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[1982] SLR (HC) 10High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

ETUA vs. SIKA-KYERE-ABUSUA [1982-83] GLR 781

21 May 1982 · TWUMASI J · ≈ 7 min read

Cite as[1982] SLR (HC) 10
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OSCOLAETUA v SIKA-KYERE-ABUSUA [1982-83] GLR 781 [1982] SLR (HC) 10
APAETUA v SIKA-KYERE-ABUSUA [1982-83] GLR 781, [1982] SLR (HC) 10 (Ghana).
BluebookETUA v SIKA-KYERE-ABUSUA [1982-83] GLR 781, [1982] SLR (HC) 10 (Ghana High Ct. 1982).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Okwabi v. Adonu (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 268.

(2) Quartey v. Martey [1959] G.L.R. 377.

(3) Yeboah v. Yeboah [1974] 2 G.L.R. 114.

(4) Adjabeng v. Kwabla [1960] G.L.R. 37.

(5) Adom v. Kwarley [1962] 1 G.L.R. 112.

(6) Gyamaah v. Buor [1962] 1 G.L.R. 196.

(7) Yerenchie v. Akuffo (1905) 1 Ren. 362.

(8) Amissah-Abadoo v. Abadoo [1974] 1 G.L.R. 110.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION for a declaration that the plaintiff, a widow, was the joint owner of a self-acquired property of a deceased husband. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

D. D. Gwira for the plaintiff.

Kobina Acquaye for the defendant.

JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.

The plaintiff is the widow of the late Kobina Kakraba of New Takoradi. Their marriage was blessed with seven children, five of them surviving the said Kobina Kakraba. The defendant is the customary successor of the late Kobina Kakraba. The plaintiff has brought this action against the defendant claiming: (a) a declaration that house No. 40/1, Lower Town, New Takoradi is the joint property of the late Kobina Kakraba and the plaintiff or in the alternative a declaration that the plaintiff and her surviving children under the said marriage are entitled to the occupation and exclusive possession of house No. 40/1 aforesaid;

(b) an account of all rents received by the defendant from tenants of house No. 40/1 from September 1974 to the date of judgment; and (c) the refund of the plaintiff’s ¢1,000 which was in the custody of the late Kobina Kakraba but now with the defendant who has refused to pay same despite repeated demands.

[p.783] of [1982-83] GLR 781 The plaintiff’s claim for a joint ownership of house No. 40/1 is based on her contention that her late husband made evident his intention to build the house as the absolute property of the plaintiff and her children. With this awareness, she made a substantial contribution of a financial nature to the construction of the building. According to the plaintiff, the land on which the house was built was not family property of her late husband but was self-acquired by the husband at New Takoradi at a time when plots were allocated to the public by the authorities concerned. Indeed, this fact was confirmed by the fourth defendant witness.

Moreover, the first plaintiff witness, elder son of the plaintiff, gave such a detailed and credible evidence about the purchase of the plot that convinced me that the house was built on a vacant land acquired by the late Kobina Kakraba. I therefore reject the story of the defendant that Kobina Kakraba converted a swish house into the new house No. 40/1 in dispute. I gather from the pieces of evidence given by the defendant and her witnesses, all of the defendant’s family, that they had no close contact with Kobina Kakraba during the latter’s lifetime.

Therefore there is nothing in the testimonies of the defendant and her witnesses which in my estimation could be treated as a rebuttal of the fact that the plaintiff contributed substantially to the construction of the house by making available to the late Kobina Kakraba all her earnings from her trading business in fish and that Kobina Kakraba used same in purchasing cement, sand, stones, doors, windows and scantlings. The plaintiff also paid for the installation of electricity to the house. I am satisfied on the evidence that proportionately, the plaintiff contributed far more substantially than the late Kobina Kakraba.

