FULANI AND ANOTHER vs. ISSAH [1980] GLR 319
1 June 1979 · ANSAH-TWUM J · ≈ 21 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 35Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Asumah v. Khair [1959] G.L.R. 353, C.A.
(2) Awortwi v. Nwansu [1968] G.L.R. 1106.
(3) Ahima v. Kuma (1916) D.C.A.L. 199.
(4) Republic v. Accra New Town District Magistrate; Exparte Papafio, High Court, Accra, 13 February 1969; digested in (1969) C.C. 53.
(5) Abangana v. Akologo [1977] 1 G.L.R. 382 (6) Gray v. Gray [1971] 1 G.L.R. 422.
(7) Beckley v. Beckley [1974] 1 G.L.R. 393.
(8) Braun v. Mallet [1975] 1 G.L.R. 81.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the decision of the District Court, Grade I, Tarkwa, in favour of a natural father in his customary law claim against the legal father for custody of a child born in adultery during the subsistence of a customary marriage. The facts are fully set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Miss Frances Mercer for James Mercer for the defendants – appellants.
Dr. Tackie – Otoo for the plaintiff-respondent.
JUDGMENT OF ANSAH TWUM J.
This is an appeal against the decision of the District Magistrate Court Grade I, Tarkwa, dated 1 November 1978. The only original ground of appeal filed was the usual omnibus ground: “(1) The Judgment is against the weight of the evidence.” The following additional grounds of appeal were, however, filed on 14 February 1979:
“(2) The trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff-respondent’s suit.
(3) The plaintiff-respondent failed completely to establish a cause of action against the defendants-appellants.
(4) The learned trial magistrate erred in law in not applying the rules of customary law applicable in the case before him.
[p.322] of [1980] GLR 319 (5) The learned trial magistrate erred in law in applying the wrong principle of law in granting custody of the child to the plaintiff-respondent.
(6) The learned trial magistrate’s decision is contrary to public policy and cannot be supported.”
The claim before the district court against the appellants was for:
“(1) Possession of the plaintiff’s son born on 17 January 1978.
(2) ¢200 damages for unlawful detention of the plaintiff’s said child.”
The defendants-appellants (hereinafter referred to as the defendants) denied liability and the second defendant filed the following counterclaim against the plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff):
“(a) An order of the court prohibiting the plaintiff from carrying on further concubinage with the second defendant’s wife, Fati.
(b) ¢700 damages for seduction of the second defendant’s wife made up of (i) Special damages of ¢300 being transport expenses incurred whilst looking for my wife who some time left the marital home without my knowledge.
(ii) ¢400 being general damages.”
The plaintiff’s case before the trial court, inter alia, was that he met the woman Fati, some time in 1977 at Atieku market and proposed marriage to her because Fati claimed that she had been divorced by her husband. Fati apparently consented to the marriage proposal and later went and stayed with the plaintiff at Atieku for four days. Fati was at the time staying with her parents at Subri. Fati’s mother looking for Fati, traced her to the plaintiff and having taken Fati away reported the plaintiff to the Atieku police for having abducted a married woman. The plaintiff was put before the District Court Grade I, Tarkwa, but he was discharged.
According to the plaintiff he later went to see Fati’s mother and father (the first defendant) and asked for Fati’s hand in marriage but they turned his offer down without assigning any reason. Four months later Fati paid the plaintiff another visit and lived with him as man and wife. Fati became pregnant while staying with the plaintiff, who again approached Fati’s parents and expressed his intention to marry Fati, but the parents would not allow it. The plaintiff lived with Fati throughout the whole period of gestation,
[p.323] of [1980] GLR 319 and left for her parent’s only two weeks before delivery. Fati delivered at Foso Hospital; the plaintiff paid the hospital fees and maintained Fati and the baby at Subri for two months. Fati later told the plaintiff that her former husband had come to Subri and named the child as Ibrahim Tanko. When the plaintiff went to Fati’s father, the first defendant, he told the plaintiff that since Fati’s marriage with the second defendant had not been dissolved, the second defendant was entitled to name the child as his and he had done so with his consent.
When the plaintiff was cross-examined he admitted that he saw Fati’s husband when he, the plaintiff, was put before the district court for having abducted a married woman. He admitted having had a child with Fati without performing the necessary customary marriage rites. He again admitted that before the district court on the abduction charge, the second defendant told the court that Fati was his wife.
Fati who testified as the plaintiff’s first witness, told the court, among other things, that she had been married to the second defendant since 1970 and had had two issues with him. They were divorced in 1976 and Fati went and stayed with her parents at Subri. It was during that time that she went to the plaintiff for four days which led to the arrest of the plaintiff.
