[2026] SLR (SC) 80Supreme Court - Ghana2026 SC - GHANA

FRANK OBENG vs. THE REPUBLIC

8 July 2026 · MENSA-BONSU JSC · ≈ 25 min read

Cite as[2026] SLR (SC) 80

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OSCOLAFRANK OBENG v THE REPUBLIC [2026] SLR (SC) 80

APAFRANK OBENG v THE REPUBLIC, [2026] SLR (SC) 80 (Ghana).

BluebookFRANK OBENG v THE REPUBLIC, [2026] SLR (SC) 80 (Ghana Sup. Ct. 2026).

Linkhttps://superlawgh.com/slr/2026/sc/80/

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

IN THE SUPREME COURT

ACCRA – AD.2026

CORAM: AMADU JSC (PRESIDING)

PROF. MENSA-BONSU (MRS.) JSC

ASIEDU JSC

GAEWU JSC

DARKO ASARE JSC

CRIMINAL APPEAL

NO. J3A/1/2025

8TH JULY, 2026

FRANK OBENG ……….. CONVICT/APPELLANT/APPELLANT

VRS

THE REPUBLIC ……….. PROSECUTION/RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

“What is begun in anger, ends in shame”

Benjamin Franklin

PROF. MENSA-BONSU (MRS) JSC:

This is a Criminal Appeal from the judgment of Court of Appeal dated 14th March 2024 in which the appellant in a fit of uncontrolled anger caused another serious injury with the result that death ensued.

The appellant was charged with the offence of murder contrary to section 46 of the Criminal and Other Offences Act,1960(Act 29). He was convicted of the offence by the High Court, Accra, after the jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict on 22nd November,2022.

Facts

The Appellant and the deceased were both resident in the same neighbourhood at Achimota, a suburb of Accra. The relationship between them was cordial as the older brother of the deceased was appellant’s friend. Indeed, their relationship was said to be one of brothers, ie senior and junior brother respectively.

On 20th July 2014, the appellant and the deceased ran into each other at the frontage of a pub in the neighbourhood. The deceased approached the appellant for money, but asked for it in a manner which the appellant considered disrespectful. An altercation developed between them. According to the appellant, the deceased attempted to stab him with a knife but he escaped by the help of two family members (i.e the deceased’s father (PW1) and sister (PW2)), who intervened and restrained the deceased.

Later, it was alleged that the appellant went to the house of the deceased to warn him to stay out of his way. The deceased was said not to be at home, but according to PW2, who was then in the house: “the accused (the appellant) came and told me that he would kill Michael Kpabitey (the deceased) for us to go and bury him”

Still later that day, the appellant met the deceased at a concrete bridge in their locality. According to the appellant, the deceased pulled a knife on him. Frightened at the sight of the knife he hurled the deceased to the ground, and the deceased landed on his buttocks on the concrete bridge with metal fence on both sides. People in the neighbourhood of the incident intervened to save the deceased from the appellant. They then carried him home as he a as he could not stand up or walk. It appeared he had become paralysed.

According to the father (PW1) and the sister (PW2) of the deceased, the deceased recounted to them what had happened on the footbridge between him and the appellant. He alleged that in the course of the confrontation, the appellant held his hands to his back, raised him up high and threw him on to the concrete floor of the bridge. The appellant then attempted to push him into the drain full of water, but he failed as he was saved from falling into the drain by the iron rods at the edge of the bridge. He believed this was what had caused him to become paralysed.

PW1 then took his injured son to the Tesano Police Station where he was given a medical form for him to be sent to the Achimota Hospital. He was then referred to 37 Military Hospital where he got some attention and a further referral to the Korle-Bu Teaching Hospital. At the Korle-Bu Teaching Hospital, he was examined, his condition diagnosed and surgery prescribed. PW1 alleged he was informed that there was a risk that the deceased might not survive surgery, but as it turned out, he was told that the deceased stood a 50% chance of never walking again even after the surgery. Following this information, PW1 returned the deceased to the house where he began herbal treatment which treatment he was still undergoing when on 7th November, he experienced breathing difficulties and died after being rushed to the hospital.

