GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK vs. BINOO-OKAI [1982-83] GLR 74
17 July 1980 · CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J · ≈ 12 min read
[1980] SLR (HC) 55Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Ryley v. Master, Sheba Gold Mining Co., Ltd. v. Trubshawe [1892] 1 Q.B. 674.
(2) Wilks v. Wood [1982] 1 Q.B. 684.
(3) London & Universal Bank v. Earl of Clancarty [1892] 1 Q.B. 689; 61 L.J.Q.B. 225; 66 L.T. 788;
40 W.R. 411; 36 S.J. 364.
(4) Lawrence and Sons v. Willcocks [1892] 1 Q.B. 696; 36 S.J. 395, C.A.
(5) Yardom v. Minta III (1926) F.C. ‘26-’29, 76.
(6) Harbutt’s Plasticine Ltd. v. Wayne Tank and Pump Co., Ltd. [1970] 1 Q.B. 447; [1970] 2 W.L.R.
198; 114 S.J. 29; [1970] 1 All E.R. 225; [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 15, C.A.
[p.76] of [1982-83] GLR 74
(7) Dickenson v. Harrison (1817) 4 Price 282.
(8) Price v. Great Western Railways Co. (1847) 16 M. & W. 244; 4 Ry. & Con. Cas. 707; 16 L.J. Ex.
87.
(9) In re European Central Railway Company; Ex parte Oriental Financial Corporation (1876-77) 4 Ch.D.33; 46 L.J.Ex. 57; 35 L.T. 583; 25 W.R. 92, C.A.
(10) In re Agriculturist Cattle Insurance Co.; Ex Parte Hughes (1872) 4 Ch.D. 34.
(11) Sneyd, Re.; Ex parte Fewings (1884) 25 Ch.D. 338; 53 L.J.Ch. 545; 50 L.T. 109; 33 W.R. 352, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION to enter final judgment on a specially indorsed writ and to claim interest up to final payment. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
M. R. K. Atadika for the plaintiff.
A. K. Okine for the defendant.
JUDGMENT OF CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J.
This is an application for summary judgment under the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), Order 14, r.1. The plaintiff is a financial institution established by statute and transacting commercial banking business throughout the country. The defendant is a customer. He was granted banking facilities in the normal course of business by the plaintiff. As at 27 September 1979, the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of ¢732,839.68. The plaintiff claims this amount plus interest calculated at the current rate from 27 September 1979 to the date of final payment.
The claim for the principal is not disputed. The defendant through counsel pleaded liable on the principal sum. He also concedes he is liable to pay interest at the current rate of eighteen and a half per cent, but it has been argued on his behalf that the plaintiff is entitled to interest only up to the date of judgment and not up to the date of final payment. Mr. A. K. Okine, counsel for the defendant, referred me to the following cases: Ryley v. Master, Sheba Gold Mining Co., Ltd. v. Trubshawe [1892] 1 Q.B. 674; Wilks v. Wood [1892] 1 Q.B. 684; London and Universal Bank v. Earl of Clancarty [1892] 1 Q.B. 689 and Lawrence and Sons v. Willcocks [1892] 1 Q.B. 696. Counsel submitted that the effect of all these cases is that judgment cannot be entered for interest which has not yet accrued. Mr. A. K. Okine contended that the interest which is to accrue after the date of judgment is not yet due so the court cannot give judgment for an amount which has not yet accrued. Interest which has not yet accrued is not a debt due and owing, so judgment cannot be entered in respect of it. He argued further that the judgment would terminate the party’s
[p.77] of [1982-83] GLR 74 contractual right, so the plaintiff must come back and sue for whatever interest which will accrue if the debt remains unpaid after the judgment. Arguing contra, Mr Atadika submitted that this is a statutory interest, and the banker is entitled to a judgment for interest up to final payment, otherwise the ridiculous situation would be created whereby the plaintiff would bring a multiplicity of actions every six months or so to consolidate his claim for interest.
I have read and studied carefully the cases cited above and on which counsel for the defendant relies. In each of these cases, the question which the court had to determine was whether a claim for interest in each particular case was a liquidated demand within the meaning of Order 3, r. 6 of LN 140A, such that the indorsement of it on the writ was sufficient to constitute a specially indorsed writ within Order 3, r. 6 to enable a summary judgment under Order 14, r.1 of LN 140A to be taken on it. In both Ryley v. Master, Sheba Gold Mining Co., Ltd. v. Trubshawe (supra) the writs in each case was indorsed with a claim for a sum of money and for interest at five per cent till date of payment or judgment. In each case, the interest was not founded on any contract express or implied, or statute. In each case therefore, no interest was recoverable.