The parents very much wanted her to go back to Accra to her husband but since she did not want to go back, her mother threw her personal effects out of their house. Fati took advantage of that and went and lived with the plaintiff some time after he had been freed on that abduction charge. Fati lived with the plaintiff and she became pregnant and had the baby boy. The plaintiff said he would go to her parents to perform the customary marriage rites and thereafter name the child. Fati stated, “My father then left for Accra to inform my former husband after the child’s birth and he proceeded to Subri to name the child as Ibrahim, as custom demanded.”
When Fati was cross-examined as to where and when she was divorced by the second defendant she replied that divorce was pronounced by the first defendant in the second defendant’s absence, because the second defendant failed to attend the first defendant’s call for divorce rites to be performed. She added, however, that her father, the first defendant, always said that the second defendant was still her husband.
The defendants’ case, on the other hand, was that the second defendant married Fati and performed the necessary marriage rites. He paid to the first defendant ¢1,200 being the value for three cows, being bride price, and gave the bride assorted personal
[p.324] of [1980] GLR 319 effects, including seven veils, clothing, footwear and cooking utensils. Fati’s and her husband lived in Accra and had two daughters aged seven and four years respectively. There once arose a misunderstanding between Fati and a woman in Fati’s husband’s house in Accra. Fati father, the first defendant, went to Accra and settled the dispute, but both defendants agreed that Fati should be taken to Subri for a while before going back to Accra.
It was while Fati was staying temporarily with her parents that she secretly went and committed adultery with the plaintiff, they claimed. When this was discovered the matter was reported to the police. When the parents took Fati away and sent her sister to collect Fati’s personal effects from the plaintiff’s room, the plaintiff would not release them. Fati’s parents and the chief of Subri advised Fati to go back to her husband but she would not listen to them. Fati eventually had a baby with the plaintiff. They maintain, however, that the second defendant is still Fati’s lawful husband for there has never been any form of divorce between them. The second defendant whilst under cross-examination stated, “The plaintiff’s first witness is still married to me by Fulani custom and I performed marriage rites according to such custom by paying ¢1,200 being the value of three cows plus personal effects.”
Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted, inter alia, that an adulterer has no right under Fulani customary law against a customary husband. Counsel cites Asumah v. Khair [1959] G.L.R. 353 at p. 357, C.A. and Awortwi v. Nwansu [1968] G.L.R. 1106.
Counsel submitted further that a child born of an illicit association does not belong to its natural father, but to its mother and its mother’s family: Ahima v. Kuma (1916) D.C.A.L. 199. That a child born of an adulterous association is the property of the legal father and not of the adulterous father: Republic v. Accra New Town District Magistrate; Ex parte Papafio, High Court, Accra, 13 February 1969; digested in (1969) C.C. 53; an adulterer is not allowed to take away the child of an adulterous union.
Counsel then referred to the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), s. 49(1) and submitted that all the parties involved here are subject to Fulani customary law. Counsel then referred to page 22 of the record of proceedings, where the learned magistrate had stated in his judgment that the marriage was contracted under Fulani customary rites. Counsel therefore submitted that this court is bound by the decision in Asumah v. Khair (supra).
Counsel submitted further that the plaintiff knowing that Fati was married at the time and having had intercourse with her and [p.325] of [1980] GLR 319 conceived her, cannot have any cause of action against the defendants. And that under the authority of Republic v. Accra New Town District Magistrate; Ex parte Papafio (supra), the district court, grade I had no jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff’s suit.
Counsel submitted on ground (7) that the trial magistrate was wrong in failing to consider the second defendant’s counterclaim. He referred to Order 58, r. 18 (1) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), and submitted that there being sufficient evidence, the court could consider the counterclaim and give a decision on it in favour of the second defendant. That on the whole the appeal should be allowed.
In reply to these submissions, learned counsel for the respondent has made the following submissions: That the plaintiff is by virtue of the Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4 (1951 Rev.), Sched. II, Order 18, rr. 1 and 2 entitled to any equitable relief, even if not specifically asked for. The plaintiff sued in equity and there should be clear proof of Fulani customary law to the contrary. That there was no proof of Fulani customary law on the record of proceedings, since no expert on Fulani customary law was called in proof. Counsel submitted further that the plaintiff’s case was tried under Order 18, Sched. II to Cap. 4 and section 49(1) of the Courts Act, 1971 says that customary law is applicable when known, but if unknown then Order 18 of Sched. II to Cap. 4 applies.