In the meantime, the appellant who had been arrested, detained and charged with causing harm, had been arraigned before the Circuit Court, Accra, for the offence of causing harm. He had pleaded Not Guilty and been remanded into police custody.. On 7th November, 2014, he was granted bail by the Circuit Court. It was on that same day of 7th November, 2014 that the deceased died, ostensibly after hearing the news that the appellant had been granted bail. The medical cause of death was given as “fracture of the bones, ie Cervical and Thoracic Spine (C7 and T1) and pulmonary embolism”. It transpired that having been rendered immobile as a result of his injuries, the deceased suffered deep vein thrombosis and died of pulmonary embolism. Upon the death of the deceased, the appellant was re-arrested and charged with the offence of murder.

On 2nd January, 2016, the appellant was arraigned before the District Court for committal proceedings, and was committed to stand trial for the murder of the deceased on 22nd February 2016. He was eventually arraigned before the High Court on 14th April 2021 for trial. On 22nd November 2022 the appellant was convicted of murder and was sentenced to death.

The appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 31st January 2023, containing Nine (9) grounds seeking to set aside the conviction and sentence. The gravamen of the appellant’s appeal was that the judge erred in the summing up of the law to the jury and same occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice which necessitated its reversal by the Court of Appeal. On 14th March 2024, the Court of Appeal set aside the conviction and sentence for murder on the ground that the trial judge erred in her summing up of the law to the jury by her failure to direct the jury on the alternative defence of manslaughter which was available to the appellant. The Court of Appeal substituted a conviction for manslaughter and imposed a sentence of 40 years of Imprisonment with Hard Labour. It is against this sentence that the appellant has initiated the instant appeal.

By Notice of Appeal filed on the 12th day of April 2024, the appellant urged one sole ground of appeal on the Supreme Court, that the sentence

“(a) is harsh and excessive having regard to the fact that the deceased was the aggressor.

(b) has occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice which necessitates this Honourable Court to reduce same on account of the Appellant being a first-time offender and having shown remorse for his actions.”

The appellant also complains that considering the length of time spent in custody the sentence of 40 years starting from November 2022 is harsh and excessive.

LEGAL ARGUMENTS OF APPELLANT.

The appellant argued on the authority Dotse JSC espoused in Dexter Johnson vs The Republic [2011] 2 SCGLR 601 that an appellate court while hearing a criminal appeal is empowered by the Section 30 of the Courts Act,1993[Act 459] that-

On an appeal from a conviction or an acquittal, the court can do any of the following things:

Reverse the finding of conviction and sentence of the trial court and instead acquit the accused

Convict the accused or order a trial de novo

Alter or vary the findings of the trial or first appellate court by maintaining the sentence or reduce or increase the sentence

Annul the conviction and substitute a special finding that the accused was guilty of the act or omission but was criminally insane so as not to be responsible at the time for the crime and order the accused to be confined to a mental hospital, prison or other suitable place

Annul or vary an order of imprisonment or any other form of punishment

Annul or vary an order for payment of compensation or for restoration of property.

It is the further contention of the appellant that even though the lower court indicated that it took into consideration the aggravating and mitigating circumstances laid down by Azu-Crabbe J.A in Kwashie vs. Republic [1971] 1 GLR 488, the lower court did not consider same. These grounds are that:

The intrinsic seriousness of the offence;

The degree of revulsion felt by law-abiding citizens of the society for the particular crime;

The premeditation with which the criminal plan was executed;

The prevalence of the crime within the particular locality where the offence took place, or in the country generally;

The sudden increase in the incidence of the particular crime;

Mitigating of aggravating circumstances such as extreme youth, good character and the violent manner in which the offence was committed”

The appellant relied on the case of Frimpong aka Iboman vs Republic [2012]1 SCGLR 297 where Justice Dotse in discussing the deterrence theory of punishment explained that even though punishment is meant to deter others, the punishment imposed must fit the crime. See also: Kwame Nkrumah A.k.a Taste vs The Republic [2020] CRIM LR 294 at 295.

The appellant therefore contends that the appellate court in order to vary or alter the sentence must consider whether the sentence imposed on the accused person by either the trial court or the first appellate court is appropriate, harsh or excessive, taking into consideration factors such as the nature of the offence. In addition, it had to consider factors such as the period spent by the accused in prison custody, as prescribed by the Constitution, 1992 and relevant statutes, as well as aggravating circumstances such as the gruesome manner in which the offence was committed; the prevalence of the crime; whether the accused is a first time offender; and remorse, if any, shown by the accused.

