BRUTUW vs. AFERIBA [1984-86] 1 GLR 25
11 April 1984 · FRANCOIS JA · ≈ 28 min read
[1984] SLR (CA) 11Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Duchess of Kingston’s Case (1776) 20 St. Tr. 355; 168 E.T.R. 175.
(2) Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley [1956] 1 Q.B. 702; [1956] 2 W.L.R. 503; [1956] 1 All E.R. 341, C.A.
(3) Brown v. Dean [1910] A.C. 373; 102 L.T. 661, C.A.
(4) Anto v. Mensah (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 218, C.A.
(5) Staffordshire Financial Co. v. Hill (1909) 53 S.J. 446.
(6) Lake v. Simmons [1927] A.C. 487; 137 L.T. 233.
(7) Jonesco v. Beard [1930] A.C. 298.
(8) Kyiafi v. Wono [1967] G.L.R. 463, C.A.
(9) Bater v. Bater [1951] P. 35; [1950] 2 All E.R. 458,C.A.
(10) Hornal v. Neuberger Products Ltd. [1957] 1 Q.B. 247; [1956] 3 W.L.R. 1034; [1956] 3 All E.R.
970, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL by the appellant from the decision of the High Court overturning the judgments of the High Court and the Court of Appeal on grounds of fraud. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of the court delivered by Francois J.A.
[p.28] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 25
COUNSEL
Short for the appellants Ewusi-Wilson for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A.
The late John Sarbah begat an illustrious son, the lawyer, scholar and author, John Mensah Sarbah. To make provision for his son and his wife Sarah Sarbah, John Sarbah made a gift to them of land at a place called Yaayaakuano. It appears the land comprised a contiguous parcel of two plots bisected by the Jukwa-Cape Coast road. The perimeters of the land were identified by cement pillars bearing the inscriptions J. M. S. and S. S. indicating the properties of John Mensah Sarbah and Sarah Sarbah, respectively. These pillars were affixed along a boundary of obar, onyinah and palm trees. There can hardly be any doubt therefore, that disputes over the boundary must necessarily take cognisance of both man-made fixtures which the cement pillars represent and the natural features which the forest trees provide. The Sarbahs are no more, but the property has descended to their descendants, the present defendants whose occupation and ownership of the land is challenged by the plaintiff.
It would be convenient at this stage to relate the short history of the dispute between the parties. Sometime in 1970, the plaintiff’s predecessor, the then head of family, Kobina Amoasi, sued the defendants claiming damages for trespass and an order for perpetual injunction. Though he pleaded that his ancestors had sold a portion of the land to John Sarbah the plaintiff sought at the trial to deny the sale and treat the nature of the transaction between the parties as a pledge. This was rejected by the trial judge, the late Sampson Baidoo J. The issue consequently turned on the extent of land acquired by Sarbah; the plaintiffs contending it did not extend into Yaayaakuano village, the defendants challenging the attempted abridgment of their interest.
From the nature of the claim and relief sought, an issue of ownership of the land in dispute was raised and the usual tests are to be applied to ascertain whether the plaintiff had successfully discharged the onus cast on him. In a fully reasoned judgment, the late Sampson Baidoo J. pronounced judgment in the defendants’ favour. Dissatisfied with that decision, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal which found no difficulty in dismissing the appeal. Terse though that judgment was, it covered the areas in issue so authoritatively that I make no apology for reproducing it in full here. Jiagge J.A who delivered the judgment of the court said:
“We find no merit in this appeal and we dismiss it. The appellant admitted the sale of the land by his predecessors to the respondents’ predecessors. What was in dispute was the extent of the land sold.
[p.29] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 25
There was evidence before the court that there were boundary trees and concrete pillars all along the boundaries of the area claimed by the respondents as what was sold to their predecessors. An old culvert built on the land was also shown to the surveyor.
There was unchallenged evidence before the court that the pillars were erected during the lifetime of S.
Sarbah and that the boundary trees were planted during the lifetime of J.M. Sarbah. Most of the tenants on the land held their grants from the respondents’ family. The appellant was not able to explain why these acts of ownership were not challenged earlier. The plaintiffs-appellants were not even aware of the existence of some of the pillars and the concrete culvert on the land.
The learned trial judge found in favour of the respondents and his judgment was supported by the evidence before him. We confirm the said judgment and dismiss the appeal.”
