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[1979] SLR (HC) 26High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

DESHINA BUILDING WORKS LTD. vs. BUAH [1980] GLR 390

28 June 1979 · ANSAH-TWUM J · ≈ 21 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (HC) 26
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OSCOLADESHINA BUILDING WORKS LTD. v BUAH [1980] GLR 390 [1979] SLR (HC) 26
APADESHINA BUILDING WORKS LTD. v BUAH [1980] GLR 390, [1979] SLR (HC) 26 (Ghana).
BluebookDESHINA BUILDING WORKS LTD. v BUAH [1980] GLR 390, [1979] SLR (HC) 26 (Ghana High Ct. 1979).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Dodd v. Churton [1897] 1 Q.B. 562; 66 L.J.Q.B. 477; 76 L.T. 438; 45 W.R. 490, C.A.

(2) Waghorn v. Wimpey (George) & Co., Ltd. [1969] 1 W.L.R. 1764.

(3) Adae v. Eyiah [1972] 2 G.L.R. 358.

(4) Joseph v. Boakye [1977] 2 G.L.R. 392, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION by the plaintiff-contractor against the defendant-building owner for damages for breach of a building contract. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Forson for the plaintiffs.

Dawson for the defendant.

JUDGMENT OF ANSAH-TWUM J.

The plaintiff’s claim against the defendant is for the sum of ¢28,021 which is set out as follows:

“(a) ¢18,000 being the balance or damages or both due on a building contract between themselves and the defendant and which the defendant unilaterally terminated; and, (b) the sum of ¢10,021 being the cost of building materials belonging to the plaintiff company and which the defendant collected from the site of operations at the time he terminated the contract.”

In his pleading, the defendant denied liability and pleaded further that the original contract price was ¢100,000 but was later on [p.393] of [1980] GLR 390 mutually varied upwards to ¢120,000 because of a rise in prices of materials at the time, and he paid thereon a total of ¢102,000. The defendant continued in paragraphs (4), (5) and (6) of his statement of defence:

“(4) The defendant says that for no apparent reason the plaintiffs thereafter abandoned work on the defendant’s building and in spite of the defendant’s protestations the plaintiffs failed to continue.

(5) The defendant further says that at the time the plaintiffs abandoned the project it was incomplete and haphazard.

(6) In desperation the defendant turned to Messrs. Ahey Ltd. who agreed to complete the work at an additional cost of ¢135,000.”

The plaintiffs joined issue in their reply with the defendant on his defence generally and admitted that the original contract price was eventually varied upwards to ¢120,000 because of additional jobs they were to carry out on the building. The plaintiffs did specifically deny paragraphs (4) and (5) of the statement of defence to the effect that they did themselves abandon work on the defendant’s building. The most important issues which were thus set out for trial are:

“(b) Whether the plaintiffs abandoned the building operations for the defendant for no good cause.

(c) Whether or not the materials collected by the defendant are for the plaintiffs.

(d) Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief sought.”

The defendant also counterclaimed for damages for breach of contract against the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs were represented in this action by David Eshun, who signed himself as the managing director of the plaintiff-company on the written contracts and other relevant documents tendered in evidence in this matter. The plaintiffs’ evidence is that they entered into a building contract with the defendant to construct, originally, a two-storey building for the defendant at Takoradi. The original contract, evidenced by exhibit A, was concluded on 20 June 1975 and construction of the building commenced thereafter. The plaintiffs and the defendant entered into another agreement on 3 May 1976 by which the plaintiffs were to construct a third floor to the building they were constructing for the defendant, making it a three-storey building. This second agreement is evidenced by exhibit B dated

[p.394] of [1980] GLR 390

3 May 1976. The original total cost of construction as per both exhibits A and B was ¢90,000 but as pleaded by both parties, this was increased to ¢120,000 and the defendant paid a total of ¢102,000 by instalments.