The appellant argues also that the Criminal Offences Act, 1960[Act 29] provides that the offence of manslaughter is a first-degree felony and a person convicted is liable to imprisonment for life or any lesser term which could even be one day. The appellant says that the court in imposing the sentence on the appellant, ought to have stated the exact grounds that formed the basis for the imposition of the sentence of 40 years as same would have allowed the Supreme Court to apprise the propriety or harshness of the sentence within the sentencing guidelines prescribed by case law. Based on the arguments above, the appellant submits that the 40-year sentence imposed on him by the lower court is too high as he is a first-time offender who has shown remorse for his misbehaviour. Further, that he has a six-year-old daughter with whom he has a strong bond and that the 40year sentence means that he would spend the greater part of his life in prison and lose out on life completely. He therefore prays the court for a reduction in his sentence.

LEGAL ARGUMENT BY THE REPUBLIC

The respondent argues that the Court of Appeal’s pronouncement that had there been the least exercise of patience and restraint, the deceased’s injury and death would have been averted is indicative of the thorough work done by the lower court. The Court of Appeal, according to the respondent, cannot be said not to have taken into consideration the many mitigating factors before imposing the 40-years sentence on the Appellant. Therefore no injustice to the appellant had been occasioned.

The respondent, also citing Kwashie v. The Republic, supra restated the principles of sentencing therein, and which were affirmed in Kamil v. The Republic [2011] 1 SCGLR 303. According to the respondent, the Supreme Court in that case, went further to consider the following as both aggravating and mitigating factors; the conduct of the accused person particularly how remorseful he or she is; the age of the accused person, the nature of the offence, the circumstances under which the offence was committed; whether accused person is first offender and the vulnerability of the accused person or the victim. In the words of the Supreme Court,

“where an appellant complains about the harshness of a sentence, he ought to appreciate that every sentence is supposed to serve a five-fold purpose, namely, to be punitive, calculated to deter others, to reform the offender, to appease the society and to be a safeguard to this country”.

These considerations, the respondent submitted, had been taken into account as set down in Kwasi Frimpong alias Iboman vs The Republic [2012] 1 SCGLR 297. The Court of Appeal did state thus:

“I will allow the appeal and set aside the conviction of murder to manslaughter. I will sentence the appellant to a term of forty(40) years in hard labour, after considering all the aggravating and mitigating factors more particularly expoused in the case of Kwashie v Republic[1971] 1 GLR 488 as well as Article 14(6) of the Constitution, 1992, with effect from the date of conviction by the trial court, that is, November 2022.”

In consideration of all these authorities therefore, the respondent urged that the 40 year- sentence by the Court of Appeal had received due and proper consideration before being imposed on the appellant. The respondent therefore urged this honourable court to dismiss the appeal as being without merit.

THE LAW AND ANALYSIS

It is trite law that an appeal is by way of rehearing. In Obeng Gyebi v. The Republic Criminal Appeal No: 33/02/2021 dated 26th May, 2021, Kulendi JSC explained the principle of an appeal being a rehearing thus:

“first, let us commence from the trite and over-repeated principle that an appeal is by way of a rehearing. … But what does it mean, exactly, to say an appeal is by way of rehearing ? For an answer to this , we can look to the dictum of Windeyer J. which elucidated with efficient precision, what it means o say that an appeal is by way of rehearing in the case of Da Costa vrs Cockburn Salvage & Trading Pty. Ltd [19 70] HCA 43;(1970)124 CLR 192, at pp 208-209. There he stated as follows:

‘This does not mean that the appeal is a complete re-hearing as a new trial is. It means that the case is to be determined by the Full Court, its members considering for themselves the issues the trial judge had to determine and the effect of the evidence he heard as appearing in the record of the proceedings before him, but applying the law as it is when the appeal is heard not as it was when the trial occurred’” (emphasis added)

In criminal appeals, an appellate court’s power to review a sentence imposed on an appellant by a trial court or an appellate court is provided for in section 30 of the Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459) as Orders available to Appellate Court. It provides that:

Subject to this Act, an appellate court may in a criminal case;

On an appeal from a conviction or acquittal

Reverse the finding and sentence and acquit and discharge or convict the accused or order the accused to be retried by a court of competent jurisdiction, or commit the accused for trial; or

Alter the finding, maintaining the sentence or with or without altering the finding, reduce or increase the sentence; or

With or without the reduction or increase and with or without altering the finding, alter the nature of the sentence; or

Annul the conviction and substitute a special finding to the effect that the accused was guilty of the act or omission charged but was criminally insane so as not to be responsible at the time when the act was done or the omission was made , and order the accused to be confined as a criminally insane person in a mental hospital ,prison or any other suitable place or safe custody; or

Annul or vary an order of imprisonment or any other punishment imposed on the person convicted; or

Annul or vary an order for the payment of compensation, or of the expenses of the expenses of the prosecution, or for the restoration of the property to a person whether or not the conviction is quashed.”

