DIVISION: IN THE HIGH COURT, ACCRA
DATE: 31ST OCTOBER, 1963
BEFORE: SOWAH J.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from a decision of a district magistrate on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to try the
case as it involved a question of title to land.
COUNSEL
Appellant in person.
Quartey for the Commissioner of Police.
JUDGMENT OF SOWAH J.
In this appeal the appellant elected to argue the third ground of appeal, namely, that the district magistrate
had no jurisdiction to try the case, because title to land was in issue. On this point the magistrate stated
that he was not impressed with the argument of counsel that his jurisdiction was ousted on the grounds
that there was not enough evidence before him to that effect.
It is significant to note that nowhere in the record was the argument of counsel noted. It does not appear
that after the close of the case for the prosecution, counsel made any submission, nor does it appear that
[p.370] of [1963] 2 GLR 369
counsel made submission after the close of the case for the defence, and yet the magistrate made reference
to such submission.
In my view it was incumbent upon the magistrate to record whatever submission counsel made in the
case, and I need hardly say that failure to record the submission by counsel vitiates the proceedings and makes the record incomplete.
I have had the opportunity of reading the record rather carefully and I consider that the magistrate was
wrong in holding that his jurisdiction was not ousted. From the cross-examination of the complainant, the
appellant sought to show that the property was not the property of the complainant. The complainant
however maintained that the litigation referred to had ended in his favour and that he had a copy of the
judgment. Strangely enough, the complainant, apart from the bare assertion that he had obtained
judgment, never sought to tender the judgment to enable the court to find out that the litigation had ended
and had so ended in his favour.
The appellant also went into the witness-box and claimed ownership of the property for his principal to
whom he was the caretaker. He further stated that he had dug or caused to be dug foundations preparatory
to the erection of a building. The complainant together with labourers had gone onto the land to fill in the
foundations and the appellant after requesting the complainant to stop without result, started stopping the
complainant forcefully.
I am of the opinion that considering the evidence of the complainant and the accused as whole, there can
be no doubt that any reasonable person would be of the opinion that a bona fide question of title was
involved and therefore under section 180 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 19601 the learned magistrate
ought to have discharged the appellant.
In the circumstances I do not think it is worthwhile to consider whether the appellant was not entitled to
eject the complainant from his land, using no more force than was necessary. I consider that a person who
goes to fill in the foundations dug by another person is likely to expect to be stopped if that other person
were present and, if in an affray he gets the worse of the fight he will have no one else to blame but
himself. The proper thing to do when one’s rights are infringed is to seek legal remedy and not to adopt
self help, as force often engenders force. For these reasons I will allow the appeal, set aside the conviction
and sentence and order that any fines paid be refunded.
If any compensation has been paid to the complainant she should refund the same within a month from
today’s date.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
Conviction and sentence set aside.
K. T.