The court held that such interest could only be in the nature of unliquidated damages, therefore the writ was not specially indorsed under Order 3, r. 6 to enable the plaintiffs obtain final judgment in an action under Order 14, r. 1. In the course of his judgment in the Sheba Gold Mining case (supra), Lord Coleridge C. J. stated at p. 682:
“So regarded, we think that the claim in the present case departs from the requirements of a special indorsement in two respects: (1) it does not show that the interest is claimed as being due by contract; (2) no definite sum is claimed. All the forms given in Appendix C, S. iv., in which interest is claimed are cases of interest due either by express covenant, or upon bills or notes… Again, all the forms claiming interest mention the specific sum claimed.
We think this is as it should be. It is important that a man, who is to be proceeded against summarily for judgment, should know exactly how much he has to pay if he wishes to stay the action, and should not be called upon to take the risks of calculation. A claim for interest which is not thus specific departs in a material and important respect from the forms to which a special indorsement is required to conform.”
It is clear that that case was dealing with the question of form rather than the substance of the form, i.e. whether or not interest is claimable. In Wilks v. Wood (supra), the claim was for the price of goods sold and delivered to the defendant and interest on the amount
[p.78] of [1982-83] GLR 74 till date of payment or judgment. The English Court of Appeal agreed with the decision in the Sheba Gold Mining case (supra) and held that the interest did not arise under a statute or by contract express or implied, so it was not a liquidated demand and as such the writ was not specially indorsed on which an order for judgment could be made under Order 14, r. 1. In London and Universal Bank v. Earl of Clancarty (supra), the action was brought by indorsees against the makers of two promissory notes of which the plaintiffs were the holders within the meaning of section 57 of the English Bill of Exchange Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict., c. 61). That section provided that where a bill is dishonoured, the measure of damages shall be declared “liquidated damages”, and this shall be the amount of the bill, interest thereon from time of presentation for payment and the expenses of noting.
The case was distinguished from Sheba Gold Mining (supra) and its companion case Ryley v. Master (supra). It was held that by virtue of section 57 of the Act, the claim for interest from date of the writ “till final payment or judgment,” could be specially indorsed under Order 3, r. 6 and judgment could be taken under Order 14, r. 1.
If these cases have any application to this case, then it is only to the effect that the interest in this case was fixed by statute and therefore the writ is properly indorsed under Order 3, r. 6. But with the amendment of Order 14 contained in the High Court (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) (No. 2) Rules, 1977 (LI 1129), for a plaintiff to apply for summary judgment, the writ need not be specially indorsed. All that is required are that the action is begun by a writ, that the defendant is served and that he enters appearance. The indorsement therefore need not be for a liquidated demand.
Since hearing argument on the matter, I have had a second look at the case and I think one has to have a commonsense approach to resolve the problem. The argument presented by both counsel sound reasonable, but both cannot be the solution to the same case. I agree with Mr. Okine that the court cannot give judgment in respect of an amount which is not yet due. And having brought the action to secure the advantages of an execution, the plaintiff cannot complain of the hardship of losing interest if they fail to go into execution and the judgment debt remains unpaid for some time. The judgment for the principal sum and interest up to the date of judgment is more potent than the mere right to take an action for these sums. The judgment gives the successful plaintiff a legal right, the enforcement of which the law places at his disposal the whole panoply of the law enforcement machinery of the State. Howes J., put it well in Yardom v. Minta III (1926) F.C. ‘26 – ‘29, 76 at p. 79 when he said, “a judgment does no more than give, to one party, rights of the strongest possible character against the other party.” So there is a basis for saying that
[p.79] of [1982-83] GLR 74 the plaintiff cannot have the advantage of the judgment and still enforce the terms of the original contract.
But I sympathise with the plaintiff in the sense that if the matter had not been brought to court they would be entitled to claim interest up to the date of payment, but if the court gives judgment entitling them to levy execution, then interest is not payable. In other words, they seem to be worse off by reason of their diligence in bringing the action. The answer to this would seem to be that they were not compelled to bring the action. They brought it to obtain the advantage of an execution so if there is hardship it was not inflicted by the law.