In Ignatius Howe v. The Republic [Criminal Appeal No. J3/3/2013] dated 22/05/2014 (Unreported), Akamba JSC explained that an appellate court such as this honourable Court has the power to consider whether the sentence imposed by the trial court, or the first appellate court is appropriate or excessive. See also: Appiah v. The Republic[1987-88]2 GLR 377.

The Courts are also enjoined not to be arbitrary in the exercise of such discretion. The Courts in the Kwashie v Republic, supra, set down factors that needed to be considered as follows:

The intrinsic seriousness of the offence;

The degree of revulsion felt by law-abiding citizens of the society for the particular crime;

The premeditation with which the criminal plan was executed;

The prevalence of the crime within the particular locality where the offence took place, or in the country generally;

The sudden increase in the incidence of the particular crime;

Mitigating of aggravating circumstances such as extreme youth, good character and the violent manner in which the offence was committed”

Being a trial by jury, the Court of Appeal rightly acted within its remit by evaluating the summing up of the trial judge as the appeal ground brought before it. The Court of Appeal rightly identified a misdirection in the trial judge’s summing up which could not have sustained a murder conviction. It is for that reason that the Court of Appeal set aside the conviction of murder and substituted same with manslaughter by virtue of section 154(1) of Act 30 of 1960.

This instant appeal is on the sole ground that the sentence is harsh and excessive. All the same it would be a worth exercise to analyse the evidence to justify why a reduced sentence would be appropriate.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal began with these words:

“ The facts that led to the unfortunate death of the deceased, a young man of about 24 years, Michael Kpabitey, portray an unfortunate situation. I am describing the circumstances that led to the death of the deceased as most unfortunate as I think that if there had been the least exercise of patience and restraint the injury that subsequently resulted in the victim’s death could have been avoided.”( emphasis added).

This statement above, though correct, carried the seeds of assumptions of guilt that coloured the later reasoning. The real question on hand was whether the harm to the deceased resulted in his death in an unbroken chain of events. The Summing Up by the judge did not even address the issue of causation, although it did loom large as the evidence showed.

Section 51 of the Criminal Offences, Act 1960 (Act 29) provides that

“A person who causes the death of another person by an unlawful harm commits manslaughter, but if the harm causing death is caused by negligence that person has not committed manslaughter unless the negligence amounts to a reckless disregard for human life.”

The appellant did cause grievous bodily harm to the deceased which caused him to become paralysed, but the death was eventually caused by embolism occasioned by his having been rendered immobile by his paralysis. The Medical Report listed three causes: 1. Pulmonary embolism;

Deep vein thrombosis

Spinal injury (C7 and T1) as a result of having been rendered immobile.

Under cross examination, the Pathologist PW4 (ROA P87) stated thus:

A. “Coming home to this case, this man’s death is a complication to the injury he sustained to the neck C7 and T1.

Q. So it is your testimony that apart from extenuating circumstances C7 and T1 injury are not a direct cause of death?

A. The direct cause of death is pulmonary embolism that as a consequent of the paralysis.”

Once he indicated that it was a “consequence”, rather than the cause, this should have set off alarm bells, because it was an admission that the spinal injury by itself would not have caused death even though it was part of the history of the trajectory of the suffering of the deceased. Section 13(4) of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) provides for situations involving liability for a chain of events as follows:

A person shall not be convicted of having intentionally or negligently caused an event if, irrespective of the act of that person and the acts of any persons acting jointly with that person, the event would not have happened but for the existence of a state of facts, or the intervention of any other event or of any other person, the probability of the existence or intervention of which other event or person the accused person did not take into consideration, and did not have reason to take into consideration. (emphasis added)

In Sarimbe alias Olala v. The Republic [1984-86] 2 GLR 17

The appellant fought his pregnant wife and she died. The evidence showed that the beating he administered was moderate and was probably not the cause of the death. On appeal against a conviction of murder, the court held that the prosecution must show that the harm undoubtedly caused to the deceased by the appellant resulted in death. If the evidence was susceptible to a conclusion that the death was caused by some other cause, then the prosecution had failed to prove that it was the harm that resulted in the death of the deceased.

