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[1984] SLR (CA) 20Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

GUARDIAN ROYAL EXCHANGE ASSURANCE (GHANA) LTD. vs. APPIAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 52

21 May 1984 · MENSA BOISON JA · ≈ 9 min read

Cite as[1984] SLR (CA) 20
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OSCOLAGUARDIAN ROYAL EXCHANGE ASSURANCE (GHANA) LTD. v APPIAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 52 [1984] SLR (CA) 20
APAGUARDIAN ROYAL EXCHANGE ASSURANCE (GHANA) LTD. v APPIAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 52, [1984] SLR (CA) 20 (Ghana).
BluebookGUARDIAN ROYAL EXCHANGE ASSURANCE (GHANA) LTD. v APPIAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 52, [1984] SLR (CA) 20 (Ghana Ct. App. 1984).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Aitchison v. Page Motors Ltd. (1935) 154 L.T. 128; 52 T.L.R. 137.

(2) Ansah v. Boye and West and South African Mines Ltd. (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 219, W.A.C.A.

(3) Goh Choon Seng v. Lee Kim Soo [1925] A.C. 550; 94 L.J.P.C. 129: 133 L.T. 65, P.C.

[p.53] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 52

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL against a decision of the Circuit Court, Accra awarding damages to the plaintiff in a road traffic accident. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Aduama Osei for the appellants.

Nii Osah Mills for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A.

This appeal is within a narrow compass on the one issue as to whether or not the servant of the defendants-appellants (hereinafter referred to as the appellants) was on the occasion of a traffic accident acting in the course of his employment as a driver. It would be necessary to state just enough facts of the case to give understanding to the arguments of counsel.

On 23 November 1974 the plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) as a passenger, from Accra to Nsawam, on a Bedford commercial bus sustained serious bodily injuries when the said bus collided with a Fiat saloon car of the appellants’ at the outskirts of Nsawam. The appellants’ car was at the time travelling in the opposite direction and was being driven by one Ofori Armah, a driver employee of the appellant company; but who unfortunately was killed in the collision.

In due course, the respondent instituted this action at the Circuit Court, Accra against the appellant company for damages for personal injuries. The trial came on before Mrs. Striggner-Scott (then a circuit judge) who on 31 October 1980 found for the respondent. She held that the late Ofori was negligent in his management and control of the appellants’ car on the occasion and that he was wholly to blame for the collision. Further, contrary to the gravamen of the defence, the learned circuit judge held that Ofori was on the occasion driving in the course of his employment as a servant of the appellant company, and in consequence found the appellants liable in damages to the respondent.

Before us the finding of negligence has hardly been contested. But the one serious ground taken and argued with some earnestness was thus directed at liability. It averred that the learned circuit judge erred in holding that Ofori was on the occasion of the accident acting in the course of his employment. In substance the submission of learned counsel for the appellants was that Ofori, on the day in question, had only limited instructions, namely to collect the Fiat car from its garage, have it washed and return it to the garage in readiness for use on Sunday, 24 November 1974. He never had any business of the company at Nsawam or thereabout, and that he must necessarily have been at Nsawam for purposes of his own, unconnected with the interests of the appellant, and in the course of which the collision occurred. Consequently, learned counsel argued that the case of Aitchison v. Page

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Motors Ltd. (1935) 52 T.L.R. 137, relied on by the trial judge was inapplicable, and that the appellants ought not to be held responsible.

The foundation for the contention of the appellants purports to be the evidence of the defence at the trial. The Fiat car, to which Ofori was assigned as a company driver, was officially allocated to the company’s chief accountant, Mr. Acheampong. The car as a rule was garaged at the home of this officer. At the time of these events, Mr. Acheampong, who had gone abroad for a course, was expected back in Accra on 24 November 1974. In his absence the car was under the charge of Mrs. Acheampong, with instructions not to give the keys to Ofori, except on request from the office.

The evidence of Mr. Cathline, the appellants’ representative, was that on 20 November Mrs. Acheampong was notified of the husband’s expected arrival, as per exhibit 1, as follows:

“AC/RCA.

20/11/74 Mrs. O. K. Acheampong Accra.

Dear Madam, This is to inform you officially that Mr Acheampong is returning on Sunday evening by flight No. GH703 which arrives at 19.45 hours, i.e. 7.45 p.m.

Driver Ofori, has been instructed to send his car to the airport and perhaps you will join him.

With kind regards Yours sincerely (Sgd) A Cathline (Company Secretary).”

This witness asserted that while the officer was out of the country the Fiat car was not expected to be used or taken out by Ofori. And he emphasised that for the arrival assignment, Ofori was to drive from Mr. Acheampong’s house directly to the airport.

