona IV. For the sake of clarity, I will quote some pertinent portions of exhibit B. They read as follows:
“The vendor . . . hereby grants and conveys unto the purchaser all that piece of land … together with all rights privileges … and appurtenances whatsoever to the said land … and the estate right title interest claim and demand whatsoever of the vendor in to and upon the same to have and to hold the same unto and to the use of the purchaser forever … And that the purchaser shall . . . hereafter peaceably and quietly hold possess occupy and enjoy the said land … without any interruption, claim and demand whatsoever from or by the vendor or his successors or any person or persons claiming from under his successors in office . . .”
(The emphasis is mine.)
I must say in passing that at the time of the sale of the disputed land to the co-defendant by the Osu stool, the Land Registry Ordinance, Cap. 133 (1951 Rev.) which was then in operation did not make registration of deeds of conveyance compulsory as it has now been made by the Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122). Cap 133 was mainly concerned with registration to enable the court to determine priority between deeds or conveyances of the same land by the same grantor to different persons. That Ordinance did not make unregistered instruments invalid or ineffective. The co-defendant’s conveyance, exhibit B, was therefore valid and effective as from the date of its execution on 13 April 1961 when Act 122 had not yet come into existence: In other words, the Osu stool validly and effectively divested itself of the ownership of the disputed land to the co-defendant who therefore became the owner thereof as from the said 13 April 1961.
The evidence further showed that the co-defendant after the sale went into possession. The co-defendant in giving his evidence referred to various acts he did to protect his ownership and possession. He said:
[p.23] of [1987-88] 2 GLR 1
“After the grant of this land in exhibit 2 [exhibit 2 is the original of exhibit B] I started developing it. I was in possession; while thus in possession two people came there—one of them is one Owusu-Ansah—he said the land was his. And I purchased same land from him. Another man also came and claimed a portion of this land. I paid him off … I know Ayitey Okine the defendant in this case. When I was released from protective custody in 1967 or 1968 I saw this man on the land. I took action for trespass. And obtained judgment against him. He therefore arranged with me for permission enabling him to continue in occupation of the land. I allowed him to do so because as a fitter he had some vehicles on the land. I therefore gave him a year to enable him to quit. He was to pay ¢12 a month. At the expiration of the one year period the defendant refused to quit from the land. And, so I applied for writ of possession. The defendant in this case has never told me that he was granted permission by the plaintiff to be on the land.”
The learned trial judge accepted this evidence and found as a fact that the co-defendant was in possession and occupation of the land before the plaintiff ‘s alleged acquisition by exhibit A. That being the case, could the Osu stool in 1963 validly sell or make a customary grant of the same piece of land to the plaintiff? On the plaintiff’s own showing he got his grant in 1963. In his evidence-in-chief the plaintiff said:
“I acquired the area by custom from Nii Dowuona, the then paramount chief of Osu in 1963. He is no more on the stool … Subsequently, a document was executed between me (as purchaser) and Nii Dowuona V and his elders as vendors. I submitted this document to the Lands Department for processing. It was eventually registered and stamped. This is the document. I tender it in evidence (accepted and marked A without objection). Exhibit A was executed on 15 November 1967 and registered as No. 147/1974 on 23 January 1974.”
The plaintiff was here saying that he was given a customary grant in 1963, the customary grant was evidenced or confirmed in writing by a deed of conveyance dated 15 November 1967. But as has been shown, the co-defendant clearly established that as at the date of the plaintiff’s grant (whether going by the customary grant in 1963 or by the deed of conveyance dated 15 November 1967) he, the co-defendant, was not only the owner of that disputed portion of land but was also in effective possession and occupation thereof. The legal or customary right which a stool has over its stool land is limited to those portions of the stool lands which have not already been disposed of or which are
[p.24] of [1987-88] 2 GLR 1 vacant and unoccupied by the subjects of the stool. Indeed this was appreciated by Nii Dowuona IV when he said: “If I in my capacity as Nii Dowuona IV granted a piece of land to a purchaser it would not be possible for Nii Dowuona V to grant the same piece of land.”
I totally agree with Nii Dowuona IV on this score. According to the evidence the immediate successor of Nii Dowuona IV was Nii Dowuona V who was enstooled in or about 1963. But by that date the disputed land was no longer a vacant plot and also the title therein had already passed from the Osu stool to the co-defendant. In Norquaye-Tetteh (Emmanuel) v. Malm; Norquaye-Tetteh (David Quao) v. Malm (Consolidated) [1959] G.L.R. 368 at 369, it was held, inter alia, as stated in the headnote:
“that each of the plaintiffs in that case having failed to prove that the portion of land which he claimed was vacant land at the time of its purported conveyance to him by the stool, the claim of each must fail.”