Counsel contended further that in Republic v. Accra New Town District magistrate; Exparte Papafio (supra), these was proof of existing customary marriage, but in the instant case, the marriage had been dissolved. In Asumah v. Khair (supra) too there was proof of existing marriage. Counsel therefore referred to Abangana v. Akologo [1977] 1 G.L.R. 382, a decision of Edward Wiredu J. and urged upon the court to follow it.
Counsel submitted in respect of the second defendant’s counterclaim that it was not filed within four clear days after service of writ and was therefore not properly before the court, and the magistrate was therefore right in ignoring it altogether. Counsel referred to Order 58, r. 18 (1) of LN 140A and submitted that the court can make any reasonable order flowing from the action brought before the court, the court can therefore say that the counterclaim was not properly before the court even if the trial magistrate did not say so. The magistrate’s judgment should therefore not be disturbed.
The court’s attention was drawn to Part F, section 87(2) of Cap. 4, and that there is sufficient evidence on the record which clearly established that the parties before the court were subject
[p.326] of [1980] GLR 319 to Fulani customary law. Fati’s statement of the existence of such custom was not challenged by the plaintiff. Fati was the plaintiff’s own witness. The plaintiff having failed to prove actual dissolution of the customary marriage between Fati and the second defendant could not succeed in his claim.
The learned magistrate wrote a very short judgment after having set out the facts of the case as disclosed by the evidence before him. The following, therefore, is all the judgment against which this appeal has been brought:
“In the circumstances of this case it is clear that the plaintiff put Fati under conception as this is supported by Fati herself and her father (the first defendant) and so would be just to grant custody of the child to him (the plaintiff) the biological father as the child’s welfare is paramount. I therefore enter judgment for the plaintiff and order that the child be handed over to him and to name him as he is still cohabiting with Fati and the child. I award ¢100 costs against the defendants. Reference: Abangana v. Akologo [1977] 1 G.L.R. 382;
Beckley v. Beckley [1974] 1 G.L.R. 393.
The claim for damages for unlawful detention is dismissed as the plaintiff is cohabiting with Fati and the child at Atieku.”
The first objection taken to this judgment by the appellants is that the trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff’s suit. In support of this contention learned counsel has cited Republic v. Accra New Town District Magistrate; Ex parte Papafio (supra). This is an unreported decision of Archer J. (as he then was) wherein he said.
“Ghana is a civilised country and I do not think that although the Courts Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 84), has conferred jurisdiction on district courts grade I in paternity suits, it was the intention of the Decree to encourage adulterers to institute proceedings to embarrass spouses. Such a jurisdiction was never contemplated and could never have been intended.
In the name of decency, public morality and public policy, I hold that the district court grade I had no jurisdiction to entertain such a suit. Such a jurisdiction can only arise where there are proceedings for the dissolution of the marriage according to customary law or where a mother seeks an order against the putative father of her child.”
It should be noted that by section 49 (1) (f) of the Courts Decree 1966 (N.L.C.D. 84), the district court grade I was given jurisdiction over “suits for divorce and other matrimonial causes and for the
[p.327] of [1980] GLR 319 paternity and custody of children where the law applicable is exlusively customary law. “ I think the position has not been altered by section 37 (1) (f) of Act 372 since by it the district court grade I retains its jurisdiction in such civil matters, the provisions of section 49 (1) (f) of N.L.C.D. 84 having been repeated almost verbatim in section 37 (1) (f) of Act 372.
I think, however, with all due respect, that it cannot be wholly right in saying that the jurisdiction of the district court grade I is ousted simply because the customary marriage between the spouses still subsists and the plaintiff claiming paternity and custody may be an adulterer. This is because there may be instances where the customary husband or legal father may intentionally refuse to maintain the child of an adulterous union because of his wife’s infidelity, and yet would not allow anybody else to have custody of the child.
I think that here, in the paramount interest of the child, if the natural father is willing and able to maintain the child properly, and perhaps even give him formal education, the doors of the district court should not be shut against him simply because he is an adulterer; for surely his position could here be likened to that of a foster father. I think that the jurisdiction of the district court given by the Act is never ousted here even if the claimant father is an adulterer. It is my view that the district court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit and apply the customary law applicable in such a suit notwithstanding the infidelity of the customary wife.
I think that when, in such a case, the adulterous father brings an action his claim must not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction but must be dismissed on the ground that under the applicable customary law the adulterous father cannot successfully maintain an action for paternity and or custody against the legal father of the child of an adulterous union.
