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[1982] SLR (CA) 8Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

DATSOMOR vs. LANG [1982-83] GLR 206

18 May 1982 · EDWARD WIREDU JA · ≈ 5 min read

Cite as[1982] SLR (CA) 8
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OSCOLADATSOMOR v LANG [1982-83] GLR 206 [1982] SLR (CA) 8
APADATSOMOR v LANG [1982-83] GLR 206, [1982] SLR (CA) 8 (Ghana).
BluebookDATSOMOR v LANG [1982-83] GLR 206, [1982] SLR (CA) 8 (Ghana Ct. App. 1982).

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CASE REFERRED TO

Mosi v Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337 S.C.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL against the refusal of the High Court to set aside a default judgment earlier obtained in the High Court differently constituted on a motion brought by the respondent-plaintiff under Order 40, r. 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), after the close of summons of directions. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

E. D. Kom for appellant-defendant.

No appearance for or on behalf of the respondent-plaintiffs.

JUDGMENT OF WIREDU J.A.

Wiredu J.A. delivered the ruling of the court. On 5 November 1975, the plaintiff-respondents to this appeal (hereafter referred to simply as the plaintiffs) took out a writ of summons in the High Court, Accra

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against the defendant-appellant (also hereafter referred to simply as the defendant) with the following indorsement:

“The plaintiffs’ claim is for recovery of possession of that piece or parcel of land comprising approximately decimal 28 acres at Kpehe, Accra, the boundary whereof commencing at GCG EP 8/48/14 thence follows a straight line in a true westerly direction for a distance of 100 feet more or less thence follows a straight line along the fence formerly belonging to the Wireless Station for a distance of 106 feet more or less to the point of commencement.”

The defendant after entering a belated appearance filed a defence on 16 January 1976. After pleadings had closed, the plaintiffs took out a summons for directions. On 9 February 1976 additional issues for trial were filed on behalf of the defendant including a request for the appointment of a surveyor to survey the disputed area.

When the summons came before the court for hearing on 10 February 1976 an objection was taken by learned counsel for the plaintiffs to the request for the appointment of a surveyor. The matter was not resolved and the case was adjourned to 17 February 1976. Proceedings of 17 February 1976 show that counsel for the defendant asked and was granted leave by the court to withdraw from the case. The summons was therefore not taken but was adjourned sine die.

On 18 February 1976, learned counsel for the plaintiffs moved the court under Order 10, r. 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A) for an order to serve the defendant with a motion for judgment under Order 40, r. 1 returnable on 26 February 1976, by substitution. The application for substituted service was granted.

Even though the motion for judgment was to be moved on 26 February 1976 there is no recorded proceedings of that day but on 17 March 1976 learned counsel for the plaintiffs moved the court and successfully obtained a final judgment.

The defendant made two unsuccessful attempts to have the judgment obtained against him set aside. The last attempt was before Amate-Kisseih J. dated 14 March 1979. It is from this ruling of Amate-Kisseih J. refusing to set aside the judgment of 17 March 1976, that the present appeal has been brought on two main grounds. The grounds of appeal read:

(i) The learned judge erred in refusing to set aside the judgment of Lamptey J. dated 17 March 1976 in view of the rules of natural justice and the known rules of procedure operative after the close of pleadings.

(ii) The learned judge failed to appreciate the scope of Order 40, r. 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure)

Rules, 1954 (LN

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140A); had he done so, his ruling would have been different. Other grounds to be filed on receipt of the record of proceedings.”

No additional grounds of appeal were filed in this court and Mr. Kom for the defendant attacked the ruling appealed from basing his submission on the two grounds originally filed.

He submitted that the judgment of 17 March 1976 which Amate-Kisseih J. refused to set aside was irregularly obtained under a motion after pleadings had closed and summons for directions filed. It was the contention of learned counsel that on the issuing out of summons for directions, the next stage was for the case to have proceeded to trial on such issues as were agreed and settled for the trial. He submitted that it was therefore incompetent for the plaintiff to have proceeded to take judgment by a motion. He said such a practice was not sanctioned by any rule of law or procedure. He argued that the judgment was a nullity. On the scope of Order 40, r. 1. learned counsel submitted that the learned judge failed to appreciate its application which if he had, his ruling would have been different.

We have carefully examined the record of proceedings and considered the submissions of learned counsel against the ruling appealed from and we are satisfied that the appeal must succeed.

We accept the contention by learned counsel for the defendant that after pleadings have closed and summons for directions taken it is only in special circumstances that judgment can be obtained on a motion. We have examined the facts of this case and we are satisfied that the issues raised in the original summons filed on behalf of the plaintiffs, and the additional issues by the defendant did not justify the taking of judgment on a motion. There was for instance, the controversial issue for the appointment of a surveyor requested by the defendant which was not resolved.

There were the other triable issues as to whether the disputed land belonged to the plaintiff and whether the defendant had committed trespass thereon. These were matters which could only be resolved by evidence. We hold that the taking of judgment by the plaintiff by motion on 17 March 1976 was void. It is void because it is not warranted by any law or rule of procedure. It is now trite law that where a judgment or an order is void either because it is given or made without jurisdiction or because it is not warranted by any law or rule of procedure the party affected is entitled to have it set aside. Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C. and host of other cases are authorities for this proposition.

Had the learned trial judge directed his mind properly to the facts of this case and appreciated the scope and extent of the application made under Order 40, r. 1, he would have refused the plaintiffs’ request for judgment. It was therefore incumbent on Amate-Kisseih J.

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to have set aside that judgment on the application of the defendant who was affected by that void judgment.

The appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The ruling appealed from is set aside. The judgment of Lamptey J. in favour of the plaintiff is hereby declared void and of no legal effect. We remit the case to the High Court for it to proceed to trial de novo by another judge.

DECISION

Appeal allowed.

D. R. K. S.

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