According to the plaintiffs, the defendant, some time later, stopped the plaintiffs’ workers from working on the building, and the plaintiffs’ representative went to the defendant to find out as to why he had stopped their workers who were working on his building. The evidence is that when the defendant met the plaintiff’s representative, the defendant handed to him exhibit C by which he purported to have terminated the building contract. Exhibit C, being the letter of termination is dated 23 January 1978 and it is addressed to the plaintiffs; it reads:

“Dear Sir, TERMINATION OF CONTRACT I wish to inform you that I have revoked the contract which enabled you to construct three-storey building for me on plot number 236 at West Tanokrom, Takoradi.

You have been unduly slow in the construction that I have been forced to spend many times the amount I anticipated would complete the building.

Since I want the house completed as quickly as possible and since you are not in a position to do that I deem it expedient to abrogate the contract and employ a new construction firm.

Yours faithfully, (Sgd.) A. K. Buah.”

There is further evidence that the plaintiffs were keeping at the defendant’s site certain building materials which they had purchased at the cost of ¢10,021. The defendant did seize these building materials upon his termination of the contract and has refused to hand same to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs maintain that they gave the defendant no cause to terminate the building contract and up to the day on which the defendant purported to terminate the contract, the defendant had had no occasion to complain about the quality of the work done on the house by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs claim therefore that the defendant’s action was in breach of the terms of the contract and that he is therefore liable to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of ¢18,000, being the balance of the cost of construction plus ¢10,021 being the cost of the plaintiffs’ building materials seized by the defendant.

[p.395] of [1980] GLR 390

The defendant’s evidence is that the plaintiffs had abandoned work on the building for about one year before he wrote exhibit C terminating the contract. He tendered in evidence exhibits 1, 1A, 1B, and 1C to show the state of the building at the time he says he decided to stop plaintiffs from carrying on with the work any further. The defendant admits that he collected building materials valued ¢10,021 but claims that they belong to him because the plaintiffs must have used part of the money he paid to them for construction of his building in procuring those building materials.

Exhibit 9 by which the defendant engaged Ahey Ltd. to complete construction of his house in question is dated 18 November 1977. The agreed cost for completion was ¢135,000 and the defendant now maintains that the plaintiffs having failed to complete the work are in breach of the contract and must be held liable to pay damages. He claims he would have collected ¢500 a month as rent from tenants in each of the eight flats in his said house. This he lost because of the plaintiffs’ failure to complete.

The defendant admitted under cross-examination that he had executed exhibit 9 and advanced ¢50,000 to Ahey Ltd. before he wrote exhibit C, the letter of termination. Exhibits 1-1C, being the photographs, were taken in the plaintiffs’ absence. The defendant admitted further that the plaintiffs wrote to him complaining that the man engaged by the defendant to lay terrazzo in the building was delaying their work on the building and that at the time he wrote exhibit C, the terrazzo work had not been completed. He admitted further that the plaintiffs were still working on the building at the time he engaged Ahey Ltd. to take over and complete same.

There is hardly any doubt that both exhibits A and B establish clearly that the original agreed total cost of construction of the defendant’s three-storey building by the plaintiffs was ¢90,000 and that by the second agreement, exhibit B, dated 3 May 1976, the plaintiffs promised to complete the building by the end of September 1976, that is, within five months from the date of execution, i.e. 3 May 1976. It appears from exhibit 6, dated 16 February 1976, that the plaintiffs were on that date demanding payment of ¢10,000 from the defendant to enable them complete work on the original two-storey building and hand over its keys to the defendant by the end of July 1976. Exhibit 7 shows that the defendant paid the ¢10,000 to the plaintiffs as “the last advance” on the plot.

Exhibit B shows that the defendant did by 3 May 1976 enter into another agreement with the plaintiffs by which the latter were to construct a fourth floor to the building under construction. It was obvious from this

[p.396] of [1980] GLR 390 that the plaintiffs could not be reasonably expected to be able to complete the entire house and hand it over by the end of July 1976, in view of the fact that a major constructional work had been added to the original work which the plaintiffs had contracted to carry out.