It is my view that the evidence before the trial court clearly shows that the marriage between the second defendant and his wife, Fati, was contracted purely under Fulani customary law. The second defendant stated under cross-examination:
“It is not correct that the plaintiff’s first witness had denounced me as a husband in your presence and others as she is still married to me by the Fulani custom and I have performed marriage rites according to such custom by paying ¢1,200 being the value of three cows plus personal effects.”
As stated in his judgment, the trial magistrate recorded:
“According to the first defendant (Mohamadu Fulani) the father of Fati, he gave his daughter in marriage to the second defendant (Mohamed Ali), his nephew in 1970, after he has performed
[p.328] of [1980] GLR 319
Fulani customary rites by paying an amount of ¢1,200 (signifying three cows), and a bride price together with assorted dresses, veils, clothing and cooking utensils.”
It is my view, therefore, that the trial magistrate should have clearly found that the marriage was contracted under Fulani customary law and that it had not been dissolved, there being no weightier evidence to the contrary.
I will here hold that the trial magistrate was bound, as I am, to have applied the principle laid down in Asumah v. Khair (supra), by the Court of Appeal, where Ollennu J. (as he then was) who gave the decision, held at p. 357:
“Where a man has obtained the consent of a girl’s family and has completed the marriage by making the token gift, and another man interferes with his wife, two remedies are open to him. He may claim adultery fee from the offender and keep his wife, in which case any child born in consequence of that illicit relation is by customary law a legitimate child of the husband, and would be given a name by the latter.
On the other hand, the husband may elect to break the marriage, and to claim the return of all the customary drinks or fees and presents which he has given to the family and to the girl. In the latter case, the family will refund those customary fees, and, in turn, claim the same from the seducer. If the offender pays the amount which the family had to refund, he steps into the shoes of the former husband and is deemed to be validly married to the girl.”
Learned counsel for the respondent’s contention that there is no evidence as to proof of Fulani customary law on the record of proceedings, since there was no evidence from an expert on Fulani customary law is, in my view, not a valid argument. Here the choice of law is obviously the system of customary law to which the parties in the suit have clearly demonstrated by the undisputed evidence before the court that they are subject: see section 49 (1) of the Courts Act, 1971 which provides:
“49. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and any other enactment, the Court when determining the law applicable to an issue arising out of any transaction or situation, shall be guided by the following rules in which references to the personal law of a person are references to the system of customary law to which he is subject or to the common law where he is not subject to any system of customary law.”
[p.329] of [1980] GLR 319
Section 50(1) and (2) provide further:
“50. (1) Any question as to the existence or content of a rule of customary law is a question of law for the Court and not a question of fact.
(2) If the Court entertains any doubt as to the existence or content of a rule of customary law relevant in any proceedings after considering such submissions thereon as may be made by or on behalf of the parties and consulting such reported cases, text-books and other sources as may be appropriate, the Court may adjourn the proceedings to enable an inquiry to take place under the next subsection.”
It is my view, therefore, that in the proceedings such as there were before the trial court, it was for the court to determine the existence or otherwise of a particular customary law, namely, Fulani customary law or the content of a rule of such customary law, after having heard the parties, consulted text-books and other sources as the magistrate may consider appropriate; and it is only when the court is still in doubt after such exercise that he may hold an inquiry and perhaps seek the assistance of an expert on that particular system of customary law.
I am clearly of the view, therefore, that if the learned magistrate had adverted his mind to the Fulani customary law as established by the evidence adduced before him, and had applied the principle laid down in Asumah v. Khair and Republic v. Accra New Town District Magistrate; Ex parte Papafio, he would not have erred by wrongly decreeing custody in favour of the respondent, the father of an adulterous child. The trial magistrate was plainly wrong in the face of binding authorities in granting custody of the child in question to the respondent.
It is correct, as learned counsel for the respondent submitted, such an action implies a claim for an equitable relief. It is correct that the Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4 (1951 Rev.), Sched. II, Order 18, rr. 1 and 2 provide:
“1. Every suit implies an offer to do equity in the matter thereof, and admits of any equitable defence.
2. The plaintiff may obtain any such equitable relief as the facts stated and proved entitle him to, though not specifically asked.”
It is my view that in all such cases the courts will grant an equitable relief only when the existence thereof has been clearly stated and proved by evidence before the court. But where, to borrow the words of Archer J. (as he then was), in the Ex parte Papafio in
[p.330] of [1980] GLR 319
“the name of decency, public morality and public policy,” it must be held to be inequitable so to act, the court must refuse to exercise its equitable jurisdiction in favour of the claimant. One cannot claim to have come to equity with clean hands when one offends against decency, public morality and public policy.