The plaintiff’s third throw of the dice following this defeat, was to challenge the two previous decisions in a fresh action in the High Court, Cape Coast charging fraud. It was the success of that gambit which has led to this further appeal.
The specie of fraud which the plaintiff urged as vitiating the judgments of Sampson Baidoo J. and the Court of Appeal, consisted in the alleged surreptitious planting of boundary pillars on the land by the defendants, presumably in a bid to enclose land which had not been alienated. The point was pleaded in the following manner:
“3. The defendants for the purpose of obtaining the judgments referred to in paragraph 2 above and which are sought to be set aside in this action perpetrated gross and serious frauds on the High Court of Justice.
PARTICULARS OF FRAUD (a) Manufacturing concrete pillars and placing them on the land in dispute so as to represent that the said pillars were placed on the land by the late John Mensah Sarbah, barrister-at-law, who died in 1910 or otherwise by Mrs Sarah Sarbah, the mother of John Mensah Sarbah, barrister-at law, who died in 1917.
(b) Falsely claiming that the said John Mensah Sarbah was succeeded by his mother Mrs Sarah Sarbah when to the knowledge of the defendants John Mensah Sarbah died leaving a will which was admitted to probate.
(c) Falsely claiming that the land in dispute belonged to John Mensah Sarbah when to the knowledge of the defendants
[p.30] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 25 the land did not form part of the estate of John Mensah Sarbah.
(d) Falsely stating that Fawuhutwer, the second defendant, has lived at Yaayaakuano village for over 80 years when the defendants well know that the said Fawuhutwer has for a greater part of his life lived at Wenyiato village, and moved to live at Yaayaakuano only when the first action started.
(e) Falsely claiming in one breath that Yaayaakuano village and the inhabitants thereon were bought by John Sarbah, the father of John Mensah Sarbah, from the plaintiff’ ancestors and in another admitting that despite the alleged sale, the plaintiff’s predecessors have been the
Odikros of Yaayaakuano since it was founded by Nana Effina.
(f) Suborning witnesses to come and give evidence to the court.
4. The plaintiff says that by reason of the frauds perpetrated by the defendants her family has suffered the loss of her ancestral lands.”
With the exception of the fraud relating to the affixing of boundary pillars, the High Court, Cape Coast presided over by Osei-Hwere J. (as he then was) dismissed all the other allegations pleaded. There was no appeal from this ruling. Consequently, the only issue in this appeal which requires a decision is whether the fraud alleged and consisting in the planting of boundary pillars, was established to the extent and with the result that it vitiated the earlier judgments.
It must be noted that the judgment of Sampson Baidoo J. examined not only the boundary features of the land in dispute, but dealt extensively also with the traditional evidence and the evidence of boundary neighbours, as well as evidence of user and acts of occupation and admissions against interest. These matters would be reverted to again. The judge decided firmly on what appeared overwhelming evidence in the defendants’ favour. As already pointed out, that judgment received the unalloyed support of the Court of Appeal. Indeed, on the basis of the evidence on record it would have been bizarre and perverse had the judgment been otherwise. No wonder the losing party adopted the only available avenue for reopening the matter, namely the vacation of the judgments upon an allegation of fraud.
We are concerned now to examine whether this was a mere resourceful ploy or a bona fide fight for the plaintiff’s deserts. There is no denying the fact that a judgment obtained by fraud is, in the eyes of the courts, no judgment as it is not founded on the intrinsic merits of the case. It is born of an attempt to overreach the courts by deceit and
[p.31] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 25 falsehood. Consequently, proven fraud is the battering ram to demolish the ramparts of any judgment created on fraud. It would serve no useful purpose to attempt an excursus of the cases. Two from the old and the new order will suffice. In the celebrated Duchess of Kingston’s Case (1776) 20 St. Tr. 355, the guiding rule was thus enunciated: “Fraud is an extrinsic collateral act, which vitiates the most solemn proceedings of a court of Justice.” And Lord Denning M.R. in Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley [1956] 1 All E.R. 341 at 345 said:
“No court in this land will allow a person to keep an advantage which he has obtained by fraud. No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything. The court is careful not to find fraud unless it is distinctly pleaded and proved; but once it is proved it vitiates judgments, contracts and all transactions whatsoever.”