It would appear from exhibit 2, a letter dated 6 September 1976, written by the defendant in reply to the plaintiffs’ letter dated 4 September 1976, that the plaintiffs were complaining that the defendant was refusing to release money to them to enable them carry on with the construction of the house. Paragraph (2) of exhibit 2 indicates that the defendant demanded that the ground, the first, second and third floors of the house should be “sealed completely” before ¢7,500 of the last ¢30,000 would be released and thereafter, the last instalment of ¢27,000 to be paid to the plaintiffs when they would complete and hand over the keys of the buildings.

It appears that the defendant refused to release further sums of money to the plaintiffs in spite of their request for the further advance per their letter of 4 September 1976. This therefore prompted another letter dated 16 September 1976, exhibit 4, written by the plaintiffs to the defendant; and I will like to reproduce that letter here since it seems to give an account of the contractual relationship as it existed at the time between the plaintiffs and the defendant. The registered letter addressed to the defendant reads:

“Dear Sir, CONCERNING YOUR BUILDING AT WEST TANOKROM—TAKORADI This is our second letter to your letter dated 6 September 1976.

We are sorry that you failed to have referred our letter of 4 September 1976 to a person having much experience in building contract affairs. That you are complaining that we have wasted much time on the building but we wish to draw your attention to the fact that some time ago, we demanded an amount of ten thousand cedis (¢10,000) as an advance from you, but instead of you to have released this amount to us at once, it took you more than three months before you could give us this money, while throughout this period the work was then at a standstill waiting for the money. Even before you gave us the money, you requested us to bring guarantors, whereas when we started the contract with you there was no question of guarantors regarding both the contract and the agreement on it.

Secondly, we wish you to read our agreement document carefully word by word, and that you would see that floor tiles

[p.397] of [1980] GLR 390 was not included in the agreement, and that you took this upon yourself to do. Now before fittings can be fixed on any building the floor tiles should be first and foremost completed. It is now six months since we completed the down floor, second floor and third floor, and up till now you have not completed the floor tiles, nor even started the floor tiles on the building, and how could the fittings be fixed? This matter of floor tiles which you took upon yourself to do, worried us much so that about five months ago, we brought to you an experienced tiles maker, to do the tiles work on the building; that up till now you have not paid any heed to this our request.

As you are now the person delaying our contract work on the building by not bringing in the man to do the tiles work, we beg you to engage experts to inspect the works we have done on the building: The party would see that we have completed both wiring and plumbing works on the building. Building contract works are done step by step, and as you delayed the terrazzo works on the building, how could we do the fittings on the building. Please know that you yourself have caused the delay of the works on the building and that the fault is not from us but from you.

We are registered contractors doing works for many people, and so your reference that we bought fittings from Messrs. Farouk, etc. does not concern (sic) you.

That we are now on our stand that because you have wasted our time by delaying the terrazzo works on the building, it has made time for building materials to go high on the market, and hence we are asking you to give us back all the money you deducted from our first, second and third estimates which we gave you on the house. By the time we signed the contract, building materials had not then gone up, but your delay in doing the terrazzo works on the building caused all these.

We now point it out to you bluntly that the works we have done on your building exceed the money you have given to us for the contract. If you are not satisfied with this, let us all go to the government valuation officer to decide the matter for both of us.

We hope you will now understand yourself properly with the explanations we have given you in this our second letter.

We remain, Yours faithfully, (Sgd.) David Eshun The Managing Director.”

[p.398] of [1980] GLR 390

This letter, exhibit 4, quoted in extenso (supra), shows clearly that as by 16 September 1976, the plaintiffs were complaining about the defendant’s failure to release money on advance as and when requested by the plaintiffs, and his failure to carry out the terrazzo works in the house as the defendant himself had undertaken to do, had delayed the work and had prevented the plaintiffs from completing the work on schedule.