In the course of his judgment, Ollennu J. (as he then was) at 371 had this to say:
“The true position is that, although the documents Exhibit ‘B’ and Exhibit ‘C’ are valid documents, they can be effective to transfer title in the land to the plaintiffs if (and only if), at the dates of their execution, the lands which each purports to convey were vacant stool lands. If at the date of the execution of these deeds the lands were in the occupation of a subject of the stool, or of a stranger to whom the stool had already granted them, those documents would be incapable of conferring title in the lands upon the plaintiffs, the validity of their execution notwithstanding. In my opinion the onus is upon the plaintiff to satisfy the Court that the lands were vacant lands at the date when the stool purported to convey them by Exhibit ‘B’ and Exhibit ‘C.’ They cannot succeed on their claim if they fail to discharge that onus, and, if they so fail their claim cannot succeed …”
(The emphasis is mine.)
I endorse this view of the learned judge as the correct statement of the law, and will go further to say that the purported grant to the plaintiff in the present case was null and void. For, so far as the land in dispute was concerned, as at 1963, the date of the plaintiff’s customary grant, there was nothing left in the said land for Nii Dowuona V to transfer or grant to the plaintiff; and so the purported grant, as evidenced by exhibit A, was null and void and of no legal consequence whatsoever. Thus the plaintiff’s deed of conveyance, exhibit A, was intrinsically invalid. The fact that it was registered before the co
[p.25] of [1987-88] 2 GLR 1 defendant did register his, did not give the plaintiff title which he never had. The grant to him was null and void and what is null and void is always regarded by law as never having taken place.
It ought to be emphasised that registration does not prevent the court from ascertaining who has a valid title to a piece of land; and it must also be borne in mind that registration will not confer any legal right or title on any party who took his grant from a person who had no title to convey. Section 24 of Cap. 133 made the following provision: “Registration shall not cure any defect in any instrument registered, or confer upon it any effect or validity which it would not otherwise have had.” Cap 133 was repealed by Act 122, and the provision referred to above was not re-enacted in Act 122. All the same, there is nothing in Act 122 which states that the validity of any deed of conveyance or any instrument should not be questioned or challenged in any court of law after it has been registered. As I pointed out earlier on, there is no doubt that Act 122 made registration compulsory and the registration constitutes notice to all persons. But as Archer J. (as he then was) said in Kwofie v. Kakraba [1966] G.L.R. 229 at 232: “the Act does not confer state-guaranteed title on grantors who have no title . . .” As already stated, the Osu stool had no title of any kind in the disputed land to transfer to or confer on the plaintiff in 1963 or 1967; the stool having divested itself of the legal title and beneficial interest in the said land to the co-defendant as far back as April 1961.
There was, however, another matter which made the plaintiff ‘s claim rather confusing. The plaintiff based his root of title on a customary grant by the Osu stool as confirmed by exhibit A executed between him and Nii Dowuona V and dated 15 November 1967. But in his reply to the defence and the counterclaim of the co-defendant, the plaintiff made certain averments contrary to his earlier pleadings. Paragraph (6) of the said reply reads:
“The plaintiff says that his late father Festus Botchway acting for and on behalf of the plaintiff sued one Mama Moshie and others for a declaration of title, perpetual injunction and damages for trespass in respect of the land in suit No. L 68/57 and judgment was given in favour of the plaintiff ‘s father on 17 September 1958.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
By this plea, the plaintiff was saying that by 1957 he was the owner of the land in dispute and his father, Festus Botchway, in a representative capacity litigated about this very land on behalf of the plaintiff and obtained judgment in 1958. The question then is, if the plaintiff was the owner of this land in or about 1957 and that his ownership had been confirmed by the court in September 1958, how
[p.26] of [1987-88] 2 GLR 1 did it come that in 1963 he approached the Osu stool to grant him the very piece of land of which he was already the owner?
Whichever way one looks at the evidence, the plaintiff could not possibly have succeeded in this action. The evidence in support of his claim was very weak and confused.
On the whole, the plaintiff utterly failed to prove his claim and he was therefore not entitled to the reliefs he sought. On the other hand, the co-defendant well established his counterclaim and the learned trial judge was therefore right in dismissing the plaintiff’s claim and then entering judgment for the co-defendant on his counterclaim. In the circumstances, I am in entire agreement that the appeal is without merit and should therefore be dismissed.
JUDGMENT OF AMPIAH J.
I also agree and have nothing useful to add.
DECISION
Appeal dismissed.
L.K.A.