The fact that the courts abhor fraud does not make them insensitive to the just claims of victorious parties. The judicial edifice was not constructed to lend a ready ear to every cry of fraud from suitors who have lost on the merits. For if charges of fraud are not examined closely, the stratagem would subvert the very foundation of the administration of justice and undermine the hallowed principle that a victorious party is entitled to the fruits of his judgment and should not be deprived of them without just cause. In effect, fraud must be clearly proved, and if this requirement is satisfactorily discharged, the edifice erected on it, however imposing, must fall. Short of this, a solemn declaration in a party’s favour by a competent court should not be lightly disturbed. As was said in Brown v. Dean [1910] A.C. 373 at 374: “When a litigant has obtained a judgment in a court of justice, . . . he is by law entitled not to be deprived of that judgment without very solid grounds. . .”
It is now necessary to examine the evidence relating to the alleged fraudulent implanting of boundary pillars in a setting which should take account of the evidential burden which the plaintiff by virtue of his claim must discharge. The allegata probanda must establish facts which amount to fraud and constitute it; if this falls, the judgments assailed are automatically and effectively affirmed.
It is a matter of regret that the particulars of fraud did not explicitly state whether the plaintiff rejected the entire boundary of pillars marked J. M. S. and S. S. or some only. It seems in one breath the complaint is about new pillars added to old, but in another breath the objection is to the appearance for the first time of pillars. Be that as it may, the plaintiff charged that a caretaker of the defendants, one
[p.32] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 25
Penyinyena, caused nine pillars to be affixed on the land. Penyinyena was dead at the time of the trial but his son, Kofi Abakah, the first plaintiff witness, related the story of the assistance he gave his father to carry the pillars to the land. The story was not that the pillars were affixed along a line that deviated from the true boundary. Indeed, his evidence read in conjunction with the surveyor’s would suggest that there was no departure from the boundary line of existing natural features. There was no suggestion either of a fraudulent intent on the part of Penyinyena. His son said:
“I asked my father why we were fixing the pillars and he told me that it is their own land and he is fixing the pillars so that in future, after his death, if there was a case about the land the pillars will give them support.”
The erection of the nine pillars was according to the witness done fifteen years earlier, that is about 1965; eight years before the plaintiff launched his claim. Some issues arise here. Placing pillars along one’s known boundary does not necessarily connote an intention to deceive. The second witness for the plaintiff, Kofi Mensah, indeed, gave evidence not only of the nine pillars but of 30 pillars which one Coleman who shared a boundary on the south of the disputed land also planted on his land. This does not appear to have provoked adverse comment.
A second issue is that the planting took place, if it did as Penyinyena’s son described, eight years before the plaintiff sued in the early trial. The defendants did not initiate the legal action to be accused of prior preparations to launch a false claim. They were defending a claim.
When the suit was instituted before Sampson Baidoo J. in 1975, the surveyor was asked the following relevant questions by counsel for the plaintiff:
“Q You also have pillars indicated by S.S?
A Yes Q Do you know what S.S meant?
A The defendants’ representative J.K. Aggrey told me S.S stood for Sarah Sarbah.
Q Apart from the pillars you have obar trees, Anyina, palm and other trees or features on the boundary.
Who indicated these?
A The plaintiff pointed out these features on the boundary while the defendant pointed out the pillars especially S.S and J.M.S. The defendant explained that the whole land was bought by the late John Sarbah who divided it into two
[p.33] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 25 parts, one for his wife Sarah Sarbah and the other for his son, John Mensah Sarbah.
Q Did he tell you from whom the land was bought?
A No.
Q In actual fact the big trisectional pillar and the ant-hill to the south marked the dividing line between J.
M.S. and Sarah Sarbah?
A No.
Q Did the defendants show you the dividing line between J M S and S S?
A Yes, the defendant showed the road as the dividing line or boundary.”
Pausing for a moment, it does not appear that the existence of the pillars disturbed the plaintiff, he knew they were on the land as boundary features, as the further questioning of the surveyor by the defendants revealed:
“Q The plaintiff was with you when you were traversing the S.S pillars and the J.M.S?
A Yes.
Q Did he express surprise at seeing them there?
A No.”