The plaintiffs therefore stated clearly in exhibit 4 that what they had spent on the construction of the defendant’s said building was in excess of the money the defendant had advanced to them for that purpose. The plaintiffs thereupon even requested the appointment of a government valuation officer to assess the value of work done by them on the defendant’s said building. This letter obviously and clearly brought home to the defendant that the plaintiffs were claiming that the delay in the completion of their part of the work on the building had been caused by the defendant; that the building could not therefore be completed by the end of September 1976 as originally expected and that the defendant, perhaps, would have to advance further money towards the completion of his house.

The defendant’s reply to exhibit 4 is exhibit 3, wherein he appears to have admitted that he deliberately delayed paying the ¢10,000 advance which the plaintiffs had requested because he was dissatisfied with the work done by the plaintiffs. He eventually paid the ¢10,000 to enable the plaintiffs carry on the work after they had provided guarantors. The defendant further seems to admit in exhibit 3 that he undertook to do the terrazzo work himself and that the plaintiffs should forget about the terrazzo work. It seems to me here that the defendant did not specifically deny that the delay had been caused by him, by his failure to do the terrazzo work.

When the plaintiffs received the defendant’s letter exhibit 3, they sent yet another letter dated 23 September 1976, exhibit 5, requesting the defendant to meet them at the residence of Messrs. Amuah and Appiah, their guarantors on 25 September 1976 by 9 a.m. The plaintiffs warned that if the defendant failed to comply with that request the matter would be taken to court. It is not clear from the evidence before me whether or not that meeting took place on 25 September 1976. Exhibit 8, receipt for ¢5,000 however, seems to suggest that the defendant did, by 11 January 1977, advance a further sum of ¢5,000 to the plaintiffs towards the construction of his said building. This, in my view, is a clear indication that the defendant no longer held the plaintiffs bound to have completed the building by the end of September 1976. No further letters seemed to have passed between the plaintiffs and the defendant thereafter until 23 January 1978,

[p.399] of [1980] GLR 390 when the termination letter, exhibit C, was given to the plaintiffs by the defendant.

There is evidence that the defendant entered into a contract with Ahey Ltd., constructional engineers and contractors on 18 November 1977 to take over the construction of his said building from the plaintiffs even though the plaintiffs were still at the site and work was in progress. This is quite clearly so because the first defendant witness, G. A. Quaicoe, the technical director of Ahey Ltd., told the court his company was asked by the defendant to go to the building and assess the value of the work done so far, and in answer to a question by counsel for the plaintiffs, he said: “When I went to the building I noticed that work on the building was in progress.” It is my view therefore that the plaintiffs did not abandon work on the defendant’s said building, but that it was rather the defendant who did unilaterally terminate the building contract. The question then is was the defendant entitled to do that under the terms of the contract and in the circumstances of this case?

It seems to me that even though when the building agreement, exhibit B, was executed by the parties herein on 3 May 1976, time appeared to have been made the essence of the contract, yet as time went on, because of the defendant’s refusal to advance money promptly when called upon, this coupled with a steady rise in the cost of building materials, there occurred a delay over the execution of work on the building. This necessitated an upward variation of the contract price, and this is what the defendant himself pleaded:

“The contract price was originally ¢10,000. However, when the defendant had paid up to ¢90,000 the plaintiffs asked for an upward variation of the contract price on the ground that prices had changed. The plaintiffs and the defendant eventually agreed on ¢120,000 as the new contract price out of which the defendant paid up to ¢102,000 to the plaintiffs.”

It is my view that there having occurred an inevitable delay mainly caused by the defendant in the execution of work on the building due to the stated valid reasons, including a rise in the cost of building materials at the time, necessitating an upward variation of contract price as agreed in exhibit B, the time limit set in exhibit B was no longer binding. It seems to me that the delay caused by the defendant which culminated in the upward variation of the cost of construction whittled away the notion regarding time as being of the essence of the contract.