Considering both contentions, I think the best way to resolve the matter is to invoke the provisions of Order 36, r.38 and Order 42, r.15 of LN 140A. Order 36, r.38 provides: “Where damages are to be assessed in respect of any continuing course of action, they shall be assessed down to the time of the assessment.” The basis of an award of interest is that the defendant has kept the plaintiff out of his money, and the defendant has had it, so he ought to compensate the plaintiff: see Harbutt’s Plasticine Ltd. v. Wayne Tank and Pump Co., Ltd. [1970] 1 All E.R. 225, C.A. It has also been held that interest at the rate stipulated for in a mortgage or bond is constantly given in an action at law by way of damages: see Dickenson v. Harrison (1817) 4 Price 282 and Price v. Great Western Railways Co. (1847) 16 M. & W. 244. The interest claimed therefore may in a way be regarded as damages, and it must be assessed in terms of Order 36, r.38. It can only be assessed up to the date of judgment.
I think the plaintiff’s right to levy interest after the date of judgment should be considered in terms of Order 42, r.15 which provides:
“15. Every writ of execution for the recovery of money shall be indorsed with a direction to the Sheriff, or other officer or person to whom the writ is directed, to levy the money really due and payable and sought to be recovered under the judgment or order, stating the amount, and also to levy interest thereon, if sought to be recovered, at the rate of 4 pounds per cent per annum from the time when judgment or order was entered or made, provided that in cases where there is an agreement between the parties that more than 4 pounds per cent interest shall be secured by the judgment or order, then the indorsement may be accordingly to levy the amount of interest so agreed.”
The situation which arose in In re European Central Railway Co.; Ex parte Oriental Financial Corporation (1876-77) 4 Ch.D 33, C.A. throws light on the interpretation of this rule. A debenture holder sued the company and recovered judgment for principal debt, interest at six per cent and costs. The company went into liquidation and the [p.80] of [1982-83] GLR 74 plaintiff sought to prove his claim. In addition to the judgment debt, which by statute carried four per cent interest, the plaintiff sought to prove an additional two per cent on the original amount of the debenture from the date of judgment. It was held that the original debt was merged in the judgment and the claimant was entitled to four per cent interest on the judgment debt. Bramwell J.A. concluded his judgment with the following passage at p.38:
“A case has been cited in which Mr. Hughes was held entitled to six per cent after obtaining judgment against the Agriculturist Cattle Insurance Company. But in that case there was a special agreement between the parties that the loan which carried interest at six per cent should continue; there is no such special agreement here. There is no other agreement than that which has been converted into a judgment; there is no other debt or obligation affecting them. It is, therefore, our opinion that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.”
In In re Agriculturist Cattle Insurance Co.; Ex parte Hughes (1872) 4 Ch.D. 34 there was a subsequent agreement whereby the company gave Mr. Hughes judgment for principal debt plus interest, but the judgment was not to be enforced for two years but the interest agreed upon would continue to run on the principal sum. The judgment was agreed to be a collateral security for the principal sum and interest.
When the company was wound up, Mr. Hughes claimed to be paid this principal sum plus the agreed interest. The Master of the Rolls held that Mr. Hughes was entitled to judgment for the principal sum with four per cent interest. On appeal, it was held he was entitled to interest according to the terms of the subsequent agreement. From these cases, my understanding of Order 42, r. 15 is that a judgment debt shall carry interest at four per cent from the date of judgment, unless the contract, or a subsequent one, specifically stated that the judgment obtained for recovery of the debt shall carry an agreed rate of interest: see also In re Sneyd; Ex parte Fewings (1884) 25 Ch.D. 338, C.A.
I have not been shown the agreement in this case whereby this loan transaction was made. But I take it from the pleadings that it was granted under the normal banking transaction of this type. The loan is usually granted upon the covenant of the borrower that he will pay a certain rate of interest as long as the principal sum or any part shall remain unpaid. There is no doubt that “unpaid” meant the actual tendering of the cash. But, as I said, it is well settled that if there is a debt secured by a covenant and judgment is recovered on the agreement the debt merges in the judgment debt. The amount which becomes payable thereafter is upon the judgment and not the
[p.81] of [1982-83] GLR 74 agreement. The agreement to pay eighteen and a half per cent as in this case is wiped off. The judgment debt bears interest only at four per cent. I have not been shown any agreement which stipulated that the judgment debt shall bear the agreed interest of eighteen and a half per cent. The contention of the debtor is right and I uphold it to the extent that interest after the judgment is not eighteen and a half per cent. It should be four per cent in terms of Order 42, r.15. The order is that there is judgment for the sum of ¢732,839.68 plus interest calculated at the current bank rate up to the date of judgment. The interest thereafter should be levied in terms of Order 42, r.15. This should be four per cent. I award ¢15,000 costs.
DECISION
Judgment for the plaintiff with costs.
J. A. A.