Moreover from the questions by the plaintiff’s counsel it appears the pillars and the forest trees were along a line which coalesced. An interesting feature is that there is no evidence where the nine pillars were allegedly planted by Penyinyena. There are over 30 pillars marked J.M.S. and S.S. on the land in dispute, edged red and yellow in the court plan, exhibit A. Almost an equal number of pillars are affixed along the boundary of the uncontested part of the land delineated green and yellow. They demonstrate a punctilious attempt to identify the extent of ownership to avert future controversy. The plan also shows along the undisputed portion of the land that a number of pillars were broken. It is not unknown for land owners to replace their broken pillars with new ones. Ideally, one may ask an adjoining owner to witness a replacement, but where other features exist to make patent and expose attempts at deviation, this is not necessary and in my view does not violate the principle in Anto v. Mensah (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 218 at 225, C.A., i.e. that it is by native law and custom wrong for an owner of land by himself alone to demarcate a boundary between his land and adjoining land without the owner of the adjoining land acting together with him.
It has not been suggested that any natural features were destroyed to create new boundaries. It has not been demonstrated that the planting
[p.34] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 25 of nine pillars on an undisclosed area of this land was fraudulently contrived. It has not been shown that whatever was done was at the behest of the defendants.
It is trite law that the fraud which must bind a party must be his own fraud and not that of a third party. No liability attaches for a fraud which is not committed, conceived or assisted in its establishment by a party: see Staffordshire Financial Co. v. Hill (1909) 35 S.J. 446 and Lake v. Simmons [1927] A.C. 487, and the cases cited in the court below.
The pith of the plaintiff’s complaint however lay in the result of samples of the S.S. and J.M.S. pillars allegedly taken from the disputed land an sent to a firm in Britain for forensic examination. They showed that they differed greatly in age. Incidentally the disparity in age was also the conclusion of the surveyor in the earlier trial. It was not new. It did not provoke the howl of fraud which two defeats and time for invention seem to have latterly inspired.
The result of the laboratory tests were tendered as exhibit H despite the defendants’ protests. The plaintiff argues that the ages ascribed to the pillars in the report make it impossible for the J.M.S and S.S pillars to have been affixed in the lifetime of the two persons whose initials they bore as they died, respectively in 1910 and 1917. The defendants question the basic assumptions that this line of inquiry provoke. First, as has been alluded to before, they challenge the existence of proof of a mandate from them to Penyinyena to affix pillars with an intent to deceive. They see no deceit in replacing broken pillars or planting new ones with same inscriptions along the boundary line if, indeed, their caretaker did so. Quite apart from the legal injunction that one should be wary of experts on account of their constitutional inability to be objective and dispassionate in their evaluation of material, since their client’s interests always dominate their judgments, the report concedes that the conclusions might be erroneous from the lack of acquaintance with the weather, climatic and environmental conditions of this country. Besides, the latitudes indicated in the report are so wide as to create uncertainties and negate any value they might otherwise have commanded. Parts of the report are reproduced hereunder.
“A very rough guide to age is sometimes based on the calculation that carbonation proceeds at the rate of I mm per year. This figure is based on experience in Europe and the rate may well be different in a hot, damp climate.
The samples E. S. 2192 and E. S. 2193 were not very thick so the only evidence they provide is that, they are older than 30 and fifteen years, respectively. An approximate age for E. S. 2194 would be about 20 years but as is of exceptional quality even this may be too low… On the evidence of the clinker fragments
[p.35] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 25 it appears that E. S. 2192 (old J. M. S.) was made before 1920; that E. S. 2193 (new J. M. S.) and E. S. 2194 (S. S.) were made about 1940 and possibly after 1950.”
If the S. S. pillars that have occasioned the furore could have been made in 1940, i.e 25 years before Penyinyena was supposed to have implanted them, not much reliance can be placed on the report:
The important and irresistible argument against putting much weight on the report however, is that the samples were taken unilaterally by the substituted plaintiff in these proceedings in the course of the first trial before Sampson Baidoo J. as far back as 1974. But no processes were instituted to utilise the results at that trial or speed up the examination of these samples. What is worse, there is nothing to show that the samples came from pillars from the disputed plot except the witness’ sole testimony. Was she a credible witness? This was a witness who expressed disbelief that pillars were implanted around the whole land which she described as small. A disbelief which her predecessor and head of family, the original plaintiff, Kobina Amoasi, did not share. On the admitted facts it was not a small piece of land either. It was a large expanse of farming land which was developed as a sugar cane plantation and for which “labour from the Kroo Coast”. had to be recruited: see exhibit C—letter from the plaintiff, Ekua Brutuw, of 25 July 1968. I shall return to this aspect of the matter later. To say the least, then, the plaintiff’s evidence was highly suspect and required more scrutiny than the court gave it. When the notion of testing the actual age of the pillars dawned on the plaintiff, she should have sought the court’s assistance or implored the co-operation of counsel on the other side for authorised laboratory tests to be made and not embarked stealthily on the task like a thief in the night.