The question then was how the pulmonary embolism that caused the death came into the picture. Here is where a series of events occurred that broke the chain of causation. When the incident occurred His father took him to the hospital where many tests were conducted. According to the evidence of his father PW1 (John Kpabitey) he narrated what happened at the hospital and stated that

“After examining them [i.e. the test reports]… he told me…that the spinal cord of my son is broken and even I was lucky that where the spinal cord was broken if the injury had been further up he would not be able to talk and that he needed to be operated upon. And it is a two way affair after the operation was carried that is either he will walk or remain in a wheelchair for the rest of his life. It was a hard decision to me so I brought him home and we were treating him at home…”

This was confirmed by PW7 (D/CPL Sylvanus Antwi) that the deceased was discharged from the hospital because of the inability of the family to pay Gh¢5,500 for the needed surgery would cost The decision to take him from the hospital and administer treatments at home after doctors had diagnosed his condition as requiring surgery with a 50% chance of full recovery set events in motion that eventually resulted in developing pulmonary embolism.

PW1 further complicated matters when he stated under cross-examination on 2nd December, 2021 as follows:

“Q. I further suggest to you that the deceased person death would have been prevented if he had been treated properly at the hospital rather than being kept at home.

A. No My Lady he was responding to treatment when he got to know that the court had granted the accused person bail that gave him the shock.

This account was confirmed by PW2, sister of the deceased thus:

“so the deceased asked that with all the accused has caused him has he been released? This made the illness worsen, he was then rushed to the hospital again.

Thus, the two important witnesses attributed the death to shock he sustained upon hearing that the accused (appellant herein) had been granted bail for causing harm to him. The evidence of DW2, a Physician specialist was instructive. She stated that “C7 and TI injuries would not directly cause death however they can cause a devastating disability. On the issue of the resulting Pulmonary Embolism, the doctor (ROA pp122) explained it thus:

“Pulmonary embolism can occur in any person who has had any form of surgical procedure, including a spinal surgery. If after surgery the person is unable to walk, pulmonary embolism can also occur.”

The doctor went further to state that death by pulmonary embolism was preventable by proper treatment. “They are usually treated with medication that thins the blood or otherwise called blood thinners…” she stated, and went further thus: (ROA 121)

“However pulmonary embolism can be prevented in hospital for persons who have undergone surgeries or have sustained a spinal cord injury and have undergone unsuccessful surgeries where they are unable to walk so with such a person, we would give smaller doses of these blood thinners that are used to treat Pulmonary Embolism for a period of three months … After the 3 months, the individual’s risk or likelihood of forming cloth and eventually developing a pulmonary embolism is similar to the good population. What this means is that if a person is unable to walk after spinal surgery and receives this medication for 3 months his risk of getting a clot in the lungs is similar to someone who has never had surgery before.” (ROA 122-123)

The medical evidence showed that a person who has reduced mobility and is undergoing treatment in hospital would receive treatment to prevent pulmonary embolism since it was a likely result from immobility. DW2 testified to the nature of occurrence and treatment for pulmonary embolism. She indicated that it was not only spinal injury that could cause a person to develop blood clots, but even immobility for long periods in airplane cabins during air travel could produce such results. Therefore, the decision to take the paralysed patient out of hospital for herbal treatment was not without significance to the trajectory of the patient’s recovery. The decision by PW1 after he had been told that there was a 50% chance of the patient becoming wheelchair bound even after successful surgery was critical in the determination the father made that the expense of the surgery was not worth it. Therefore the evidence of PW3 and DW1 that it was a question of how to raise the hospital fee of Gh¢5,500 that propelled the family to move him back home for herbal treatment was backed by the facts.

This development, in my considered opinion, operated to break the chain off causation between the grievous injury and the death by embolism. A person who had become paralysed by such grievous spinal injury should not have been taken out of hospital to be treated by herbs and hot water. Had doctors taken charge of the case, they would have been conscious of risks occasioned by lack of mobility and prescribed medication to prevent blood clots. Therefore, the death from the harm caused to him could have been avoided if the family had not taken it upon itself to treat him at home without medical supervision.

Not only did the judge’s summing up fail to address the alternative verdict of manslaughter, but it failed in a fundamental way to address the evidence that showed that the decision to move him from the hospital to treat him at home with herbs and by persons whose competence and medical knowledge had not been established was fundamental in the trajectory of the treatment of the injury. The Court of Appeal stated that: “In this appeal the most crucial and pertinent issue to look at is whether the harm inflicted was intentionally done, so as to cause the death of the deceased.