The question that arises, however, is whether under such circumstances customary law would treat the plaintiff as joint owner of the house. In Okwabi v. Adonu (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 268 at p. 269 the following appears:

“It is a common feature of family life that a son will work with and for his father, and therefore, in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, no presumption will be raised that property, obtained by the joint efforts of father and son and held by the father, is held by the father in trust for father and son as joint tenants or in trust for the son absolutely.”

The principle of customary law enunciated in Okwabi v. Adonu (supra) is clearly transferable to cases where a property is acquired or obtained by the joint efforts of husband and wife: see Quartey v. Martey [1959] G.L.R. 377. The evidence shows that even where the plaintiff collected rents from tenants she gave the proceeds to her husband, Kobina Kakraba, in conformity with our custom that the man is

[p.784] of [1982-83] GLR 781

the pater familias of a Ghanaian matrimonial home. Nothing under customary law can raise an impediment in the way of any two or more persons whether they be man and wife, father and son or man and wife and children to acquire property by their joint contribution as joint tenants as it obtains under the common law.

The essential factor in determining such joint property is the intention of the parties. Such intention can always be inferred from proved facts including the conduct of the parties. Where there is evidence that a particular property was intended to be the joint property of a married couple, effect should be given to such intention: see Yeboah v. Yeboah [1974] 2 G.L.R. 114 at p. 121 per Hayfron-Benjamin J. (as he then was). But where there is no evidence to establish such intention, property acquired by the joint contribution of man and wife or father and son shall be treated as the property of the man alone: see Adjabeng v. Kwabla [1960] G.L.R. 37 and Adom v. Kwarley [1962] 1 G.L.R. 112. In Gyamaah v. Buor [1962] 1 G.L.R. 196 Bruce Lyle J. (as he then was) had this to say:

“In Akan custom the plaintiff was not entitled to a share of her late husband’s property only on the ground that she assisted in the cultivation of the farms. The position is different where assistance by a wife had been substantial and of a financial nature.”

I would not share the view that assistance by a wife however substantial in cash or in kind in the acquisition of property by her husband per se suffices to stamp the property so acquired with the label of joint property. Whether property acquired is the joint property of the man and wife who contributed to its acquisition is all a matter of evidence of the intention of the parties and each case must be viewed through its peculiar facts. In certain cases a man may intend to build a house for his wife and children and where such intention is clear effect should be given to it. I find from the evidence that even though the house was built by the joint contribution of the plaintiff and her late husband, the latter clearly intended to build and did build the house for the plaintiff. There is therefore a presumption in favour of the plaintiff that the disputed house was held by the late Kobina Kakraba in trust for himself and the plaintiff as joint owners. On the death of Kobina Kakraba, the right of the plaintiff to a share of the property had matured. But in the special circumstances of this case, I would order that the plaintiff take exclusive possession of the house. As the successor and her family have inherited two other houses of which the late Kobina Kakraba died possessed of, it is only fair that the disputed house be given to the plaintiff to the exclusion of the family. As Griffith C.J. said in Yerenchi v. Akuffo (1905) 1 Ren. 362 at p. 367, “ . . . native custom generally consists of the performance of

[p.785] of [1982-83] GLR 781

the reasonable in the special circumstances of the case.” I see no sense of fairness in the family of the deceased taking two houses left by the late Kobina Kakraba and then be allowed to share the disputed house which, although was built by the joint contribution of the late Kobina Kakraba and the plaintiff, was intended by the deceased to be the absolute property of the plaintiff, and her children.

In any case, the plaintiff and her children have possessory right to the exclusion of the deceased’s family where as in this case the members of the deceased’s family are not without rooms to stay in because they have taken two other houses: see Amissah-Abadoo v. Abadoo [1974] 1 G.L.R. 110 at p. 112. For these reasons, I would grant the plaintiff and her children exclusive occupation and possession of the house. Consequently, she is entitled to all rents collected by the defendant since the death of the late Kobina Kakraba and the defendant must account to her. There will be ¢1,000 costs for the plaintiff.

DECISION

Judgment for the plaintiff.

J. A. A.

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