The crucial challenges therefore are over the samples themselves, i.e where they were collected from, then secondly, over the weight to be attached to the report since it does not furnish an acceptable attack on the veracity of the defendants, and for the further reason that the ages of the two pillars had never been hidden, not even in the earlier trial.
Tedious though it may be, it is important on this issue of pillars to stress where the present plaintiff was in disharmony with his former family head Kobina Amoasi. The latter declared in his evidence before Sampson Baidoo J. that when Sarbah obtained the land he put pillars round it. He said: “Nana Sarbah then fixed pillars around the boundaries of the land in addition to those boundary trees and features already existing around the land.” Amoasi and the defendant were happily at one, for the second defendant stated:
[p.36] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 25
“When the land was being demarcated the trees standing along the boundaries were marked. In addition ‘obar’ trees were planted on the boundaries, later on cement pillars were erected all over the boundaries during the lifetime of Mensah Sarbah.”
To successfully controvert this contention an accurate analytical report of the exact age of the J. M. S. and S. S. pillars is required of all the pillars since some, at least, were acknowledged by the plaintiff’s predecessor Amoasi to have been on the land to his own knowledge.
Secondly, it had to be shown that later pillars which were not replacements for broken pillars or fixed in between pillars along the boundary line, had been planted to divert the boundary line and enclose what had not been properly alienated.
In my view, the plaintiff failed to discharge this onus. There is nothing on the record to justify the finding of the High Court, Cape Coast that the planting of the pillars was fraudulent. Worse still, there is not a scintilla of evidence to support the court’s finding “that the defendants who knew of this fraud perpetrated by Penyinyena concocted and conducted their defence on that fraud. “Another unfortunate error of the learned judge is clearly in the uncritical acceptance of the plaintiff’s assertions. The judge said:
“the whole foundation of the plaintiff’s case is that the pillars around the land were recently erected and that they were not placed there by either John Mensah Sarbah who died in 1910 or Sarah Sarbah who died in 1917.”
Since Amoasi and the defendants are at one on the traditional story that pillars were placed around the land at the time of alienation, the present plaintiff cannot be commended for veracity or knowledge of the traditions of the land if she maintains as the bulwark of her case that pillars were non-existent. The judge erred in so holding.
The learned High Court judge in dismissing the objection to the report, exhibit H, said nothing prevented the defence from also calling their own evidence to challenge the plaintiff’s report. This blithely ignores the fact that the report was sprung as a surprise on the defendants at the trial and the defendants’ objections were unavailing. No particulars indicating the existence of this report was given.
The writ grounded on fraud in the implanting of pillars was issued on 8 March 1987. Yet the report, exhibit H, upon which the plaintiff purported to have come upon the stunning discovery of fraud and based her action thereon, was signed by its author on 17 April 1979. One wonders who is attempting to overreach the courts!
The issue of pillars was only one thin strand in the fine spun web of which the defendants’ earlier victory was woven. The plaintiff who
[p.37] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 25 complains about that judgment cannot say that her predecessor was cheated out of a deserved victory by the deceit and fraud practised on him by the defendants. The truth is that he was robbed of success by his own inability to establish his claim.
The proceedings in the earlier 1970 case were admitted as exhibit A and at the second trial before Osei-Hwere J. (as he then was) exhibit A shows that the plaintiff, his sister and a common witness for the parties in the person of the surveyor were the only witnesses attesting on the plaintiff’s behalf. The plaintiff and his sister attested to the traditional history of the land. There was no attempt to produce a single boundary neighbour or give evidence of exclusive possession. No single act that could pass as evidence of ownership was retailed. Indeed, the surveyor’s evidence was most damaging to the plaintiff’s cause as the plaintiff could not deny being present when owners of adjoining property to a boundary with the defendants and grantees acknowledged receiving their grants of land from the defendants.
Shattering evidence of this nature elicited not the slightest demur from the plaintiff. Even when a tenant of the defendants deposed to the payment of tribute on the land to the defendants, the plaintiff could only shrug his shoulders and ask a single inconsequential question: “The plaintiff also lives at Yaayaakuano?”, which elicited an affirmative answer. The only conclusion that could be drawn from the plaintiff’s performance in the earlier trial was that he proved no overt acts over the land that could remotely support his claim to ownership.