With respect the most “crucial and pertinent issue to look at”, is whether the harm resulted in the death in an unbroken chain of causation.

The appellant has appealed against the harshness of the sentence even after a reduction of the offence to manslaughter. Appellant contends that the sentence

“(a) is harsh and excessive having regard to the fact that the deceased was the aggressor.

(b) has occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice which necessitates thus Honorable Court to reduce same on account of the Appellant being a first-time-offender and having shown remorse for his actions.”

It now falls on this honourable Court to evaluate the sentence imposed by the Court of Appeal. Section 51 of the Criminal Offences, Act 1960 (Act 29) provides that a person who commits manslaughter commits a first-degree felony. The sentencing regime applicable to first -degree felonies is spelt out in Section 296 of the Criminal and Other Offences [Procedure] Act, 1960 (Act 30) that a person convicted of the offence is liable to imprisonment for life or any lesser term. From the aforementioned legal provision, a court may impose a sentence between a day and life imprisonment. The Court of Appeal in substituting the conviction of murder with manslaughter took account of the mitigating factors as set down in Kwashie v. Republic, supra, to arrive at the 40-year sentence of imprisonment. We do same, by

starting from the same standpoint of evaluating the mitigating factors or considerations stated in Kwashie v. Republic, (supra), the following come up for consideration:

The nature of the offence

The appellant is a first-time offender who has not had any brush with the law.

He had a good enough relationship with the deceased as well as a cordial relationship with the family of the deceased before the unfortunate incident

The appellant appears to have shown remorse after the incident, judging by the few visits he paid to the family before the deceased died.

The appellant’s cooperation with the police until his conviction indicate that he is law abiding citizen.

From the facts, the incident was instigated by the deceased and the appellant’s reaction in fighting back did not reveal a pre-meditated intent to kill the deceased, even though evidence from the family of the deceased indicated that he had made threats to kill the deceased.

The appellant over-reacted when he failed to control his anger.

Having been under the custody of the state for almost ten years from his arrest to his conviction, the appellant deserves consideration for the period served in custody

There has not been any report of misbehaviour or misconduct by the appellant towards other inmates or prison wardens while in custody.

The appellant further contends that considering the time he has spent in custody 40 years is harsh and excessive. In respect of this submission, the principles set down above are further strengthened by factors outlined by the Supreme Court in Owusu Banahene v. The Republic Criminal Appeal No. J3/02/2019; dated 3rd July, 2019:

1. Any period of time spent in lawful custody in respect of that offence before the completion of his trial [Article 14 (4) of the Constitution,1992]

2. The intrinsic seriousness of the offence.

3. The degree of revulsion felt by law abiding citizens of the society for the particular crime.

4. The premeditation with which the crime was convicted.

5. The prevalence of the crime within the particular locality where the offence took place, or in the country generally.

6. The sudden increase in the incidence of the particular crime.

7. Mitigating circumstances such as the extreme youth, good character, remorse and reparation

8. Aggravating circumstances such the violence or the manner in which the crime was committed.

The appellant states that he has been remorseful; has been of good behaviour and has a young daughter of about 6 years. (This must obviously refer to the pre-incarceration period as he has already spent ten years in custody before launching this appeal.) It is certain that by now, he must appreciate the importance of anger management and self-control. All the mitigating factors operate in his favour. The discussion of issues of causation show that the conviction should have taken all that evidence into account as mitigating factors. There appear to be no aggravating factors affecting the circumstances of this case. In consideration of the law and analysis above, a sentence of 20 years from the date of his re-arrest and trial for murder would serve as sufficient punishment for causing such grievous harm to the deceased.

The appeal succeeds. The appellant states that he has been remorseful; of good behaviour and has a young daughter of about 6 years. He must have learnt his lessons on the importance of anger management by now, and is unlikely to repeat the conduct. All the mitigating factors operate in his favour, and there appear to be no aggravating factors affecting the circumstances of this case. In consideration of the law and analysis above, a sentence of 20 years from the date of his re-arrest and trial for murder would serve as sufficient punishment for causing such grievous harm to the deceased.

The sentence of 40 years from the date of conviction in November 2022 imposed by the Court of Appeal is hereby set aside. In line with the prescription of article 14(4), a sentence of 20 years from the date of his re-arrest and trial for murder (ie November 2014) is substituted therefor.

(SGD.) PROF. H.J.A.N MENSA-BONSU (MRS)