HIGH COURT, ACCRA
DATE: 5TH OCTOBER, 1962
BEFORE: AKAINYAH, J.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
ACTION by an employer for recovery of possession of premises occupied by a former employee.
COUNSEL
Anteson for W. Ofori-Atta for the plaintiff.
W.A.N. Bossman for Akyea-Djamson for the defendant.
JUDGMENT OF AKAINYAH J.
This is an action brought by the plaintiff under section 11 subsection (1) (f) of the Rent Control Ordinance1(1) for recovery of possession of a furnished house and mesne profits from the month of May, 1962, to the date that possession is given up at £G100 a month. Briefly, the plaintiff’s case is that he is a merchant carrying on business in England and in Ghana. He owns a house in Farrar Avenue, Accra, the subject-matter of this action, which he has furnished and is specially allocated by him for the use of the staff of his business. The defendant was employed in England as manager of the plaintiff’s business in Ghana. One of the conditions of the defendant’s contract of service was that the plaintiff would provide accommodation for him. On arrival in this country, the
[p.95] of [1962] 2 GLR 94
defendant was made to occupy the said house in Farrar Avenue without being responsible for the payment of water and electricity consumed by him on the premises. On the 30th April, 1962, the defendant’s employment was terminated by the plaintiff and, as from that date, the defendant has done no work for the plaintiff, but he has remained in occupation of the said house. The plaintiff says that he requires the said house for his own occupation. The defendant admits the facts stated herein with one exception and that is, the defendant maintains that the termination of his employment is wrongful and that he has instituted an action against the plaintiff in this court for wrongful dismissal but the case has not yet been heard. As the propriety or otherwise of the termination of the defendant’s employment is sub judice, I want to make it quite clear that this judgment relates solely to the case before me. The plaintiff said the house in question consists of three bedrooms, one sitting-room, one dining-room, one kitchen, a separate flush or water-closet lavatory and bath, two verandahs and a detached servants’ quarters, and an all-round garden. He has furnished the house with expensive furniture, carpets, curtains, refrigerator, gas and electric cookers, and a water-heater. When the house was unfurnished, the Accra Rent Assessment Committee assessed the rent at £G25 a month. There is no evidence as to the value of the furniture, carpets, etc., but in my opinion, a reasonable rent for the said house including the use of the furniture, etc., is £G50 a month. This will give the plaintiff £G25 a month extra which should bring him sufficient funds to enable him to replace any worn out article at intervals of three or five years.
I find as a fact that the defendant ceased to work for the plaintiff as from the 30th April 1962, and that the defendant has been living in the said house without leave and licence of the plaintiff. I am satisfied also that the plaintiff has been living in a hotel and reasonably requires the premises for his occupation. I hold, therefore, (a) that the defendant is liable to pay rent as from the 1st May, 1962, and (b) that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought.
The defendant’s contention that he is entitled to remain in possession of the said house because the termination of his employment is wrongful is untenable. The wording of section 11 (1) (f) of the Rent Control Ordinance, 1952, does not admit of any interpretation or construction that makes a distinction between a ceasing of employment de facto and a ceasing of employment de jure. It simply says in clear, unambiguous words that “where the premises were let to the tenant by reason of his employment in the service of the landlord and such employment has ceased,” the landlord shall be entitled to an order for recovery of possession of the premises. The section means what it says. No authority has been cited by counsel for the defendant for the proposition that the termination of the employment must be adjudged to be rightful before the landlord or employer can obtain an order for recovery of possession. I therefore give judgment for the plaintiff and order that the defendant should quit and give up possession of the said house to the plaintiff by 9 a.m. on the 9th October, 1962, and for the
[p.96] of [1962] 2 GLR 94
sum of £G250 being mesne profits from the month of May, 1962, up to and including the month of September 1962. Costs in favour of the plaintiff assessed at 25 guineas including counsel’s costs of 15 guineas.
DECISION
Judgment of the plaintiff.