On the other hand both of the defendants, aged 65 and 80 years respectively, had lived on the disputed land without let or hindrance, making grants to a number of tenants and instituting toll collections on the land without real protest. Two of the three neighbours who acknowledged that they shared boundary with the defendants were directly related to the plaintiff.
A stricking feature on the land is a long cement culvert extending from Yaayaakuano village to John Mensah Sarbah’s house which was then in ruins. The plaintiff knew nothing about this huge and extensive culvert. The evidence shows that it was built by Sarbah. It linked the two parcels of land and strongly confirmed the defendants’ stance, and makes it even difficult to appreciate the basis for the success of the fraud charge.
In rejecting the plaintiff’s case, Sampson Baidoo J. drew conclusions (in my view, right ones) from a letter from the plaintiff to the defendants (exhibit C) mentioned before. There is clear admission in paragraphs 3 and 4 of that letter that the plaintiff’s predecessors had sold plots of land to the Sarbah family. The paragraphs were couched as follows:
[p.38] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 25
“3. As you are aware the late John Sarbah, the husband of Mrs Sarbah, before his death bought a portion of our family (Anona) land at Yaayaakuano for farming purposes. At that time he recruited labour from the Kroo Coast and made a large sugar cane plantation on his land, such transactions did not confer on him the title of odikro or the owner of Yaayaakuano village.
4. It is further understood that apart from the first purchase by late John Sarbah of the portion of land in respect of which he paid the sum of £7 4s it is further understood that he subsequently purchased another piece of land for which he paid £5. In the circumstances, I wish you to produce the necessary documents giving you title to the lands within two weeks from the receipt of this letter, failure of which I will be compelled to put you before court to establish your title as to how you became the landlord of Yaayaakuano.”
The learned judge at the second trial at Cape Coast completely missed the significance of exhibit C. It is with great regret that I feel constrained to criticise yet another conclusion of the learned judge at the second trial. The judge said: “I must remark that but for the pillars surrounding the land the defendant’s evidence as to how the whole land was acquired could not have passed muster.”
This is clearly contrary to the preponderance of evidence on record adumbrated before but which will bear repetition. The evidence which showed the defendants’ tenants long established in the disputed area and within the confines of the boundaries. The overt acts of the defendants’ predecessors in building culverts and fanning sugar cane and other crops extensively as admitted even by the plaintiff’s predecessors. The unchallenged testimony of boundary neighbours over the disputed area in favour of the defendants even though some of these persons were the plaintiff’s relatives. And last, the plaintiff’s own admission of the purchase by the defendants’ predecessors of two parcels of land. The learned judge’s aforesaid conclusion is a most unfortunate lapse as it demonstrates a failure to evaluate the evidence on record.
An important observation must be made here. In a suit charging fraud there is clear impropriety for a plaintiff to reopen his entire case. Jonesco v. Beard [1930] A.C. 298 at 300-301, H.L. is authority for the principle that where a judgment is attacked for fraud fraud only must be in issue. It is not a rehearing of the whole case. Unfortunately learned counsel for the plaintiff proceeded even at the appeal stage to subvert this principle, acting as if everything was at large. He rehearsed his stand on the pledge against sale controversy not only in the second
[p.39] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 25 action before Osei-Hwere J. (as he then was) but before us also by free-wheeling over this terrain and we had considerable difficulty in persuading him that this course was most improper. The pledge or sale controversy must be given the full rites for a definitive burial. The plaintiff having acknowledged a sale to the defendants in the pleadings and given evidence of it and having further admitted it in exhibit C, must not be allowed further opportunities to resurrect the issue.
Another matter arising from the sale controversy which must be put to rest also is the onus of proof of sale, based on the principle of Kyiafi v. Wono [1967] G.L.R. 463, C.A. The question of a sale was accepted by the plaintiff in his pleadings. It was a defence of the defendants which has support from the plaintiff. An onus no longer lay on the defendants to show the quality of their holding. The issue then was purely the extent of the alienation and the evidence on record should lead no one in any doubt that the defendants were entitled to succeed. These spectres should not haunt our corridors any more and provide a hunting ground for poltergeists or their companions masquerading in legal robes.
