CRENTSIL vs. KWEINUA [1979] GLR 348
6 November 1978 · OSEI-HWERE J · ≈ 11 min read
[1978] SLR (HC) 19Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Arkaah & Morrison v. Tarquah Mining Exploration Co. (1911) 2 Ren. 604.
(2) Taylor v. Horde (1757)1 Burr. 60; 97 E.R. 190.
(3) Akuru v. Olubadan-In-Council (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 523.
(4) St. Leonards (Lord) v. Ashburner (I 870) 21 L.T. 595.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim for declaration of title to a house. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of the court.
COUNSEL
J. B. Short for the appellant.
A . E. Sampson for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.
The plaintiff sued the defendant at the District Court Grade I, Cape Coast, and claimed from her house No. A. 156 situated at Kurankyekrom, Saltpond. This house was originally acquired by the plaintiff’s father which the plaintiff says his father subsequently disposed by way of gift to his mother and the children by her. According to the plaintiff this gift was covered by the document, exhibit A, which was purported to have been executed on 15 March 1917. The defendant’s contention was that the plaintiff’s father had sold this house to her mother (the original defendant in this suit) in 1938 and that she and her mother had been in occupation of the house ever since the date of purchase. The defendant also tendered exhibit 1 the document on the sale. In his judgment the magistrate rejected both documents as having no evidential value upon the sole ground that neither had been registered. He found, besides, that the plaintiff had failed to prove any customary grant of the house to him to buttress his claim. On the contrary, he was impressed by the defendant’s undisturbed possession and overt acts of ownership and he accordingly dismissed the plaintiff’s claim. The plaintiff has appealed to this court on the ground that the judgment is against the weight of evidence and, secondly, that the trial magistrate misdirected himself on the evidence before him and arrived at an erroneous decision.
Arguing on behalf of the plaintiff, his counsel contended that as the authenticity of the deed of gift was not impugned but that what weighed
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with the court was its non-registration then two consequences flowed from this premise, viz. (a) after the date of the deed of gift the donor had no title to dispose of by sale and, (b) since both documents were unregistered the trial magistrate ought to have applied the maxim that where the equities are equal the first in time prevails. According to counsel the court below could have made a declaration in favour of the plaintiff upon any of these two grounds. Counsel further argued that the plaintiff’s explanation for the delay in bringing his action was satisfactorily explained as he told the court that he had to trace the deed of gift first before he could bring any action on it. In paragraph (5) of the statement of claim the plaintiff had pleaded the deed of gift made to his mother and her children and in paragraph (6) he averred that his mother had provided customary thanks for the gift. Paragraph (4) of the defence denied paragraphs (5) and (6) of the statement of claim and said it would put the plaintiff to strict proof of those averments. The defendant went on in his paragraph (5):
“The defendant states in further answer to paragraphs (5) and (6) of plaintiff’s statement of claim that since 1938 neither the plaintiff nor persons he claims to be representing has ever challenged the defendant about her occupation and possession of the house in dispute.”
It was on account of the defence filed that the defendant’s counsel argued that the deed of gift was challenged and that, as the aseda was also denied, it was incumbent on the plaintiff to have proved a customary gift which he failed to do. Counsel further argued that the doctrine of equal equities will only apply where there is any truth in the claim put forward or where the party seeking the application of the doctrine has not been indolent.