Originally the parties in executing exhibit A did not make time to be of the essence of the contract, and it is my view,

[p.400] of [1980] GLR 390 therefore, that when it became necessary to vary the terms of the contract in exhibit B, if the parties intended to make time of the essence of the contract, they should have explicitly stated it either in writing or verbally as the case may be, and a specific deadline given. There is no evidence that anything of the sort was done and it is my view therefore that the parties reverted to the terms of the original contract where no deadline for completion was set and therefore time was not made of the essence of the contract.

I am further of the view that in a building contract, even where time for completion is agreed upon and there can therefore be no doubt that time is of the essence of the contract, the contractor is relieved of his obligation to complete the works within the stipulated time if completion is made impossible by delay caused by the employer, i.e. the owner of the building himself. For example, by failing to advance money to the contractor for work as and when demanded in accordance with the terms of the building contract or failing to execute any piece of work which the employer has undertaken to carry out to supplement completion, e.g. by laying terrazzo floors: see Halsbury’s Laws of England(3rd ed.), Vol. 3, p. 489, para. 960 where it is stated under the sub-heading Effect of delay caused by employer:

“There are many ways in which the completion of the works by the contract time may be prevented by the act or default of the employer, as, for instance, by ordering extras or not providing the site at the proper time, failure to supply drawings, etc., or failure to supply any materials which the employer has agreed to supply.

Where the effect of extras being ordered by the employer is to delay the contractor, it is clear that, in the absence of special stipulations in the contract, the date fixed for completion is made inapplicable and the contractor relieved from his liability to pay liquidated damages for delay.”

Dodd v. Churton [1897] 1 Q.B. 562, C.A. was referred to.

Even though the defendant pleaded only that he took over the work on his said house and engaged another building contractor to complete construction he seems to have sought to lead evidence to the effect that the plaintiffs were in breach of the contract because they failed to complete work on the building as they promised within the stipulated time and also that the work was badly executed. This was not pleaded and therefore there being no issue joined thereon by the plaintiffs, it could not have been made an issue for trial. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs has therefore submitted forcefully

[p.401] of [1980] GLR 390 on this that this is a complete departure from what has been pleaded and should be ignored altogether. Counsel cited Waghorn v. George Wimpey & Co. Ltd. [1969] 1 W.L.R. 1764 at p. 1765 where it was held (as stated in the headnote):

“Since the version of facts found was not just a variation, modification or development, but was something new, separate and distinct and not merely a technicality, there had been so radical a departure from the pleaded case as to disentitle the plaintiff to succeed, for if his case had been pleaded in accordance with the facts found the defendants’ preparation and presentation would have been different.”

I think this is clearly a case in point and the defendant who seeks to counterclaim for damages for breach of contract must not be allowed to depart from what he has pleaded.

As already pointed out, because of changing circumstances the plaintiffs were no longer bound to complete the construction of the work by the end of September 1976 or any other stated subsequent date; time therefore being no longer of the essence of the contract, the defendant was clearly in breach of the contract when he did terminate the contract and stopped the plaintiffs’ workers from completing work at the time when, as admitted, work was really in progress.

I don’t think the defendant was entitled to terminate the contract unilaterally as he did, even if work in progress was slow, since the defendant himself, admittedly, was partly or mainly the cause of the delay occasioned. It would seem that inspite of the delay caused by the defendant, the plaintiffs were still bent on completing the work provided the defendant was prepared to co-operate by performing fully his part of the contract. I will here respectfully wish to adopt the decision of Abban J. in the case Adae v. Eyiah [1972] 2 G.L.R. 358 at pp. 367-368 where the learned judge had the following to say in a similar case:

“Be that as it may, I find that despite the financial difficulties and the plaintiff’s unreasonable conduct, the defendant did not abandon the construction of the building. He did not refuse to continue working on the building. It was rather the plaintiff who in fact drove the defendant’s workmen from the building site and collected the building plans from the defendant’s foreman. This was a clear indication or notice to the defendant that she did not want the defendant to continue the work.