Two other matters remain to be examined. First the surveyor’s plan ordered by the court at the first trial. A scrutiny of this plan exposes the hollowness of the plaintiff’s claim. The plan reveals a wide expanse of land virtually bisected by the Cape Coast-Jukwa road. The plaintiff lays claim to the southern half and admits alienating the western portion up to a green line to the defendants’ predecessors. This area is consequently not in dispute. The whole land is studded along its entire boundary with a great number of pillars, almost 60, spaced not more than 200 feet apart and bearing the inscriptions J.M.S. and S.S in between a line of boundary trees of obar, onyina and palm trees.
The Jukwa-Cape Coast road divides the properties marked J.M.S. and S.S. Yaayaakuano village lies within the area claimed by the plaintiff but the entire area seems to be farmed by tenants holding their grants from the defendants. Even the Yaayaakuano village which comprises about seventeen houses, shows fifteen of these houses to belong to the defendants’ tenants. The S.S pillars on the disputed land number around 30. They are all placed along the boundary claimed by the plaintiff. If the parties are ad idem over the boundary then the issue is not a deviation of a boundary line but the carving out of a huge chunk of land by the defendants. If this is so, the emphasis on the “fraudulent” implanting of nine pillars on the land is pointless. Nine pillars could not circumscribe the area in dispute. Exhibit C which talks of the purchase of two plots of land also gives the lie to this contention.
[p.40] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 25
It remains now to tie in the plaintiff’s instructions to the surveyor in the earlier case which required the surveyor to plot “any portion of the land admitted by the plaintiff as having been granted to the defendants’ predecessor.” This was clearly done on the plan and marked green, consequently the area of controversy was the eastern half of the land marked red and yellow. It explains further the plaintiff’s reply to the statement of defence, paragraph 3 which was pleaded as follows:
“3. The plaintiff admits sometime ago his predecessors sold a piece of the land at Yaayaakuano to the defendants’ predecessor but deny that the township as well as the land in dispute ever formed part of the said sale.”
Finally some comment on the burden of proof. In impeaching the judgments of the Court of Appeal and Sampson Baidoo J. the plaintiff undertook to establish fraud as she was asserting it. The standard of proof has sometimes created a controversy. When the question is asked, what measure must be applied in the assessment of proof of fraud, and is it to be equated with the criminal standards, the words of wisdom of Lord Denning L.J. (as he then was) in Bater v. Bater [1950] 2 All E.R. 458, C.A. from which the quotation from Hornal v. Neuberger Products Ltd. [1957] 1 Q.B. 247 is derived, spring to mind, and seem not only apposite but in my respectful view also to supply the answer. Lord Denning L.J. (as he then was) said at 459:
“The difference of opinion which has been evoked about the standard of proof in these cases may well turn out to be more a matter of words than anything else. It is true that by our law there is a higher standard of proof in criminal cases than in civil cases, but this is subject to the qualification that there is no absolute standard in either case. In criminal cases the charge must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but there may be degrees of proof within that standard. Many great judges have said that, in proportion as the crime is enormous, so ought the proof to be clear. So also in civil cases. The case may be proved by a preponderance of probability, but there may be degrees of probability within that standard. The degree depends on the subject-matter. A civil court, when considering a charge of fraud, will naturally require a higher degree of probability than that which it would require if considering whether negligence were established. It does not adopt so high a degree as a criminal court, even when it is considering a charge of a criminal nature, but still it does require a degree of probability which is commensurate with the occasion.”
[p.41] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 25
In the net result this may be an academic exercise as in my view the plaintiff failed even on the lightest test to discharge the burden.
In conclusion, I must confess to an insuperable difficulty in discerning the fraud that led to the overturning of the judgments of Sampson Baidoo J. and the Court of Appeal. I am of the view that those judgments admirably dealt with the issues raised in the plaintiff’s claim. The plaintiff in the early case failed not on account of any fraud practised on him but because he could not prove his title, and it is a mockery of the law to allow legal resourcefulness and ingenuity to subvert a just victory.
I shall consequently allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court, Cape Coast dated 19 June 1980 and reinstate and affirm the judgments of Sampson Baidoo J. and the Court of Appeal.
JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A.
I have read in advance the brilliant and detailed judgment of my brother Francois J.A. and have nothing useful to add.
I agree that the appeal be allowed. The judgment of the trial court is set aside; the judgment of Sampson Baidoo J. (now deceased) dated 26 August 1975 and the Court of Appeal judgment dated 16 June 1977 be reinstated
JUDGMENT OF MENSA-BOISON J.A.
I also agree that the appeal be allowed.
DECISION Appeal allowed.
L. K. A.