Learned counsel for the respondent has urged the court to follow the decision of Edward Wiredu J. in Abangana v. Akologo [1977] 1 G.L.R. 382. The relevant portion of the decision of the learned judge at p. 388 is quoted here for comment:
“The order that the defendant should hand over his two children to the plaintiff, a stranger to the union that brought them into being, solely on the basis of a customary rule of practice is not only repugnant to principles of equity, good conscience and natural justice but also contrary to the accepted principle which our courts have accepted as paramount in considering granting custody of infants, namely, the welfare of the children: see Gray v. Gray [1971] 1 G.L.R. 422; Beckley v. Beckley [1974] 1 G.L.R. 393 and Braun v.
Mallet [1975] 1 G.L.R. 81.”
Having read carefully the judgment of Edward Wiredu J. in Abangana v. Akologo, I find myself unable to follow that decision in this case because it does appear, to me, with all due respect, that his lordship’s attention was not drawn to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Asumah v. Khair and the High Court decision in Awortwi v. Nwansu which have been referred to supra. I find myself bound by the Court of Appeal decision in Asumah v. Khair, even though we are both not bound to follow Awortwi v. Nwansu. I do not find any distinction between Asumah v. Khair and the present case before me.
It seems to me further that the main and prime concern of the court in Abangana v. Akologo was the custody of the child involved, whose interest the court considered as being paramount. It seems to me that the position of an adulterous father, vis-a-vis, that of a legal or customary father, was not fully considered in Abangana v. Akologo. It is my view, moreover, that there was no question of adultery on the part of either party in Gray v. Gray [1971] 1 G.L.R. 422; Beckley v. Beckley [1974] 1 G.L.R. 393 and Braun v. Mallet [1975] 1 G.L.R. 81.
It was in each case a pure question of custody as between the mother and the natural father, not an adulterous father of the child, and the principles applicable there are not the same as those in the case before me now. I think that here the accepted principle of law applicable is that which was laid down in Asumah v. Khair; and, since I have not come across any other decision of the Court of Appeal declaring this customary rule
[p.331] of [1980] GLR 319 or law to be outmoded or obsolete, I find myself bound to follow Asumah v. Khair.
I now come to the second defendant’s counterclaim which is mainly and truly an action for davages for seduction or an adultery fee. I am of the view that there being ample evidence that the plaintiff had seduced the second defendant’s wife, Fati, and had thereby committed adultery, the trial magistrate erred in failing to consider the counterclaim and making a decision on it. I think this appellate court is empowered under Order 58, r. 17 of LN 140A to examine the evidence adduced in respect of the counterclaim and give judgment thereon accordingly.
Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted, however, that the counterclaim was not filed within four clear days as required under Order 18, r. 4 of Sched. II to Cap. 4 and that therefore the counterclaim was not properly before the court and should be dismissed even if the trial magistrate failed to do so. The said Order 18, r. 4(a) provides:
“4. (a) No defendant shall be allowed to set up any such counter-claim or set-off unless he shall have lodged with the Registrar four clear days before the return day a notice in original, and as many duplicates thereof as there are plaintiffs, containing his name and address and a concise statement of the grounds of such counter-claim or set-off, and shall have paid the same Court and service fees as would be payable if he were claiming by writ of summons: Provided that the Court may in its discretion, and on such terms as may seem just, allow the defendant to set up a counter-claim or set-off notwithstanding that such notice has not been duly lodged.”
It is obvious from the foregoing that even where notice of such a counterclaim has not been duly lodged in accordance with the rules, the court has a discretion to allow the defendant on terms to set up a counterclaim or set-off. Moreover, the “four clear days” mentioned in the rules, I am of the view, refers to the return day and not “four clear days,” after service of the writ as counsel claims. It is my view therefore that the submission of learned counsel for the respondent is not valid. I hold the view that the second defendants counter claim was properly before the court and that the second defendant succeeded in establishing that the plaintiff had seduced his wife and committed adultery with her. The second defendant is therefore entitled to judgment and damages.
I will, for the reasons stated above, in this judgment, allow the appeal. The judgment of the trial court is hereby set aside and the
[p.332] of [1980] GLR 319 plaintiff’s claim is dismissed, and judgment is entered thereon for the appellants as against the respondent with ¢300 costs.
Judgment is entered for the second appellant against the respondent for seduction. The second appellant is awarded ¢500 damages with ¢200 costs.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
D. R. K. S.