But Mrs. Acheampong’s testimony was to the contrary, in that, except for the weekends, Ofori came to collect the car every morning for the office and returned it in the evening. This she permitted, although she had no specific request from the office. She said those were directions from the husband before he left the country. It was Ofori who had delivered the letter, exhibit 1, to her, and he had told her

[p.55] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 52

that he was expected to get the car washed on Saturday morning, 23 November. On her insistence that she wanted a written note, Ofori came early on Saturday morning with a note, which he alleged was from the office, authorising her to let him take out the car to have it washed. Although she did not really believe that that note was from the office and would not read it, she relented and allowed Ofori to take the car out. Indeed, it was her practice to meet the husband on such occasions and take him home in her private car; and she was going to do so this time, in spite of the invitation carried by exhibit 1. So she tried to persuade Ofori in vain, not to bother about the office car nor come to the airport on the Sunday. But Ofori took his orders from the office, and would not be deflected.

Now, as Mrs. Acheampong had refused to read the note presented to her by Ofori the contents were not known to her, nor could its instructions, if any, and its source of authority be given in evidence. That was a strange behaviour on the part of Mrs. Acheampong, and the trial court was not impressed by the inconsistent and conflicting evidence given by the appellants. It rejected their evidence as a belated attempt to deny having authorised Ofori to take out the car that day; a stance which the trial court considered to be inconsistent with their statement of defence. There, the appellants had admitted in paragraph 4 that Ofori was to collect the car on 23 November 1974 and have it filled with petrol. Whether it was to wash or to fill the car with petrol, the material point here I think is whether Ofori had any authority to collect the car out. There was the clearest possible evidence from the appellants themselves that justified the learned trial judge’s finding that Ofori had authority to collect the car to have it washed.

In Ansah v. Boye and West and South African Mines Ltd (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 219, where in similar circumstances the second defendant employer successfully resisted liability, Coussey P. in a concurring judgment cautioned at 226 that:

“A master must not lightly be exonerated from liability. He selects his lorry driver and places him in charge of mechanism which can become the instrument of destruction in the control of an unskilled or negligent servant engaged on the master’s business; but the servant must be at the time on the master’s business.”

And the learned trial judge properly devoted much attention to the question whether Ofori was on the business of the appellants when he became involved in the collision at Nsawam. In other words was Ofori acting within the scope of his authority. According to the finding Ofori was to take the car out and have it washed. Place and mode or method and means of carrying out that assignment were not spelt out in the

[p.56] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 52

evidence. Nor was there evidence of any prohibition. Indeed when the appellants took it into their heads at the trial to deny authorisation, they logically precluded themselves from giving any such evidence, as to show any limitation on how Ofori was to execute the day’s job. Consequently, such evidence as limiting Ofori’s conduct and scope of work was conspicuous by its absence.

I think in those circumstances the reasonable and probable inference was that Ofori was left to his discretion as to how the job was to be done. And in that case the appellants could not talk of deviation or departure from the authority given to Ofori. Where a plaintiff establishes that a servant was doing the job he was employed to do, the onus of rebutting the presumption that the servant was acting in the course of his employment and within the scope of his authority lies on the employer who seeks to repudiate liability for any wrongful acts arising from the servant’s conduct. As it happened, the appellants may well complain of wrong exercise of discretion by Ofori. It may well be that the appellants did not expect him to have the job done outside Accra. Or that if Ofori had told them that he was to do it 22 miles away at Nsawam, the appellants would not have allowed it. There is really no evidence whether the car was washed at all. But it is conceivable that for some convenience Ofori chose to go that far say to the River Densu to get it done. But that is strictly irrelevant to the appellants’ liability once Ofori had the authority, without fetters, to have the car washed.

The law was stated in the case of Goh Choon Seng v. Lee Kim Soo [1925] A.C. 550 at 554-555, P.C. that:

“. . . where the servant is doing some work which he is appointed to do, but does it in a way which his master has not authorized and would not have authorized, had he known of it . . . the master is, nevertheless, responsible.”

It is on the basis of this principle of law that the case of Aitchison v. Page Motors Ltd. (supra), relied upon in the judgment of the trial court, seems to have been decided, and in my respectful view correctly.

The instant case, on the facts, is no less illustrative of the principle stated above. Ofori was appointed to have the car taken out and washed. It makes no difference that the appellants did not authorise and would not have authorised the place, means and manner he decided to do it; the appellants are nonetheless liable for any wrongful acts of Ofori. It follows, in my judgment that the appeal should be dismissed.

For her injuries the respondent was awarded ¢7,220 damages. That was in October 1980, when the ceiling of jurisdiction of the circuit court in such actions was not in excess of N¢8,000. Currently the jurisdiction is enlarged to ¢100,000 by the Court (Amendment) Law,

[p.57] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 52

1983 (P.N.D.C.L. 47). Besides, while the appeal was pending for hearing there has been a fall in the value of money in this country and elsewhere. These factors, coupled with the nature of the respondent’s injuries as shown by the record, invoke some sympathy. But the respondent has not cross-appealed against quantum, and has consequently aired no complaint. The judgment debt and costs were paid into court as a condition for stay of execution. The result is that the sum of ¢7,000 now comes into the hands of the respondent drastically affected by inflationary trends. Circumstances, which could have been taken care of by an order for payment of interest at the current rate from 31 October 1980 to the date of judgment. Alas! it is too late in the day for such consideration and the award of the court below stands.

JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.

I also agree.

DECISION Appeal dismissed.

J. A.A.

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