In building contracts, such as the one under consideration, the contractor is entitled to uninterrupted possession of the site for the purpose of carrying out the works in the contract: See Halsbury’s Laws [p.402] of [1980] GLR 390 of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 3, p. 442, para. 836. Thus, the driving away of the workmen of the defendant from the building site amounted to a repudiation of the whole contract by the plaintiff, and the defendant, in those circumstances, was entitled to treat the contract as discharged by the said breach.”

In the case before me the plaintiffs did not abandon construction of the defendant’s said building; work was in full progress when the defendant stopped the plaintiff’s workmen at the site and terminated the contract by the letter exhibit C. There being no good cause shown for so doing, the defendant has clearly been in breach of the contract and the plaintiffs are therefore entitled to damages for such a breach.

On the measure of damages we have the following in Mayne and McGregor on Damages (12th ed.) p.488 at para. 559:

“On the measure of damages where the owner acts so as to bar completion there are again, surprisingly, no English cases. General principles would put the normal measure at the contract price less the cost to the builder of executing or completing the work. In calculating the builder’s costs the indirect as well as the direct costs must be included, especially overheads’.”

It seems to me that since the plaintiffs did not complete the work what they may be entitled to recover would be what they have spent on the building in excess of what the defendant has paid to them plus their overall profits on the entire contract work. Here the plaintiffs provided their own materials while the defendant advanced money. The ultimate contract price was ¢120,000 out of which the defendant paid a total of ¢102,000. The plaintiffs claimed at the time that they had spent more than what the defendant had paid them for the construction of his said building. Thus in Joseph v. Boakye [1977] 2 G.L.R. 392 at p.401, C.A. where in a contract of sale of land, there was a forfeiture clause: “The vendor shall forfeit the purchaser’s deposit of ¢20,000.00, should the latter break this agreement of sale,” Apaloo J.A. as he then was, said:

“It seems to me on the wording of this clause that the appellant would have been within his rights to forfeit the ¢20,000.00 if that sum had been paid. But as the sum has not in fact been paid, I think the appellant can only fall back on his common law remedies and seek such damages as the respondent’s breach of contract resulted to him under the principle laid down in the rule-making case of Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex.

341.”

[p.403] of [1980] GLR 390

It is my view here that the plaintiffs should have led evidence to establish how much more they claim they spent on the building in excess of what the defendant paid to them, and in addition to this, the amount they reasonably expected as their overall profits. The plaintiffs led no such evidence and I am at a loss to find what they are really entitled to in the circumstances. There is no doubt, however, that the plaintiffs are the owners of the building materials valued ¢10,021 which the defendant seized at the site. It is my view that such building materials always remained the property of the contractor providing his own materials, until they have been used on or affixed to the building being constructed.

If, therefore, while being kept at the site the owner of the building takes them away without the consent of the contractor, he will be liable to pay for same. The plaintiffs are therefore entitled to recover the sum of ¢10,021 from the defendant as being the value of the plaintiffs’ building materials seized by the defendant. The plaintiffs will in addition be awarded ¢6,000 damages for breach of contract. Judgment is therefore entered for the plaintiffs against the defendant for the sum of ¢16,021 of which ¢6,000 represents general damages being five percent of the contract price for breach of contract and ¢10,021 being the value of the plaintiffs’ building materials. The plaintiffs’ costs are assessed at ¢1,500 inclusive of counsel’s fees.

The defendant having failed to prove that the plaintiffs abandoned the contract or did anything in breach of the building contract, must fail in his counterclaim. The defendant’s counterclaim is therefore dismissed with ¢150 costs.

DECISION Judgment for the plaintiffs.

Defendant’s counterclaim dismissed with costs.

D. R. K. S.

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