I quite concede the observation of the plaintiff’s counsel that nowhere did the trial magistrate make any specific finding that exhibit A is not authentic. No doubt his refusal to accord it any probative weight on account of non-registration did not make him feel that he was under any duty to consider the question of authenticity. This appellate court would not have found any fault with him if only exhibit A mandatorily required registration and that its non-registration in any way impugned its validity. I have no doubt that the trial magistrate was in grave error when he rejected both exhibit A and exhibit I as useless insofar as they had not been registered and held that they could not, accordingly, be admitted to prove the facts stated therein if they had been tendered for that purpose. The court below, it seems, misapplied sections 24 (1) and 36 of the Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122), to these two documents. The Ordinance applicable to them was, of course, the Land Registry Ordinance, Cap. 133 (1951 Rev.), which, by its section 5, made the registration of “instruments” permissible and by its section 21 gave priority to registered instruments. Thus in Arkaah & Morrison. v. Tarquah Mining Exploration Co. (1911) 2 Ren. 604 it was held that an unregistered deed prior in date to a deed which is daily registered under the Lands
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Registry Ordinance does not take priority, but that the later deed, by virtue of its prior registration prevails over the unregistered deed. The question of invalidity of unregistered instruments is an innovation introduced by Act 122 which applied it to instruments (apart from those excepted) first executed after the commencement of that Act. Exhibits A and I were, therefore, properly admissible in evidence without any registration qualification.
It is a rule of law that private ancient documents which have been produced from proper custody and are otherwise free from suspicion prove themselves and no evidence, therefore, of the handwriting, signature, sealing or delivery in general, need be given. The result is that if exhibit A (which is undoubtedly an ancient document because it is more than 30 years old) can show on its face that it was signed, seated and delivered then it must be presumed that it was duly executed; and it was enough to prove such execution by the mere production of the document. Looking at exhibit A, I am satisfied that it was duly executed and that the trial court ought to have accepted it (just as he ought also to have accepted exhibit 1) as a properly executed document. In his judgment the trial magistrate said:
“In conclusion this court takes the view that exhibits A and I at best only indicate respectively an intention to make a gift and to sell the house in question. For the plaintiff to succeed he should have led further evidence to support the alleged gift, which further evidence, has not been forthcoming.”
The trial magistrate obviously came to this conclusion because he was all through haunted by this bogey of non-registration. What further evidence he had expected the plaintiff to lead in the face of exhibit A cannot conjecture.
Before me, counsel for the defendant has contended, in effect, that somebody from the family of the plaintiff’s father or an independent witness should have been called to support the gift. By this submission counsel is inviting the court to hold that the customary gift of the house should also have been proved. Although at the date of the execution of exhibit A section 74 (1) (but now the Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4 (1951 Rev.), s. 87 (1)) provided that native law and custom should be deemed applicable in causes and matters where the parties thereto were natives, and particularly in causes relating to the tenure and transfer of real and personal property, it also provided:
“. . . No party shall be entitled to claim the benefit of any local law or custom, if it shall appear either from express contract or from the nature of the transactions out of which any suit or question may have arisen, that such party agreed that his obligations in connection with such transactions should be regulated exclusively by English law.”
As indeed a conveyance forms no part of a gift under customary law, exhibit A clearly indicates that the plaintiff’s father intended the gift
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of his self-acquired house to be governed exclusively by English law. Order 34, r. 2 of Schedule 2 to Cap. 4, which the trial magistrate ought to have applied provides that in any civil proceedings direct oral evidence of a fact would be admissible, any statement made by a person in a document tending to establish that fact shall, on production of the original document, be admissible as evidence of that fact upon those conditions laid down. After the plaintiff had given the best evidence on the gift by producing the original document there was no duty on him to call any further evidence and the finding by the trial court that he ought to have dove so was erroneous.
Where a party takes advantage of English law to settle his action then he must as well be prepared to bear its consequences. I agree with the plaintiff’s counsel that as exhibit A properly disposed of the plaintiff’s father’s proprietary interest in the house in 1917 he could convey nothing by way of sale to the defendant’s mother in 1938. The plaintiff’s cause of action, accordingly, accrued against the defendant’s mother in 1938 when she took possession on the strength of the purported sale to her. The Limitation Act, 1632 (21 Ja. 1, c. 16), had always been recognised by virtue of section 14 of the Supreme Court Ordinance, 1876 (No. 4 of 1876), as a statute of general application in this country, and its sections 3, 5, 6 and 7 have particularly been preserved by the First Schedule of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372). The plaintiff’s action which was founded on the basis of exhibit A was accordingly governed by the Limitation Act, 1623, and he ought to have brought his action inside the twenty year period when, at least, he became aware that the defendant’s mother had taken possession of the house. The lexicon given by the plaintiff to explain his injection, namely that he was searching for exhibit A to enable him to sue, could hardly be any good reason why the period of limitation should not run against him. In Taylor v. Horde (1757) 1 Burr. 60 the court held that twenty years adverse possession is a positive title to the defendant and that it was not only a bar to the action or remedy of the plaintiff but that it also took away his right to possession. Although the defendant did not specifically plead the Limitation Act, 1623, yet the tenor of the averments in her defence and of her evidence was to show that the plaintiff had slept over his rights.
The trial magistrate did not himself advert to the Limitation Act, 1623, as a bar to the plaintiff’s action. He rather chose as one of the props to support his judgment his finding of the plaintiff’s laches and acquiescence. As the plaintiff’s action was on the face of it essentially one for a declaration of title to the house the remedy sought became discretionary and, even though he had exhibit A to support his title, his laches and acquiescence destroyed any right he had to such declaration and the trial magistrate was empowered to say so: see Akuru v. Olubadan- In-Council (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 523. It was for this reason that the trial magistrate thus delivered himself:
“One point, however, which stands out clearly . . . is that the defendant and her mother had been in possession of the house since 1938. The evidence is that the plaintiff’s father died in 1945, seven
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solid years after the defendant had been in undisturbed occupation of the building. It was a period when the defendant’s possession was not challenge in any way by any person. Possession, as it is well known is nine points of the law . . . The plaintiff has said that it was his grandma who first told him about this gift by his father to his mother and children. He said also that he went to live with his grandma in 1929 and the grandma died in 1932. There is no evidence that during this period the plaintiff did any thing to show his interest in this supposed deed of gift. There is also no evidence that the plaintiff ever discussed this gift with his father from 1932 when his grandma died to 1945 when his father also died. The plaintiff in his evidence did admit that as far back as when his father left Saltpond the defendant went to occupy the house. Of course the year the father so left does not appear in evidence but at least the plaintiff did admit that in 1948 he saw the defendant in occupation. Evidence has also been led that in the 1950’s the plaintiff lived in an adjoining house. I think therefore that the plaintiff was not speaking the truth when he stated in paragraph (9) of his statement of claim that it was in 1967 when he came to Saltpond to find that the defendant was occupying that house. For the same reason I am not impressed by his evidence that he took no action because the document on which he sought to rely for action was discovered in 1967.”
The declamations of the court below against the conduct of the plaintiff find their support in the judgment of Bramwell B. in Lord St. Leonards v. Ashburner (1870) 21 L.T. 595 where the headnote read, inter alia:
“In an action which raises a question of title to land . . . long possession and acts of ownership afford pregnant evidence of title in the person possessed, notwithstanding the non-production of his title deeds, and even against some evidence of title in the other party . . . And this evidence is quite independent of the Statute of Limitations, the effect of which is to vest the property in the person in possession, even although until the period of limitation had elapsed it was not his, whereas the effect of possession and acts of ownership is evidence to show that the title was originally in that party.”
The plaintiff’s unfortunate stand in the case at the trial certainly was that even though his mother and her children had the title deeds to the house since 1917 yet they did not have possession and, as Bramwell B. said at p. 596 of the above-quoted case:
“Title-deeds come to little without evidence of actual enjoyment . . . Parchment, of itself, comes to little; the real question is as to actual enjoyment; and in this case the great question is, who has enjoyed the land in dispute since the estate was divided.”
It is only on account of this last reason found by the court below to the effect that the defendant had enjoyed long possession and exhibited [p.354] of [1979] GLR 348 acts of ownership, as also for the reason found by this court that the Limitation Act exclusively conferred title in the defendant, that I dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal with ¢60 costs to the defendant. DECISION Appeal dismissed, S. Y. B. – B.
